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2ABSTRACT
DECISION-MAKING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
STATE GOVERNMENT: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
REVENUE SHARING AND STRATEGIES FOR CITY SURVIVAL
Lawrence Elliott Susskind
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
With the emergence of revenue sharing and block grants to
the states, the American federal system faces a severe
challenge. How will cities fare as the balance of power
shifts (i.e., as centralized control built up in Washington
over past decades is diminished and responsibility for
meeting critical urban needs is assigned to the states)?
What factors will be important in influencing state alloca-
tions of shared revenues and federal grants-in-aid? How
might a better understanding of the decision-making pro-
cesses operating at the state level suggest new approaches
to the design and implementation of strategies designed to
ensure city survival?
The Partnership for Health Act and the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act passed in 1966 and 1968 were
the forerunners of block grant revenue sharing. Both
programs have been in operation long enough to shed some
light on the potential advantages and disadvantages of the
block grant approach to managing intergovernmental fiscal
transfers. Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Admini-
stration (LEAA) established by the Omnibus Crime Control
Act and under section 314(d) of the Partnership for Health
bill, the states were given responsibility for the admini-
stration of block grant funds to be channeled through to
cities and towns. The LEAA and 314(d) experiences in
Massachusetts from 1967-1972 suggest that there are hidden
incentives and controls embedded in the administrative
culture of state government that shape resources alloca-
tion decisions in ways likely (1) to threaten the long-run
3fiscal survival of medium-sized cities (under 100,000) and
(2) to inhibit consumer or community-oriented efforts to
promote fundamental reform in unworkable service delivery
systems.
Previous attempts to model decision-making in state govern-
ment have postulated certain crude relationships among
socio-economic inputs, political system characteristics,
and policy outcomes. I have tried to construct a more
complete model of administrative behavior that takes into
account both "external" constraints (such as laws and guide-
lines, legislative-politics, and plan-making requirements)
and "internal" constraints (including the norms of profes-
sional conduct, perceived administrative survival needs,
and the need for administrative gratification) that shape
decision-making in our intergovernmental system.
Given a more complete understanding of resource allocation
and decision making at the state level, it is not difficult
to strike down the prevailing myths associated with Presi-
dent Nixon's special revenue sharing proposals. Drawing on
the LEAA and the 314(d) experiences in Massachusetts, as
well as on my model of state administrative behavior, I
have tried to articulate a more powerful federal strategy
aimed at meeting the special needs of the poor and the dis-
advantaged in urban areas. To a great extent, city survival
may depend on an expanded national commitment to categorical
grant programs as well as on a move away from block grants
to the states (special revenue sharing). The most highly
redistributive strategies (and thus the most desirable from
the standpoint of the urban poor) would involve national
assumption of welfare costs, balancing grants to metropoli-
tan areas, and a streamlined system of categorical grants-
in-aid. It is important to keep in mind, though, that urban
areas have special needs that transcend the welfare needs of
particular segments of the population. Thus, strategies
designed to redistribute income must be balanced with strate-
gies that focus on the management of other aspects of
national urban growth and development.
Thesis Supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin, Head
Ford International Professor
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Introduction
In order to explain the successes and failures of various
intergovernmental grants-in-aid (and to predict the
outcome of block grant revenue sharing and other alterna-
tives to the current system of intergovernmental fiscal
transfers), it is necessary to keep several things in
mind. First, the responsibilities assigned to each tier
of government are continually changing. As the "balance
of power" fluctuates, strategies for planning and management
must shift accordingly. Second, even the most carefully
articulated domestic programs can bog down. This is true,
perhaps, because there are few if any generally accepted
principles to guide the design of intergovernmental ad-
ministrative arrangements. Finally, future efforts to
ensure the political and fiscal survival of American
cities must take account of the implicit "decision rules"
that influence resource allocation in the public sector.
Hidden incentives and controls have sabotaged even the
most carefully thought-out intergovernmental grant-in-
aid programs.
11
Background
The Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations has
suggested that the success of our federal system depends
in large part on the "workability" of intergovernmental
grants-in-aid:
[Grants-in-aid can] reconcile state and local administra-
tion of public services with federal financial support for
programs of national concern. Grants-in-aid, conditioned
on performance requirements, can make possible the achieve-
ment of national goals without overextending the federal
bureaucracy and without federal assumption of state and
local functions. By means of grants-in-aid the federal
government [can] support existing state and local functions
[as well as] stimulate the state and localities to expand
their own programs and to undertake new ones.1
By the early 1970's it was clear that the traditional
approach to managing fiscal transfers was not working
particularly well. In fact, political leaders of both
major parties had long since condemned various categorical
approaches to grants-in-aid. Unfortunately, almost all
efforts to correct alleged deficiencies have fallen far
short of their mark. What is more, there is every reason
to believe that further attempts to improve the functioning
of our federal system are also likely to fail. My aim is
to show why intergovernmental grants-in-aid have not done
their job and to suggest why block grant revenue sharing--
1 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan
America: Challenge of Federalism (Washington, D.C.: 1970), p. 121.
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the latest and most popular "solution" to the dilemmas of
intergovernmental grant management--also has very little
chance of succeeding.
Past attempts to reform or adjust the grant-in-aid system
have produced unexpected results (most, if not all of them,
undesirable). This may suggest that somewhere beneath
the rhetoric of legislative intent and the constraints
imposed by layers of administrative guidelines there lurks
a hidden system of incentives and controls that we have
not yet learned how to manipulate properly. Under the
circumstances, it is hard to know what "strings to pull"
or what levers to trip. There is evidence to suggest that
in trying to implement national strategies to promote city
development, ensure environmental protection, and enhance
social and economic opportunities for the poor, a whole
range of unarticulated "decision rules" have been
overlooked.
The two grant-in-aid programs discussed in this disserta-
tion--The Partnership for Health (P.L. 89-749) and the
Safe Streets and Law Enforcement Assistance Program
(P.L. 90-351) provide a backdrop against which to view
many of these issues. Moreover, since both were fore-
runners of the consolidated block grant approach proposed
13
by President Nixon as part of his "New Federalism," 2 they
come as close as possible to providing a test of the Nixon
administration's notion of special revenue sharing. In
essence, they offer a preview of what is likely to happen
under a grant-in-aid system administered not by the
national government, but by the states.
2 Daniel Elazer writing in Vol. 2, No. 1 of PUBLIUS (the Journal of
Federalism), reports that in January 1970, William Safire, special
assistant to President Nixon, circulated an eighteen-page mimeo-
graphed document entitled, "New Federalist Paper No. 1," signed with
the pseudonym, Publius. The thrust of Publius' argument (which was
later attributed by columnists Evans and Novak as much to the President
as to Mr. Safire) was summed up in the following paragraph:
"A sea-change in the approach to the limitation of central-
ized power-part of what is 'new' in the new Federalism-
is that 'states' rights' have now become rights of first
refusal. Local authority will now regain the right to
Federal financial help; but it will not regain the right it
once held to neglect the needs of its citizens. States'
rights are now more accurately described as states' duties;
that is a fundamental change in Federalism, removing its
great fault without undermining its essential local-first
character . . .
Publius in effect was suggesting the replacement of true federalism
or non-centralization, which involves the rights of states and
localities not only to determine what is proper for their citizens
in the way of services, but to be neglectful and even to make
mistakes, with a new concept that can only be labeled administrative
decentralization in which all significant policies will be made in
Washington with their administration left in state and local hands.
Elazer also reports that Tom Huston, another special assistant to
President Nixon, extended the debate in a paper entitled,
"Federalism: Old and New or the Pretensions of New Publius
Exposed," in which he argued for the constitutional dispersion of
power that is the true hallmark of federalism and pointed out the
dangers inherent in the substitution of administrative decentraliza-
tion for it.
These two papers plus responses written by Richard Nathan (then in
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Far too little attention has been paid in recent years
to the role of state government. With a few notable
exceptions (referred to in the chapters that follow),
planners and political scientists have been preoccupied
with the ways in which political and economic factors have
tended to influence decision-making and resource allocation
at the local and national levels. Now, though, it is no
longer feasible to ignore the states. They have secured a
much larger role for themselves in the future development
of rural portions of the country, and it seems certain
that they are destined to play an increasingly important
role in the allocation of resources necessary for the
continued fiscal survival of cities and major metropolitan
areas.
The Scope of This Study
Three general questions help to define the scope of my
inquiry. First, how will cities fare when the balance of
power in the federal system shifts (i.e., when centralized
control built up in Washington over the past decade is
diminished and responsibility for meeting critical urban
needs is assigned to the states)? Second, if some form
the Office of Management and Budget) and Wendell Hulcher (then
Assistant Director of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations)
are presented in the Spring 1972 issue of PUBLIUS.
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of block grant revenue sharing is adopted, how are the
states likely to use the unrestricted funds that come
their way and what factors will influence their allocation?3
Third, how might a better understanding of the decision-
making processes that operate at the state level suggest
new approaches to the design and implementation of
strategies to ensure urban fiscal survival?
Six specific questions help to focus the research still
further: (1) Have state governments spent federal funds
wisely when stringent planning and grant management require-
ments have been lifted? (2) Have local governments,
particularly those in urban areas, received an equitable
share of block grant monies distributed by the states?
(3) Have states hoarded federal funds in an effort to hold
down tax rates or to reduce prevailing public expenditure
levels? (4) What impact might alternatives to the current
grant-in-aid system have on the movement of workers from
resource-poor areas to regions where suitable employment
opportunities and improved public services are available?
(5) Have recent experiences with the Partnership for
3 In the course of my research, Congress "settled" the general revenue
sharing issue at least temporarily by passing the State and Local
Assistance Act of 1972. When general revenue sharing is mentioned
throughout the dissertation it refers generally to the idea of fiscal
transfers from the federal to municipal governments and not specific-
ally to the Revenue Sharing Bill passed by the 92nd Congress.
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Health and the Safe Streets Program indicated whether or
not the block grant approach to intergovernmental planning
and management is likely to benefit inner city areas? and
(6) Are additional "strings" or restrictions on the ways
in which states spend federal block grants necessary to
ensure greater "resource equalization" among the various
units of government?
At the outset, I intended to analyze the Partnership for
Health and Safe Streets Programs in Texas, Illinois and
Massachusetts: three highly urbanized states with
well-regarded administrative capabilities. For a variety
of reasons I ended up limiting my study to Massachusetts.
Financial and time constraints made extensive travel
infeasible. Preliminary discussions with colleagues in
Texas and Illinois indicated that it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to gain access to the necessary
information. In addition, the analysis I proposed to do
required a highly developed sense of the political "goings
on" in each state. Since my direct involvement with state
government up until that time had been limited to
Massachusetts, I felt it would be a mistake to try to
take on all three states. Moreover, it was clear that
studies similar to mine were just getting underway
elsewhere in the country and I would have access to
comparable information even if I did not collect it myself.
17
Theoretical Starting Points
Although it is generally acknowledged that state legis-
lators, governors, agency administrators, mayors, and
community representatives influence the allocation of
federal funds at the state level, no one has yet modelled
this "influencing process." William Gamson has suggested
two different ways of viewing the process of "influencing":
One view takes the vantage point of potential partisans
and emphasizes the process by which such groups attempt
to influence the choices of authorities or the structure
within which decisions occur. The second view takes
the vantage point of authorities and emphasizes the
process by which they attempt to achieve collective
goals and to maintain legitimacy and compliance with
their decisions in a situation in which significant
numbers of potential partisans are not being fully
satisfied.4
In support of the first perspective, Gamson cites the work
of "the interest group" theorists (Lassell, Key, Truman,
and Latham) along with the work of "the political party"
theorists (Schumpeter, Schattschneider), "the basic
conflict group" theorists (Marx, Dahrendorf), and finally
the "elite group" theorists (Pareto, Mosca, and C. Wright
Mills). In summarizing the themes common to the writings
of these authors, Gamson underscores (1) their orientation
toward actors in the system rather than toward the system
4 William Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey
Press), 1968, p. 2.
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as a whole; (2) their concern for the strategy of conflict
rather than with the regulation of conflict. That is,
their concern for how groups try to get what they want
and the conditions under which they succeed, rather than
for the consequences of such attempts for the stability
or integration of the political system as a whole. And
(3) their view of discontent as an opportunity or a danger
for particular subgroups, not as a problem of social
control. s
The second perspective that Gamson mentions, deals
primarily with "the collective purposes to which power
is put.s"
It is concerned with the power of the system, i.e.,
the ability of a society to mobilize and generate
resources to attain societal goals. If one had to
reduce this perspective to a [single] question . . .
it might be: How does leadership operate to achieve
s Ibid., p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 11. It is this perspective, Gamson suggests, that Parsons
brings to his critique of Mills' The Power Elite. Mills adopts one
main version of power, a zero-sum, or more precisely, a constant-sum
conception.
"The essential point . . . is that, to Mills, power is not
a facility for the performance of function . . . on behalf
of the society as a system, but it is interpreted exclu-
sively as a facility for getting what one group, the
holders of power, wants by preventing another group, the
touts,' from getting what it wants."
Granting that power has a distributive aspect,
"it also has to be produced and it has collective as well
as distributive functions. Power is the capacity to
mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment
19
societal goals most efficiently while at the same time
avoiding costly side effects?7
Clearly, this second perspective suggests a different set
of questions; it is concerned not with the distribution
of private goods but with the achievement of collective
purposes. Those who adopt the first perspective are
concerned with the relative advantages and disadvantages of
various actors in the system while those who are more
interested in planning for public purposes ask about the
relative efficiency or effectiveness of different forms of
social or governmental organization.
There are other aspects of this second perspective that
are important such as a prevailing concern for the regula-
tion of conflict and an emphasis on the role of governments
as conflict regulators or brokers for competing demands.
The conflict regulators see discontent as a source of
instability and assumes that a well-designed governmental
system must have ways of alleviating underlying strains by
channeling political expression in an orderly fashion.8
of goals for which a general 'public' cormitment has been made,
or may be made."
(Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, New York:
The Free Press, 1970, pp. 220-221.)
7Ibid.
8Ibid., p. 16.
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In summarizing the unifying concerns of the second, or what
he calls the "social control perspective" Gamson cites a
concern for the regulation of conflict and for the question
of how power struggles among actors may impair the ability
of the system to achieve collective goals. He also
highlights discontent as a system management problem rather
than an opportunity for actors to increase their influence.
In terms of evaluating block grants and other approaches
to managing intergovernmental grants-in-aid, both perspec-
tives provide useful starting points. It is important, for
example, that the federal system and the various programs
that it undertakes be organized efficiently. On the other
hand, we ought to be especially concerned about the ways in
which cities are treated if for no other reason that that
they house a disproportionate share of the poor and dis-
advantaged people in this country.
Thus, I would argue that it is necessary to be concerned
about the relative strengths of particular interest groups
and the extent to which each is able to command an
equitable share of the available resources. In short, I
am suggesting that cities, or more precisely clusters of
cities of certain sizes, should be viewed as interest
groups within the federal system. Planners involved in
21
the design of intergovernmental grant-in-aid programs need
to be concerned not only about finding the most efficient
alignment of fiscal resources and decision-making powers,
but also about serving the special and different needs of
cities.
Models of Decision-Making in State Government
State politics conjure up images of wheeling-and-dealing
"machine" politicians, back-room payoffs, and do-nothing
bureaucrats protected by outdated civil service regulations.
Perhaps it will come as a surprise to some, therefore, that
the forces of professionalism, bureaucratization, and admini-
strative reorganization have wrought startling changes in
recent years in the character and style of state government.
No defense of the status quo is intended, but there is a
need to look more carefully at what has become an especially
large and powerful component of our federal system. In
light of recent proposals put forward by the President and
the Congress aimed at enhancing the power of state govern-
ment, it may be the state (rather than the national) level
is where "the action" is likely to be over the next decade.
Professors Dye, Sharkansky, and others have used various
correlation, regression, and historical trend techniques to
explain why some states spend more money for particular
22
purposes than others.9 Their efforts to determine the
relative importance of various economic and political
factors have not been particularly instructive. James Q.
Wilson suggests that "although most of these studies have
used certain political variables, few have used any
measure of the distribution of influence."' For example,
they have found that the single best explainer of variations
in state expenditure patterns is the level of state expendi-
ture in previous years. " This, of course, comes as no
surprise. Such findings are of little help to public
officials or citizens groups anxious to improve their
ability to manipulate the levers of power. By mapping and
probing certain interactions among political actors and
governmental agencies, it should be possible to determine
whether or not there are hidden incentives and controls that
influence resource allocation decisions in state government.
9 See Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, Spending in The American States
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Ira Sharkansky and Richard I.
Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public
Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 (Sept. 1969),
pp. 867-879; Richard Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy
and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in The Arerican
States," American Political Science Review (March, 1966).
10James Q. Wilson, ed., City Politics and Public Policy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 4.
"Sharkansky, Spending in The American States, op. cit.
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Until administrative and political behaviour in state
government can be explained more effectively, planners and
policy makers will be forced to operate on a dangerous
trial and error basis.
Models of decision making in state government are built
around certain crude postulates regarding socio-economic
inputs (forces), political system characteristics (systems),
and policy outcomes (responses). 12 These have been
represented as follows:
12 Dye, Politics, Economics and The Public, op. cit., p. 3.
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A Model for Analyzing Policy Outcomes
in American State Politics13
INPUTS POLITICAL SYSTEM OUTCOMES
d
Characteristics of
Political Systems
Socioeconomic --------
Development Policy
Variables Outcomes
e.g., e.g.,
urbanization welfare policies
industrialization constie nal framework highway policies
income electoral system educational policies
education party system tax policies
interest group structures morality regulation
elite or power structures
political style (Rules of the Game)
13 This conceptualization is based on David Easton, A Framework for
Political Analysis (New York: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 23-76.
Thomas Dye explains that
"linkages a and b suggest that socio-economic variables are
inputs which shape the political system and that the
character of the political system in turn determines policy
outcomes. These linkages represent the most comon notions
about the relationship between socio-economic inputs,
political system variables, and policy outcomes. They
suggest that some variables have an important independent
effect on policy outcomes by mediating between socio-economic
conditions and these outcomes. Linkage c on the other hand
suggests that socio-economic variables affect public policy
directly, without being mediated by system variables. Of
course, public policy is still formulated through the
political system, but linkage c suggests that the character
of that system does not independently influence policy
25
For the most part, these models have been empirical
rather than normative. That is, they have attempted to
highlight the main determinants of public policy choices
but not to explain the implicit political and institu-
tional processes at work or to describe what the outcomes
of public policy ought to be.'1 4  What is lacking is a
prescriptive model of decision-making in state government
that can explain the relationships among specific public
policies, institutional structures as well as desired
policy outcomes. 15
Previous modelling ,efforts have emphasized trivial explana-
tory variables. For example, demographic characteristics
(such as the state's socio-economic mix) are most often
used to explain differences in policy outcomes (expendi-
ture patterns). Variables which are more difficult to
outcomes. Hence the linkage between socio-economic inputs
and policy outcomes is unbroken. Feedback linkage d
suggests that policy outcomes have reciprocal impact on
sociological conditions and system characteristics."
Dye, oa. cit., p. 4.
1 4 The distinction between normative and empirical models is dis-
cussed in more detail in Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A
Philosophical Analysis (Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 6-13.
1 5 Prescriptive models are described more elaborately in Daniel
Lerner and Harold Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 3-15.
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measure (such as information flows, interagency competi-
tion, internal professional relationships, and the ways
in which goals are formulated or authority is legiti-
mated) are rarely studied.
Efforts to analyze decision-making in government have
concentrated on environmental characteristics (such as
population change, party identification, and levels of
community participation). Attempts to correlate these
variables with policy outcomes almost always yields a
weak relationship of one kind or another. Unfortunately,
such correlations explain very little. Moreover, the most
powerful explanatory factors are often insensitive to
policy manipulation. For example, variations in state
educational policy (expenditures) have been shown to be
highly correlated with inter-party competition.1 6 What
can a public official or neighborhood group do to effect
inter-party competition? At best, this suggests a very
roundabout approach to institutional reform!
Although extensive inventories of what goes into and what
comes out of the decision-making machinery exist, when
confronted with the task of directing public policies at
the state level toward specific outcomes, we are still
16 Dye, Politics, Economics and The Public, op. cit., pp. 74-114.
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dealing more or less with a "black box." Efforts to
describe decision rules in terms of socio-economic or
"environmental" inputs have not yielded particularly inter-
esting or useful results.
Generalizing from the experience of one state or from two
limited case studies is a hazardous business. Yet there
may be something to be said for an intimate and systematic
review of a small number of cases. Hopefully the chapters
that follow will suggest new ways in which administrative
incentives and controls might better be manipulated to
guide decision-making and resource allocation in state
government, and intergovernmental grants-in-aid might be
managed in order to increase the chances of meeting the
needs of the poor and the disadvantaged in urban areas. If
these suggestions turn out to be useful in one state, they
may be instructive for other states as well.
Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter I, several alternatives to the traditional sys-
tem of grants-in-aid are examined. This overview is design-
ed to put concepts such as revenue sharing and block grants
into their proper perspective, and to document shifts that
have occurred over the past decade in the nature of the poli-
tical debate about intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
Chapter II portrays the recent re-emergence of state govern-
ment as a potent force in the American federal
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system. The following questions are addressed: What
accounts for continued shifts in power among the various
levels of government? Which pressure groups and coalitions
have succeeded in promoting grant-in-aid reforms? What
forces lined up in the late 1960's behind the block grant
provisions of the Partnership for Health Program and the Safe
Streets Act? And what did these groups expect to gain?
Chapter III presents a critique and an evaluation of the
block grant feature of the Safe Streets and Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Act of 1968 and deals with a number of
issues in the Massachusetts context. Has the program had
an impact on rising crime rates? How have decisions been
made to allocate Safe Street funds? Have all cities
benefited from this program? Have the original goals of
the program (spelled out in the legislation) been met?
What tends to determine whether or not cities are able to
secure a "fair share" of the block grant funds allocated
by the state?
Chapter IV presents an assessment of the block grant
component of the Partnership for Health Program. I have
tried to determine how the program has worked in
Massachusetts and whether or not block grants have been
used to support innovative approaches to health care
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delivery. I was also interested to learn whether or not
the Partnership for Health funds were used to meet the
special needs of urban areas and whether unexpected insti-
tutional or political barriers have impeded the success of
the program.
In Chapter V, the successes and failures of the block grant
approach to intergovernmental grant management are sum-
marized. A number of generalizations are offered (based
not only on the two case studies presented here but also
on evidence from comparable studies in other states). I
have tried to determine whether or not constraints such as
planning requirements imposed at the national level affect
the ways in which cities are treated by states and also
how various incentives and controls might be manipulated to
ensure certain city interests more of a say in the alloca-
tion of funds at the state level. The chapter concludes
with a review of the key variables that must be included
in any model built to predict how federal block grants
will be allocated by the states.
Chapter VI addresses the following questions: If states
are not pushed by the federal government to deal with the
problems of inner city residents, can they be relied upon
to do so of their own accord? Should the trend toward
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greater decentralization of federal programs be encouraged?
Does the overall experience with the Partnership for Health
and the Safe Streets programs suggest the need for a new
approach to national planning to meet critical urban needs?
The last chapter and the dissertation conclude with a
number of recommendations regarding the need for and a
preliminary outline of a concerted national strategy
designed to deal with the problems of urban fiscal survival
and metropolitan development.
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Chapter I: Federal Grants-in-Aid and the
Emergence of Revenue Sharing
Lyndon Johnson wanted very much to overhaul the federal
categorical grant-in-aid system. He hoped to ease the
administrative burdens on local and national officials who
had become entangled in "red tape" and bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency. The Congress, however, seemed more interested in
drastic political and fiscal reforms (such as tax sharing)
that would reassign revenue-raising and allocation responsi-
bilities. President Johnson's rather modest plans for sim-
plification and reform were trampled in the rush for a
revenue scheme that could prop up state and local govern-
ments allegedly caught in a severe financial squeeze. In
1968, Richard Nixon was able to rally both liberal senti-
ment for intergovernmental reform and conservative pressure
for a shift toward governmental decentralization around his
own personal brand of revenue sharing.
The State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, a compromise
version of the conservatives' revenue sharing plan and the
Democrats' notion of grant reform, was the result. The
block grant approach to consolidating categorical grants-
in-aid was incorporated into the special revenue sharing
proposals submitted by President Nixon (which did not pass
in 1972) and the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972
(which, of course, was enacted). A new phase in the contin-
ued evolution of the American federal system had begun.
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Background
Our federal system is one in which the national government,
the states, and over 80,000 localities share the burdens
of financing and administering the great domestic programs
of the country. The larger governments take primary
responsibility for raising revenues and setting standards;
and the smaller units are supposed to handle the details of
program administration.1 The Congress continues to scrutin-
ize these intergovernmental arrangements and each review
produces a new batch of proposals for tuning or balancing.
It is not possible to determine who should be held account-
able for the failures of the American federal system.
Clearly, the shortcomings of our intergovernmental approach
are not the fault of one person, one agency, or one unit
of government.
Riots, tensions, unmet needs, frustrations, and disillu-
sionment are caused as much by local attitudes and in-
effective public management as they [are] by indifferent
and discriminatory policies of state agencies, or by
'Daniel J. Elazer, American Federalism: A View from the States (New
York: Thomas J. Crowell Co., 1972), (Second Edition) p. 47. For a
more complete description of the involved nature of the American
federal system, see Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New
View of Government in the United States, edited by Daniel J. Elazer
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), and W. Brooke Graves, American
Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons,
1964).
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innefective administration of federal programs [at the
national level]. 2
One overriding weakness of our governmental system, is that
we can not agree on how best to use the tools of federalism.
The debate about intergovernmental fiscal transfers, for ex-
ample, never ceases. Categorical grants-in-aid (defined
technically as the payment of funds by one level of govern-
ment to be expended by another level for a specified
purpose, usually on a matching basis and in accordance with
a prescribed set of standards) are continually adjusted.
Although intergovernmental fiscal transfers have been part
of our governmental system since its earliest days, there
has always been disagreement about how such arrangements
ought to be handled. In the last few years, the debate
has intensified. Proposals calling for a switch to some
form of revenue sharing (this refers to a number of plans
that would have the national government provide a general
and less conditional form of financial aid to state and
local governments) have received nation-wide attention.
Walter Heller has suggested that an optional grant-in-aid
system would serve to unite federal financing with state-
2 Hearings before the Subcomnittee on Intergoverrnental Relations of
the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 89th
Congress, second session, Creative Federalism, p. 2.
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local performance in "a fiscal marriage of convenience,
necessity and opportunity." He argues that grants-in-aid
enable the Federal government to single out and support
those state and local services in which there is an identi-
fied national interest, particularly those services like
education and health, whose benefits in a country with a
mobile people spill over into communities and states other
than those in which they are performed. Categorical aides
enable the Federal government to put a financial floor
under the level of specific services that is consistent
with our national goals and priorities. Without this
financial support the states and municipalities might not
be able to meet demands for essential public services.
Failure to meet the demands might eventually mean yielding
these functions to the Federal government, thereby weaken-
ing the fabric of federalism. Also, conditional grants
enable the Federal government to apply national minimum
standards, ensure financial participation at the state and
local levels through matching requirements, and take both
fiscal need and fiscal capacity into account. 3
Over the years, grants-in-aid have been designed to serve
a number of different purposes: to stimulate action at
3 Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 141-142.
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the state and local level, to guarantee a minimum level
of services for certain segments of the population, and
to ease specific hardships.4 Some grants have been aimed
at achieving interstate equalization of resources or at
producing economic stabilization. And, in still other
cases, federal grants-in-aid have been used to demonstrate
the feasibility of innovative approaches to dealing with
pressing public problems.
Whether measured in numbers, in aggregate or functional
outlays, or as a proportion of state-local or federal
finances, federal grants have increased significantly over
the past two decades.5 Total federal aid to state and
local governments grew from $7 billion in 1960 to nearly
4Deil Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1968), p. 5. Wright
suggests that stimulation can mean the encouragement of action in a
field where none existed previously, or it may mean the elaboration
and extension of an existing program. He points out that grants to
guarantee a minimum level of services are best characterized by the
early "flat grant" program in vocational education. The distinguish-
ing feature of flat grants is that they allocate equal (or minimum)
amounts of money to each state, frequently without any kind of match-
ing requirement. Insofar as special hardship grants are concerned,
the Congress occasionally enacts a grant program aimed at alleviating
special or unusual difficulties such as those caused by floods. In
some instances hardship grants may be available on a continuing basis
as in the case of aid to schools in federally "impacted" areas.
5Ibid., p. 8.
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$28 billion in fiscal 1971, or at an average annual rate
of 12% (see Table I). The national government's contribu-
tion now equals more than 20% of all state and local
expenditures (see Table II).
During the early 1960's, when emphasis at the national
level shifted to urban-oriented concerns, grant-in-aid
programs increasingly tended to bypass the states or to
involve them in only the most peripheral ways. In some
instances allocation formulae were used to equalize inter-
state and intra-state income differences.6 In addition,
grants intended primarily for state and local governments
were made available to certain voluntary/nonprofit groups
performing quasi-public functions. Trends such as these
substantially affected the distribution of power among the
various levels of government. In a relatively short time,
the national government grew much more powerful. Its
strength and control increased through the collection and
disbursement of tax monies and grants-in-aid.
6 Wright points out that equalizing grants
"take into account the relative ability (or fiscal capacity)
of a state to support a program. States with lesser fiscal
capacities are granted proportionately more funds . . .
usually through an allocation formula that reflects a state's
per capita personal inccme. The net effect is geographic
redistribution of wealth, a transfer of revenues frcm high
incom to lower income areas."
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Table I
FEDERAL-AID OUTLAYS IN RELATION TO TOTAL
FEDERAL OUTLAYS AND TO STATE-LOCAL REVENUE
Federal Aid
As a percentage of
Fiscal year
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970 estimate
1971 estimate
Amount
($ millions)
$ 6,669
7,040
7,112
7,893
8,634
10,141
10,904
12,960
15,240
18,599
20,255
24,119
27,624
Total Domestic
federal federal
outlays outlaysa
7.2%
7.6
7.3
7.4
7.8
8.6
9.2
9.7
9.6
10.4
11.0
12.2
13.8
15.9%
16.4
15.4
15.8
16.5
17.9
18.4
19.2
19.5
20.9
21.3
21.8
23.0
State-local
revenueb
13.5%
12.7
12.0
12.3
12.5
13.4
13.4
14.2
15.3
16.9
17.4
18.2
C
aExcluding outlays for defense, space, and international programs.
bxcludes state-local revenue from publicly-operate utilities, and
liquor stores.
cNot available.
Source: Special Analyses: Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year
1971, p. 226.
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Table II
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AID TO
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY FUNCTION
Function (actual) (actual) (actual) (actual) (estimate)
Agriculture and rural
development
Natural resources
Commerce and transportation
Comnmunity development
and housing
Education and manpower
Health
Income security
Other
Total
aLess than 0.5%.
Source: Special Analyses: Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year
1971, p. 220.
1950 1955 1960 1965 1971
8%5%
2
21
a
5%
3
19
3
11
2
43
3
10
4
33
1
100%
2
40
5
10
7
29
2
100%
5
55
1
4%
3
19
11
17
14
28
4
100%
4
47
2
100%100%
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By the late 1960's, some observers concluded that the time
had come to decentralize public responsibility and to
allow state and local governments a greater degree of
autonomy. Congressional investigations revealed that grant-
in-aid programs were plagued by a range of administrative
and political problems. Leaders of both parties and
politicians of all persuasions took turns trying to devise
alternatives to the categorical grant system. Proposals
ranged from minor adjustments aimed at simplifying and
streamlining categoricals to tax credits or revenue-
sharing approaches that called for a total overhaul of
the federal fiscal system. Unfortunately, all the
Congressional probes and wide-ranging academic studies
yielded little if any agreement on the merits of specific
alternatives. By 1970, there were over 500 categorical
grant-in-aid programs and no uniform grant-in-aid policy.
Congressional and Executive Concern About the Scope and
Character of the Intergovernmental System
Federal-state-local relationships have undergone careful
scrutiny time and time again. In 1949, the first Hoover
Commission analyzed the workings of the entire Executive
Branch of government (that had grown mightily during the
1930's and 1940's) and recommended a shift to a system
of broad, consolidated grants as well as the creation of
4o
a continuing agency on federal-state relations.7 In 1953,
the Congress established a Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations to study the role of the national government in
relation to state and local governments, to review inter-
governmental fiscal relations, and to assess grant-in-aid
programs. In June of 1955, the Commission issued a report
documenting the on-going evolution of the American federal
system (focusing especially on the constitutional basis
for continued re-alignment of responsibilities among the
various levels of government) and the need for more state
leadership, more local home rule, fewer and stronger local
7 Specifically, the Commission made five recommendations:
1. That the functions and activities of government be
appraised to determine which could be most advantageously
handled by each level of government, and which required
joint policy-making, financing or administration.
2. That our tax systems-national, state, and local--be
revised to provide localities and states adequate resources
with which to meet their debts and responsibilities.
3. That all grants-in-aid given to state governments be
directly allocated in detail at the federal and state levels.
4. That grant-in-aid planning programs be clarified and
systematized.
5. That an agency be set up to provide information and
guidance in the field of federal-state relations.
Federal-State Relations: A Report to the Congress (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949). See also the Council of
State Governments, Federal-State Relations (Washington: Senate
Document No. 81, 81st Congress, first session, 1949).
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units of government, and for the development of solutions
to the crucial problems of metropolitan areas.8 The
Commission also emphasized the need for overall economic
expansion, coupled with price "controls" and tax expendi-
ture restraints as the best approach to the resolution of
inter-governmental fiscal problems. Finally, they rejected
the notion that the equalization of the fiscal capacities
of the states was in itself a proper objective of federal
grant-in-aid policy.
In 1957, President Eisenhower urged the formation of a
joint federal-state action committee to recommend shifts
in responsibilities and fiscal resources from the federal
government to the states. In 1959, the Joint Action
Committee was superceded by the permanent Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations. Since that time, the
Advisory Commission has undertaken a wide range of studies
on federal, state, and local problems and has recommended
8 The Commission report is usually referred to as the Kestnbaum
Report (after Commission Chairman Meyer Kestnbaum). The Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, Report to the President for
Transmittal to the Congress. In addition, the Commission published
a series of sixteen special reports and supporting documents. For
a summary of the Cmnission's reports see William Anderson, "The
Commission of Intergovernmental Relations and the United States
Federal System," Journal of Politics, May, 1956, pp. 211-231.
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policies and legislation dealing with a host of inter-
governmental issues.
In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson pointed to the need for
a new approach to intergovernmental cooperation. He called
for "a creative federalism between the national capital
and the leaders of local communities." In his State of the
Union message in 1966, he announced the appointment of
still another Commission to study federal, state, and local
governmental relations and to develop further the concept
of creative federalism.9 He hinted that all future grants-
in-aid would be directed at specific problems in particular
geographic areas and that grants would carry fewer federal
requirements dictating how programs ought to be run. His
intention was to encourage state and local governments
to develop their own unique solutions to local problems.
A number of other plans and proposals for intergovernmental
reform also surfaced in the mid-1960's. The most widely
publicized proposal was the Heller-Pechman plan which
would have provided block grants to the state (distri-
buted largely on the basis of population) with few
9 Joseph Pbhman., director Of economcrsd at the Brookings Irstitutions,
heade4 the Task Force which was assigned 'the task of deciding how
Heller's plan might best be put into effect. Since that time, the
names Heller and Heller-Pechman have become synonymous with tax
sharing. Congressional Quarterly, April 7, 1967, p. 523.
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restrictions on how funds could be used.1 0 The Republican
National Committee which strongly endorsed the Heller plan
argued that
the solution to the problems of states slowly strangling
for lack of funds amid the fiscal abundance of the
national government must be one which enphasizes the
independence of the states and not a system which ties
them further to Washington.
The Republicans also favored a series of functional grants
to states in broad areas such as mental health, education,
1 0 Heller referred to his proposal as "per capita revenue sharing."
He suggested that, over and above federal grants-in-aid for specific
purposes, the government ought to distribute to the states 1 to 2% of
the taxable income reported by individuals with "next to no strings
attached." He agreed that the use of taxable income as a base would
offer stability and keep the states from acquiring vested interests
in what the tax rates were. The funds would be distributed to the
states on a per capita basis. Some of it, 10% or 20%, could be set
aside to supplement states of either low per capita income or high
urbanization. Heller intended for states that reduced their own tax
effort to get reduced amounts of federal money.
Most of the Republican bills introduced in the mid-1960's followed the
Heller-Pechman plan but were based on a somewhat different formula
devised by Richard Nathan (also of the Brookings Institution). Most
of the Republican bills were identical to HR 4070 introduced by
Representative Charles Goodell of New York, Chairman of the House
Republican Planning and Research Cormittee. Goodell's bill differed
from Heller's plan in that HR 4070 proposed to allocate 3% of the
preceding year's federal personal income tax revenue for tax sharing
in 1968 and 1969, 4% for fiscal 1970, and 5% for fiscal 1971. Goodell
said that if the plan were adopted, federal grants-in-aid would be
cut back. That stipulation, however, was not included in the actual
language of the bill.
A bill introduced by Representative Melvin Laird, chairman of the
Republican Conference, also called for cutbacks in grants-in-aid.
His bill (HR5450) would have returned a straight 5% of the federal
revenue from personal income taxes to the states and would have
reduced grants-in-aid by the amount of taxes "shared" in any year.
In a bill sponsored by Senator Jacob Javits of New York, federal tax
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water pollution control, and highways, with no federal
controls on how the money was to be spent. These block
grants, it was thought, would gradually replace existing
grant-in-aid programs. President Johnson strongly opposed
the Heller Plan and efforts to eliminate existing cate-
gorical grant programs, but he was in favor of efforts to
consolidate and streamline the burgeoning grant-in-aid
system.
Arguments for and against changes in the intergovernmental
grant-in-aid system crystallized around two distinct
points of view. The Republicans phrased their arguments
in terms of the need for fiscal readjustments. They felt
that states lacked the revenues they needed because the
federal government had pre-empted the most productive tax
sources. And although they agreed that federal aid was
sharing would have been aimed at bolstering educational, health, and
welfare programs in the states (S 482).
Two Democratic revenue sharing plans also deserve special note. A
bill introduced by Representative Henry Reuss (HR 1166) would have
authorized $5 billion a year for three years to be distributed to
modernize state and local governments. A plan introduced by Joseph
Tydings (S 673) would have allocated federal revenues directly to
large cities. He proposed to establish a Commission on Federalism
to receive plans for the use of shared taxes and to allot funds
to the states and metropolitan governments that submitted plans.
One per cent of the annual federal revenues from individual and
corporate income taxes would have been made available to large
cities on the basis of their populations. None of these bills,
however, received wide-spread support.
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necessary to help states and municipalities meet their
needs, they were mostly concerned about the fact that
grants-in-aid were being used by the federal government
to enter fields of action reserved by the Constitution for
the states. In short, they wanted federal aid, but they
resented the fact that the policies and decisions of
federal bureaucrats were infringing upon the authority of
elected state and local officials. In addition, they felt
that many grant programs coerced states into participating
in activities they would otherwise not undertake or would
perform differently--in a manner more in keeping with local
attitudes and preferences.
A second group, mostly Democrats, lined up behind the need
for administrative reforms in the intergovernmental grant-
in-aid system. They felt that federal supervision of
grant-in-aid programs had helped to improve state and
local standards of performance and that federal participa-
tion in programs administered by states and localities
had provided a valuable medium for the exchange of
information and ideas and an appropriate mechanism for
the provision of federal technical assistance. They felt,
however, that some categorical grant programs could be
consolidated; overlapping and duplication could be
eliminated, and that federal "red tape" could be cut by
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simplifying application and grant management procedures."'
The fiscal readjusters were primarily concerned about
redistributing control over federal funds. The "administra-
tive reformers" were more interested in what the money
would be used for and in making sure that the national
government maintained ultimate review power. Those
concerned about fiscal readjustment suggested that the
financial capacity of state and local governments would
have to be bolstered if they were to take on an increasing
share of emerging public responsibilities. If they could
not satisfy demands for critical public services, the
fear was that pressure would mount for increased national
participation in areas of primarily state and local
concern.
11 Dozens of grant reform proposals have been introduced in the
Congress over the past ten years. In general, they have been aimed at
over-coming (1) confusion about what grants are available and what the
differences and similarities are among the many grant-in-aid programs;
(2) the problems involved in having to deal with numerous small
categories of funds which prohibit flexibility; (3) administrative
waste involved in overlapping and duplicated effort; (4) the inevitable
difficulty of having to conply with a multitude of different grant
requirements; (5) difficulties at the disbursing end which Federal
grant-administering agencies encounter in coordinating grant programs
in handling mountains of paper work, and in making certain that
program goals set by Congress are achieved. For a detailed review of
grant-in-aid reform proposals see Legislative Analysis of Bills to
Consolidate, Coordinate, and Simplify and Improve Federal Assistance
Programs (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1970). Also
see Selma Mushkin, "Barriers to a System of Federal Grants-in-aid,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 13 (September 1960), pp. 193-218.
The Failures of the Grant-in-Aid System
Grants-in-aid are created whenever the Congress feels that
a problem requires the attention of the national govern-
ment. Some problems are a source of continuing concern and
the Congress has concluded that national support in these
areas should continue indefinitely; in other cases problems
cease to be of importance. Currently, for example, concern
for the problems of air and water pollution are increasing,
while support for tuberculosis control- and vocational
training in agriculture are diminishing. This ebb and flow
in the interpretation of national priorities is often not
reflected in efforts to phase out categorical grants that
have outlived their usefulness. Once a federal grant
program has begun, it hardly ever ends.12
The Congress has identified several obstacles to the termi-
nation or redirection of grants-in-aid.1 3 Vested inter-
ests--both public and private--come into being every time
a new grant program is initiated. Aside from the fact that
. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Periodic Con-
gressional Reassessment of Federa.L Grants-in-aid to State and. Local
Governments (Washington: Committee on Governmental Operations,
United States Senate, 1967), pp. 10-13.
1 3 The discussion of these obstacles is one based on the points made
in the Periodic Congressional Reassessment mentioned in footnote 12
above,
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administrative personnel at all levels display normal
survival instincts, most federal administrators have not
been especially concerned with the overall problem of
intergovernmental fiscal balance or with the proliferation
of grants-in-aid. For the most part, they have developed
a narrow sense of mission with respect to their particular
programs. Given their somewhat partisan point of view, it
comes as no surprise that they invariably favor the per-
petuation and expansion of categorical grants.
Once a particular grant has continued for a number of
years, it becomes an integral part of state and local
budgets and constitutes one of the assumed sources of
revenue in the process of budgetary planning. With states
and localities hard-pressed for revenue, officials are
naturally reluctant to support any grant reduction. If
federal funds are cut, a greater state or local appropria-
tion would be needed to maintain a particular program at
a given level.
Groups in the private sector (such as professional
organizations, suppliers of materials or providers of
services normally purchased with grant funds) are inter-
ested in seeing their grant programs continue. They
strongly resist all attempts to reduce or eliminate federal
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appropriations, presumably on the grounds that it is easier
to lobby for the continuation of an existing national
appropriation than it is to obtain a new or increased
appropriation from state or local government. Efforts to
redirect grant programs toward newer and more urgent
problems usually result in an additive rather than a
substitutive appropriation--or the creation of a new
categorical grant rather than the elimination of an old
one. Comprehensive surveys of federal, state, and local
officials involved in the administration of grant programs
reveal a number of very disturbing trends: 1 4
1. Very little is known about what happens to a federal
grant-in-aid program after it is approved by the Congress.
No one is quite sure whether or why individual grant pro-
grams succeed or fail. Delays at the federal level having
14 See Replies from State and Local Governments to Questionnaire on
Intergovernmental Relations, Sixth Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, U. S. House of Representatives, 85th Congress,
first session, House Report No. 575, June 17, 1957; and The Federal
System as Seen by State and Local Officials (a study prepared by the
staff of the Subconmittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the
Committee on Government Operations), U. S. Senate, 88th Congress,
first session (Committee Print), 1963. A recent catalogue of "fric-
tion points" in the intergovernmental system was prepared for the
National Association of State Budget Officers, Federal Grant-in-Aid
Requirements Impeding State Administration (Chicago: Council on
State Governments, 1966). Additional information on the problems
of intergovernmental coordination as seen from the point of view of
state and local officials can be found in Deil Wright and Richard
McAnaw, American State Administrators (Iowa: Institute of Public
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to do with the timing of appropriations and the promulgation
of rules and regulations can create a serious gap between
the time a program is approved and the point at which it
is actually put into effect. Additional delays are almost
always encountered in gearing up the necessary administra-
tive machinery. In many instances, state governments have
not been willing or prepared to play their part. When
federal funds finally filter down to the state and local
level, they often fall into the wrong hands. For the most
part, communities that do not have the technical skill or
the money to do the requisite pre-planning or to come up
with the required matching funds are left out--although
in some cases they may be most in need of assistance. The
impact of individual grant programs is, of course, very
difficult to measure. By the time a grant program begins
to operate smoothly, the particular crisis that prompted
its initiation may have already disappeared. Moreover,
since agencies involved in administering grant programs
are not likely to report accurately on their own failures,
and information is rarely available for others to piece
together a precise evaluation, attempts to evaluate
programs have been severely handicapped.
Affairs, 1965); and David B. Walker, "Federalism Today," National
Civin Review. , November, 1964, pp. 535-539.
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2. Congress continually adds new grant-in-aid programs
with no real sense of overall purpose. Separate programs
continue to proliferate along with single-function
agencies at the federal and state levels as well as
specialized districts and authorities at the local level.
While new programs are continually added, existing grants
are rarely eliminated. Part of the problem, perhaps, is
that there is no single Congressional committee responsible
for reviewing the whole array of grants-in-aid.
3. Federal departments have a very difficult time coor-
dinating programs and services within their own agencies
and with other departments and agencies. In most cases,
responsibility for coordinating the efforts of various
bureaus in a given department is fragmented. When
responsibility is assigned, staffing arrangements are
often less than adequate. Various attempts to design
new administrative tools for managing the grant application
process, auditing accounts, or evaluating the success of
particular projects have not succeeded.
4. Interdepartmental coordination at the regional level
has accomplished very little. Until very recently,
regional office directors had very little decision-making
power. More often than not, they were unable to coordinate
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their own activities with other Federal agencies operating
in the same region.
5. Federal departments and their respective bureaus and
divisions have done very little to develop favorable
cooperative relationships between the federal government
and state and local agencies.
6. Federal aid programs administered at the state and
local level have-, for the most part, been handled
inefficiently. State and local agencies have been under-
staffed, lacking in experience and imagination, and
subject to very strong political and bureaucratic
pressures.
President Johnson's Proposals to Overhaul the Grant-in-Aid
System 1 5
In 1967, President Johnson, while trying to gain congres-
sional support for his domestic programs, promised that
grant-in-aid programs would be improved and simplified.
However, he studiously avoided any mention of tax-sharing--
an alternative to categorical grants-in-aid that was being
i s This discussion of President Johnson's legislative proposals is
based on weekly reports presented by Congressional Quarterly Weekly
during the years 1966-1968.
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advocated at that time by the Republicans. Mr. Johnson
declared his intention to make administrative changes in
the antipoverty program (hinting at a shift of some Office
of Economic Opportunity programs to different agencies).
He made it clear that he considered the problems to cities
to be at the top of his list of domestic priorities and
he requested an appropriation of $400 million for the
new "Model Cities" program.
The President proposed to intensify the war on poverty
with special methods and special funds. He also spoke
at some length about a new effort to fight rising crime
rates--the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967
which would provide federal aid to states and cities to help
them develop and equip local law enforcement agencies.
Several months later, in a message on the "quality of
government" President Johnson proposed a number of steps
to halt the proliferation of grants-in-aid and to
cut through the administrative red tape that placed extra
burdens on state and local officials. He called for
simplified grant application procedures, and promised to
make it possible for federal agencies to package related
grants without disturbing the original authorizations,
appropriations, and legislative requirements. In addition,
he requested the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to
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review all federal grant-in-aid programs in an effort to
determine how consolidation of grant-in-aid authorizations,
appropriations, and statutory requirements could be carried
out. He referred specifically to the precedent set by the
"Partnership for Health" Act passed in 1966. As part of
that program, Congress combined a number of health grants
into a single package.
Growing Congressional Interest in Tax Sharing
In 1958 former Representative Melvin Laird introduced the
first bill embodying many of what have come to be con-
sidered the essential ingredients of revenue sharing.
The Laird bill provided for the automatic distribution of
a portion of federal tax revenues to the states with
virtually no strings attached. The revenue sharing idea
was expanded in 1960 by Walter Heller, who later became
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (1961-1964).
Heller's plan was adopted by a task force which in 1964
recommended a form of revenue sharing to President Johnson.
Mr. Johnson, although reportedly in favor of the idea,
never announced his support for such a plan. One of the
key reasons for his silence was a projected federal
budget deficit.
A task force on revenue sharing, appointed by President
Johnson in 1964 and headed by Joseph Pechman (Director
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of Economics for the Brookings Institution), proposed a
compromise plan, recommending that the fiscal dividends
of an expanded economy--that is, a percentage of annual
federal tax revenue increases due to economic growth--
be distributed to the states with few strings attached.
The 90th Congress became increasingly interested in the
concept of tax sharing. The basic argument of the idea's
supporters was that the federal government, which had a
growing tax base from which to draw revenue and a highly
developed tax collection system, should return a small
percentage of its revenues to the money-starved states
to use in whatever ways they wished. Some Democrats
countered with proposals to earmark specific amounts of
money for large cities or to require states and local
governments to improve their administrative machinery in
order to qualify for tax sharing.
The July 1966 meeting of the Governors Conference approved
the report of a special committee headed by Governor
George Romney that recommended the return annually of
$2.5 billion in federal tax revenues to the states and
federal tax credits for taxes paid to states. Governor
Raymond Shaeffer in March of 1967 announced that he had
urged all the governors to support the call for a
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constitutional convention to draft a tax-sharing amendment.
Taking the opposite tack, the National League of Cities
unveiled a ten-year plan to provide $125 billion in
federal funds to the nation's cities. None of this money
would go through the states. Former Boston Mayor John
Collins speaking for the "city lobby" called tax-sharing
"the most dangerous idea in America." He predicted that
federal funds would stop at the statehouse door, instead
of filtering down to cities and local communities. Mayor
Harold Tollefson of Tacoma, Washington, President of the
National League of Cities, said that the states could not
be trusted to respond to urban needs.
Organized labor's opposition to tax sharing was first
expressed in an AFL-CIO resolution in 1966 which stated
that the AFL-CIO opposed any aid via unconditional federal
grants with no strings attached. Under general revenue-
sharing, it was argued, proportionately too much aid
would go to wealthier states and none to hard-pressed
cities; misuses of federally shared revenue would be
invited; and effective enforcement of anti-discrimination
and minimum labor standards would not be assured.
Representative Wilbur Mills (D.-Ark.), Chairman of the
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House Ways and Means Committee, held the decisive position.
In a 1967 speech in Houston, Texas, Mills said,
I have always felt that more discipline could be exercised
over the spending by a governmental unit if that unit had
the responsibility, or some measure of responsibility, for
collecting the revenues. . . . It has been suggested that
tax sharing will not contribute to the decentralization in
government but, on the contrary, might well cause state and
local units to become more and more dependent upon the
Federal Government., and that this in turn would actually
serve to enlarge rather than diminish federal power.
He raised a number of other important questions: How much
federal control and supervision, if any, should be
exercised over the disbursement of federal revenues? To
what extent should federal tax revenues be provided to
states which had not adopted state income taxes? Should
funds be allocated directly to local units of government?
Should state and local governmental reforms be required?
Were the states in fact in worse financial straits than
the federal government?
Representative Thomas Curtsin, an influential member of
the Ways and Means Committee, expressed his opposition to
tax sharing on still other grounds. He felt that the
federal government did not have a surplus of revenues to
return to the states and that the federal government could
not risk turning revenues back to the states without any
guidelines for their use. Curtsin also argued that the
property tax still had the capacity to produce the revenue
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necessary to finance most local expenditures.16
Assumptions Underlying Alternative Approaches to Revenue-
Sharing
Heller's original revenue sharing proposal recommended
"?unrestricted federal grants to the states as one method
of reducing the fiscal drag." A number of economists
predicted that after the cessation of hostilities in
Vietnam, the nation would realize a "peace dividend," and
that several years of federal budget surpluses would
follow. Federal revenues derived from the existing tax
base would increase more rapidly than expenditures for
domestic programs. This seemed logical since federal
revenues are based primarily on a rapidly growing income
tax with a generally progressive rate structure. Moreover,
once defense expenditures were curtailed, total expendi-
tures for federal domestic programs would not tend to rise
as fast as the yield of the progressive tax structure
(even though various non-defense programs might grow at
a very rapid rate) . 7
State and local officials feared that the revenue "gap" at
1 6 Congressional Quarterly Weekly, April 7, 1967, p. 525.
'
7Murray Weidenbaum, Prospects for Reallocating Public Resources
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1967).
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the state and local level would widen. 18 The costs of
state and local programs (most notably in the areas of
education and welfare) were rising more rapidly than the
revenues from existing taxes. State and local revenues
obtained primarily from taxes on property and retail sales
were generally increasing more slowly than the gross
national product.
We now know, of course, that federal surpluses were used
up and the "peace dividend" never materialized. The
federal government expanded some domestic programs, added
new ones, and cut taxes. State and local governments
dealt with budget deficits in a variety of ways: by
raising tax rates, utilizing new tax sources, raising
property assessment ratios, or by deferring programs. Some
of these approaches, of course, would not work for very
long. Debt increases, for example, were limited by
constitutional ceilings, and efforts to raise taxes
invariably met with voter resistance. The increases also
tended to accentuate the problems of interstate competi-
tion.'9
1 8 Ibid. See also, Harry Johnson, ed., State and Local Tax Problems
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969).
"Weidenbaum, o_. cit., p. 3.
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The basic argument for tax sharing (or revenue sharing)
still stands; namely, that the only way to solve the
country's long-term budgetary problems is to use federal
surpluses to diminish state and local budgetary deficits.
Unfortunately, there is no agreement on the best way of
accomplishing this. The alternatives include: increased
categorical grants-in-aid to state and local governments
for specific activities; unconditional grants to states
to be used for whatever purposes they like; federal-state
sharing of a fixed portion of federal income tax revenues;
federal income tax credits for the payment of state and
local taxes; or federal tax cuts that might make future
increases in state and local taxes somewhat more
palatable. 20
Each approach can be examined from a number of perspectives.
First, will it increase or decrease the importance of the
federal government in the national economy? Second, will
it tend to increase federal influence over the states?
Third, what are its effects on the progressiveness of the
2 0 Weidenbaum and Wright both present similar lists of options along
with Michael Levy and Juan de Torres, Federal Revenue Sharing with
the States (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1970);
and George F. Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the
United States (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970).
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combined governmental tax structure? Fourth, what is its
impact on the ability of federal budget to act as a
"built-in" stabilizer (as a means of offsetting fluctuations
in economic activity)? Fifth, what influence will it have
on the geographic distribution of income (i.e., will it
help to achieve fiscal equalization among high and low
income states)? Sixth, what impact is it likely to have on
the distribution of income among various economic strata?
And seventh, will it enhance the role of the cities in
relation to rural and suburban-dominated state legis-
latures?21
Categorical grants-in-aid: One way of reallocating federal
tax revenue would be to step up the flow of conditional
or categorical grants to state and local governments. This
type of federal assistance has typically been problem-
focused. A federal agency administering such programs
typically sets detailed standards and selects specific
state and local recipients from among a host of applicants.
In order to be eligible for most categorical grants-in-aid,
states usually must match the national contribution at
2 1 I have used a modified version of the criteria that Weidenbaum
op. cit., p. 31, suggests for evaluating alternative grant-in-aid and
federal management strategies.
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some specified rate. The aid-to-dependent children program
(AFDC), for instance, requires states to pay between 35 and
50 per cent of the cost of the program, depending upon their
per capita income. While the wealthiest states must con-
tribute one dollar from their own funds for each dollar
received, the poorest states need contribute only 54 cents.
The interstate highway program, by contrast, requires each
state to pay 10% of the total cost, regardless of its per
capita income. For all categorical grants-in-aid, the
states pay (on the average) one-third the cost, although
there is enormous variety among programs in terms of
required matching rates. 2 2
It has been suggested that the desire of national politi-
cians to supply conditional grants is more constrained
than the desire of state and local politicians to accept
them.2 3 Grants may be nearly costless to state and local
officials (assuming that the federal government will
permit existing operating expenditures to double as
matching funds), while national politicians must levy the
2 2 Richard Wagner, The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.), 1971, p. 27.
2 3Ibid., p. 42. Wagner provides a rather elaborate mathematical
analysis of fiscal federalism and the basis for institutional
resistance to reforms in intergovernmental relations.
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taxes necessary to finance categorical grants. Conditional
grants are also a vehicle by which national politicians
can secure local votes without violating Constitutionally
defined governmental responsibilities. (The Constitution
limits the national government to responsibilities for
foreign affairs and other "general-benefit" activities.)
A number of studies suggest that categorical grants can
distort expenditure patterns in a state. 2 4
[Categorical] grants have been criticized for misdirecting
state and local expenditures, for rigidifying state
budgetary procedures, for curtailing local autonomy, for
undermining state and local incentives both to spend their
funds wisely and to raise enough of them fran local
sources, and for shifting too many public responsibilities
to Washington so that political power is unduly centralized
and citizens are prevented from participating actively in
the choice and administration of governmental programs.2s
Nevertheless, greater reliance on conditional grants-in-aid
need not adversely affect the progressivity or stabilizing
effects of the overall tax system. Moreover, most
categorical grant programs have an equalizing effect.
Decisions to focus additional funds on certain problem
areas have a redistributive impact. This has been true
2 4 Governmental Affairs Institute, Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on
South Carolina, a report to the Conmission of Intergovernmental Rela-
tions (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 1-4;
McKinsey and Company, The Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on the State
of Washington (San Francisco: McKinsey and Co., 1954), pp. 1-3.
2 5Break, o. cit., p. 83.
primarily because most allocation formulae have been based,
at least in part, on population or per capita levels of
income. 2 6  There is always a chance that an expansion of
federal grants-in-aid might intensify the regressive
character of state and local taxes, but this would occur
only if federal matching requirements brought new pressure
for state and local tax increases.
The basic economic justification for functional grants-in-
aid is the spillover of benefits from some of the most
important state and local expenditure programs. 2 7  Cate-
gorical grants also serve as catalysts in situations where
coordinated regional action is needed, but for one reason
or another, the cities, counties, or states have been unable
to work together.28
Unconditional block grants: Unconditional grants--not tied
to specific programmatic uses--have been used in other
2 6Muray Weidenbaum, "Shifting the Composition of Government Spending:
Implications for the Regional Distribution of Income," in Papers of
the Regional Science Association, Vol. 17, 1966.
2 7 Break, op. cit., p. 105. He refers to Kenneth Ainsworth, "A Coment
on Professor Moneypenny's Political Analysis of Federal Grants-in-Aid,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 13, September, 1960, pp. 282-284, for a
concise presentation of the economic case for federal grants, based
primarily on the existence of spillover benefits.
2 8Break, o. cit., p. 106.
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countries such as Australia, West Germany, and Canada.2 9
They minimize the role of the national government. They
also have a moderately equalizing effect on high and low
income states (although they have no effect on the overall
progressivity of the tax structure).
Unrestricted intergovernmental grants are ideally suited
to offsetting, or balancing, state or local fiscal deficien-
cies arising as a result of high concentrations of low-
income families (with extraordinary service requirements).
This approach, however, is far from ideal for urban areas
if grants are funneled through the states. A two-step
process involving the states tends to accentuate the diffi-
culties that typical metropolitan areas already have in
obtaining a fair share of state funds. Unconditional
block grants allocated directly to cities and towns might
get around this problem.
Some observers have argued that only unconditional block
grants can compensate for differences in resources and
allow for the attainment of optimum levels of government
2 Levy and de Torres, o. it., present a review of grant-in-aid poli-
cies and practices in Canada, Australia, and West Germany; also, see
Advisory Ccmmission of Intergovernmental Relations, "In Search of
Balance-Canada's Intergovernmental System" (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1971).
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activity in accord with locally or regionally accepted
goals. The unconditional block grant may be the most
satisfactory way of bringing about an overall equalization
of financial resources. 30 Of course, this assumes a
budgetary situation in which, at full employment levels,
federal tax receipts are expanding more rapidly than
federal expenditures.
Unlike other forms of federal aid, unconditional grants cut
directly to the root of the fiscal dilemma allegedly
plaguing state and local governments. They provide a new
revenue source that grows as rapidly as the national
economy expands and income levels rise. Critics such as
Wilbur Mills have asserted that unconditional block grants
would uncouple responsibility for collecting taxes from
the actual allocation decisions. A number of Democratic
leaders have argued that a switch from categorical to
unconditional grants would force the national government
to give up significant leverage. They point out that in
the past categorical grants and matching requirements have
been used to push through certain reforms in state and
local government.
3 0 John F. Due, Goverrnental Finance: An Economic Analysis, third
edition (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 455-456.
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Tax Sharing: A third alternative would be for the national
government to share a fixed portion of income tax revenues
with the states. This approach implies that high-income
states, with above-average federal tax payments, would
receive the largest share of federal aid. As in the case
of unconditional block grants, this approach would diminish
the role of the federal government. The states would be
free to determine how their shared tax money would be used.
Tax sharing is attractive mainly because it is so simple.
It provides a large and growing source of revenue and
reinforces the progressive distribution of federal, state,
and local fiscal burdens. Its detractors fear that tax
sharing will drain funds from higher priority national
purposes and that these funds will go into "leaky state
purses." Several members of the U. S. Senate have argued
that a generous tax sharing arrangement would lead to a
relaxation of state-local fiscal efforts and that tax
sharing would not meet the total needs of local governments,
particularly those in central cities and metropolitan
areas. 31
Tax credits: Tax credits differ from tax sharing in two
3 Heller, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
68
important ways. The imposition, collection, and administra-
tion of taxes would be handled entirely by state govern-
ments.3 2 State governments would be free to increase or
decrease tax rates on their own. This type of federal
assistance would allow federal income taxpayers to write-off
a generous portion of their state and local taxes; it would
offer them an option either to deduct their state and local
tax payments from taxable income, as they can do now, or to
deduct a fixed portion of their state and local tax payments
from their federal tax bills.
The benefits of this approach would accrue to persons in
low and middle income tax brackets. Persons in higher
brackets already enjoy a liberal write-off through itemiza-
tion. Federal tax credits would give state and local
governments an incentive to place more reliance on income
taxes in order to maximize federal tax-saving possibili-
ties. This could help local, as well as state governments,
by softening resistance to increases in state and local
taxes. Also, the federal role would be reduced in both
the national economy and in relation to state and local
governments. The only drawback is that the stabilizing
3 2 Weidenbaum points out that the tax structure currently provides
credits for two types of state taxes: a limited credit for state death
taxes against federal estate tax liabilities, and a 90% credit against
general payroll levies for payments into state unemployment corpensa-
tion systems.
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impact and the progressivity of the overall tax structure
would tend to be reduced to the extent that progressive
and income-elastic federal taxes were replaced by state
and local levies less progressive and less responsive to
economic growth.33
Federal Tax Cuts: A federal tax cut is a clear alternative
to categorical grants, unconditional grants, or tax shar-
ing. First, federal tax cuts might stimulate economic
expansion. Second, in those states that treat federal
income taxes as a deductible item, federal tax cuts would
increase the tax base and thus tax revenues. In discussing
these two effects, Walter Heller estimates that $3 billion
extra a year was flowing into state-local coffers from the
1964 tax cut alone, a 7% increase for both state and local
tax revenues.3 4 If his estimate was correct then the
federal tax cut was responsible for nearly 90% of the $3.5
billion increase in tax revenue that was obtained by state
and local governments from 1965 to 1966.3s
Tax reductions have the advantage of allowing states and
3 3Weidenbaum, op. cit., p. 40.
3 4Heller, o. ci., p. 140.
3 5Ibid.
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localities maximum discretion in choosing whether or not
to increase service levels or taxes. Yet, in the eyes
of some observers, tax cuts would only reduce the federal
role in key problem areas without providing guarantees
that states and localities would increase their taxes and
services. Others point out that a tax cut would not
help to equalize interstate fiscal burdens.a3
Whether in fact state and local governments would raise
their tax rates under these circumstances is debatable.
In order to forecast what might happen, it is necessary
to decide whether present state-local tax rates are held
down primarily by intergovernmental competition for
business and industry or primarily by the extent to which
the federal government has preempted the revenue field.3 7
The desirability of tax cuts is influenced heavily by
conditions in the national economy.
If strong inflationary pressures were likely as a result
of especially rapid increases in consumer and business
spending, a surplus in the federal budget, which would
permit retiring some of the national debt, would be
desirable as an anti-inflationary measure. However,
such would not be likely to be the case if the economy
were generally characterized by recession-like conditions. 38
3 6Ibid.
37George Break, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United
States," a background paper prepared for a Conference held at the
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., November, 1965, p. 4-85-6.
3 8Weidenbaum, Prospects for Reallocating Public Resources, O_. cit.,
p. 41.
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Tax cuts might bring about a decrease in the size of the
federal government, but they would only meet state and
local needs indirectly. Tax sharing and unconditional
block grants would provide for the allocation of public
funds among programs selected by state governments (which
are presumably more familiar with the needs and desires
of their own residents than the national government).
However, there is no guarantee that the financial require-
ments of cities and metropolitan areas would in turn be
met under the unconditional grant format or the tax-cut
approach. Moreover, high-income states would benefit
more from tax sharing than from the other forms of federal
aid,3 9 while low-income states would benefit most from a
3 9 Deil Wright has calculated that under a tax-sharing arrangement
(based on collection of federal personal income taxes in each state) a
number of states including Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania would receive
larger shares as opposed to poorer states such as Mississippi that
would benefit more under a consolidated-grant approach with a strong
equalizing feature.
For an attempt to measure the redistributional effects of both federal
grants themselves and taxes that finance them, see Jamres A. Maxwell,
Financing State and Local Governments (Washington: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1965) pp. 6-166. Also, see the Advisory Conmission on Inter-
governmental Relations, The Role of Equalization in Federal Grants
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). One additional
note: opponents of equalization grants point out that efforts to
counterbalance regional poverty with federal grants only worsens the
situation by weakening the incentives to residents to move to other
locations where they would be more productive. This is a highly con-
troversial and as yet unresolved issue.
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grant-in-aid approach which contained some kind of equali-
zation provision.
Summary: As long as tax resources are distributed unevenly,
the problem of preserving fiscal balance in the federal
system will persist. In essence, the problem is actually
three-fold. First, imbalances exist between the national
government and the states. The latter are handicapped
because they are prohibited constitutionally from tapping
lucrative revenue sources. There are also imbalances among
the states. The geographic distribution of resources
places some states at a distinct disadvantage. Finally,
imbalances within individual states exist as a result of
the concentration of resources in certain sub-areas.4 0
The objective of equality (formulated in interpersonal
terms) can best be served through interstate fiscal equal-
ization. Thus, tax sharing on a per-capita basis is a
definite means to this end. Additionally, a very strong
case can be made for unconditional equalizing grants to
the states. With state-local tax effort built into the
distribution formula, unconditional grants would become a
vehicle for achieving a degree of equalization not approxi-
40 Knestnbaum Report, op. cit., p. 92.
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mated by categorical or conditional grants. Yet, the
greatest single obstacle to most proposed revenue sharing
or tax sharing schemes still remains: a lingering doubt
about the adequacy and reliability of state government.4 1
The Nixon Block Grant and Revenue Sharing Proposals
In 1968, the Republicans, led by Representative William
Roth, Jr., argued for block grants under which the states
would play the major role in allocating federal funds. 2
The concept, of course, had received substantial Republican
support in earlier years. Opponents of tax sharing,
especially in the Johnson administration, argued that
state governments were just not sufficiently equipped to
handle the funds and that, because many states were domi-
nated by rural interests, they would not give urban areas
their fair share.
On April 30, 1969 President Nixon asked Congress for power
to consolidate certain federal assistance programs and to
41 See, for example, The Committee for Economic Development,
Modernizing State Government, New York, 1967.
42 In presenting his findings to the House of Representatives on June 25,
1968, Roth said that "no one, anywhere, knows exactly how many federal
programs there are." He went on to say that in an agency-by-agency
survey he had done, a verified list of at least 1,271 different federal
grant-in-aid programs were found. Conressional Quarterly Weekly,
August 16, 1968, p. 2198.
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place them under the control of a single agency. The
President said that only clearly related programs would be
merged and grant limits would be changed as little as
possible. The Republican Coordinating Committee warned
that the trend in federal-state relations was leaning more
and more toward a "virtual monopoly of power in Washington"
and if it continued until 1973 when federal grants-in-aid
were expected to reach $60 billion, "state and local
governments would be . . . taking all their orders from
federal administrators."
President Nixon echoed these sentiments in his "New Feder-
alism" speech in August, 1969:
For a third of a century, power and responsibility have
flowed toward Washington-and Washington has taken for
its own the best sources of revenue. We intend to
reverse this tide--not as a way of avoiding problems,
but as a better way of solving problems.
President Nixon asked Congress to approve automatic dis-
bursement of a portion of federal tax revenues to the
states "with no strings attached." 4 3 Proponents of the
revenue sharing principle were generally happy with the
Nixon plan, although they hoped it would begin on a much
larger scale than the $500 million planned for the second
half of 1971. Opponents charged fiscal irresponsibility
4 3 Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 5, 1969, p. 1648.
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in sending funds to units of government with no responsi-
bility for raising them and no curbs on their use.
The President's "no-strings-attached" revenue sharing
program would have returned a portion of federal revenues
to the states each year. The monies were to be distributed
according to population but adjusted to take each state's
revenue raising efforts into account. A pass-through
formula was supposed to ensure cities and counties a fair
share of the funds (in proportion to their relative size
and revenue-raising effort within the state). The payout
was scheduled to rise from one-sixth of one per cent of
personal taxable income in the second half of fiscal 1971
to 1 per cent in fiscal 1976 and thereafter. The return
to the states was estimated at $5 billion by 1976. Payment
was to be authorized under a permanent appropriation
(similar to the appropriation covering interest payments
on the national debt). President Nixon said that the
plan was proposed as a supplement to and not a substitute
for existing categorical grants.
Though different in a number of ways, the Nixon administra-
tion's proposal was linked in many minds with the Heller-
Pechman plan of the Democratic years. At a White House
reception in April of 1961, Mr. Nixon told Heller, "We are
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about to present your plan to Congress and our people are
giving you a lot of credit for it."
Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee
opposed the Nixon plan. He felt that the level of govern-
ment which spends funds should share in the responsibility
for raising them. Civil rights advocates raised questions
about the problems of holding states accountable for
unencumbered revenue shares. If there were truly going to
be no strings attached, what would prevent a recalcitrant
state from returning its regular federal funds for educa-
tion--which would be withheld if a school district refused
to follow the law of the land on integration--and using
its revenue sharing funds to make up the difference?
Although the amount of shared revenues might not be large
enough in the beginning to make up for a loss in federal
educational grants, the possibility of substitutions was
still very real. Some critics said that the distribution
formula with its emphasis on revenue effort would aid
wealthy suburbs at the expense of core cities. Suburbs
with high-income residents could afford higher taxes
with less pain to the taxpayer--and risk to the political
leaders--than could most cities., and thus could increase
their revenue effort ratio at the expense of the cities.4 4
4 A sampling of major cities and selected suburbs indicated that cities
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Mr. Nixon's general revenue sharing plan went to Congress
on February 9, 1971 and was introduced by Senator Howard
J. Baker and 37 co-sponsors (four of whom were Democrats).
The bill stipulated that states would have to pass through
nearly 50% of their shared revenues to cities and counties.
In some states, where cities did not impose heavy tax
burdens, shares would be substantially below half; in
others they would amount to more. The bill also called
for a special incentive payment to any state that negotiated
a different formula with its cities and counties, although
cities could not get less than they would under the federal
formula. Although there were no programmatic strings tied
to the funds, governors would have to pledge to the
Secretary of the Treasury that they would use the money
only for governmental purposes. If the Secretary found
evidence of racial discrimination in the allocation of
funds, he was authorized to encourage voluntary compliance
with civil rights law. Should that fail, he could refer
generally made better revenue efforts than their respective suburbs.
Another study shows that if the Nixon revenue sharing plan were
financed through a personal income tax surcharge, it would redistri-
bute income from urban to rural states and from high-inccme to low-
income states. The same study suggests that by substituting revenue
sharing for categorical grants, income would be redistributed from
rural to urban states and from high-income to low-income states.
Stephen Dresch, "An Alternative View of the Nixon Revenue Sharing
Program," in National Tax Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, June 1971,
pp . 131-142.
the matter to the Attorney General of the United States.
The revenue sharing proposal would have provided $5 billion
during its first full year of operation and increased as
the federal income tax base expanded. There was a second
part to the President's proposal. He proposed to provide
special revenue sharing funds that would be underwritten
largely by consolidating 130 categorical grants-in-aid.45
States and cities could use these funds--totalling $11.4
billion the first year--for urban community development,
rural community development, manpower training, law enforce-
ment, transportation, and education. Special revenue-
sharing was part of President Nixon's overall effort to
decategorize federal grants-in-aid, but unlike general
revenue sharing, consolidated or block grants still had
some strings attached.
The President's administrative staff indicated that the
six special categories mentioned above were chosen
because work was already underway in various federal
departments on grant consolidation. They were "natural
avenues to follow." 46  Transportation Secretary John A.
4 5 National Journal, April 3, 1971, pp. 620-624.
4
"Ibid.
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Volpe had previously advocated a transportation trust fund
that would merge highway construction and mass transporta-
tion funds. HEW Secretary Elliott Richardson had already
begun efforts to consolidate the 105 categorical grants
in the field of education. HUD Secretary George Romney
several months earlier had begun talking about a more
flexible approach to community development. The Rural
Development Council, a unit of the Domestic Council, had
suggested moves toward balanced population growth. And
manpower training and law enforcement officials had
endorsed less restrictive block-grant programs than those
that already existed. 4 7
Richard Cook, Assistant to the President for Congressional
Relations, indicated that special revenue sharing would
be harder to sell to the Congress than the general revenue
sharing proposal. Another presidential aide said that many
members of Congress were "frightened by special revenue
sharing" because it would deprive them of the political
advantage of being directly associated with federal aid
to their home districts. Also, local officials could not
be held accountable for the ultimate disposition of the
funds. From all reports, the general public was unable to
distinguish between general and special revenue sharing. In
4 7Ibid.
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addition, the press failed to understand that special
revenue sharing was nothing more than the consolidation
of a number of existing categorical grants-in-aid.
While general revenue sharing was designed to meet
complaints about the shortage of funds at the state and
local levels, special revenue sharing was Mr. Nixon's
response to complaints about service delivery. Mr. Nixon's
solution was to consolidate narrowly defined grant programs
into more general categories. The six special revenue
sharing plans were different in some ways, but they had a
number of common characteristics:
--they required no state or local matching funds;
--no pre-grant planning or applications were required;
--guarantees were provided to ensure that no state or
community participating in categorical aid programs
at that time would receive any less during the
transition to a broad-purpose tax sharing program
than they were already receiving; and
--anti-discrimination guarantees similar to those in
the general revenue sharing proposal were included
in all six special revenue sharing bills.
For years, city and county lobbies had been pressing
Congress and the Washington bureaucracy for basic reforms
in the categorical grant-in-aid system. They wanted
--drastic curtailment of federal application and
review procedures;
--program goals to be set at the local rather than
the federal level;
--program consolidation within broad, flexible areas;
--funding of general-purpose local governments
rather than semi-autonomous bureaucracies;
--establishment of more stable and equitable funding
procedures; and
-- abolition of local matching requirements.
The Nixon proposals promised practically all of these things.
However, local government groups expressed essentially three
complaints about the Nixon revenue sharing approach. First,
city experts were angry that they had not been involved
in drafting any of the proposals. Second, the amount of
money proposed for general and special revenue sharing
programs was inadequate. And, finally, the flow of funds
under the new block grant programs would be routed through
state government.
The Compromise State and Local Assistance Act of 1972
In April of 1972 the House Ways and Means Committee endorsed
a compromise version of the Nixon revenue sharing bill
(The State and Local Assistance Act of 1972). The Presi-
dent's special revenue sharing proposals were referred to
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various Congressional committees. The compromise version
of the general revenue sharing bill, written by Ways and
Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, provided for revenue sharing
for five years at an annual rate of $3.5 billion for local
governments and $1.8 billion for state governments.48 The
committee noted a federal budget deficit of almost $39 bil-
lion for fiscal year 1972 and a deficit of $25.5 billion
for fiscal 1973, but felt that postponing revenue sharing
in order to cut the national deficit would be assigning a
lower priority to state and local financial needs than to
other national needs.
The bill created three trust funds: one for state shares,
4 8 The bill appropriated funds for state government at an initial
annual rate of $1.8 billion and increased that rate by $150 million
for the following year and $300 million for each succeeding year for
the rest of the five-year period. Since the government operates on
a fiscal year, the bill appropriated half of the initial allocation
for the period of January 1 to June 30, 1972 (the remainder of fiscal
1972). It appropriated funds for the four succeeding fiscal years and
a final half-year allocation. The appropriations (in billions of
dollars) are summarized below (the source is Congressional Quarterly
Weekly, May 6, 1972, p. 1001).
Year State Local Total
FY 1972 (half-year) .9 1.75 2.65
FY 1973 1.95 3.5 5.45
FY 1974 2.25 3.5 5.75
FY 1975 2.55 3.5 6.05
FY 1976 2.85 3.5 6.35
FY 1977 (half-year) 1.575 1.75 3.325
TOTALS 12.075 17.5 29.575
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one for local shares, and one for a "hold harmless" fund.
Statest funds were to be distributed according to total
tax effort and level of income-tax collection. The
Treasury Department would calculate tax effort by relating
the total tax collections of a state and its local govern-
ments (including special-purpose districts such as school
districts) to total personal income in the state. The
state allocation would then be calculated by establishing
the proportion of state tax effort to the total U.S. state
and local tax effort. The state's share would be 7.5% of
each state's income-tax collections. For states with no
income tax, and particularly states like Tennessee and
Florida, which had constitutional prohibitions against
income taxes that would take time to repeal, a minimum
amount was guaranteed equal to .5% of federal income-tax
liabilities attributable to the state.
The distribution of funds to local governments was far
more complicated. The Treasury department would allocate
the total amount available nationally among the states on
the basis of total state population, urban population,
4 $300 million a year was to be set aside for the states essentially
as a "hold harmless" increment to ensure that no state received less
in any year than it had in previous years. There was no indication,
though, whether or not this guarantee was meant to extend beyond the
first transitional year.
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and population weighted by per-capita income. Each state
would then receive an allocation to divide up among its
counties according to the same formula. Next, each county
would calculate the proportion of total local taxes raised
in the county and levied by the county government. As in
the original Nixon plan, only general-purpose governments
(not school and other special-purpose districts) could
receive funds. Finally, the municipalities would receive
their funds according to the same three factors: popula-
tion, per-capita income, and urban population. States
could withhold up to 10% of local funds for regional
projects, provided that the state matched local funds
with state funds on a dollar to dollar basis.
The State and Local Assistance Act proposed to tie more
Istrings" to revenues shared with local governments than
the Nixon administration had originally intended. Funds
allocated to local governments were limited to "generally
recognized national high priority objectives." These were
defined as "operational and maintenance expenses for public
safety, environmental protection, and public transporta-
tion." The exclusion of such major local expenses as
education and welfare was justified on the grounds that
state and local responsibilities in these areas were
handled in very different ways by each state. It was also
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noted that the House had passed a welfare reform bill
which, among other things, was designed to provide greater
federal welfare assistance and that a number of federal-
aid-to-education programs were already in operation.
The bill required states to maintain at least the same
level of aid to local governments that prevailed before
the revenue bill was enacted. It also prohibited state
and local governments from using revenue sharing funds
to match other federal grants. The bill authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to require local governments
to repay 110% of any expenditure used for unauthorized
purposes and to cut off funds to localities in violation
of the bill's provisions. Finally, the bill required the
Internal Revenue Service to piggyback state income tax
collection under certain conditions.50 The purpose was
to enable states to use the income tax as a greater source
of revenue with minimum administrative effort.
5 o The state taxes eligible for federal collection were those based on
taxable income as federally defined and those levied as a percentage of
federal tax liabilities. The bill provided for establishment of com-
bined withholding rates, so that employers would be required to keep
only one set of records and to make combined deposits of withheld taxes.
The system was scheduled to take effect January 1, 1974 if at least five
states had agreed and qualified and if the residents of these five states
had filed at least 5% of the total federal income tax returns in 1973.
86
There was strong dissent from just under half the members
of the Ways and Means Committee. They objected to the
restrictions on the use of local revenue sharing funds
while state government was free to use its share of the
funds in any way it liked. The local priority spending
categories, it was suggested, were plucked from thin air
for the sole purpose of distinguishing the Mills version
of the bill from the administration's no-strings attached
revenue sharing proposal (which had been denounced by
some members of the Congress). The provisions of the
bill that the dissident group found objectionable included
its failure to deal with the existing weaknesses of local
and state governments; the lack of any rationale for the
amounts of money or relationship of the amounts to state
or local needs; the lack of a rationale for the various
formulae; the failure to take account of other federal
aid programs or state aids to local governments; the lack
of effective accountability requirements. The dissenters
said basically that the bill would transfer more power to
Washington instead of strengthening state and local
government.
Passage of the bill in the House was virtually assured on
the first day of debate when proponents of the revenue
sharing plan prevailed in a key procedural move. By a
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roll-call vote of 223-185, the House closed off debate and
precluded the possibility of making any amendments. The
closed rule procedure limited action on the House floor to
either passing the bill, killing it, or returning it to
the Ways and Means Committee. With governors, mayors,
and other state and local officials lobbying vigorously
for the bill (with strong support from taxpayers) the
bill commanded an impressive majority when it came to a
vote. With an election coming up shortly, opponents had
little hope of defeating a program that was being touted
as a sure-fire method of holding down or reducing local
property taxes.
The debate on the floor of the House pitted two important
political figures against each other: Wilbur Mills, and
George Mahon of the Appropriations Committee. Mahon
opposed the bill on the grounds that it required the
federal government to spend money it did not have and that
it disregarded House rules which specifically prohibited
appropriations in legislative bills. Mahon hoped to
delete the on-going appropriation provision and to require
annual appropriations as in the case of most other grant-
in-aid programs. 51
51 Had the bill been open to amendment, attempts would surely have been
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Mills defended the bill against charges that it would
distribute more funds per capita to wealthier states than
to poorer states and cities. The distribution formulae
were terribly arbitrary, but it was clear from the nature
of the debate on the floor that most Congressmen could
not understand them.5 2 Other arguments, which also
failed, held that the bill did nothing to reduce the
fragmentation of local governments or to address the
needs of sparsely populated rural areas.
Revenue Sharing from the City Perspective
Revenue sharing will miss the mark if it fails to relieve
some of the intense fiscal pressure on local, and
particularly urban, governments. 53 All along, the
theoretical arguments for revenue sharing such as the
need to adjust for the spillover effects of public expendi-
tures or the need for interstate equalization of tax
made to challenge the complicated distribution formulae, to add tax
reforms of various kinds, and perhaps to make still other changes in
basic tax statutes. As with other legislation under similar circum-
stances, Mills announced before the bill was taken up that he was
under instructions from his committee to withdraw the bill from floor
consideration if it was open to amendment. The Rules Committee, on
May 23, 1972, voted 8-7 to approve the closed rule motion.
5 2Congressional Record, Thursday, June 22, 1972. No. 102-Vol. 118
(see the debate in the House on H5943).
5 3Harvey perloff, ed., with Richard Nathan, Revenue Sharing and the
City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 30.
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burdens have been less convincing than the cries for help
from financially-pressed cities struggling to pay for
vital public services. While municipal costs have sky-
rocketed, local political leaders claim that their tax
base has diminished as industry and middle-income resi-
dents have fled to the suburbs. The evidence on this
score is inconclusive. Certainly costs have escalated
(especially payments to unionized municipal workers), but
many cities have failed to professionalize their budgeting
and accounting systems. Quite possibly, the real fiscal
crisis is on the expenditure and not the revenue side of
the ledger.
Although in recent years state governments have become
somewhat more responsive to service needs in metropolitan
areas, there has not been (nor is there now) any assurance
that the additional income states receive via revenue
sharing will be used to increase state aid to the cities.
Most city officials have not accepted the argument that
variations in state-local relationships require federal-
state arrangements to give states the flexibility they
need to deal effectively with their own localities.s 4 City
spokesmen have urged that special provisions be included
5 4Report of the National Comnission on Urban Problems, Building the
American City (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),
better known as the Douglas Commission Report, p. 378.
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in any federal revenue sharing bill to protect the
interests of large urban areas. One of the original
proponents of revenue sharing summed up the issue quite
nicely:
the question is not whether revenue sharing should put
federal funds at the disposal of local governments, but
how. Can one count on relief coming, automatically,
from a no-strings grant made to the states, or should a
specific part of the state share be reserved for the
local units?ss
As it turns out, the proponents of revenue sharing were
finally persuaded that an explicit pass through require-
ment was necessary in order to recognize the legitimate
claims of city governments.5 6 Choosing an appropriate
pass-through percentage, however, was by no means an easy
task. In addition, there was much agonizing over whether
or not all units of local government should be eligible
for federally-shared funds. In arguing for direct formula-
based shares for major cities and urban counties, the
Douglas Commission suggested aid should go only to munici-
palities of 50,000 or more and county governments above
the same minimum size in which at least half the population
was "urban." This selective approach was designed to avoid
s sWalter Heller, "A Sympathetic ]Reappraisal of Revenue Sharing, " in
Perloff, 
__. cit., p. 31.
56Douglas Commission, o]. cit.,, p. 378.
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the tremendous administrative headaches involved in
servicing 80,000 localities as well as the possibility
that no-strings federal aid would be used to maintain
entrenched local governments too small to operate
efficiently. In addition, it was hoped that this system
would encourage consolidation of local governments in
urban areas, and an increasing use of the county as an
instrument for local school-taxing purposes. 5 7  In
determining each city's revenue sharing allotment, a
formula could have been designed to give extra weight to
a high incidence of dependency, density, or poverty. In
the end, however, the easiest solution was a simple per-
centage pass through. 58
5 7 Ibid.
"Senator Javits proposed to meet the problem of a minimum pass through
by requiring states to distribute to the local governments an equitable
proportion of their allotments, the ratio in each state to be no less
than the average of the state's distribution of its own revenues to
local governments over the previous five years (S. 2619, 89th Congress).
At one point it was suggested that a Council of representative state and
local officials be set up to assure a careful weighing of general and
special local needs in each state. Although in the final analysis most
mayors and city officials felt they had no choice but to support the
compromise State and Local Assistance Act of 1972 (there was no way to
explain to a "tax-revolting" public why the terms of the bill were not
all they might be), they had to cross their fingers and hope that the
minimum pass through would not also become the maximum, that the states
would not reduce other payments to local governments; and that the
federal government would not abandon its categorical grant programs
aimed at combatting poverty, blight, disease, and pollution.
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A number of Republican congressmen who opposed the pass-
through requirements on the grounds that it would weigh
down revenue sharing plans with too many complexities
were banking on reapportionment to ensure fair treatment
for cities at the hands of the state legislature. Some
even hoped that reapportionment would eliminate the need
for a pass-through requirement altogether. But reappor-
tionment alone could not help cities to solve "the
crushing problems of poverty, racial disability, obsolete
social capital, pollution and undernourished public
services." 5'9  Even after reapportionment, central cities
are "represented in proportion, not to their problems,
but to their population."
Before lining up behind the compromise version of the
State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, Wilbur Mills
tried to win support for an alternative plan. His
approach differed from the Nixon's administration's in
several respects:
--Disbursement: the Mills bill would have funnelled
aid directly to eligible units of local government.
Under the Nixon plan, of course, aid was scheduled
to go through the states (although local govern-
ments were guaranteed a share).
59Perloff, op. cit., p. 32.
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--Needs Test: communities would have to show a
need for additional federal aid. A test might have
been based, for example, on the number of persons
in the community living at the poverty level (as
defined by Congress). The Nixon plan contained no
needs test of any kind, although states and locali-
ties that made greater tax efforts were scheduled
to receive proportionately larger shares.
--Strings: all new federal aid would be earmarked
for specific purposes such as police and fire pro-
tection. The money could not be used, according
to the Mills approach, for a long list of prohibited
programs--including capital construction or reduc-
tion of the municipal debt. (No strings of any
kind were to be attached to federally shared funds
under the Nixon plan.)
--Fiscal Base: the Mills legislation would have been
funded annually at a level set by Congress. The
President's bill was tied automatically to a 1.3%
share of the federal personal income tax.
--Duration: Mills wanted a three to five year
program; the Nixon administration proposed a
permanent outlay. 60
One reason cited in Democratic circles for Mills' interest
in direct aid to the cities was a presidential boomlet in
his behalf. In order to run for the Presidency, it was
suggested, he had to project himself as a national
Democrat. This, of course, required building a base of
6 0 Ibid.
support in large central cities. The Mills approach would
have substantially altered the compromise between state
and local fiscal needs envisioned under the Nixon revenue
sharing plan. By tying federal aid to local tax effort,
the Administration's program offered advantages to
wealthier communities (which tended to tax their citizens
at a high rate) which tended to vote Republican. By
tying aid to a community's specific needs, the Mills plan
would have shifted the advantage to big urban centers and
poor rural communities, both of which tended to vote
Democratic. Under the Mills approach state governments
would have been frozen out of the block grant program.6 1
City interest groups in support of the revenue sharing
idea coupled their endorsement with a urgent plea for
the continuation of federal categorical grants--especially
those designed to "stimulate, sustain, or reinforce
efforts to deal directly with the needs of economically
and socially dependent persons in urban areas." In
short, they argued that more generalized fiscal assistance
should not substitute for federal aid aimed directly at
certain types of pressing social needs.
6 1National Journal, July 10, 1971.
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There were at least three reasons for city representatives
to oppose totally unrestricted revenue sharing. First
there was no assurance that the states would spend
federal funds according to national priorities. Thus,
revenue sharing might encourage a balkanization of
expenditures at the very time when a comprehensive
national approach was needed.6 2 Second, past experience
suggested that the states could not be trusted to take
proper account of city needs in allocating federal block
grants. Third, a shift to block-grant revenue sharing
might be used as an excuse to cut back categorical grant-
in-aid programs.
Summary
At the time of this writing chances are that some form of
general revenue sharing will be enacted even though the
Senate Finance Committee has tampered with the pass-
through formula proposed by the House, thereby ensuring
a fight in committee. 3 The Finance Committee, dominated
by rural interests, proposed a modification that would
6 2 Richard Musgrave, "National Taxes and Local Needs," The Nation,
January 16, 1967, p. 80.
6 3New York Times, "Senate Panel Votes to Cut Sharing for Urban
States," August 9, 1972.
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cut aid to big cities in favor of an increased allocation
to rural states. Election-year pressures are such,
however, that most Congressmen cannot afford to oppose
a measure that looks as if it might provide additional
funds to their districts (even if the formula is less
than ideal). So, some form of general revenue sharing
is likely to pass, if not this year, then next.
The special revenue sharing bills have not fared so well.
Only the urban and rural development bills have been
through the wringer of committee hearings. These bills
hinge ultimately on the President's proposed executive
reorganization plans which have been scuttled at least
temporarily by the Congress. Because the special revenue
sharing programs threatened to cut into the power of
standing Congressional committees, they were not parti-
cularly well received and their chances of passing in the
long run are not particularly good.
Attempts to reform intergovernment management over the
past ten years have revolved around three separate but
related arguments. First, the proliferation of rigid
categorical grants-in-aid ought to be halted and admini-
strative procedures simplified. Second, the national
government ought to help state and local governments
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which have tried but have been unable to meet the rising
costs of public services. Third, some way ought to be
found to redistribute or equalize income among the states
and to shift the power that has centralized in Washington
back to the states. Basically, all three ideas make
sense. Yet each implies a somewhat different approach
to intergovernmental reform. Attempts to rally support
for unrestricted revenue sharing as the best means of
achieving all three objectives have been downright mis-
leading. Substantial improvements can be made in cate-
gorical grants-in-aid without resorting to block grants
or revenue sharing. It also seems obvious that the mere
consolidation of grants or simplification of administra-
tive procedures will do little if anything to redress
imbalances in the distribution of income among the various
states.
In the course of Congressional deliberations, President
Nixon's general revenue sharing proposal was modified
substantially. The latest compromise version includes a
pass-through requirement as well as certain restrictions
on the ways in which federal funds can be used. The
President's special revenue sharing proposals have turned
out to be nothing more than another effort at grant con-
solidation. All in all, it would appear that the United
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States is not prepared at the present time to seriously
consider unconditional block grants (or balancing grants)
to the states. Lingering doubts about the capabilities
of state government and the ways in which cities are
likely to be treated at the hands of state officials have
been cause for continued concern.
In light of all this, it is surprising that so little
attention has been paid to the two block-grant programs
that have been in operation for the past four years.
Although arguments for and against different approaches
to modifying our intergovernmental grant-in-aid system
have hinged on whether or not criticisms of state govern-
ment have been justified, no systematic attempt has been
made to chart the experience under these two programs.
The Safe Streets Act and the Partnership for Health are
nothing less than test cases. In both instances the
states were given an opportunity to show what they can do.
A review of these two programs may help to calm the
rhetoric on all sides of the revenue sharing and grant
reform debate.
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Chapter II: A New Role for the States
Passage of the Partnership for Health Act in 1966 and the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 sig-
nalled an important turning point in the evolution of our
federal system. From the time of the great depression in
the 1930's, up until the mid-1960's, efforts to expand
federal grant-in-aid programs were characterized almost
exclusively by the rise of "direct federalism": the
allocation of federal funds from the national government
directly to local governments (or even private individuals
and institutions). More often than not programs designed
to deal with the difficult problems of large cities and
metropolitan areas by-passed the states. The national
government forged a partnership with the larger cities of
the nation. Direct federalism represented a commitment
on the part of the President and the Congress to deal with
the problems plaguing central cities. Throughout the
1950's and 1960's the response of the states had been weak
and incomplete; but growing federal involvement with the
problems of the cities spurred state action. State govern-
ments reacted (partly out of fear and partly for other
reasons) to the expansion of the federal government's role
in local affairs by trying to regain their once proud
position as important partners in the federal system.
This turn of events began in the late 1960's with an
effort to consolidate dozens of fragmented categorical
grants into broad functional-area programs under the
control of the states. Certain forces emerged to shape a
new and more powerful role for state government. For-
tuitous events and key individuals helped to bring about
the changes. The most interesting question is, what were
the real motives of those involved, and on what did they
base their new-found confidence in the states?
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The Rise of Direct Federalism
Although numerous indirect and direct relationships have
existed between the national government and various
localities from the founding of the country, the rise of
direct federalism actually began during the Great
Depression. 1 Widespread economic distress during that
period spurred the creation of federal agencies [such as
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA),
Civil Works Administration (CWA), Public Works Administra-
tion (PWA), and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC)], set up to counteract the terrible pressures of
unemployment and to catalyze economic recovery. To
succeed, they had to show success in the cities where
the problems were most acute. As it turned out, the
urgent need to distribute relief funds provided the
federal government with an excuse for "short-circuiting
the states and dealing directly with the cities." 2
The reasons for bypassing the states were fairly obvious
They had not performed effectively, nor had they developed
'Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Involvement
in Federal Local Grant Programs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970), p. 10. The ACIR report is based on a doctoral disserta-
tion by Carl Steinberg, State University of New York at Albany,
August, 1969.
2Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations, op. cit., p. 655.
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"adequate channels through which the federal government
might extend desperately needed assistance to the
cities.3 Furthermore, because state legislatures were
dominated by rural interests, many cities "were in the
peculiar position of petitioning Washington for protec-
tion." And, for the most part, Washington provided local
officials with a. more sympathetic ear than their own state
capitals.
Direct and indirect administrative and financial relation-
ships between the federal government and local units
continued to flourish throughout World War II as inter-
national pressures dictated immediate action in areas
such as civil defense. In the post-war period, mounting
public demands for new and improved services rapidly
dissipated local cash surpluses (that had accumulated
during the war), while restrictive state controls prevented
localities from raising sufficient funds to meet their own
needs. As was the case during the Depression, most state
governments were unwilling or unable to assist in resolv-
ing post-war fiscal dilemmas. As a result, Congress
3ACIR, State Involvement, op. cit., p. 10
4Ibid.
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responded with direct federal financial aid for urban
renewal, public housing, slum clearance, airport construc-
tion, highway building, flood control, medical facilities,
and other types of public works projects.s
The growth of direct federalism slowed somewhat during
the 1950's, although a few direct federal-local programs
were enacted dealing with water quality control and
community renewal. In general, President Eisenhower
preferred to rely on the states to administer federal
grant programs.6
The number of new federal programs which by-passed the
states completely grew very rapidly in the early 1960's.
Prior to 1960, 25 programs--beginning with the low-rent
public housing program in 1937--had been adopted under
which funds went directly from Washington to the local
governments. From 1960 to 1966, another 43 grant-in-aid
programs were put into effect. Twenty-two of these pro-
vided no role at all for the states. Federal aid to
urban areas continued to grow apace increasing from
sGraves, o. cit., pp. 658-660.
6 ACIR, State Involvement, oQ. cit., p. 11.
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$3.8 billion in 1961 to over $14 billion in 1969 (see
Tables III and IV).
Some of the reasons for increased federal involvement in
urban development activities are fairly well documented.
For one thing, the population of the country had (from
1950 to 1960) become predominantly urban.7 Moreover, the
number of poor and black residents in the country's
largest cities had increased dramatically. Since the bulk
of the votes had moved to the cities, federal largesse
was flung in that direction. The Democrats rode to power
in the 1960's on the strength of the big-city vote. In
an effort to make good on their campaign promises, the
7 The percentage distribution of state populations for selected states
in 1960 was as follows:
SMSA Cities SMSA Suburbs Outstate
New York 58 31 11
California 34 50 16
Pennsylvania 32 48 20
Illinois 42 35 23
Ohio 35 34 31
Texas 46 17 37
Michigan 32 41 27
New Jersey 18 60 22
Massachusetts 33 51 16
Florida 24 41 35
Source: A James Reichley, "The Political Containrrent of the Cities,"
in Alan Campbell, ed., The States and the Urban Crisis (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 175.
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Table III
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PAYMENTS FOR SELECTED YEARS,
(In Millions of Dollars)
1932-1963
Column 1
Federal
Payments
to State
and Local
Governments
8,507
6,974
3,131
2,486
954
945
948
232
Column 2
Federal
Payments
to State
Governments
7,566
6,382
2,762
2,275
926
667
719
222
Column 3
Federal
Payments
Direct
to Local
Governments
941
592
368
211
28
278
229
10
Column 4
State
Payments
to Local
Governments
10,906 (1962)
9,443
5,986
4,217
1,842
1,654
1,417
801
Sources:
1932-1955, Columns 1, 2, and 3: U. S. Bureau of the Budget,
"Historical Summary of Governmental Finances in the United States,"
1957 Census of Governments, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1959, Table 4.
1960, Columns 1, 2, and 3: U. S. Bureau of the Budget,
Governmental Finances in 1960, September 19, 1961, Tables 1, 12.
1963, Columns 1, 2, and 3: U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Federal
Payments to State and Local Governments, by Program: 1963"
(processed tabulation compiled by the Governments Division).
Column 4: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962,
Vol. VI, No. 2, State Payments to Local Governments, Table 1.
Year
1963
1960
1955
1950
1944
1940
1936
1932
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Table IV
FEDERAL-AID OUTLAYS IN URBAN AREAS (In Millions of Dollars)
1961
Function and Program Actual
1964 1969
Actual Actual
1972
Estimate
Community Development and Housing
Community action program
Urban renewal
Public housing
Water and sewer facilities
Model Cities
Other
Education and Manpower
Head Start and Follow Through
Elementary and secondary
Higher education
Vocational education
Enployment security administration
Manpower activities
Other
Health
Hospital construction
Regional medical program
Mental health
Maternal and child health
Comprehensive health planning
and services
Health educational facilities
Medical assistance
Health manpower
Other
Income Security
Vocational rehabilitation
Public assistance
Child nutrition, special milk
and food stamps
Other
General Government
Law enforcement
National Capital region
Other
Other Functions
Total aids to urban areas
106
105
2
432
159 786
136 257
36 52
8
17 75
222
5
28
303
3
48
4
18
29
264
14
29
344
64
7
256
1,262
210
179
449
530
77
66 89
19
8 50
34 139
48 80
106
140 1,731
28
4 54
37 61
L,170 1,450
131
3
168
16
25 38
9
2
3,893 5,588
247
3,022
549
975
570
110
420
278
97
1,1457
113
393
327
1,271
704
113
63
66
203
150
117
2,074
193
283
400
5,581
482 1,690
148 510
17
85
27
14,045
464
158
145
5
24,035
Source: Douglas M. Fox, "Federal Aid to the Cities," in D. Fox, ed.,
The New Urban Politics (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Pub. Co.,
1972).
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Democrats responded directly to their primary constituency
--inner city ethnics, machine politicians, and upper-
middle-class liberals anxious to do something about
poverty and inner-city problems. The rediscovery of
poverty during the 1960's provided a handy justification
for expanding and initiating a whole range of federal
domestic programs. Poverty was a problem that everyone
agreed was national in scope and required immediate action.
To some extent federal programs designed to channel aid
to the cities were a payoff to inner-city blacks who,
during the riots of the mid-1960's, flexed their political
muscle for the first time. No sooner had the ink dried on
one proclamation than another program was proposed. It
was easier to initiate a new program than to figure out
why the old ones had failed. The adage, "If at first
you don't succeed, try, try again," typified the attitude
of federal administrators trying to make a dent in the
insurmountable problems of the cities and metropolitan
urban areas.
By the mid-1960's the city lobby had secured a strong
position for itself in what Roscoe Martin calls "the
expanded federal partnership."8 Martin contends that the
8Roscoe Martin, The Cities and the Federal System (New York:
Atherton, 1965).
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expansion of the federal system from a two- to a three-
way partnership was unintentional and came about only
as a way of "dealing more effectively with problems
beyond the scope or resources of traditional governments
operating within customary and long-standing usage."9
His assertion, however, does not seem to hold up; for
the dispatch with which the federal government suddenly
moved to assist the cities was more than a measured
response to the inactivity of the states. There were
special pressures on the Democrats to respond to the
needs of the cities. True, the states had fumbled many
opportunities over a long period of time, but the rise of
direct federalism was not merely a response to this.
Political pressures and national party politics also
played an important role.
The argument that "weak state governments make for
national centralization" is, according to Professor Morton
Grodzins, "far more false than true." 10 Daniel Elazer,
one of the foremost authorities on state government,
has suggested that the growth of direct federal-local
relations can be viewed partly as an effort to bypass
9 Ibid., pp. 45-82.
1 0Norton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Govenment in
The United States, op. cit., p. 320.
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those state governments in the South "hostile to the
civil rights aspects" of various domestic programs, and
partly as "an attempt to break through established power
structures to reach certain excluded groups." Elazer
also contends that the states encouraged the establishment
of direct federal-local relations--not by their inability
or unwillingness to discharge their responsibilities,
but rather as a part of a larger political strategy:
The large cities, in mst cases, have been encouraged to
turn to Washington by their states, if not openly at
least by tacit agreement . . . the states would use their
limited resources of money, time, and manpower to service
smaller urban and rural places, while the great metro-
politan centers would complement their efforts by doing
similar work themselves. In this respect, the states are
behaving no differently from when they encourage certain
of their functional agencies such as the highway and wel-
fare departments to pursue negotiations with their
federal counterparts, in effect, utilizing cities as
agents of state interests as much as autonomous entities. "
This conspiracy theory seems as sensible as any other and
fits quite nicely with many of the findings discussed in
later chapters of this dissertation. It suggests,
perhaps, that the states have not been quite so lazy or
so foolish as many commentators would have us believe.
"Daniel Elazer, American Federalism: A View from the States, OP.
cit., p. 76.
2 Daniel Elazer, "The Impact of Cooperative Financing Solutions," in
Perspective on State and Local Finance (Atlanta: Southern Regional
Education Board, 1967), pp. 58-59. See also Elazer's American
Federalism, o. cit., pp. 163-164.
109
The Outcome of Direct Federal Involvement
Before 1960, most federal assistance programs were not
actually designed to address explicit national purposes. 1 3
Typically, grants-in-aid were instituted to help state or
local governments accomplish their own objectives:
It [was] the states that set the goal of "getting the
farners out of the mud" through inproved state highway
networks; federal highway aid was made available
sirply to help them reach that goal sooner. Communi-
ties needed hospitals and sewage treatment plants and
airports; the leading lobbyists for the expansion of
federal assistance for community activities were the
national organizations of municipal officials, and
they sought it for specific and accepted functions of
local government. 14
After 1960, however, the urban-oriented grants that pro-
liferated (39 were added in just six years from 1961 to
1966) were conceived primarily as a means of enabling the
federal government (in some cases the Executive Branch
and in others the Congress) to achieve its objectives.
In the absence of an over-arching philosophy, federal
agencies often found themselves in conflict with one
another. By the time Richard Nixon took office in 1968,
many cities had been "torn by the conflicting demands of
1 James L. Sundquist, "The Problem of Coordination in a Changing
Federalism," in Douglas Fox, ed., The New Urban Politics (Pacific
Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear), p. 58.
1 4Ibid.
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competing federal agencies" all trying to provide some
form of assistance to the cities, but totally unable to
coordinate their activities.
Clearly, direct federalism helped to sustain many cities
during a period of severe financial and political strain
and to provide a form of tax relief by helping the states
to put off tax increases that were needed to underwrite
large-scale inner city redevelopment efforts. The growth
of direct federalism also helped to raise the national
consciousness about the serious plight of metropolitan
urban areas suffering from severe poverty and racial
discord and to highlight the problems resulting from
malapportionment in state legislatures and from the
fragmentation of local government.
Perhaps the states failed to respond to the cities' cry
for help because they were shackled by out-dated or
overly restrictive constitutions or because they were out
of touch with the needs of their citizens. It is also
possible that the governors were unable to get anything
done because their authority was undermined by numerous
independent boards, commissions, and separately elected
agency heads. Yet the federal government was not really
in a much stronger position. Federal efforts to ensure
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maximum feasible participation of local representatives
in the operation of federally-funded urban programs
failed. Federal guidelines and administrative red tape
were just as cumbersome as restrictive state constitutions.
And the problems of coordination within state government
were dwarfed by the ferocious competition among separate
federal agencies trying to maintain their ground. It is
very likely that the states were not unable to respond,
but rather just unwilling.
In the long run, the failures of direct federalism set
the stage for the re-emergence of the states. Although
federal funds helped to counter-balance regressive state
tax policies and to minimize disparities between the
quality of services in the central cities and the suburbs,
they had very little visible impact on deteriorating
central cities. While federal funds may have helped to
stave off pressures for much needed tax reform, money
did not seem to be the answer to the cities' problems.
More than anything else, federal project grants helped
to zero in on specific problems and to demonstrate how
things ought not to have been done. By testing the waters
the federal government saved the states considerable
embarrassment. Had the states with more limited resources
than those of the federal government and with smaller
pools of qualified professionals to draw upon moved
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quickly to assist the cities, they probably would have
failed miserably.
The States React
In the end, the states, through their initial inaction,
may have come out on top. The federal government made
an effort, but was condemned for trying. While the cities
gained some leverage over the states by forging a direct
alliance with the federal government, it is not clear
now just how much that leverage was worth. By the late
1960's the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) was suggesting that if any state chose
to remain aloof from the problems toward which federal
aid was being directed, then the localities were justi-
fied in participating in the federal program and dealing
directly with the federal agencies concerned. 1 5  That
suited the states, for as long as federal aid programs
were basically unsuccessful, the governors could settle
back, shake their heads sympathetically, complain about
being left out and watch the federal dollars flow.
The state's righters, of course, continued to beat their
"John DeGrove, "Help or Hindrance to State Action? The National
Government," in Campbell, o. cit . , p. 153.
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drums opposing expansion of any federal programs (whether
they operated directly through local governments or through
the states). One study of congressional voting on a
series of key urban issues during the early 1960's helps
to explain what was happening:
Roll call votes demnstrated a dominant pattern of party
voting. The evidence was clear: . . . in every instance
rural and small town Democratic members voted in much
larger proportions to support . . . urban bills than did
the Republicans from urban and suburban districts. The
predominance of party influence over constituency influ-
ences strikingly confirms the findings of much research
on Congress that political party is most likely to be the
decisive factor in Congressional voting. 16
More than anything else, party politics helps to explain
the re-emergence of state government as a force in the
federal system. Those who felt that the states should
have a greater role to play in the allocation of federal
monies said all that was needed were certain reforms:
reapportionment of state legislatures, modernization of
state constitutions, strengthening of the governors'
hand, and enactment of more permissive legislation
affecting localities. If these steps could be taken,
they felt, there would be no need to worry about the way
in which cities would be treated.
In the hearings conducted by the Senate Sub-committee on
16Frederick Cleaveland and Associates, Congress and Urban Problems
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969), pp. 370-371.
Executive Reorganization, considerable opposition was
expressed to any proposal that would have increased
federal aid to the states on the grounds that the money
would never get to where it was most needed--the cities.
Senator Joseph Clark testified that "I have always been
for bypassing the states because I was a mayor and not a
governor." He went on to assert that
I think, actually, that state government is the weak
link in American government today. I think that both
the federal government and most of the local govern-
ments, at least in the larger cities, are more
sophisticated, more mature, in their dealing with
these problems. 1 7
A number of states had responded to pressures for reor-
ganization and modernization. Special study commissions
had been set up to examine the possibilities of regional
and metropolitan government. State offices of local
affairs were established. Councils of government and
metropolitan planning agencies were already at work.
Annexation procedures had been liberalized and special
efforts were being made to impose more restrictive
standards on municipal incorporation. In some cases,
states were actively cooperating in city-county consoli-
1 7 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of
the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress,
second session, Parts I-IX, Part I, pp. 4-25.
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dation efforts and in some instances they had actually
assumed the responsibility for providing urban services
in badly fragmented metropolitan areas. 1 8
Skepticism toward the states, however, did not diminish
in the face of efforts to update and streamline government
organization. The "questionableness of the states as
instruments of fiscal salvation" stemmed from more than
their historic disinterest in urban affairs. As James Q.
Wilson and others pointed out, corruption in the states
has always been more or less a fact of life:
More boodle is flying around with no one watching in
state capitals than in city halls; . . . The States
have rarely been subject to the kinds of reforms which
over the years have gradually centralized formal
authority in the hands of a professional city manager
or a single strong mayor. 1 9
The reaction of the states to the growth of direct federal-
ism can be viewed in still another way. Pressures not to
respond to urban interest were very strong:
To ask why the states have not done more to help their
cities is to raise a question of political power. The
simple answer is that the cities have been unable either
1 8Daniel Grant, "Urban Needs and State Responses," in Carpbell, og.
cit., p. 80.
19James Q. Wilson, "Corruption: The Shame of the States," The Public
Interest, Winter, 1966, p. 35.
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to persuade or compel the states to give them the help
they feel they deserve and need. 2
Many city representatives were convinced that malappor-
tionment was the entire cause of the relative impotence
of city delegations in the legislature. Yet, now that
the process of redrawing legislative districts on the
basis of one-man-one-vote has almost been completed,
spokesmen for the cities are having painful second
thoughts. 2 1 The fact is that reapportionment helped the
suburbs much more than it helped the cities. Now that
the suburbs have ascended to a position of power, and the
Republicans have gathered strength in white suburban
working-class neighborhoods, it has become clear that
the latent conservatism of state legislatures may have
had more to do with state disinterest in city problems
than administrative inability or corruption. In short,
cities did not have the votes. By 1969 eight of the ten
most populous states had Republican governors (and one
of the two Democratic exceptions, Preston Smith of Texas,
was probably more conservative than any of the Republicans).
The controlling political fact of life in almost every
urban state was that power was in the hands of suburban
2 0A. James Reichley, op. cit., p. 169.
2 1Ibid.
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and outstate voters. The cities found themselves up
against a strategy of political containment.
Congress Acts to Expand the States' Role
During his term in office, Lyndon Johnson enacted more
social and domestic legislation than any other President
in our history, except perhaps Franklin Roosevelt. Two
programs initiated by President Johnson deserve special
attention: The Comprehensive Planning and Public Health
Services Act of 1966 [CHP] (otherwise known as the
Partnership for Health) and the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (which superceded the original
Law Enforcement Assistance Act [LEAA] of 1965). The Safe
Streets Act was intended as another in the growing list
of direct federal-to-city programs. The Congress,
however, refused to go along, and recast it as a block
grant program designed to channel federal funds through
the states. The Partnership for Health Program consoli-
dated almost two dozen public health formula and project
grants-in-aid. Insofar as the CHP program was concerned,
the Congress endorsed the President's proposal; although
a number of troublesome issues hovered just below the
surface. While President Johnson endorsed an expanded
role for the states in the public health field, he fought
bitterly to minimize the administrative involvement of the
states in the law enforcement area.
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The CHP and LEAA programs need to be viewed in context.
The first public health grants to the states were
authorized as early as 1917 (as part of the cooperative
federal-state program aimed at controlling the spread
of venereal disease in the vicinity of military bases
and defense installations). The Social Security Act of
1935 authorized $8 million in annual matching grants to
the states for the development of local public health
and general disease prevention services. In 1944 the
Public Health Services Act provided grant assistance to
state and local public health agencies involved in
fighting cancer, chronic illness, dental disease, heart
disease, mental illness, tuberculosis, neurological
disease, and in providing home health services. Law
enforcement, on the other hand, had almost always been
considered a local responsibility. Of course, the federal
government played a direct role in enforcing criminal
statutes against kidnapping, smuggling, drug abuse, tax
evasion and certain other crimes, but the day-to-day
administration of criminal justice activities was always
a local (and to a much lesser extent, a state) responsi-
bility. Through the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the federal government provided information, advice,
and training to state and local law enforcement officials,
but not until the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965
119
was the federal government involved in any significant
way in financing and administering law enforcement and
crime prevention activities.
President Johnson wanted to strengthen the grant-in-aid
system through a consolidation of the fragmented public
health assistance program and to expand the federal role
in the law enforcement field by channeling federal funds
directly to cities and towns. In both cases, he was
seeking to maximize flexibility while ensuring that
certain minimal federal objectives were met. The cities,
of course, had the most to gain from the two programs:
health and crime problems were concentrated in urban
areas. In effect, the President, by pushing these two
programs, was once again responding to the Democrats'
primarily urban constituency.
The ability of state governments to administer the CHP
and LEAA programs was very much at issue in the Congres-
sional debates. For various reasons, though, other
aspects of the two programs attracted considerably more
public attention than the block grant programs. During
the LEAA debates, for example, the question of the
states' role was obscured by a fight over wiretapping and
the rights of criminals. Richard Harris, in a book re-
counting the issues surrounding passage of the Omnibus
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Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, mentions the question
of the states' role only in passing. Most of the attention
was focused on right-wing members of the Congress who were
trying to overturn key Supreme Court decisions. 2 2 The
Partnership for Health legislation, on the other hand,
became a political hot potato for entirely different
reasons. The Congress and the President battled back and
forth over a controversial rat control provision that was
not even part of the original bill. In addition, the
expansion of federal programs in the health field kicked
off a fierce lobbying effort by the American Medical
Association which feared governmental intervention in any
aspect of private medical practice.
The Conservative coalition in the Congress was still
another factor that shaped the destiny of the CHP and
LEAA programs.2 3 Conservative Republicans and southern
Democrats teamed up to whittle down the President's
proposed authorization for the CHP program from six years
22 Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime (New York: Praeger, 1969).
2 3The revitalized "Conservative coalition" of Republicans and Southern
Democrats was a dominating force in Congress in 1967, buoyed by a
shift of 47 House seats to the GOP as a result of the 1966 elections.
The coalition challenged the President on 29 different occasions and
was victorious 17 times. Congressional Quarterly, December 29, 1967,
pp. 2649-2651.
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to two and also helped to kill a number of amendments
designed to channel aid directly to big-city hospitals.
The coalition played a critical role in squelching
President Johnson's efforts to channel LEAA funds
directly to the cities.
One interesting turn of events may shed some light on the
events that transpired. During the 1968 Presidential
election, the Republicans adopted the law and order issues
as a campaign theme. Even though it was the Democrats
who proposed more federal involvement in the law enforce-
ment area, it was the Republicans who took credit for the
idea. The Democrats held that crime was directly related
to social and economic deprivation. They chose to empha-
size the War on Poverty, the Civil Rights Act, and various
educational measures as the most appropriate techniques
for altering the environment in which criminal activity
was allegedly spawned. The Republicans took a harder
stand; they wanted to beef up local police forces and
called for an all-out assault on street crime and rioting.
While the Democrats considered the LEAA program another
string in the Great Society's bow, the Republicans and
the Conservative coalition turned this issue to their own
advantage by putting the stress on law enforcement rather
than crime prevention.
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As the LEAA and CHP bills moved slowly through the Con-
gressional mill, a new found confidence in the ability
of state government appeared. It may have been nothing
more than an instinctive Republican reaction to the rise
of direct federalism. A number of arguments surfaced
during the Congressional debates suggesting that the
Republicans were convinced that the time had come to
carve out a new and more powerful role for the states.
First, they argued that the states, because they are
closer to local needs than the federal government, are
more likely to spend federal dollars in ways that will
yield "disproportionate benefits." Allegedly the states
are more aware of local problems, and thus in a position
to avoid waste, duplication, and unnecessary competition
for funds. Second, because many problems transcend
local boundaries and there is a need to pull together
fragmented and balkanized local jurisdictions, the states
are in the best position to accomplish this. Cities and
towns are nothing more than Constitutional creatures of
the state. Third, if the states are ever to improve
their administrative capabilities, the federal government
will have to give them additional support. Direct
federal-city relations were doing very little to institu-
tionalize problem-solving capabilities in state government.
Block grant advocates were unusually sanguine about the
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intrinsic capabilities of the states. They claimed that
a federal-state-local partnership in the fight against
crime made a great deal of sense since the courts and
correctional institutions were beyond the control of city
governments. Their real motive, though, was to use the
block grants to help reinforce the principles of tradi-
tional federalism and to halt the centralization of power
in the hands of the President. The convergence of self-
serving interests rather than a renewed confidence in
state government may best explain the push for a larger
state role in the management of intergovernmental grants-
in-aid.
Some of the compromises made to ensure passage of the
LEAA and CHP legislation guaranteed that the programs
would run into great difficulty eventually. For one
thing, the goals of both programs were never spelled out
in any detail. The LEAA program, for example, was designed
to escalate "the war against crime in the streets." The
rhetoric captured the public's imagination, but there was
no agreement on how best to fight crime or what the causes
of lawlessness really were. This was intentional, of
course, for as long as the legislative mandate was vague,
no state would be left out when the money was distributed.
Although flexibility was probably in order considering
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the unique circumstances in various parts of the country,
the vagueness of the legislation also opened the door to
widespread abuse.
Both bills called for "innovation." Somehow, the states
were supposed to come up with ways of improving public
health and of controlling crime that no one in Washington
had been able to invent. Neither the LEAA nor the CHP
program required federal approval of state or local plans
designed to spur innovation. Eventually, a stipulation
was added to the LEAA program requiring every state to
submit an annual plan, but to this day health funds are
looked upon as an entitlement, not as an award. In the
absence of review procedures, the federal government had
no way of knowing how the states used the money or whether
they had any intention of meeting basic federal require-
ments (vague as they were). Neither program made adequate
provision for monitoring or evaluation. The states were
under little if any pressure to assess their efforts or to
report the results of experimental projects. Federal
audits were required; but they involved nothing more than
a check to see if all the funds were accounted for--a far
cry from carefully designed studies appraising the success
or failure of particular projects. All in all, there was
no agreement on what the programs were designed to accom-
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plish or on how success would be measured.
The LEAA and CHP programs were related indirectly. By the
time the Safe Streets Act was considered by the Congress,
the Partnership for Health was already in operation. The
CHP program had clearly served to expand the role of the
states. Of course, there was a long history of state
involvement in public health activities. When the anti-
city forces in the Congress used the CHP program to
support their plea for greater state involvement in law
enforcement, no mention was made of the fact that law
enforcement had always been the exclusive province of local
government. The Conservative coalition was able to use the
CHP precedent to head off a move toward direct federal-city
grant awards in the law enforcement field. The Congress,
in its rush to halt galloping federalism and invigorate
the states, obscured the distinction between the states'
earlier role in the public health field and their relative
inexperience in matters of law enforcement.
The Partnership for Health Controversy
As signed by the President, the 1966 Partnership for
Health bill (S3008) (see Appendix B) contained the following
key provisions:
General Provisions: Specified that federal funds be
used to support the marshalling of national, state
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and local health resources to assure comprehensive,
high quality health services for every person,
without interferring in the private practice of
medicine and dentistry.
Planning: Authorized $2.5 million in fiscal 1967 and
$5 million in fiscal 1968 for formula grants to the
states for comprehensive health planning. Federal
funds could cover all costs of planning if the U.S.
Surgeon General approved.
--Required each state to set up one agency to
administer health planning programs and to encourage
cooperation among public and private health organiza-
tions.
--Authorized $5 million in fiscal 1967 and $7.5
million in fiscal 1968 for grants to cover up to 75%
of the costs of projects to develop regional or local
plans for coordination of health services.
--Authorized $1.5 million in fiscal 1967 and $2.5
million in fiscal 1968 for grants to public or non-
profit agencies for training or demonstration projects
to develop improved comprehensive health planning.
Comprehensive Health Services: Authorized $62.5 mil-
lion in fiscal 1968 for grants to state health
authorities to help them establish and maintain ade-
quate public health services under plans reviewed by
the Surgeon General.
--Repealed section 314 of the Public Health Service
Act of 19 44 which authorized formula grants to the
states for general public health services and control
of specific diseases.
--Directed that state plans promote local health
services and use federal funds to augment existing
services.
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--Stipulated that at least 15% of the state's
allotment go to the state's mental health authority.
--Provided that the federal share range from one-
third to two-thirds of total cost for services,
depending on relative state per capita income.
Health Services Development: Authorized $62.5 million
in fiscal 1968 for grants to public and nonprofit
agencies to cover part of the cost of providing ser-
vices to meet health needs of limited geographic
scope, stimulating new health services, and undertak-
ing studies or training to improve methods of provid-
ing health services.
-- Repealed section 316 of the Public Health
Services Act of 1944 which authorized project grants
for developing new methods of providing out-of-
hospital health services, effective July 1, 1967.
Public Health Schools: Authorized $5 million in
fiscal 1968 for grants to nonprofit schools of public
health for professional training, specialized clonsult-
ing services and technical assistance in administration
of state or local public health programs.
The President succeeded in meeting the general objectives
outlined in his March 1, 1966 message on health in which
he recommended a "program of grants to enable states and
communities to plan for better use of manpower, facilities,
and financial resources for comprehensive health services."
He also called for new formula grants to the states and
nonprofit agencies to meet special health problems. He
said that the existing categorical grant program led to "an
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unnecessarily rigid and compartmentalized approach to
health problems." By the time the President signed the
bill, various House and Senate committees had made a
number of important changes that reflected differences
of opinion with the Chief Executive.
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee tried to
add provisions authorizing the Surgeon General to estab-
lish national health goals and guidelines and to assist
states in developing comprehensive health plans. The
Committee also specified that federal funds could not be
used to interfere with existing patterns of private medi-
cal practice and that comprehensive health services would
have to be made available to all individuals in a state,
regardless of their income, age or place of residence.
Two other important amendments were added on the floor of
the Senate; firsta stipulation requiring each state to
use 70% of its allotment to improve services in local
communities; second, at the suggestion of Everett Dirkson,
a cut in the authorization by about $1.2 billion. 24
The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee held
hearings on the bill. Chairman Harley Staggers announced
2 4 Congressional Quarterly, October 7, 1966, p. 2405.
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at the outset that it was too late in the session for the
Committee to "conduct the extensive hearings which the
subject deserved" and that the best policy would be to
hold hearings on a "much more limited bill." For that
reason, he introduced a revised version of S3008 which
authorized $125 million for the planning of comprehensive
health services in fiscal 1967-1969 (permitting the exist-
ing project and formula grant programs to run through
fiscal 1967), and for new formula and project grants for
health services (for 1968-1969 only) as recommended by the
Administration.
Dr. William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service (PHS), said that the PHS preferred the
original administration bill to the more limited proposal,
but would accept the modified version in view of the
pending adjournment of Congress. The Surgeon General
expressed the hope that new legislation providing for more
adequate funding would be presented in the 90th Congress.
The administration agreed to the cut in authorizations in
order to put the block grant feature on the books. Repre-
sentatives of the American Medical Association, testifying
in support of the legislation, asked for a clearer defini-
tion of the services that would be provided. The AMA
opposed the broad and vague terminology of the bill. They
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feared a possible intrusion into the private practice of
medicine. In addition, the AMA proposed that the state
health planning councils called for in the legislation (to
oversee state health planning activities) include a
majority of physicians. Dr. Charles Hudson, AMA President,
also suggested that the state comprehensive health plan
should be reviewed and approved by the state health plan-
ning council.
The CHP program was aimed at improving health services for
individuals and families and not at combatting specific
diseases. This was not acceptable to the AMA. In eliminat-
ing categorical grant programs, and attempting to give the
states greater flexibility, Congress eliminated the focus
on combatting specific diseases and in so doing stepped
on the toes of the private physicians. The issue was made
perfectly clear during the hearings when Dr. Hudson urged
Congress to "define public health services so that its
intentions will be clear and that public health clinics
will not be fostered to replace private medical care." 25
The bill reported by the House Committee differed from the
Senate-passed measure in a number of ways. First, it
2 5Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comierce,
House of Representatives, 89th Congress, second session, pp. 57-72.
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authorized funds for two years instead of four. Second,
it carried lesser authorizations for some programs (1968
comprehensive health services and development authoriza-
tions were $145.5 million lower than Senate figures).
Third, it did not contain authority for the Surgeon
General to formulate health goals and guidelines for
developing comprehensive health plans. Finally, it did
not include the provision that at least 70% of a state's
allotment for comprehensive health services be used for
service to the state's communities. The House passed the
bill by voice vote. The Senate concurred, clearing the
way for the President to sign the bill into law.
The following year, in his February 28th message on educa-
tion and health, President Johnson asked for an extension
of the Partnership for Health legislation through fiscal
1972. In addition, he requested open-ended authorizations
after fiscal 1968. Quite by chance, pressure was mounting
in Congress for enactment of regulations to control clini-
cal laboratories. Attention was drawn to the potential
danger of unregulated laboratories during hearings held in
February when Dr. David Spencer, Director of the PHS
Communicable Disease Center, told the Senate Judiciary
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee that 25% of the tests
performed by 13,000 to 14,000 U.S. clinical labs were
"erroneous."
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When the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
reported the Administration's Partnership for Health
Amendments of 1967, the bill included provision for the
licensing of clinical laboratories which received speci-
mens through interstate commerce. In addition, the House
Committee expanded and extended through 1971 authorization
for grants to the states for comprehensive health planning
and public health services. The Committee also accepted
an amendment offered by Rep. Richard Ottinger of New York
authorizing $58 million in fiscal 1968 for emergency
improvements in critically overcrowded city hospitals.
In a surprising move, the Committee restored the provision
deleted the year before requiring at least 70% of the
state's block grant funds to be made available for ser-
vices in local communities. The thirteen Republican
members of the House Committee objected to the Ottinger
amendment. They called it a preferential bonanza for a
few big cities. The Republicans charged that it would
"completely short circuit" the "sensible and successful
Hill-Burton Program" (a health facilities construction
program that had been in effect since World War II).
On September 20, 1967, the House adopted an important
amendment to the Partnership for Health bill providing an
additional $40 million for rat-control. It was tacked on
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quite by accident. The House reversed an action it had
taken several months earlier when it refused to consider
a rat control bill presented by the Administration. That
earlier action had unleashed a storm of protest from
civil rights groups. Republicans provided the votes
needed to reverse the earlier stand on rat control,
although the program was again opposed by the "conservative
coalition." 26
The rat control amendment proposed by Henry Reuss and
Charles Mathias probably had as much to do with the
passage of the 1967 CHP amendments as anything in the ori-
ginal legislation. Opposition to the Reuss-Mathias amend-
ment was led by William Springer, ranking minority member
of the House Commerce Committee. He contended that the
Public Health Service already had enough money in its
$65 million fund for special project grants and that at
least ten other federal agencies were already operating
rat control programs. Just because he happened to live in
2 6 There were substantial differences between the rat control bill re-
jected earlier by the House and the Reuss-Mathias amendment to the
Partnership for Health bill. The earlier proposal called for a broad
new program to be operated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. The Reuss-Mathias amendment merely authorized additional
funds to be awarded by the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, through the Public Health Service, for project grants; states,
communities or private agencies that wanted to carry out the rat con-
trol projects could apply for the grants. Congressional Quarterly,
September 22, 1967, p. 1840.
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a rural area, Springer contended, did not mean that he was
opposed to helping urban areas that wanted funds for rat
control.
Debate on the Ottinger amendment to provide emergency funds
for overcrowded hospitals broke down into a rural-urban
fight, with big city Democrats speaking out for it and
Republicans and Southern Democrats opposing it. Springer
again led the opposition, charging that the amendment
ignored the Hill-Burton formula for distributing hospital
aid. (According to HEW, the Hill-Burton Act had continu-
ally favored rural areas. HEW figures revealed that during
the 20-year life of the Act, the ten largest cities in the
country with 11.7% of the U.S. population had received
only 4.1 per cent of the funds allocated under Hill-
Burton.)
The House finally passed the Reuss-Mathias rat control
amendment, but it defeated the additional $58 million
authorization for emergency assistance to overcrowded
hospitals. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee
accepted all the major provisions of the House bill, but
cut out the fiscal 1971 authorizations for health services.
The Senate passed the bill and the President signed it on
December 4th.
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The 1967 amendments established the mandatory 70% pass-
through that had been defeated in 1966. The effort to
provide additional assistance to big city hospitals was
defeated. Various groups used the 1966 and 1967 bills to
their own ends. The rat control provision, for example,
was tacked on to the 1967 bill at the last moment. It
was a convenient way for a number of Congressmen to
reverse their earlier decision which had caused such
fierce reaction. The merits of grant reform were hardly
discussed at all in the face of sharp debate over specific
amendments and special interests.
In an effort to give each state more flexibility, the
federal government chose not to set minimum standards for
public health services. The Surgeon General was author-
ized to review state comprehensive health plans, but this
provision had no teeth. The federal review of state
plans was not mandatory. Moreover, the medical lobby
succeeded in attaching a rider to the CHP program
preventing any interference in private medical practice.
Even the AMA, though, was unable to push the Congress to
be more specific about the public health objectives at
stake. The move away from categorical (special disease-
oriented) grants helped the states in one respect, but
confused them in another. In the absence of clearly
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defined federal guidelines, the states were unsure of
their responsibilities.
The LEAA Controversy 27
Despite the emergence of crime as a national issue during
the 1964 Presidential campaign and despite steadily increas-
ing crime rates, President Johnson and Congress were reluc-
tant to tackle the law enforcement issue head on. They
were more concerned about passing the other basic com-
ponents of the Great Society program. Besides, it was
generally agreed that law enforcement was a local and not
a federal responsibility. During floor debates on various
anti-crime measures, Congressmen from both parties spoke
out against federal encroachment upon state and municipal
law enforcement prerogatives. Even among those anxious
to involve the federal government in the criminal justice
field, there was disagreement over the best way to proceed.
Democrats--particularly Lyndon Johnson--viewed crime
largely as a product of deeper troubles in American society.
President Johnson argued for patient analysis and
2 7 This section is based on materials presented in Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Reports (1966-1970); The Law Enforcemnt Assistance
Administration Annual Reports; and the Advisory Commission on Inter-
government Relations: Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Inter-
government Challenge (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1970).
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restraint. He wanted time for additional study and special
efforts to determine the underlying causes of lawlessness.
Many Republicans favored strong retaliatory measures
against those guilty of breaking the law. The Conserva-
tive coalition took a strong stand in support of stronger
enforcement efforts. They preferred to deal with the
obvious manifestations of criminal activity.
The President envisioned his antipoverty and educational
programs as long-term solutions to key social problems.
He was counting on his national crime commission, a high
level study group, as well as various experiments in the
District of Columbia, to come up with new and more effec-
tive approaches to crime prevention and control. In mid-
September of 1965, the Congress finally passed a number
of bills pertaining to law enforcement and criminal
justice. One piece of legislation (the Law Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1965) provided federal assistance for
the training of local law enforcement personnel while
another extended federal control over certain drugs. A
third law prolonged the ongoing federal juvenile
delinquency study program, while other legislation per-
mitted more latitude in rehabilitating federal prisoners
and provided for a study of manpower and training needs
in the corrections field. Efforts to impose stricter
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controls on the shipment and sale of fire arms were un-
successful as were bills aimed at combatting organized
crime and implementing new approaches to the treatment of
narcotics addicts.
The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 passed unani-
mously in the Senate and the House. The bill authorized
the Attorney General to make grants to public and private
non-profit agencies for the purpose of establishing
training programs for local law enforcement personnel.
The Act also provided funds to support demonstration
projects dealing with new methods of law enforcement as
well as studies of organizations, techniques and legal
practices. Ten million dollars were put aside for these
purposes in fiscal 1966.
The legislation (in the form that it finally passed the
House and the Senate) contained no formula for determining
the allocation of federal funds. Rather the Attorney
General was given the job of awarding project grants. By
1968, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA)--
the Department through which the Attorney General admini-
stered the program--had awarded a total of nearly $19
million for 333 separate projects.28 Projects involving
2 8 ACIR, Making the Safe Streets Act Work, op. cit., p. 9.
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police departments were the recipients of 66% of the funds
awarded by OLEA during its first two-and-one-half years.
Fifteen percent of the funds went to correctional institu-
tions, 11% for planning and crime prevention studies, and
8% for courts and prosecution.29 As a result of OLEA's
special projects program, twenty-seven states established
new criminal justice planning committees or broadened the
activities of previously existing groups. It was obvious
that word of the program was getting through to state and
local officials, for in 1968 alone, the federal agency
received 1,200 requests for assistance totalling more than
$85 million. 30
Toward the end of 1967 there was a shift in the administra-
tion's strategy. Support was amassing in the Congress for
even wider federal involvement in law enforcement activi-
ties. The administration's research and demonstration
programs had not satisfied the public's demand for action.
On February 7, 1967 the President proposed the Safe
Streets and Crime Control Act, a measure designed to
29'Ibid.
3 OU.S. Department of Justice, Third Annual Report to the President and
the Congress on Actions Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of
1965 (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1968), p. 5.
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stimulate state and local spending on crime prevention.
The emphasis was on innovative anticrime techniques and
modern equipment. The efficacy of this approach, the
President said, had been demonstrated by pilot programs
supported under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of
1965. His new bill was designed to build upon the
"creative federal partnership" initiated by the OLEA.
The President asked for $50 million for fiscal 1968 (with
an anticipated request of $300 million for fiscal 1969)
to provide
-- 90% of the cost to state, city, and regional
bodies for developing plans to improve police,
courts, and correctional institutions;
-- 60% of the cost of approved projects, provided
the state or local government increased its anti-
crime spending by at least 5% each year and had
sole or combined jurisdiction over more than
50,000 persons. Not more than one-third of the
federal funds could be used for salaries.
--50% of the cost of constructing new types of
facilities such as crime laboratories, police
academies, or correction centers.
--100% of the cost of contracts with various kinds
of agencies and institutions involved in related
research projects.
The legislation clearly signalled a shift in the Democrats'
position on crime. The mood had changed. Ghetto
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rebellions and student riots turned things around. Law
and order was rapidly becoming a very visible national
issue and, as such, demanded a clear and strong response.
The President's February 6th announcement predated the
release of his Commission on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Justice's final report by several days. The
eighteen-month study of crime in the United States
entitled "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society"
proposed more than 200 specific federal, state, and local
actions that could be taken to halt criminal activities.s3
The Commission report echoed the President's call for
federal funding on the order of several hundred million
dollars annually to assist in training and equipping
local law enforcement officers. The release of the study
enabled the President to argue that his proposed legisla-
tion was the result of careful research and not just a
hasty political reaction designed to make the Democrats
look good. There is no question that the Democrats
shifted gears. Sensing a growing public reaction to what
seemed to be "unbridled lawlessness," the Democrats
sought a "harder line" position.
3 'President's Coniission on Crime and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967).
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In hearings before a House Judiciary Subcommittee in
March and April of 1967, the Administration's Safe Streets
Act as well as a companion bill, the Right to Privacy
Act of 1967, received special attention.32 Attorney
General Ramsey Clark argued that federal support for
state and local police departments was necessitated by a
national crime problem of astounding proportions. Insofar
as the Right to Privacy Act was concerned, Clark said
that wiretapping should be banned in all except the most
urgent cases (which he defined as those involving national
security). He also pointed out that the Administration's
proposed ban on wiretapping would apply only in cases
where one of the parties to a telephone conversation con-
sented to the tap. Clark urged passage of a fire arms
control law, arguing that the use of guns in crime was
significantly less in cities where gun control laws were
in effect. In deference to the strong National Rifle
Association lobby, the Attorney General was quick to
indicate that the Administration's bill would not affect
gun ownership for self-protection or sport.
A number of big-city mayors, including John Lindsay of
32U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee No. 5, Anti-Crime Program: Hearings, 90th Congress,
first session, 1967.
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New York, spoke in favor of the Administration's proposed
Safe Streets Act. The U.S. Conference of Mayors supported
the bill along with police representatives from practically
all fifty states. There was some negative reaction from
other quarters. The firearms provision of the bill was
attacked as an infringement upon the rights of citizens
and sportsmen. The law enforcement assistance component
of the bill was criticized on the grounds that it did not
go far enough in dealing with organized crime.
The House Subcommittee sent an amended version of the bill
to the full Judiciary Committee. The proposed amendments
would have provided comprehensive planning funds to regions
that encompassed a minimum population of 25,000 instead
of 50,000 (as specified in the original Administration
version). Additional hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures allowed
still another opportunity for all sides to be heard.
Ramsey Clark testified once again in support of the Safe
Streets Act, but this time he focused his remarks on a
proposed amendment that would have given every governor
veto rights over grants made in and to his state. Senator
Roman Hruska suggested that the absence of such a provi-
sion gave the federal government too much control over
local police operations. Clark, speaking for the Admini-
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stration, strongly opposed the veto suggestion. He
challenged Senator McClellan's charge that Safe Streets
funds would be used by citizen groups to set up police
review boards. Clark did agree, however, that the bill
gave the Attorney General power to require cities to
cease practicing racial discrimination in the hiring of
police officers. He pointed out, though, that the bill
would not empower the Attorney General to require racial
balance on all police forces.33 Spokesmen for the
National League of Cities again gave strong general
endorsement to the Safe Streets Act, but criticized
provisions of the bill that prohibited the use of federal
funds for increases in the salaries of local law enforce-
ment personnel. The League also labelled as unrealistic
the Administration's stipulation that cities increase
their law enforcement budget by at least 5% annually in
order to qualify for federal funds.
The Attorney General argued that the 5% provision was
necessary in order to stimulate greater outlays than
would normally be made by state and local governments.
City spokesmen argued that since one-fifth of total local
3 3U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Criminal Law and Procedures, Controlling Crime Through More Effective
Law Ehforcement: Hearings, 90th Congress, first session, 1967.
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government expenditures already went for crime control,
and since the return of federal funds for each local
dollar invested would not be as great as in such
programs as urban renewal, antipoverty, and Model Cities,
the requirement was unfair.
As introduced in Congress, the Safe Streets and Crime
Control Act of 1967 represented another instance of
direct federalism. An exchange between Ramsey Clark and
Roman Hruska early in the hearings signalled the beginning
of a battle between the Democratic Administration and the
Conservative coalition over whether law enforcement funds
ought to be channeled through the states or directly to
the cities themselves:
Hruska: Was there any thought given to the idea of a
Governors' veto over this particular type of Federal grant?
Clark: It is a subject that can hardly escape attention in
this general area today and it was considered. It is our
judgement that the justification for that is much more
difficult to find in law enforcement than in other areas.
And the reason primarily is that law enforcement has been
basically a local function. Police expenditures by local
governments are about 2-1/2 times police expenditures by
the states. The average state does not give any financial
support to local law enforcement. It has really no experi-
ence in local law enforcement. The average state does not
have an office to coordinate the activities of local law
enforcement. There is no real basis for the Governor of a
state in the exercise of his functions to say that a parti-
cular program is not sound since he has no experience in
the field.
Hruska: But are not the cities and counties and all of
their activities creatures of the state legislature? They
obtain their powers, tax base, and a number of things from
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the state legislature. And, of course, the Governor often
plays a vital role in these functions.
Under the Safe Streets and Crime Control bill, state
governments would have been treated in the same way as
their political subdivisions. States, as well as local
jurisdictions, or combinations of localities over 50,000,
would have been required to prepare law enforcement and
criminal justice plans as a condition for receiving
federal funds. Development of statewide comprehensive
plans integrating state and local police, corrections,
court, and prosecution programs would not have been
mandatory. Instead, the preparation of plans encompass-
ing entire metropolitan areas would merely have been
encouraged. Furthermore, no provision was made in the
bill for review, comment, or approval of local grant
applications by the Governor or any other state admini-
strative agency.
The Johnson Administration's rationale for bypassing the
states was rooted in the belief that most states lacked
sufficient experience in law enforcement and that they
had spent considerably less than their local jurisdic-
tions for this purpose. Municipal representatives
34 Ibid.
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strongly opposed statewide planning requirements:
A number of states have restricted their law enforcement
activity to highway patrol and other traffic control
work, and rarely [have] states become deeply involved
in urban law enforcement problems. For this reason,
many states do not have the historical interest, the
personnel, the appropriations or the expertise to cope
with the complex problems of urban law enforcement.
Perhaps the states should be more deeply concerned, but
it would be unfortunate if planning so urgently needed
for a total attack on crime in our cities was delayed
while the states expanded their personnel and developed
the expertise necessary to deal in the areas in which
they have not been previously involved. 3
Eventually the Administration found it necessary to modify
its position. The states, it was suggested, could focus
on court and correctional planning while local units with
individual or combined populations of 50,000 or more would
concentrate on police planning. Efforts to combine these
two kinds of plans would be encouraged on an informal
basis. Conformance of local programs and projects to
statewide plans, however, was not something the Administra-
tion was prepared to accept. Nor would President Johnson
endorse a gubernatorial veto over all local plans and
programs.
The Administration was prepared to suggest that munici-
3 s House of Representatives, Anti-Crime Program: Hearings, op. cit.,,
p - 383.
148
palities with less than 50,000 inhabitants be required to
work through the state. By this time, however, the tide
had turned. Conservative members of the Senate Sub-
committee took direct aim at the Attorney General, who
for them symbolized the Administration's somewhat lenient
attitude toward rioters and student activists. They moved
to limit the Attorney General's review powers. They felt
that he should not be able to withhold funds from appli-
cants for failure to comply with the provisions of the Act.
They argued that the Attorney General, under the Admini-
stration's plan, would have too much control over the
operation of local police departments. A number of
senators argued that the Administration's Safe Streets Act
would lead to the crowning of the Attorney General as the
federal "anti-crime czar." 36
In a written response to a question from Senator McClellan
asking whether the objectives of the legislation would
be more fully realized if federal funds were apportioned
among the states on the basis of population and then dis-
tributed to localities by state agencies, Ramsey Clark
replied:
Once the tax funds come into federal hands, federal
responsibility attaches to see that they are properly
utilized. More importantly, there would be no particular
advantage in having the funds administered by the states.
The major responsibility for law enforcement in this
country is handled at the local level . . . local juris-
36ACIR, Making the Safe Streets Act Work, OP. cit., p. 15.
149
dictions would be opposed to the states attempting to
assume control over their law enforcement operations
and the possibility that the states would use control
of the purse string for such a purpose is significantly
greater than the possibility that the federal govern-
ment would do so. Thus the threat to local autonoW
under such a proposal would be considerably more
serious than the threat of federal control under the
bill. 17
On July 17, 1967, the House Judiciary Committee reported
favorably on the Safe Streets Act. They added six major
amendments:
-- local units were required to submit copies of
their applications for planning and action grants
to the governor of the state or states involved,
and the governor was given 60 days to forward to
the Attorney General, if he so desired, his
written evaluation of the proposed project;
-- the 50,000 population eligibility standard was
deleted;
--the 5% annual improvement formula was dropped,
and was replaced by provision for grantees sharing
40% of action program costs and for the Attorney
General to determine whether or not applications
are supported by adequate assurances that federal
aid will be used to supplement and increase the
amount of local dollars the applicant otherwise
would have made available for law enforcement
purposes;
--all authority to use federal funds for direct com-
3 7 Senate , Controlling Crime, op. cit. , p. 500.
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pensation of law enforcement personnel, other
than for conduct or undergoing training programs
and performing innovative functions, was removed;
--the discretionary authority of the Attorney
General was curbed by the addition of provisions
calling for judicial review of his actions;
-- as a means of achieving closer Congressional over-
sight, the open ended appropriation was deleted
and funds were authorized for only fiscal 1969,
with specific allocations for each title.
Republican members of the Judiciary Committee argued that
the amendments were not sufficient. They were still
fearful of the Attorney General's broad discretionary
powers; and they still wanted to give the states still
more control over the program. In August, Representative
William Cahill of New Jersey offered an amendment from the
floor of the House that came closer to what the Republicans
had in mind. Key features of the Cahill amendment
included
-- authorization for federal planning grants to be
awarded to the states for the establishment and
operation of state level law enforcement and
criminal justice planning agencies, created and
directed by the Governor and representatives of
state and local functional agencies, which would
prepare comprehensive and innovative statewide
plans, develop and coordinate projects, estab-
lish priorities, and make grants to general units
of local government or combinations thereof;
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-- requirements that federal planning and action
grants be made to the state planning agency,
provided the agency had a comprehensive plan
conforming to the purposes of the Act on file
with the Attorney General within six months of
approval of its planning grant. The Attorney
General's office would receive local applications
for financial assistance, determine whether such
applications were in accordance with the objec-
tives of the Act and were consistent with the
state comprehensive plan, and disburse funds to
applicants.
-- allotment of a flat grant of $100,000 to each
state and allocation of 75 per cent of the annual
appropriation among the states on a population
basis, with the remaining 25 per cent constituting
a discretionary fund for use by the Attorney
General;
--provision in the state comprehensive plan for a
mandatory pass through of at least 50 per cent
of all federal financial aid received by the state
planning agency for action programs; and
--authorization for the Attorney General to make
planning and action grants to general units of
local government if a state failed to establish a
law enforcement and criminal justice planning
agency or to file a comprehensive plan, provided
that a copy of any local application was submitted
to the Governor who within 60 days could send his
evaluation of the proposed project to the Attorney
General.s8
38 ACIR, Making the Safe Streets Act Work, p. 17.
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Opponents of the Cahill amendment argued that block
grants were undesirable in view of the states' general
lack of concern for urban problems and, particularly,
because of their inexperience in law enforcement.
Proponents of the amendment replied that the administra-
tion's bill would have given virtually unlimited authority
to the Attorney General's office and would have led
eventually to the creation of a national police force.39
The Cahill amendments passed by a vote of 378-23. The
battle moved to the Senate where the Judiciary Committee
attempted to curb the discretionary powers of the Attorney
General by establishing a three-member Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) and by reducing the
maximum federal share of eligible costs for planning and
action grants. The Senate launched a full-blown debate
on the merits of block grants. Senator Dirkson offered
an amendment requiring every state law enforcement and
criminal justice planning agency to pass through to
general units of local government at least 40% of federal
planning funds received and at least 75% of federal action
3 9U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act of 1967: Report
to Accompany HR 5037, 90th Congress, first session, H. Report No. 488,
July 17, 1967.
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funds. Dirkson also proposed that 85% of the annual
federal appropriations be allocated among the states
according to their population and the remaining 15% at
the discretion of the LEAA.
In a strange turn of events, supporters of the democratic
Administration's bill picked up the earlier argument put
forward by the Conservative coalition: namely, that law
enforcement was a local function and therefore the states
should be kept out of it. In addition, they argued that
long delays would be involved in gearing up state govern-
ment to implement action programs and that adoption of a
block grant system would adversely affect local home rule
and would stir up political conflict between the states
and their cities and counties.40  By that time, however,
it was clear that the Administration had lost. In May,
1967, the Senate approved the Dirkson amendment by a
vote of 48 to 29. Two weeks later, without resorting to
a conference committee, the House adopted a resolution
agreeing to the Senate's amendments and the bill was sent
on to the President.41 On June 19, 1968, President Johnson
40 Congressional Record, August 8, 1967, pp. 21812-61.
4 1U.S. Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1967, pp. 2-9, 27-37.
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signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
into law.
By June of 1968, law and order had once again become a
presidential campaign issue. Right before the President
announced the signing of the LEAA bill, Richard Nixon
publicly proposed that the federal government distribute
block grants to the states in order to help shore up local
law enforcement efforts. In effect, the Republicans
stole the law enforcement initiative out from under the
Democratic administration. Because the block grant provi-
sion that was ultimately adopted began as a Republican
concept, the Republicans and not the Democrats received
most of the credit for the LEAA program.
Many of the Administration's other law enforcement ini-
tiatives were also obscured by Republican modifications.
Despite the efforts of Senate liberals, amendments minimiz-
ing the rights of defendants and easing restrictions on
wiretapping were tacked on to the Administration's Omnibus
Crime Control bill.
There was only one issue on which the Conservatives failed
to overturn the Administration's efforts. This was in the
area of gun control. Early in 1968, the outlook for gun
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control legislation was dim. The mood of the Congress
and the nation changed dramatically, however, when
Robert Kennedy was assassinated.42 In fact, the passage
of the entire Omnibus Crime Control bill with its
restrictions on the sale of handguns was ensured by the
Kennedy assassination. Putting aside the question of gun
control, however, the Conservative coalition showed its
greatest strength in many years in 1968 "achieving victory
not only on the Safe Streets Act but on 73% of the votes in
which it took an active interest. " 4 3
The 1970 Version of the LEAA Bill
In 1970 Congress passed a new version of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act authorizing appropriations of $3.55 billion
for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).
The amount authorized in 1970 was more than 10 times
LEAA's total funding in its first two years of operation.
In addition, the Congress amended the 1968 legislation,
eliminating the requirement that the three-man administra-
tive troika be unanimous in its decisions. Despite pres-
sure from the nation's mayors, the 1970 law did not modify
42 Congressional Quarterly, June 7, 1968, p. 1433.
4 3Congressional Quarterly, November 1, 1968, P. 2983.
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the block grant provision under which 85% of LEAA's funds
went directly to the states. On the contrary, the 1970
amendments further weakened the cities' claim on LEAA
funds by waiving the requirement that states pass through
at least 40% of all planning grants and 75% of all action
grants to local units. It did, however, require that all
states allocate "an adequate share" of aid to areas with
high crime rates.
The 1970 Act increased the portion of the total cost of a
project which LEAA funds could cover from 60 to 75 per cent,
reducing the amount which states or local units had to
provide in matching funds. It stipulated, however, that
as of fiscal 1973, the states themselves would have to
provide at least 25% of the total matching funds.
Extensive hearings in both the House and the Senate
revealed that during its first year of operation the LEAA
program directed a disproportionate amount of its money
toward police programs while slighting the courts and
other aspects of the criminal justice system. (Police
programs received three out of every four dollars awarded
by LEAA in 1969; one out of every three was used for pre-
vention and control of riots and other forms of civil
disorder.) Nevertheless, testimony presented by Governors
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Nelson Rockefeller, Raymond Shafer, and Richard Ogilvie,
supporting the Nixon Administration's version of the 1970
bill, argued against any attempt to modify the block
grant provision "until the states had sufficient time to
prove that they could do the job. " 44 John Lindsay,
testifying in support of the Democratic version of the
1970 bill, argued that the manner in which federal funds
were channeled to the states needed to be revised as
quickly as possible:
State administration of the funds in the first year of the
program has been nonproductive or countertproductive.
Political and geographic factors, not the incidence of
crime, have dominated the distribution of funds within
the state.
In 1969 New York City received only 43% of the state's
federal grant although it had more than 65% of the state's
reported crime.45
Lindsay also argued for the elimination of prohibitions on
the use of LEAA funds for local police salaries and a
reduction in local matching requirements from 40% to 10%.
City managers and mayors from all over the country rallied
behind the Lindsay position.
Attorney General John Mitchell, speaking for the Nixon
administration, opposed any change in the state block
44 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970, p. 559.
4 sIbid.
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grant system of distributing federal crime-fighting funds.
He argued that
The state block grant concept will prove the best means
of fighting crime in the future, helping create expert
agencies concerned with developing statewide criminal
justice programs and with supervising urban-suburban
and urban-rural coordination of law enforcement pro-
46
As it turned out, the House of Representatives refused to
waive the provision of the act requiring every state to
pass on to its cities and local agencies 40% of the plan-
ning funds and 75% of action funds received from Washington.
But the Senate eventually added a number of amendments
which served to accomplish what the Nixon administration
wanted. Senator Tydings charged that the block grant
approach was not working. Other Senators said that it
would work if given a little more time. In the end, it
was the Senate Judiciary Committee which authorized a
waiver of the percentage pass-through requirement. A
number of Democratic Senators, including Edward Kennedy,
criticized the Committee version of the 1970 bill for
disregarding the needs of cities with especially different
crime problems. However, the Senate defeated Kennedy's
proposed amendment authorizing direct block grants to
high-crime areas.
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The Joint Conference Committee, assigned the task of
hammering out differences in the House and Senate-passed
versions of the bill, retained the Senate provision
waiving the mandatory pass-through requirement and
adopted instead a formula providing that the amount
"passed through in each state correspond to the amount
of statewide law enforcement costs which were funded
and spent by local units the previous year." In addition,
the Joint Committee retained the Senate provision limiting
(to one-third) the proportion of any federal grant that
could be used for local salaries.
In the end, the Nixon administration was able to loosen
almost all the strings on state spending--further
establishing the principle of open-ended block grants
and setting the stage for the enactment of general revenue
sharing legislation. The Democrats failed to muster
the support they needed in the Senate to maintain a
strong pass through provision that would have favored
urban areas.
Summary
A number of forces emerged in the late 1960's to give the
states more of a role in the administration of federal
grants-in-aid. The Conservative coalition played an
16o
important part in shaping the block grant provisions of
the Partnership for Health Program and totally dominated
efforts to design federal programs in the crime control
field. The Coalition managed to bolster the role of the
states in law enforcement over the objections of the
Democratic (Johnson) administration. In 1968, Richard
Nixon endorsed the block grant concept, hinting at the
direction his Administration would take; and in 1970, he
pressed for the elimination of practically all restrictions
on the ways in which states could spend law enforcement
block grants.
The cities meanwhile complained once too often about the
inefficiency of the federal bureaucracy and the red tape
of the Great Society's domestic programs. The more they
complained the more fuel they added to Republican efforts
to replace direct categorical assistance with block grants
to the states. In some respects, the cities were biting
the hand that was feeding them. Meanwhile, the Republican
governors, looking to strengthen their own position,
carved out a larger hunk of the federal pie for themselves.
A number of fortuitous events were especially important
in shaping an expanded role for the states. The CHP and
LEAA bills, for example, gained additional support as a
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result of the rat control controversy and Robert
Kennedy's assassination. In fact, the growing urban
fiscal crisis which should have added a compelling note
to deliberations about both of these programs was almost
totally lost amid arguments for and against different
ways of handling public health and law enforcement grants.
There was little if any hard evidence to justify renewed
confidence in state government. Mostly, the Republicans
fought for the block grant approach because they had more
to gain by supporting Republican governors than big-city
Democratic mayors. Moreover, it was not difficult for the
Republicans to hide their raw political self-interest
behind reformist arguments such as "the states will never
get any better if the federal government continues to
ignore them" or "the federal government has not been
particularly successful in managing programs designed
to aid the cities." The Republicans held to the theory
that reapportionment would guarantee the cities a fair
hearing at the hands of state officials. Moreover, as
they were quick to point out, incipient efforts to
modernize state government were already underway.
Many of the compromises made in order to buy the support
necessary to guarantee passage of the CHP and LEAA bills
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spelled trouble. Neither the scope of public health
services nor the true meaning of criminal justice was ever
clarified in the course of Congressional deliberations.
The fact is that a special effort was made to obfuscate
the legislative intent of both programs to provide an
umbrella wide enough to cover everybody who had to be
rewarded for their support. Congress opted for action
without a real understanding of the causes of crime or
the best way of handling the delivery of health services.
Innovation substituted for a more precise notion of what
was to be accomplished. Evaluation was totally ignored.
Since measures of effectiveness were not built in
the legislation, there was never any way of determining
whether the block grant programs were making matters
better or worse. Certain strings were attached to the
money allocated to the state, but these were pointless.
There were no standards that could be used to evaluate
the plans submitted for federal review. Since the intent
of the legislation was fuzzy, there was no way of determin-
ing the acceptability of any particular plan. In effect,
the planning requirements were merely "window dressing."
Apparently Congress assumed that money--rather than
skilled personnel or a professional planning capability--
was what was missing. But as it turned out, they over-
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estimated the speed with which the states would be able
to gear up new public health and law enforcement
machinery.
The drive for block grants and the debate about the
relative merits of state involvement obscured the issue
of equalization. Under the CHP and LEAA provisions,
poorer states were not scheduled to receive special
support. Moreover, no effort was made to provide incen-
tives to states to shoulder more of the financial burden.
All in all, it is not difficult to see why the CHP and
LEAA programs ran head-on into all kinds of difficulties.
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Chapter III: The Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in Massachusetts
Rarely has so much federal money been made available
so fast with so little control. State and local govern-
ments received $2.3 billion through a federal program
administered by the Justice Department's Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA). Because of concern over
urban riots, a startling rise in violent crime, and a
realization that local enforcement agencies were crippled
by lack of funds, Congress broke precedent with the tradi-
tion of keeping the federal government out of local law
enforcement.
. . . LEAA has gone through numerous transformations of
shape, purpose, and leadership in its stormy four-year
life. It originally was paralyzed by a bipartisan, three-
man leadership imposed by a Congress distrustful of former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark. It had three directors,
and for one ten-month period, had none.
. . . The emphasis on spending has shifted repeatedly:
from anything innovative to any kind of traditional equip-
ment, from equipment to "people programs," from loose
federal supervision to stricted federal rules and audits,
from state control to more city control over funds, from
an emphasis on police to an increased emphasis on courts
and prisons.
--based on excerpts from The Washington Post
To a great extent, the debate over the effectiveness of the
LEAA program has centered on the strengths and weaknesses
of the block grant approach to intergovernmental fiscal
management. Some critics have argued that a lack of cen-
tralized control in Washington has been the key obstacle
to the achievement of the objectives legislated by Con-
gress. The block grant mechanism was designed to give
more control to state and local officials, but it seems,
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in fact, to have limited the extent to which innovations
in the criminal justice system have been able to take hold.
The mere passage of a law can not guarantee success. In
the case of Massachusetts, a number of forces converged,
impeding the implementation of the LEAA program. Massa-
chusetts has handled its LEAA responsibilities rather
competently; yet LEAA funds distributed by the state plan-
ning agency have gone mostly to a few large cities. Crime
rate and need have not been taken into account adequately.
The Law Enforcement Assistance Program has failed to
promote significant institutional reform. There is a pat
explanation: namely, that the states are incompetent. A
more sophisticated explanation, however, is that in the
absence of certain safeguards the block grant approach is
bound to be ineffective (and at worst counterproductive)
in spite of the efforts of right-minded state officials.
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Background
In May of 1972, the House Government Operations Committee
voted 22 to 14 along party lines to approve a report
condemning the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
The report, issued by the Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary
Affairs, branded the LEAA program a failure and recommended
that funding increases proposed by the Nixon administration
be denied until specific irregularities were corrected.1
The Committee, headed by James S. Monagan (D.-Conn.),
charged that the block grant program of the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration had failed, in a number of ways.
Funds had been used for political purposes and wasted on
exorbitant consultants' fees. Excessive amounts had been
spent on equipment and unnecessary hardware. Funds had
been diverted from the direct needs of the criminal
justice system into areas of social action already funded
under other federal programs. And recipient agencies had
been unable to absorb funds quickly and efficiently.
The Committee's Republican members denied that the alleged
abuses of the program were widespread and claimed that
'Block Grant Programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
Twelfth Report by the Cormmittee on Government Operations (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
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virtually all the problems cited in the Monagan Report
had already been corrected. They charged that the
Democratic majority of the Subcommittee had failed to
mention the innovative programs that had indeed been
successful.2
Of $552 million appropriated by Congress to carry out the
program during its first three years, only 25% was
actually disbursed by state planning agencies to local
governments and other subgrantees. Of the $413 million in
unused program funds remaining at the end of the 1971
fiscal year, the states were holding nearly $29 million
in bank deposits or in investments in federal, state, and
private securities. In many cases, state and local
governments had invested in U. S. Treasury notes, thus
lending back to the federal government (at prevailing
interest rates) funds that had already been spent for law
enforcement purposes and on which the federal government
was already paying interest. 3
The Subcommittee found that large amounts of money were
2 Dissenting Views of Hon. Fernand J. St. Germain, ibid., pp. 139-144.
3
"House Panel Finds Inefficiency and Corruption in Crime Program,,"
The New York Times, May 12, 1972 (see pages 12-17 of the Monagan
report).
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being spent on projects and programs that exceeded Con-
gressional intent. New York and California, for example,
spent nearly 30% of their funds on projects only tangen-
tially related to the direct improvement of the criminal
justice system. (In California, an award of $75,000 was
used to study the chronic learning problems of kinder-
garten children. )4
Congressional hearings turned up rather disturbing evidence
of LEAA abuses. In Montgomery, Alabama, $117,247 in plan-
ning funds were used to fund a police cadet college train-
ing program that was little more than a source of academic
assistance for the sons of state officials. In Indiana,
an all-weather plane was purchased to allow better
mobility for law enforcement officials. The plane's log
indicated that of the first 46 hours of flying time, 30
were used to fly the Governor and his family on matters
that had nothing to do with law enforcement.5
The House Subcommittee was not the first to issue an
4Ibid. (See pages 61-69 of the Monagan report).
sHearings before a Subcornittee on Governrrent Operations, House of
Representatives, 92nd Congress, First session, July 20, 21, 22, 27,
28, and 29, 1971, pp. 31-55, pp. 279-359.
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appraisal of the LEAA program.6 In March, 1969, the
National League of Cities published a critique of the
block grant program asserting that the Safe Streets Act had
failed to focus federal aid on the critical problems of
urban-high crime areas.7 The League's review of first
year allocations revealed that local planning funds were
being used to finance "third levels of state bureaucracy
as a matter of state administrative convenience." The
League also claimed that the emphasis on state-wide planning
6Earlier evaluations include B. Douglas Harmon, "The Bloc Grant: Read-
ings From A First Experiment," Public Administration Review, March/
April, 1970, pp. 141-153, National League of Cities, Analysis of State
Administration of Planning Funds Allocated Under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Washington: NLC, March 18, 1968);
The Urban Coalition and Urban America, Inc., Law and Disorder I and II:
State Planning and Programming Under Title I of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (New York: NUC, June 1969 and
August, 1970); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge
(Washington: ACIR, September 1970); and National Association of
Counties, National Urban County Survey of Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Washington: NAC, April 10, 1968).
7B. Douglas Harmon, op. cit. , has pointed out that the city groups
were able to influence LEAA's decision to allocate some of its
discretionary funds to the eleven largest cities in the nation. This
decision meant that the big cities each received $100,000. LEAA
officials admitted that this allocation was an effort specifically
designed to pacify dissatisfied city interests. Soon after the
announcement of the award, the National Governor's Conference com--
plained that discretionary grants were a deviation from the block
grant approach. The cities were also unhappy because they were
required to gain the approval of state agencies before spending
their funds.
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relegated the cities to a secondary role and that rural
areas were receiving a disproportionate share of LEAA
funds. 8
In June, 1969, the Urban Coalition published its first
evaluation of the LEAA block grant program. The Coalition
concluded that "planning was being carried out largely
by a small number of professionals with limited represen-
tation from the poor and minority groups."9 In addition,
they suggested that the states had disregarded key aspects
of the criminal justice system by limiting their focus
almost entirely to police activities. Three years later,
after a far more comprehensive review, the Urban Coalition
offered the following appraisal of the LEAA program:
Of the major goals of the [LEAA] program, one--the
reduction of crime--has proven impossible of achieve-
ment through an effort focusing primarily on law enforce-
ment agencies. LEAA has had and can have no substantial
impact on the incidence of crime in the United States.
More police equipped with the latest technological
advances, courts with computerized calendars and newly
trained administrators, and new corrections facilities
providing a variety of fonns of therapy and education
have not been able to substantially affect crime at a
time of high unemployment, failing public schools, and
disintegrating urban centers. . . . The misapprehension
that billions of dollars funneled into the LEAA program
can and will reduce and prevent crime is placing undue
National League of Cities, op. cit., p. i.
9The Urban Coalition, Law and Disorder I, op. cit.
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pressure on the Justice Department to produce a quick
downturn in the crime statistics, statistics that are
noteworthy for their unreliability and easy distortion.
This focus is diverting the agency from the more realis-
tic objective of upgrading the agencies of the criminal
justice system.
The second major goal of the program-that of strengthen-
ing law enforcement at all levels of government--is
being achieved, but it is being achieved in a manner that
raises serious questions about its desirability. There is
no question that the agencies of the criminal justice
system--the police, the courts and corrections institu-
tions were antiquated and greatly in need of modernization
at the time of creation of the LEAA program. They had two
kinds of needs: (a) the functions they performed and their
manner of operations required basic re-examination and re-
structuring; and (b) they had outstanding material and
capital requirements. . . . LEAA has ignored the greater
need for structural and functional reforms . . . and has
instead concentrated on meeting existing material needs.
Instead of purchasing innovation and reform, LEAA funds
have, for the most part, simply brought "more of the same
old stuff."
The time has come to recognize the limitations inherent in
a program designed to build up law enforcement capabilities
for purposes of seriously reducing crime. The nation needs
a massive effort to get at the root causes of crime, but
the LEAA program is not the proper vehicle for that
effort. . . . The LEAA program should be either allowed
to lapse at the end of fiscal 1973 or should be redefined
and reduced in scale to focus on the restructuring and
innovation that the criminal justice system so badly needs.10
There were strong rejoinders to the Coalition report, but
the charges were never rebuffed. In the absence of a
1 0 The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Law and Disorder
III (Confidential Draft), September 1972, pp. 2-9. Law and Disorder
III included an analysis of the LEAA program in five states-
California, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
Unfortunately the analyses provided were (of necessity) very sketchy
and dwelt primarily on how funds were allocated rather than on what
the projects themselves had accomplished.
172
careful state-by-state examination of the LEAA program,
there was no way to tell whether or not the program had
indeed failed, or if so, why.
LEAA in Massachusetts: An Overview
Massachusetts boasts one of the most efficient law enforce-
ment assistance programs in the country. 1 1 The staff of
the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement (which admini-
sters the Safe Streets/Law Enforcement Assistance Program
in Massachusetts) is highly competent and intent on achiev-
ing significant reforms in the criminal justice system. A
number of exciting projects dealing with youthful offenders,
the treatment of alcoholics, citizen security, and legal
aid have been initiated in Massachusetts. The Committee
has managed to spur action in several of the state's
largest cities and to introduce "new blood" into some of
the more sluggish local law enforcement operations. Efforts
to implement sophisticated approaches to planning and
program evaluation have begun, and the staff of the
"The Urban Coalition concluded:
"Massachusetts represents one of the more successful
programs. The staff . . . wants to do something
besides equipping police. Although they have spent
a moderate amount of time and money in getting projects
through the 'planning stages,' some significant pro-
jects have begun to take shape."
Chapter III, p. 39.
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Governor's Conmittee has not hesitated to emphasize
interagency and intergovernmental cooperation in its
attack on the causes of crime. Yet, even in the face of
these accomplishments, there are a number of serious
problems that have not been resolved.
The Massachusetts experience suggests that the LEAA program
has not helped to reduce crime. During the first three
years of the program, the crime rate in Massachusetts
jumped from 1,863/100,000 to 3 ,004/100,000 while the
total number of "index offenses" increased from 100,989
in 1967 to 170,900 in 1971.12 Taking into account the
situation in other states, there is reason to believe
that state governments have not been up to the challenge
posed by the problems of law enforcement or the opportunity
provided by the block grant approach to intergovernmental
grants-in-aid. At the very least, the LEAA block grant
program has not been structured in a way likely to enhance
its prospects for success.
12 Index Crimes, as reported in FBI statistics, include murder and
non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny over $50, and auto theft. For a critical assessment
of the limitations of current crime reporting techniques see Hans
Zeisel, "The Future of Law Enforcement Statistics: A Summary View,"
in Federal Statistics: Report of the President's Commission,
Volume II, Washington, D. C., 1971, pp. 527-554.
174
The Safe Streets Act put the state government in an uncom-
fortable broker's role. Federal funds (apportioned
primarily according to population) were awarded to state
planning agencies (SPA's) designated by the governors.
Each SPA was assigned the task of channeling funds through
to deserving municipalities. They also had the job of
inducing cities and towns to cooperate. For the most
part, the communities that participated did so for one of
two reasons: either some political official had something
he wanted done and learned that the state had a pot of
money it was having trouble giving away; or, someone in
the state planning agency decided that a particular city
or town was just right for (what the SPA deemed to be) a
high-priority demonstration project of one kind or
another. All in all, city representatives have not been
happy with the control that the states have had over the
disbursement of federal funds. In light of the LEAA
experience, some city officials are more convinced than
ever that they would be better off by-passing the states
and dealing directly with Washington.
A review of LEAA grant allocations from 1969-1971 in
Massachusetts indicates that federal funds were not distri-
buted in proportion to either population or crime rate. 13
1 3This is not necessarily bad. State officials have argued that a
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Even in 1971 when the SPA shifted to a major-city strategy
designed to zero in on specific types of crimes within
particular geographical areas, neither population nor
crime rate could account for the uneven pattern of grant
allocations in the Commonwealth. 14
Various city officials and local community representatives
charged that the grant allocation process was predominantly
a political exercise involving, in some cases, the worst
sort of cronyism. Yet little if any evidence has been
found to support such allegations. Other criticisms,
however, have not been difficult to validate.
disproportionate amount needed to be allocated to those cities with
the capacity to design and implement programs with a good chance
of success. The outcome of such a policy would be to reinforce
those cities and towns with strong administrative capabilities
(probably the wealthier towns) and to slight many of the neighbor-
hoods in need of assistance. Federal funds were apportioned accord-
ing to population. Some local officials argued that the funds
should have been distributed in like manner within each state. This
of course would have provided little if any inclination for cities
and towns to come up with new or imaginative project proposals.
14In 1971 almost 60% of the state's funds were set aside for the
cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lynn, New Bedford, Springfield, and
Worcester. Area security projects were designed to enable these
cities to examine and strengthen their law enforcement organizations
and facilities; to develop new laws and ordinances; to provide better
equipmnt; to organize the community for citizen involvement; to
improve police-community relations; and to set up community-based
prevention and rehabilitation programs. 3rd Annual Report of the Law
Enforcement Association Administration 1971 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 168.
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While many LEAA-supported projects attracted a great deal
of attention (and in some cases helped to spark a re-
thinking of local and state approaches to criminal justice
and law enforcement), the evidence seems to indicate that
fundamental institutional reforms have not been achieved.
If federal support for the Law Enforcement Assistance
Program in Massachusetts had been halted at the end of
1972, the impact of four years' effort and $30 million
would have been practically nil. Certainly a relatively
large number of young and highly-trained professionals
secured jobs through the LEAA program. But numerous
demonstration projects died on the vine. Moreover, many
if not all of the most successful projects would have
come to an abrupt end if the cities and towns had been
forced to foot the bill on their own. In short, the
process of institutionalization did not take hold.
The critical question is whether the inability of state
government to achieve badly needed reforms in the criminal
justice system is something that can be overcome with
time (as state officials build up expertise in the law
enforcement field) or whether fundamental reform is in
fact impossible as long as the Congress and the President
place their confidence in the block grant approach to
intergovernmental management.
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It is clear that the state had access to more money than
it could spend. SPA hiring was not encumbered by civil
service regulations or legislative interference. What
accounts then for the limited impact of the LEAA program?
Whether measured in terms of reductions in the crime rate
or in terms of improvements in the day-to-day operation
of the police, the courts, or correctional facilities, the
impact of the LEAA program has indeed been limited.
A thorough review of the Massachusetts experience suggests
that the failures (and interestingly enough the successes)
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration can be
explained in several different ways. The key impediments
to successful institutional reform include the imbalance
of power among the different components of state admini-
stration; the difficulties involved in promoting citizen
participation at both the city and state level; a lack of a
professional planning capability at the local level
coupled with municipal resentment toward state efforts to
provide technical assistance; the failure of Congress and
the Justice Department to spell out exact criteria for
evaluating efforts to improve the criminal justice system;
the inability of state government to break through
entrenched coalitions at the municipal level and to imple-
ment collaborative/metropolitan approaches to law enforce-
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ment; and finally the paucity of simple theoretical models
of institutional reform that might have served to ground
haphazard attempts at innovation. These impediments are
discussed in more detail below.
LEAA Expenditures in Massachusetts
From the time the LEAA program began in 1969 until the
start of fiscal 1972, Massachusetts received almost
$17 million in block grant support (not including special
discretionary awards which the U.S. Department of Justice
also made to a number of cities and towns in Massachu-
15
setts). (See Appendix D.) Table V summarizes the
"Eighty-five per cent (85%) of all LEAA funds authorized by the
Congress was allocated in block grants to the fifty states according
to their respective populations. Fifteen per cent (15%) was awarded
for individual projects at the discretion of the U.S. Department of
Justice (thus the term discretionary grants). During the 1969-1971
period, Massachusetts received almost $3.8 million in discretionary
grants (large cities, $740,000; counties, $800,000; smaller cities
and towns, $304,000; and state agencies, $1,940,000). For the most
part, the discretionary grant system has been clumsy and inefficient.
The regional office of the Justice Departmnt has not had the staff to
put together a comprehensive regional program of any kind. In some
cases discretionary grants have been used to supplement state block
grants for projects that the two agencies have approved for different
reasons or under different circumstances. This has occurred even
though the SPA has been required to sign-off on all discretionary
grant requests originating in Massachusetts). The state planning
agency has done its best to ignore discretionary grant allocations in
trying to determine whether or not cities and towns are eligible for
block grant awards. There has been almost no evaluation of projects
funded through the regional office. Unfortunately it seems as if the
Washington and regional offices of LEAA have been working at cross-
purposes to the Governor's Committee.
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block grant awards made to Massachusetts: $1,131,000 in
1969; $5,418,000 in 1970; and $10,092,000 in 1971. Ninety
per cent of this was action money for projects designed
to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
The remainder was planning money set aside for the state
planning agency and selected cities to use in mapping out
coordinated attacks on the problems of crime and law
enforcement. (See Table V for a summary of planning
grant allocations to Massachusetts.) LEAA allocations
have increased annually. (Massachusetts received a block
grant of $13,580,000 in 1972--more than twice the average
annual award for the first three years of the program.)
Table VI summarizes the grants made by the Governor's
Committee in 1969, 1970, and 1971. State agencies
received 34% of all project money; county government, 8%;
cities over 100,000, 39%; cities between 50,000 and 100,000,
14%; towns between 20,000 and 50,000, 3%. The remaining
2% of the funds was awarded to regional planning agencies
and towns under 20,000. Table VII indicates that cities
with 100,000 or more inhabitants received $4.77 per
capita (during the three-year period under study) while
cities between 50,000 and 100,000 received substantially
less--$1.90 per capita.
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Table V
FUNDS ALLOCATED TO MASSACHUSETTS BY THE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDER THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
3-year
1969 1970 1971 total
Project Funds
Allocated to
Massachusetts $ 666,000 $4,902,000 $ 9,424,000 $14,992,000
Awarded during a a a
the fiscal year 698,902 5,679,111 7 ,80 7,2 2 2 a 14,285,235
Planning Funds
Allocated to
Massachusetts 465,000 516,000 668,000 1,649,000
Awarded during b b
the fiscal year 208,800b 267,691" 378,396 854,887
Total
Allocation to
Massachusetts $1,131,000 $5,418,000 $10,092,000 $16,741,100
aIn 1969 and 1970 the Governor's Cormittee awarded more money than it
received. That is, it approved applications in one fiscal year but did not
allocate funds until the following year. This accounts for some of the
discrepancies among various sumaries of LEAA expenditures in Massachusetts.
In the state's annual reports, only those awards actually dispersed in a
given year are listed. In a privately prepared analysis of LEAA expenditures
in Massachusetts (undertaken by Data Dynamics of Rhode Island) some awards
were counted twice-once during the year in which a decision to award was made
and once during the year in which the funds were actually dispersed.
The LEAA record keeping system is somewhat confusing.
A list of awards is kept, but in many instances running expenditure totals
for various grants are unavailable. Thus, a city may have been awarded
$50,000 in 1969 for a project, have spent $25,000 of that award in 1969,
$25,000 in 1970, and have received an additional grant renewal of $10,000
for the same project in 1971. State records show this as separate
awards for each of three years. In Table V such an award/spending
process would appear as a $50,000 award in 1969 and a $10,000 award in 1971.
Unfortunately, the LEAA record keeping system makes it hard to be accurate
in situations such as these.
bThese figures do not include planning funds retained and spent by the
Governor's Committee itself.
Table VI
SUMMARY OF LEAA ACTION GRANT ALLOCATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS 1969-1971
1969
State Agencies $170,885 25%
County Government 126,979 18
Cities over 100,000 269,394 39
Cities between 50,000
and 100,000 85,699 12
Towns between 20,000
and 50,000 11,945 2
664,902a
1970
$1,464,980 25%
432,432 8
2,253,211 40
1,209,155 21
187,124 3
5 5 4 6 , 9 0 2
b
1971
$3,251,818 42%
620,854 8
3,126,732 39
Totals -
$4,887,683 34%
1,180,265 8
5,649,337 39
727,858 9 2,022,712 14
149,960
7,877,2222 C
2 349,029
14, 0 8 9 , 0 2 6d
aIn addition, regional planning agencies received $24,000 and towns under 20,000 approximately $10,000.
The actual total for 1969 was $698,902.
Towns under 20,000 received an additional $35,000 and $97,209 was spent on police teletype terminals
in a series of municipalities. The adjusted total for 1970, therefore, was $5,679,111.
cTowns under 20,000 received an additional $30,000 for an adjusted 1971 total of $7,907,222.
dThe adjusted three-year total (given a, b, and c above) is $14,285,235.
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Table VII
SUMMARY OF LEAA PROJECT AWARDS IN MASSACHUSETTS 1969-1971
STATE AGENCIES
Dept. of Public
Safety
Dept. of Corrections
MDC
Mass. Superior Court
Parole Board
Attorney General
Municipal Police
Science Institute
Mass. Police
Training Council
Office of Comissioner
of Probation
Mass. Defenders
Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court
Dept. of Mental Health
Division of Youth
Services
UCS-Joint Correctional
Planning
1969
$ 40,525
41,330
16,800
4,950
8,000
14,850
51,000
15,430
5,000
9,000
1970
$ 187,646
292,184
15,000
10,000
60,000
155,000
78,000
70,000
42,000
172,550
1971
$ 505,000
387,321
50,000
125,000
100,000
182,292
200,000
25,000
183,950
65,000
635,000
75,000 200,000
3-Year Total
$ 733,171
720,835
81,800
139,950
168,000
352,142
15,000
215,430
108,000
262,950
65,000
42,000
807,550
275,000
N)3
Table VII Continued
1969
STATE AGENCIES
Continued
Chief Justice-
District Courts
Regional Board of
Cammunity Colleges
Mass. Association of
Chiefs of Police
Division of Civil
Service
Governor' s Committee:
N. E. Institute of Law
Enforcement
Maine
Harvard
Lowell Tech
Cormittee Administered
$170,885
1970
$ 13,600
1971
$ 47,500
20,000
50,500
46,000
20,000
11,500
75,000
117,000
$1,464,980
42,000
89,235
368,520
$3,251,818
3-Year Total
$ 61,100
20,000
50,500
46,000
42,000
20,000
100,735
75,000
485,520
$4,887,683
COUNTIES
Barnstable
Berkshire
Bristol 8,000
H--
00)
12,765 18,000 11,677 42,1442
34,00015,9000 11,000
Table VII Continued
1969
COUNTIES Continued
Dukes
Essex
Franklin
Hamrpden
Hampshire
Middlesex
Nantucket
Norfolk
Plymouth
Suffolk
Worcester
$126,979
$
15,000
18,000
39,214
5,000
8,000
21,000
$
134,856
34,980
68,537
94,575
66,484
$432,432
19711970
$
34,160
81,569
46,000
231,351
44,245
30,612
39,739
90,501
$620,854
3-Year Total
$
49,160
99,569
46,000
405,421
84,225
107,149
155,314
156,985
$1,180,265
CITIES OVER 100,000
Cambridge
(100,361)
New Bedford
(101,777)
Springfield
(163,905)
41,399 (.41)
39,465 (.39)
23,500 (.14)
280,112 (2.79)
87,231 ( .86)
135,113 ( .82)
256,699 (2.56)
466,118 (4.57)
179,239 (1.09)
578,210 (5.76)
592,814 (5,82)
337,852 (2.06)
[figures in parentheses are per capita allocations]
H-
Table VII Continued
CITIES OVER 100,000
Continued
Worcester
(176,572)
Boston
(641,071)
1969
$ 10,080 (.06)
1970
$ 314,790
154,950 (.24) 1,1435,695
$ 269,394 (.23) $2,253,211
1971
(1.78) $ 281,822
(2.23) 1,942,854
(1.90) $3,126,732
(1.60)
(3.03)
(2.64)
3-Year Total
$ 606,692
3,533,769
5,649,337
CITIES BETWEEN
50,000 and 100,000
Fall River
(96,898)
Lowell
(94,239)
Newton
(91,263)
Lynn
(90,294)
Brockton
(89,040)
Somerville
(88,779)
Quincy
(87,966)
Chicopee
(66,676)
12,000 ( .12)
1,359 (.02)
25,850 (.29)
39,415 (.45)
1,358 (.02)
208,800 (2.20)
128,799 (1.40)
175,551 (1.94)
103,525 (1.16)
63,520 ( .71)
168,864 (1.92)
28,532 ( .42)
199,300 (2.18)
70,191 ( .78)
64,059 ( .72)
115,250 (1.29)
25,000 ( .28)
P
CO
'In
12,000 ( .12)
208,800 (2.20)
328,099 (3.59)
245,742 (2.70)
193,434 (2.17)
178,770 (2.00)
233,279 (2.65)
29,890 ( .45)
[figures in parentheses are per capita allocations]
(3.44)
(5.50)
(4.77)
Table VII Continued
CITIES BETWEEN
50,000 and 100,000
Continued
1969 1970 1971 3-Year Total
Lawrence
(66,915)
Medford
(64.397)
Framingham
(64,048)
Brookline
(58,689)
Malden
(56,127)
Holyoke
(50,112)
$ 6,000 (.09) $ 206,522 (3.08) $
9,000 (.14)
1,358 (.02)
1,359
$ 85,699
(.02)
(.08)
64,500 (1.00)
10,542 ( .16)
50,000
$1,209,155
( .99)
(1.13)
29,268 ( .45)
37,480 ( .58)
155,310 (2.64)
20,000 ( .35)
$ 727,858 ( .68)
$ 212,522 (3.17)
101,768 (1.58)
49,381 ( .77)
155,310 (2.64)
20,000 ( .35)
51,359 (1.02)
$2,022,712 (1.90)
CITIES BETWEEN
20,000 and 50,000
Peabody
(48,080)
Fitchburg
(43,243)
Revere
(43,159)
Everett
(43,243)
14,280
12,000
15,000
15,600
92,700
29,900
14,280
104,000
44,900
15,600
[figures in parentheses are per capita allocations]
~1~
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Table VII Continued
CITIES BETWEEN
20,000 and
Continued
Haverhill
(42,120)
Salem(40,556)
Watertown
(39,307)
Beverly
(38,348)
Woburn
(37,406)
Attleboro
(32,907)
Chelsea
(30,625)
Marlborough
(27,936)
Milton
(27,190)
Winchester
(22,269)
1969 1970 1971 3-Year Total
50,000
$ $
10,000
12,000
12,500
14,397
6,200
5,745
$ 27,360 $ 27,360
10,000
12,000
12,500
14,397
6,200
31,000
12,842
15,000
28,250
31,000
7,097
15,000
28,250
$ 11,945 (.02) $ 187,124 ( .36) $ 149,960 ( .29)
[figures in parentheses are per capita allocations]
-oHO
$ 349,029 ( .68)
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Disproportionate Spending in the Largest Cities
From 1969 to 1971 the state's largest cities received a
disproportionate share of the LEAA money granted to
Massachusetts. State planning officials justified this
spending pattern in several different ways. First, they
argued that larger cities offered economies of scale.
That is, the cost of providing services in bigger cities
was presumed to be less since people are closely packed.
Also, they suggested that once a certain population level
is reached it becomes feasible to introduce new technolo-
gies that can ultimately reduce the per capita cost
involved in providing certain services. There are counter-
arguments. Especially crowded conditions in large urban
areas may increase the cost of providing law enforcement
(particularly police) services. For example, the most
highly populated areas suffer from special difficulties
requiring costly solutions as in the case of traffic
control or communications. In many big cities, the need
for specialized equipment implies a need for highly
trained personnel that can add substantially to the cost
of services. 16
16If nothing else, the cost of living in big cities is higher; thus
salaries and operating costs have to be higher. All in all, the
evidence for and against the presence of economies of scale is incon-
clusive. This is true partly because it is so difficult to develop
adequate measures of performance (indicators of service quality) that
189
Various public officials have pointed to the fact that
LEAA funds were intended primarily to combat crime;
since crime rates have been higher in big cities, the
largest cities deserve an extra share of the crime-
fighting money. Of course, this ignores the fact that
suburban areas have experienced the most dramatic
increase in crime rates over the past few years.
Perhaps the most convincing argument for disproportionate
spending in large urban areas is that only the largest
cities have the capacity to attract and retain the pro-
fessional staff needed to implement significant reforms
in the criminal justice system. In approving a larger
share of the proposals emanating from big-city agencies,
the state planning agency claimed that it was only trying
to enhance the probability of spawning at least a few
can be used to assess the relative cost of providing a unit of a
particular service (at a constant level of performance). Until
acceptable measures of performance are developed, it will remain
nearly impossible to sort out the arguments regarding alleged econo-
nies and diseconomies of scale. See Warner Hirsch, "Local and Area-
wide Urban Government Services," National Tax Journal, December,
1964, No. 4; and Charles Tiebout, "Economies of Scale and Metropoli-
tan Government," Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 42,
No. 4, 1967, for a more complete discussion of the problems of cal-
culating economies of scale in public services. Also, see Lawrence
Susskind et al., "Criteria for Sub-state Regionalization of Public
Services in Massachusetts: Potential Economies of Scale," Massachu-
setts Department of Administration and Finance, August, 1971, for a
thorough analysis of the economies of scale issue with regard to
police and law enforcement.
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innovative projects.17  Of course, there are counter-
arguments on this score as well. Crime and law enforce-
ment problems may be more severe and indeed more diffi-
cult to come to grips with in the largest cities. It
is often harder to get things done or to implement
changes in big-city agencies. In addition, social
service institutions in major metropolitan areas often
compete for the same constituency, and at times are
unwilling to coordinate their activities. This tends to
diminish the chances of implementing innovative approaches
to juvenile delinquency, police-community relations, and
other law enforcement activities. Finally, political
control in most large cities has become terribly fragment-
ed in recent years. Without centralized leadership and
control it is often difficult to implement innovative
approaches to service delivery. In short, it seems that
state officials have tried to use a measure of innovative
capacity to justify the skewed distribution of LEAA funds
in favor of large cities, but the case for such favoritism
has by no means been substantiated.
1 7For example, the LEAA Third Annual Report mentions that "Worcester
hired community service officers from the Model Cities neighborhood
areas to assist the police in patrol responsibilities and to increase
the number of police personnel in high crime areas." Also, "Boston
initiated a program of training and equipping a citizens auxiliary
force" and has developed a model code for new housing project construc-
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The failure to pass through the required percentage of
funds: Many law enforcement problems transcend geo-
political boundaries. Perhaps this is why state agencies
and county government received an unusually large share of
LEAA funds allotted to Massachusetts from 1969 to 1971. A
more cogent explanation was never offered. The original
LEAA legislation called for a mandatory 75% pass through
to cities and towns, but state and county agencies
received almost 42% of the action money allocated by the
SPA. 1
Discussions with the staff of the Governor's Committee as
well as reports contained in the annual state plans
suggest that grant allocations have been made according to:
(1) crime rate; (2) city size or population level; and
tion. Springfield's approach to reorganizing police patrols has also
been mentioned in the state plan as an "innovative" project along
with the highly touted Youth Resource Bureau in Cambridge. Since the
greatest number of proposals have been submitted by big-city agencies,
it is not surprising that most of the innovative programs are found in
big cities.
"
8 From 1969 to 1971 state agencies received 34% and counties received
8% of block grants awarded in Massachusetts. County governments in
Massachusetts cannot be considered units of local government since
they are supported entirely by the state,,-have no popularly elected
leadership, and do not have taxing power. Thus, only 58% of the LEAA
money in the state has actually been passed along to units of local
government.
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(3) the innovative character of grant proposals.19 of
course, other considerations undoubtedly come into play
including prior levels of LEAA funding; the technical
feasibility of proposed projects; and the SPA's estimate
of local skills and resources.
Changing Priorities: Each year the Governor's Committee
sets priorities of one kind or another. For instance,
in 1970 and 1971 special consideration was given to
projects aimed at combatting juvenile delinquency. The
means by which priorities are set is somewhat obscure,
but the fact remains that projects are selected in the
"The 1969 Comprehensive Criminal Justice Plan for Crime Prevention
and Control for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts indicated that
application disapprovals were based on one or a combination of the
following: (1) unavailability of funds to adequately support a
proposed program or project; (2) poor program design; (3) conflict
with substantive or administrative criteria contained in the state
plan; (4) conflict with priorities spelled out in the annual state
plan. The 1969 plan also indicated that
"within the confines of good program design and potential
for successful execution . . . balanced distribution [has
been sought] among cities, towns, and counties of various
sizes and appropriate metropolitan groupings. Priority
naturally [has been] given to areas of high crime."
P. 505. Emphasis has also been given to projects with the greatest
potential for success defined in terms of likelihood that project
results will be implemented; operational utility or value of
project results; availability of required background information
and skilled professionals to conduct the project; and appropriate-
ness of Justice Department support for the project, p. 402.
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context of priorities set each year.20 Table VIII summarizes
the percentage distribution of LEAA funds according to
priority areas. The relative emphasis on police and
engineering diminished slightly from 1969-1971 but they
still accounted for nearly one-third of all LEAA expendi-
tures in Massachusetts in 1972. Evaluative research and
public education each received less than one per cent of
the annual LEAA budget.
The 1971 state plan asserted that the "entire planning
and sub-grant process was designed to solicit and encourage
local initiative in the choice, development, and conduct
of programs and projects." Members of the Governor's
Committee claimed that they sought a balanced distribution
of funds among units of local government and among
various state agencies. To achieve this the Committee
claimed that it was relying on specific (non-competitive)
allocations to particular units or combinations of units
of government and combinations of special eligibility
2 oIn 1972 the Governor's Committee organized its members into a series
of subcommittees concerned with different topics (such as police,
courts, juvenile delinquency, etc.). Each subcommittee was given an
opportunity to review materials prepared by the staff. Through these
subcommittees, committee members-especially representatives of state
agencies operating in criminal justice-related areas--were able to
influence the relative emphasis placed on specific problem areas.
Table VIII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LEAA BLOCK GRANT FUNDS
ACCORDING TO AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST 1969-1971
1969% 1970% 1971%
Police
Police Personnel Development 5 8 5
Police Management and Support 8 6 9
Police Operations 1 3 2
Police-Community Relations 13 3 4
27 19 20
Courts
Prosecution 6 2 3
Defense 2 1 1
Court Administration - 1 3
Corrections
Adult Diversion and Probation - 2 1
Corrections and Parole 5 8 13
Corrections Systems Development - 3 4
5 13 I
Juvenile Delinquency
Juvenile Diversion and Community Resources 7 10 11
Juvenile Courts and Probation 5 3 2
Youth Service Reorganization - 3 7
Drugs/Alcohol
Community-based drug treatment 2 4 5
Alcohol Detoxification - 4 4
2 9
Crimes
Specific Crimes - - 1
High Crime Area Security 3 6 7
Organized Crime 2 3 -
5 9
Engineering
Criminal Justice Information Systems - 14 1
Police Information System 8 1 2
Police Communications 9 9 8
17 -27 11
Resources
Criminal Justice Devlpmt. Agencies 22 4 3
Evaluative Research - 2 1
Public Education - - 1
Source: 1972 Comprehensive Criminal Justice Plan--Program Descriptions
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classifications for competitive projects. In choosing
among two or more applicants qualified under the special
eligibility classifications, the Committee tried to
assess need, capability, ability to meet matching
requirements, and willingness to accept responsibility
for increasing program support.
Selecting cities and towns in special need of assistance:
In connection with the need criterion mentioned above,
the staff of the Governor's Committee claimed that the
following factors received special consideration (see
Table IX):
(1) Population: All cities and towns with popula-
tions of over 75,000 persons were given priority.
This decision was based on the fact that crime
was concentrated in the larger cities. Twelve
communities contained over 50% of the total
index crimes committed in the states.
(2) Five-year crime rate: All cities and towns with
a five-year average crime rate of over 2,500 per
100,000 residents were given special considera-
tion. The five-year average crime rate was
determined by averaging the number of crimes
(uniform crime reports) during a five-year
period and dividing this by the population
figure from the State Census. Seven communities
fell into this category.
(3) Number of crimes: All those communities with
over 2,000 crimes per year were considered to be
Table IX
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY CONSIDERATION (1970)
Boston
Worcester
Springfield
New Bedford
Fall River
Cambridge
Lynn
Newton
Quincy
Lowell
Somerville
Brockton
Lawrence
Medford
Chicopee
Waltham
Pittsfield
Malden
Brookline
Holyoke
XX X X X X X X 9
x x x x x x x 8
x x x x x x 6
X X X X X X 7
X x x x x 5
x
X
X
x
x
x
x
x
X
x
x
x
x
X
X
x
x
x
x x
x x
x
X
x
x
x 7
x 7
0
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
24.7
6.1
3.3
3.3
2.0
3.9
2.5
1 1.5
2 1.8
X X 5 1.1
x
x
4
3
3
0
1
1.8
1.8
1.3
0.7
0.5
0 0.8
X .1 0.6
1 0.6
3 1.9
X X 2 0.7
H
'~0
0~
2
2
2
2
2
Arlington
Framingham
Weymouth
Chelsea X
Source: 1971 State Plan, p. 380
x
X X X x
1 0.5
0 0.8
0 0.3
6 0.7
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in special needs of LEAA funds. Eleven communi-
ties fell into this category.
(4) Juvenile cases: All cities and towns with over
700 juvenile cases in a given year were given
one "check mark." Figures were based on statis-
tical tables included in letters of the Chief
Justice to the Justice, Clerk, and Probation
Officers of the District Courts. These figures
were little more than vague approximations of
the number of such cases in the individual cities
and towns. Six communities fell into this
category.
(5) Poverty indicators: As the report of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Justice pointed out, "burglary,
robbery and serious assaults occur in areas of
social disorganization: areas where there is
high unemployment, poor education and housing,
and large concentrations of low-income families."
Although there are few accurate statistics on
communities with such areas of disorganization,
a few selected factors were considered in ranking
cities on the basis of poverty and social dis-
organization. These figures were computed only
for those communities with over 50,000 people
and, in the singular case of Chelsea, for a
city with a crime rate of over 3,000 per 100,000
persons.
(6) Population density: Those cities with concen-
trations of over 10,000 persons per square mile
were given "one checkmark." Although density
of population may not be spread evenly throughout
a community, it was assumed that in those commun-
ities of highest density, there are certain
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sections of considerably higher density than
the city itself. Seven communities had densi-
ties of over 100,000 persons per square mile.
(7) Housing conditions: Those communities with
over 14% of their housing stock in dilapidated
or deteriorating condition were given one
checkmark. (Again as with density figures there
were some areas with more sound housing and
other areas with poorer housing within one
community.) Nine communities fell into this
category.
(8) Annual incomes: Those communities with over
20% of their households with annual incomes of
less than $5,000 were given one checkmark. In
1970 fourteen communities had 20% of their
households with annual incomes of less than
$5,000.
(9) Model Cities: Those communities which had model
cities programs were also given one checkmark.
These cities chosen on the basis of low-
income, deteriorating neighborhoods with
problems of social disorganization, would
be likely targets for criminal activity
and hence for priority consideration by
the Committee.
There were nine model city communities within
the Commonwealth.
Based on these considerations, seven primary target cities
and six secondary target cities were designated in the 1970
2 1 1971 Comprehensive Criminal Justice Plan for Crime-Prevention and
Control, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pp. 378-382.
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State Plan (see Table IX). All communities with a total
of six (or more) checkmarks were selected as primary
targets, and those with a total of three to five as
secondary targets. In 1969 the seven primary target
cities (Boston, Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford,
Cambridge, Chelsea and Lynn) contained 44.5% of the
state's total index crimes. The secondary target cities
(Fall River, Somerville, Brockton, Brookline, Lowell,
and Lawrence) contained 9.9%.
It is difficult to know whether the Governor's Committee
took this set of indicators seriously, since primary
target cities received approximately $3.80 per capita
between 1969 and 1971 (while all cities over 100,000
received $4.77 per capita).
The secondary target cities received approximately $2.00
per capita (while all cities between 50,000 and 100,000
were awarded an average of $1.90 per capita). Selection
as a secondary target city certainly did very little for
Fall River which received only $0.12 per capita from
1969-1971. Newton, on the other hand, which was at the
bottom of the needs list, received $3.50 per capita (more
than all but three of the thirteen target cities).
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In 1971 the Governor's Committee revamped the criteria
for priority consideration (see Table X). Fall River
edged up into the top priority classification, while
Chelsea dropped to the bottom of the list (although the
crime rate in Chelsea had increased). Brockton and
Lawrence also moved farther down on the list. The top
priority cities under the new system received $3.50
between 1969 and 1971, while the secondary target cities
received $1.80. In other words, using the 1971 criteria
of need as a measure of where LEAA should have been
going, the distribution pattern was even more difficult
to justify.
Matching requirements: The original LEAA legislation and
the 1970 amendments put certain restrictions on the
allocation of block grants within the state. Planning
grants of $100,000 were awarded annually to each state
(with a substantial supplementary planning grant cal-
culated on the basis of population). The 1970 amendments
required each SPA to guarantee that major cities and
counties received planning funds, but no specific formula
was indicated. The original legislation called for an
automatic 40% pass through of planning monies. The
restrictions on action grants were somewhat more severe.
Besides the mandatory 75% pass through mentioned earlier,
Table X
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY CONSIDERATION (1971)
Boston 641,071X 5,973X 38,2914X 824X X 32.5X X 8 1 22.4 2,798
Springfield 163,905X 4,780X 7,834X 657X 29.3X X 7 2 4.6 328
New Bedford 101,777X 4,576X 4,657X 725X - 25.5X X 7 3 2.7 252
Fall River 96,898X 4,716X 4,570X 678X 24.2X X 7 4 2.7 233
Worcester 176,572X 6,454X ll,396X 8413X 17.2 X 6 5 6.7 ~419
Cambridge 100,361X 7,536X 7,563X 515 X 16.4 X 6 6 4.4 252
Lynn 90,294X 4,749X 4,288X 770X 16.6 X 6 7 2.5 183 H
Quincy 87,966X 3,808X 3,350 802X 11.5 3 8 1.9 194
Somerville 88,779X 3,184X 2,837 205 X 114.1 3 9 1.7
Lowell 94,239X 2,780 2,620 732X 17.5 X 3 10 1.5 184
Holyoke 50,112 4,795X 2,1403 364 31.3X X 3 11 1.4 110
Brookline 58,886 6,044X 3,559X 106 10.9 2 12 2.1 151
Maiden 56,127 1,477 829 688X X 14.1 2 13 0.5 117
Newton 91,066X 2,807 2,556 187 7.8 1 14 1.5 208
Brockton 89,040X 2,375 2,115 505 14.9 1 15 1.2 171
Lawrence 66,915 2,932 1,962 540 20.4x 1 16 1.1 145
Chicopee 66,676 1,827 1,218 261 20.9X 1 17 0.7 103
Pittsfield 57,020 1,489 849 165 25.4X 1 18 0.5 81
Chelsea . 30,625 2,625 80~4 617 X 21.2X 1 19 0.5 72
Arlington 53, 324 1,067 , 569 X 8.5 1 20 0 .3 90
Medford 64,397 1,376 886 11.0 0 0.5 131
Waltham 61,582 2,061 1,269 307 10.5 0 0.7 114
Framingham 64,048 2,198 1,408 246 9.4 0 0.8 100
Weymouth 54,610 584 319 8.8 0 0.2 93
Source: LEAA Planning Staff Total - 63.1%
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matching requirements were set for various categories:
Matching Requirements
(Maximum federal share indicated)
By Act As Amended
Methods, devices, facilities and
equipment to improve law enforcement 60% 75%
Recruiting and training of law
enforcement personnel 60 75
Public education 60 75
Building construction 50 50
Organized crime 75 75
Riots and civil disorders 75 75
Community projects (police relations,
neighborhood participation) 60 75
Two additional categories were added in 1970: criminal
justice coordinating councils (75%) and delinquency
prevention and correction (75%).
The matching provisions turned out to be relatively unim-
portant. In assessing the relative strengths of competing
applicants, the SPA did not worry very much about the
community's ability to come up with matching funds. More
often than not, "in kind" contributions of goods and
services were quite acceptable.
There was some talk that in fiscal year 1973, 40% of the
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local matching share would be required in cash as opposed
to goods and services.22 The SPA's argued that if the
hard cash match provision were strictly enforced, many
cities and towns would decline to participate in the
LEAA program. From 1968-1971, however, a community's
ability to demonstrate the availability of matching
resources was not an important factor in the allocation
of LEAA funds.
The shift to non-competitive funding: In 1971 the
Governor's Committee allocated 59% of its block grant
funds for non-competitive programs, that is, the programs
designated by the state planning agency for specified
purposes in particular locales. The non-competitive
approach was an effort to reduce the dissipation of
program funds and to encourage a greater focus on the
needs of a limited number of municipalities--particularly
those in urban areas where the crime rate was highest. 2 3
The shift to non-competitive grants might help to achieve
2 2 Text of Amended Statutes and Summary of Major Amendments, Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice,
January, 1971, p. 1.
2 3The Massachusetts resolution of the city-state relationship through
reliance on non-competitive grants was the opposite of the approach
to city funding implemented in Ohio. See Law and Disorder II, draft
prepared by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Washington, D.C., September, 1972.
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these two objectives. It is equally likely that the shift
to non-competitive funding could reduce competition among
municipalities and perhaps dampen the innovative thrust
of the block grant program. 2 4
Forty-one per cent (41%) of the block grant funds allocated
by the SPA in 1971 were distributed on a competitive basis.
High priority program areas were listed in the annual plan
and localities competed for funds under various headings.
To some extent, the shift to non-competitive grants helped
to pull together statewide efforts within programmatic
areas. For a while it was possible for individual locali-
ties to buy into state programs (in areas such as drug
control or juvenile diversion) but to still work indepen-
dently of other communities concerned with the same
issues. Under the non-competitive approach, only desig-
nated cities and towns were eligible for funds, and
eligibility was contingent upon greater planning and
control at the state level.
24This, of course, assumes that municipalities are willing to accept
the fact that they are competing for limited resources and that such
competition is likely to yield better or more innovative project
proposals. Although it is hard to judge whether or not this is true,
local criminal justice planners have acknowledged that they feel
obliged to come up with a new wrinkle or a new twist every time they
submit a proposal.
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Testing the relative importance of various explanatory
factors: Besides the six factors that the Governor's
Committee claims to have taken into account in allocating
LEAA money (crime rate, population, the innovative
character of project proposals, technical feasibility,
staff estimates of local skills and resources, previous
level of LEAA funding), two other variables are often
mentioned by partisan observers: party politics and
influence with the governor's committee. The relative
importance of each of the eight explanatory factors is
discussed below.
(1) Crime rate: The 1969-1970 Comprehensive
Criminal Justice Plan for Massachusetts stated
that the Governor's Committee was unanimous in
the view that the main goal of the program was
to reduce crime. (By 1971 the emphasis had
switched to the more achievable yet difficult
goal of "developing an institutional capability
for reform within the criminal justice agencies
of the state.") As it turns out, crime rate is
not a very good explainer of grant allocation
patterns.2 s Cities and towns with high crime
rates such as Brookline, Lynn, Holyoke, Revere,
Fall River, and West Springfield received very
25 Regression analysis indicates that crime rate is a poor explainer
of the variation in LEAA funding levels. For cities of 50,000 to
100,000 (N=17) crime rate explained only 28% of the variation in LEAA
expenditures (R-squared equals + .28). For cities of 25,000 to 50,000,R-squared equaled +.31. For cities of more than 100,000 only 5% of
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little LEAA money--an average of less than
$1.30 per cepita from 1969-1971 (see Table XI).
Something other than the crime rate must have
accounted for the success that various cities
and towns had in securing LEAA funds from the
state.
(2) Population: Population is almost perfectly
correlated with the level of LEAA funding
received during the period of 1969-1971.26 It is
important to note that crime rate and population
are surprisingly independent.2 7 Following is a
breakdown of crime rates in the twelve largest
cities in Massachusetts:
City or 1970 Popu- Offenses Ranked by
Town lation Number Rate Crime Rate
Boston 641,071 35,397 563.5 3rd
Worcester 176,572 9,932 567.1 2nd
Springfield 163,905 7,367 454.5 5th
New Bedford 101,777 4,520 446.4 6th
Cambridge 100,361 6,175 624.1 1st
Fall River 96,898 3,324 347.4 10th
Lowell 94,239 2,156 232.0 21st
Newton 91,203 1,986 217.8 24th
Lynn 90,294 3,867 440.3 7th
Brockton 89.040 2,586 295.7 16th
Quincy 87,966 2,868 325.3 12th
Somerville 85,779 2,223 255.4 18th
the variation in LEAA expenditures was accounted for by crime rate.
For all cities and towns over 25,000 (N=52) crime rate explained less
than 1% of the variation in LEAA allocations. When Boston was remved
from the sample, R-squared was still only +.18. In all cases the t-
statistic was high enough to be significant.
2 6 Regression analysis indicates that population is an excellent ex-
plainer of LEAA funding levels from 1969-1971. For cities of more than
100,000 (N=5) population explained 95% of the variation in LEAA fund-
ing. For cities and towns in Massachusetts over 25,000 (N=52) R-
squared equaled +.95. When Boston was removed from the sample, popula-
tion still explained more than 65% of the variation in LEAA allocations
to cities and towns (which was significant given a t-statistic of 9.83).
2 7 The correlation between crime rate and population for cities and
towns with more than 25,000 people was only +0.18. When Boston was
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Table XI
LEAA BLOCK GRANT AWARDS RELATIVE TO CRIME RATE
(1969-1971 Totals)
City or Town
Cambridge
Worcester
Brookline
Boston
West Springfield
Holyoke
Springfield
Lynn
Fall River
New Bedford
Revere
Quincy
Offenses
Rate/
Number 10,000
7,563 753.6
11,396 645.4
3,559 604.4
38,294 597.3
1,423 500.1
2,403 479.5
7,834 478.0
4,288 474.9
4,570 471.6
4,657 457.6
1,699 394.2
3,350 380.8
Population
100,361
176,572
58,689
641,071
28,461
50,112
163,905
90,294
96,898
101,777
43,159
87,779
Total Per
Award Capita
$578,210
606,692
155,310
3,533,769
0
51,359
337,852
245,742
12,000
592,814
44,900
233,279
$5.76
3.44
2.64
.5.50
0
1.02
2.06
2.70
.12
5.82
1.04
2.65
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The fact that population or city size turned
out to be the best explainer of LEAA allocation
patterns may not seem terribly surprising, 28
but the significance of this finding will become
more apparent as the hidden incentives and
controls affecting decision making in state
government are explored in greater detail in
later chapters.
(3) The innovative character of project proposals:
This is a difficult variable to measure. Since
the state sets annual budgetary priorities,
cities and towns are restricted to submitting
grants for a relatively small number of purposes.
Moreover, the funding cycle is such that grant
applications must be prepared rather quickly
each year. Since local matching contributions
need to be approved by the chief executive and
in some cases by the city council, grant appli-
cations cannot be too controversial. Extremely
complicated or controversial proposals will bog
down in the local political system. Although
it is desirable to take several months (perhaps
even years) to prepare a grant application, this
removed from the sample (N=52) the correlation coefficient was still
only +.17.
2 8Michael Aiken and Robert Alford have suggested that larger cities
are more likely to come up with innovative grant proposals and tend to
receive a somewhat larger share of federal dollars available for com-
munity programs (in this case, urban renewal). Michael Aiken and
Robert Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban
Renewal," American Sociological Review, August, 1970, Vol. 35, No. 4,
pp. 650-664.
209
is not feasible. The rapid turnover of admini-
strative staff at the state level and the
constant shifting of annual budgetary priorities
means that applications prepared in response to
out-of-date signs and cues are likely to have
few if any advocates at the state level.
Most innovative proposals have been the work of
skilled criminal justice professionals operating
at the municipal level. In most cases, smaller
communities have not had the funds (LEAA planning
grants and agency development funds have been
limited to larger cities) to hire skilled grants-
men, or federal grant coordinators, as they are
euphemistically called. For these reasons,
innovative project proposals have come mostly
from the larger cities. Since there is no easy
way of measuring innovation, however, it is
difficult to prove that this has in fact been the
case.
(4) Technical feasibility: This factor has to be
viewed in much the same way as the innovative
character of grant proposals. A series of tech-
nical advisory subcommittees were set up by the
Governor's Committee. These sub-committees were
asked to evaluate project proposals. In most
cases, the technical review committees rubber
stamped recommendations made by the SPA staff.
In a few instances, though, the technical advis-
ory committees raised certain questions about
the viability of proposed projects. On occasion
they even demanded reductions in the initial
level of project funding. In most cases, though,
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if an SPA staff member assigned to a particular
city or agency indicated that a proposed
project seemed politically feasible, its tech-
nical feasibility was taken for granted.
(5) Estimates of local skills and resources: These
have been sketchy at best. Some informal
measures of local planning and managerial capa-
bility have been developed as cities and towns
have come back for a second and third helping
of LEAA money. The ability to meet matching
requirements is one measure of local resources,
but this has been relatively unimportant since
in kind contributions of all sorts have been
acceptable. Insofar as willingness to accept
responsibility for increasing program support
is concerned, there has been almost no way of
gauging a locality's intentions. Moreover, the
Governor's committee has been anxious to hold on
to successful projects in order to maintain its
credibility and to enhance it own track record.
Approximately 50 of the 63 grants awarded in
1972 were continuing grants; in 1972 between 60
and 70% of the total funds of the agency were
tied up in ongoing projects.
For the most part, the Governor's Committee has
been concerned only that communities requesting
assistance show enough capability to give a
proposed project a fighting chance. Assessments
of overall community resources and long-term
willingness to share the burden of a particular
project have either been ignored or have been
too difficult to estimate.
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(6) Previous level of LEAA funding: This factor
seems to have had at least an indirect bearing
on a community's chances of receiving a new
LEAA grant. If nothing else, past success
implies an ability to negotiate the grant getting
system. Of course, if a first award is spent
with little or no success, the chances of re-
newed funding are somewhat diminished. It is
not particularly difficult to show, though, why
an earlier grant failed for reasons that could
not possibly have been anticipated or why a
new grant would make particularly good sense
in light of what has been learned from previous
mistakes. For the largest cities, prior level
of LEAA funding has been an excellent indicator
of the chances of receiving additional alloca-
tions, but this has been true only because the
Governor's Committee settled in late 1970 on a
non-competitive grant approach catering to the
needs of a few large cities. Smaller communi-
ties (especially those with populations under
20,000) that received awards in 1970 were not
likely to receive awards again given the change
in philosophy at the state level. Thus, for
small municipalities, previous level of LEAA
funding has tended to be a very poor predictor
of the chances of obtaining additional LEAA
funds.
(7) Party politics: Indeed, party politics may
have something to do with whether or not a
particular grant application has succeeded or
failed, but it is not at all apparent whose
politics ought to be taken into account and
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what in fact is meant in the first place by
party politics. The basic organization of the
Governor's Committee provides a neutralizing
set of political checks and balances. At the
community level, it is not clear whose politics
would make a difference. Possibly overall
party registration in a given city or town might
be taken as a measure of the town's politics, but
almost all of Massachusetts is Democratic in
these terms. Grants made as payoffs to local
officials or loyal party workers have been diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to discern--primarily
because it is not clear who benefits politically
at either the granting or the receiving end. In
all likelihood, various competing political
forces at the top (the Governor, the Attorney
General, members of the state legislature) and
at the bottom (the mayor, the city council, se-
lected segments of the local population) all
benefit politically when grants are awarded.
This is true even though extremely controversial
projects (half-way houses, drug treatment centers,
legal aid programs, etc.) have in certain
instances proven to be political liabilities.
Although the basic precepts of partisan politics
are tantalizingly simple, a close reading of the
LEAA program suggests that what is commonly
referred to as party politics has been a relative-
ly obscure if not unimportant factor in determin-
ing LEAA grant allocations in Massachusetts.
(8) Influence with the Governor's Committee: Those
who think along conspiratorial lines may be
able to find some evidence to support their
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suppositions; if they do, though, they are very
likely to be missing the point. There are at
least two reasons why membership on the Committee
is not a significant explainer of grant alloca-
tion decisions. First, most members of the
Governor's Committee have not played an important
role in allocating LEAA funds. Only the Proposal
Review Board (a select group of eight committee
members) actually vote on specific grants. The
staff of the Governor's Committee invariably has
its way regardless of what most Committee members
think. Only in rare instances has a member of
the Proposal Review Board been able to gather the
information necessary to counteract a staff
recommendation. Committee members have tried to
use their personal influence with the Executive
Director or the Attorney General (who serves as
head of the Proposal Review Board) to block
certain projects, but once a proposal has re-
ceived staff endorsement, technical advisory
committee approval, and the support of the
Attorney General, it is almost impossible for a
committee member to turn the outcome around.
This is not to say that influence with the
Committee or the membership of the Proposal
Review Board has no bearing on the allocation of
LEAA funds. Quite the contrary: the priorities
expressed in the Annual State Plan clearly
reflect the make-up of the Committee. 2 9 Never-
2 9 The make-up of the Committee is discussed at length later in this
chapter. Suffice it to say, that the nine District Attorneys on the
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theless, interviews with Committee members
suggest that they rarely find themselves in a
position to make a difference on a particular
grant application. Most committee members hold
full-time jobs and are unable to devote enough
time to reviewing grant proposals (which often
reach them only shortly before committee meet-
ings). There is even some indication that
Committee members have withdrawn from delibera-
tions concerning proposals in which they have had
a partisan interest.
One other interpretation of the membership
factor is important. It appears that membership
on the Governor's Committee can help to increase
the flow of information to selected localities
concerning budgetary priorities for a given year.
In addition, the speed and extent to which SPA
staff members respond to city or agency requests
for assistance is also related to their represen-
tation on the Committee. This point is discussed
further in Chapter V. Nevertheless, even if there
is some correlation between community representa-
tion on the Governor's Committee and success in
obtaining grants, the direct explanatory power of
the membership variable is extremely weak. 3 0
Committee have been very concerned with efforts to reform the court
system, and the four police chiefs have been interested in seeing to it
that police operations receive a fair share of the funds.
3 oIn 1969 the list of Governor's Cormittee members included represen-
tatives from the following cities and towns: Newton, Winchester, Fall
River, Boston, Somerville, New Bedford, and Worcester. In 1970, repre-
sentatives were added from Springfield, Lowell, Malden, and Cambridge.
Fall River, Somerville, and Malden have not received even an average
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Summary: If it were possible to develop quantitative
measures of the innovative character of grant proposals,
their technical feasibility, or the strength of party
affiliations, it might be worth testing the explanatory
power of these and other factors more systematically.
However, given the softer nature of most of these variables,
the available statistical techniques such as multiple re-
gression, correlation and factor analysis are not strong
enough to sort out their relative importance.
To sum up, impressions gleaned from discussions with
state and local officials suggest that proposals sub-
mitted by large, crime-ridden cities between 1969 and 1971
were most likely to be successful. Once a large city
received an award, its chances for continued support were
excellent. Active representation on the Proposal Review
Board did not enhance the chances of success except
insofar as the flow of information regarding annual state
funding priorities was likely to be helpful. If a commun-
ity did not submit a proposal, it had no chance of
share of LEAA money over the past few years, while the success that
Boston, Cambridge, New Bedford and Worcester have had in attracting
LEAA funds has undoubtedly been the result of the large-city strategy
adopted by the Governor's Committee as a whole and not the result of
unusually cagey representation on the part of certain Committee members.
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receiving funds. Where proposals were not minimally
acceptable (let alone innovative) there was very little
chance that even a great deal of support from a sympa-
thetic staff member on the Governor's Committee could
make a difference. In short, between 1969 and 1971 it
was practically impossible to obtain a grant without
SPA staff endorsement.
Population (or city size) seems to be the best explainer
of the pattern of grant allocations in Massachusetts--
probably because of its high correlation with local
professional staff capability. To the extent that crime
rate correlates with city size, it too must be taken
into account, but because it is not directly correlated
with city size, it is a somewhat less important explana-
tory factor than might otherwise be expected.
The pattern of grant allocations is only half the story.
The various factors that account for the failure of the
LEAA program to encourage significant institutional
reform in the criminal justice system deserve even more
attention.
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The Organization and Membership of the Governor's
Committee
On March 9, 1966 the President of the United States urged
the fifty state governors to establish state planning
committees on law enforcement.3 1 On March 10, 1966 the
U.S. Attorney General notified the governors that federal
funds were available under the National Law Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1965 to aid in the establishment of
state law enforcement committees. On September 28, 1966,
Massachusetts Governor John Volpe created (by executive
order) a Public Safety Committee.
More than a year later, the state legislature enacted
legislation creating the Committee on Law Enforcement
3 1 A letter dated May 10, 1966 from James Vorenberg to Elliot
Richardson outlined what was going on. Vorenberg, who was a member
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, wrote:
"I have had in the back of my mind that Massachusetts might
become something of a model of what might be done in this area.
I recommend that the Governor appoint a small cammittee of the
sort suggested in the Attorney General's letter and use the
Public Safety Committee as a sounding board. As I told you,
our [The President's Commission] first goal--is to get certain
kinds of information which would be helpful to the President's
National Commission. The second and more important purpose is
to try to create, in as many states as possible, planning groups
which are looking at their own system of criminal administration
and developing projects which will lead to change."
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and Administration of Criminal Justice.32 Technically
the two committees were separate entities, but func-
tionally they acted as one. The ex officio members of
the two committees are identical, but the Governor's
Public Safety Committee (established by Executive Order)
provides for eighteen appointive members serving one-year
terms while the Committee on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Criminal Justice (established by law) provides
for only six appointive members who serve four-year
terms.
3 2The Conmittee had no permanent status so Volpe submitted a bill
(H4367). On February 8, 1967, H4367 was declared an emergency law
by the Executive. The committee as established was composed of the
Attorney General, nine district attorneys, and the Commissioners of
Public Safety, Corrections, the MDC, and the Chairmen of the Youth
Services Board and the Parole Board along with the Boston Police
Commissioner and four gubernatorial appointees. The committee was
required to meet at least four times a year. On April 24, 1967, a
staff consisting of Executive Director Sheldon Krantz, two research
assistants, an administrative assistant and two secretaries was
hired. In May of 1967, the Committee appointed an advisory committee
on planning, implementation and research chaired by Professor James
Vorenberg.
July 10, 1967, H5021 was reported out of the House Ways and Means
Committee. Changes were made: instead of four gubernatorial
appointees, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House,
the Minority leaders of the Senate and the House, and six members
appointed by the Governor were to be included on the Comittee. The
six appointees were to include one representative of the superior
court, one representative of the district court, and four members
of city or town police departments. The duties remained the same
except that the charge to study organized crime was deleted. Later
in 1967, when the bill was finally reported out, the composition of
the committee changed again.
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The duties of the Committee established by the legislature
were confined primarily to studies and information dis-
semination. The law did not provide for staff support.
The duties of the Committee established by executive
order encompassed not only the study and information dis-
semination functions, but other responsibilities as well. 3 3
It was empowered to advise the Governor; develop and
revise law enforcement plans; design and conduct programs
to reduce crime; provide technical assistance to regional
and local units of government; and to make grants and
administer grant programs.34 In addition, the order
provided for technical advisory committees and for a
Proposal Review Board comprised of nine committee
members. 3
There were discrepancies between the functions defined
legislatively and the responsibilities outlined by the
various executive orders. State funds have been appropri-
3 sReport of the Examination of the Accounts of the Committee on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice from April 13,
1970 to May 10, 1971. No. 71-S-186, prepared by Thaddeus Buczko,
State Auditor, p. 8.
34Unlike most other state planning agencies, the Governor's
Committee was given the power to conduct projects of its own.
3 5Executive Order No. 60, July 25, 1968, as amnded by Executive
Order Nos. 61, 62, and 70.
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ated under the title Governor's Public Safety Committee
(the agency created by executive order), but the agency
has used the title, Committee on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Criminal Justice, because it seems to
be more descriptive of the Committee's action functions.
Committee Membership: In 1972, the Governor's Committee
had 34 members, 21 of whom represented different branches
of the criminal justice system. Three members were black
and one Puerto Rican. Only three members represented
local community agencies or citizens' organizations.
Members of the Committee on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Criminal Justice as of
September 1, 1972
Ex Officio:
Robert Quinn, Chairman
Robert L. Anderson
William T. Buckley
George G. Burke
John P. S. Burke
Garrett H. Byrne
Philip Rollins
John J. Droney
John Callahan
Matthew J. Ryan
John Kehoe
C. Eliot Sands
John Boone
Martin Davis
Jerome Miller
John W. Sears
William Taylor
Attorney General or designee
District Attorney, Plymouth
District Attorney, Middlesex
District Attorney, Norfolk
District Attorney, Eastern
District Attorney, Suffolk
District Attorney, Southern
District Attorney, Northern
District Attorney, Northwestern
District Attorney, Western
Commissioner of Public Safety
Commissioner of Probation
Commissioner of Correction
Chairman of the Parole Board
Director of the Department of
Youth Services
Commissioner, Metropolitan
District Commission
Acting Police Commissioner,
Boston
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Appointed by the Governor:
Paul Doherty
Richard Levine
James Vorenberg
James O'Leary
Robert Liddy
Francis X. Finn
Chief, Capital Police State
House
Lawyer, Hale and Dorr, Boston
Professor, Harvard Law School
Lieutenant, Cambridge Police
Department
President, Mass. Police Asso-
ciation
Chief, Quincy Police Dept.
Governor's Public Safety Committee
The ex officio members of the Committee on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Criminal Justice serve on the Public
Safety Committee as well along with an additional eighteen
members appointed by the Governor to serve one-year terms.
In 1972 appointed members included:
Edward Barshak Chairman, Mass. Defenders
Comm.
Paul K. Connolly Justice, Superior Court
Paul Doherty Chief, Capital Police, State
House
Francis Finn Chief, Quincy Police Dept.
Livingston Hall Professor, Harvard Law School
Charles Hedges Sheriff, Norfolk County
Gwendolyn Jefferson Program Director, Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area Plan-
ning Action Council, Boston
Walter J. Kelliher Mayor, Malden
Richard Levine Lawyer, Hale and Dorr, Boston
Robert Liddy President, Mass. Police Asso-
ciation
Francis J. McGrath City Manager, Worcester
H. Bernard Monahan Selectman, Rockland
Robert Mulford Secretary, Children's Protec-
tive Services
James O'Leary Lieutenant, Cambridge Police
Dept.
Alex Rodriguez United Community Services
222
Donald Taylor Executive Director, South End
Neighborhood Area Program,
Boston
James Vorenberg Professor, Harvard Law School
The legislation gave primary authority to a nine-member
Proposal Review Board chaired by the Attorney General and
operated as an Executive Committee with final say on all
grant proposals.
In 1971 the Attorney General grouped Committee members
into six task forces with responsibility for guiding the
efforts of the SPA staff.se In a few instances task
forces met separately to discuss priorities for the
annual state plan, but in most cases staff members con-
tacted Committee members individually. Based on such
meetings, the Committee staff tried to identify the major
criminal justice needs and problems in Massachusetts and
to suggest operational goals to guide grant allocations.
3 6The task forces were organized as follows: police--Kelliher, Kehoe,
Levine, Doherty, Sears, Liddy, McGrath, Monahan, O'Leary, and W.
Taylor; courts, prosecution and defense--Vorenberg, Sands, Droney,
Byrne, J. Burke, Callahan, Connolly, Hall, Ryan, Buckley, Rollins,
Anderson, G. Burke; corrections--Boone, Hedges, Sands, Davis, Jeffer-
son, Rodriguez; juvenile delinquency--Mulford, Rodriguez, Miller,
Sands, Jefferson, Connolly; drugs/alcohol--Kelliher, Hedges, Callahan,
J. Burke, Miller, D. Taylor, Levine; engineering-Sands, Kehoe,
Levine, and W. Taylor.
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Annual plans referred mostly to projects begun in previous
years. With well over two hundred grants, the task of
checking budget needs against quarterly reports and
ongoing staff evaluations was indeed burdensome. Various
state agencies with representatives on the Governor's
Committee tried to use the LEAA program and the annual
state plan to help underscore their own efforts to meet
emerging state criminal justice needs. They also tried
to pry loose LEAA funds to cover the costs of reorganiz-
ing old line agencies (such as the Department of Youth
Services) or redirecting agency activities (as in the
case of the Department of Corrections, which was attempt-
ing to shift from a punitive to a more of a rehabilita-
tive community-based philosophy of corrections).
In 1971 the District Attorneys organized as a voting
block. Although the Attorney General (as head of the
Proposal Review Board) dominated the Committee, the DA's
gained some degree of power. The police chiefs on the
board, perhaps because they were jealous of each other,
were unable to get together. The DA's were accustomed
to meeting as a group, and knew how to present a solid
front when dealing with the Committee staff. In 1970,
for example, they wanted surveillance equipment and funds
for a training program. The staff rejected the proposal
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as did the technical advisory committee that reviewed it.
The staff objected because certain constitutional safe-
guards were lacking. Moreover, the proposed project was
similar to one that the Attorney General's office already
had in operation. The DA's made no attempt to deal with
the substantive objections to their project; they simply
tried to outvote everyone else. A similar tactic was used
in wangling support for the District Court Prosecutors
Program. The Committee staff wanted to set up profes-
sional prosecutorial boards funded on the basis of need
(for example, based on the number of cases before the
court in any district). Preliminary efforts along these
lines were not successful. The prosecutors were not
called upon to try very many cases, and in general the
program did little more than provide well-paid jobs for
an expanded number of assistant district attorneys. The
DA's, however, pressed for a package deal. They wanted
district court prosecutors hired in all districts and
they wanted a flat grant of $1,000,000 to support the
3 7The District Court Prosecutors Program was designed to replace police
prosecutors with professional prosecutors (the 1969-1971 award was
$351,500; the 1972 allocation was $951,000). The project enabled
District Attorneys' offices to initiate or continue programs involving
assistant DA's and student prosecutors in district courts. The pre-
existing police prosecutor system had over 200 legally untrained
police officers prosecuting criminal cases in the 73 district courts
of the Commonwealth.
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program. They opposed all efforts to relate funding
levels to measures of need. The DA's went so far as to
hire a lobbyist to represent their interests in this
area. 38
The staff: By 1972, the Governor's Committee had built
up a staff of 71 members organized into four working
divisions: Planning, Research and Evaluation; Program
Development; Grant Management; and Internal Administra-
tion. (See Figure I). Program management groups were
assigned to work directly with state agencies and city
officials. A special metropolitan area development group
was set up to visit target cities on a more or less
regular basis and to assist potential grantees in the
preparation of criminal justice plans. In 1972, key staff
38The lobbyist began his work for the DA's by making a national survey
of what LEAA was doing on behalf of DA's in 16 states--the results of
his survey showed that Massachusetts DA's "came in last." He took his
survey to the Governor's Committee staff and to the Attorney General.
About $950,000 was set aside for a district court prosecutors program.
During the task force review of the project all nine district attor-
neys showed up. There was no dissent. The DA's organized around the
project; they were sure that they could easily sway the committee; in
addition they were confident that they could show a need for the
project. There was a great deal of opposition to the program from the
Massachusetts Police Association. Obviously the prosecutors program
challenged the status of those police officers who had been represent-
ing the Commonwealth in criminal cases (an unauthorized practice of
the law) and created new opportunities for lawyers, not policemen.
Figure I
Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement
August 27, 1971
Executive Director Legal Counsel
Arnold R. Rosenfeld LeiltieAsistant
P~c- Infonation Officer
FDeputy Director
William D. Kramer
Planning., Research Program Development Grant Internal Administration
and Evaluation Management Sytm
Bob Cole Richard Geltman Arthur Freeland Richard Baird
Manager Acting Manager Maaer Maater
Planning Research Engineering Criminal Metropolitan State Local Accounting Audi Office
and and Justice Area Management
].Evaluation [Management System Development
(Information (Corrections
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diversion
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members included Arnold Rosenfeld (formerly deputy
assistant attorney general); William Kramer, Deputy
Director; Richard Baird, Manager-Internal Administration;
and Richard Geltman, Acting Manager-Program Development.
The staff influenced the funding process in a number of
ways: by its efforts to solicit grants from target
cities; by suggesting modifications in grant requests
(aimed at enhancing their fit with overall Committee
priorities); by its evaluation of project proposals;
and through the design of the annual Comprehensive
Criminal Justice Plan. 3 Staff members were assigned by
functional specialization or by geographic area. They
were expected to collect, modify, and improve proposals
from local governments and state agencies, and to advocate
particular proposals before staff subcommittees. There
was some competition among staff members anxious to
have their proposals do well. Staff biases worked in
favor of concise, well written, and well argued proposals
designed to appeal to professional norms and which stressed
39Mark H. Moore and William Greenberg, "An In-Process Evaluation of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act in Massachusetts," February 22, 1971, p. 35,
Kennedy School of Public Administration, Harvard University.
N.B.: Although the Moore-Greenberg study is outdated, the confidential
interviews that they cite are used here to back up first-hand impres-
sions.
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innovation. " In general, the staff (made up primarily
of lawyers) is characterized as "young, idealistic, and
perhaps too talented." Not surprisingly from 1969-1971
the turnover was high; moreover the staff adopted the
attitude that no one in the office knew more than anyone
else about the best way of doing things. This contributed
to the somewhat chaotic climate and to the high level of
individual initiative that characterized staff operations.
The technical advisory committees: Seven technical
advisory committees were set up in the areas of admini-
stration of justice, citizen participation and education,
corrections, organized crime, police, juvenile delinquency,
and science and technology. These panels were composed of
experts not already members of the Governor's Committee.
They were invited to comment on proposals falling within
their respective areas of competence. Prior to technical
review,the Committee staff examined all proposals and
prepared its own recommendations. In most instances the
advisory committees were unprepared to react to these
rather lengthy staff reviews. More often than not, the
panels rubber stamped staff recommendations, thereby
adding further endorsement to staff recommendations that
reached the proposal review board. Rarely did advisory
4 0 Ibid., p. 39.
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committees try to overrule the staff. On two occasions
when they did try, the proposal review board reversed
the technical advisory committees and went along with
the original staff recommendations."1
Theproposal review board: The proposal review board has
the final word on all grant awards. The Attorney General
sets the agenda and calls the shots.4 2 Descriptions of
review board sessions offered by members of the Committee
suggest that most decisions are made prior to official
meetings. The proposal review board basically serves to
ratify decisions. In the meetings, the Executive Director
usually gives a presentation, commenting on each agenda
item and reviewing the recommendations made by the staff
and the technical advisory committees. On occasion,
Committee members have tried to attach conditions to
certain grant awards, but in general, they have had
neither the time nor the expertise to comb through staff
*
1Moore and Greenberg report that of the 79 decisions made relative
to grant awards as of January 1971 the technical advisory cormittee
rejected staff recommendations only twice.
42Executive Order #70 stated that the mmnbership of the Proposal
Review Board was to include the Attorney General and eight persons
designated for one-year terms by the Governor. The Board is chaired
by the Attorney General and is directed to meet at the call of its
chairman as may be necessary to conduct its business.
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reports prior to board meetings, let alone to prepare
alternative recommendations. At best they have been able
to concentrate on a handful of proposals dealing with
subjects about which they happen to know a little bit or
in which they are most interested. Even in such cases,
though, the most they have been able to do is raise
questions.
The Committee's relationships with the Governor's Office:
The Governor has chosen not to exercise any influence over
the day-to-day workings of the Committee or the staff.
Accordingly, the staff has a good working relationship
with the Governor's office. The Governor's liaison with
the Committee reports that the staff has been very coop-
erative in setting aside money for work in the area of
corrections (in which the Governor has had a special
interest--security units for prisons, state/county correc-
tional facility leasing program, etc.), and supporting
the reorganization of the state Department of Youth
Services.
During the 1969-1971 period the Governor's office turned
more and more to the Committee staff for legislative
assistance. This coincided to some extent with the
Governor's newfound interest in the problems of law
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enforcement and criminal justice. The staff, for example,
helped to draft the judicial reform package that the
Governor submitted to the legislature. One of the major
elements of that package--the elimination of the bail-
bondsmen--was an outgrowth of two LEAA-supported projects.
During the hearings, the staff worked closely with the
Governor's office.
The Governor and the Attorney General have not had cause
to disagree (at least publicly) on the direction that the
LEAA program has taken in Massachusetts. There is some
feeling, though, that if the Attorney General decided to
run for governor, the LEAA program might become something
of a political football with the Attorney General and
the Governor vying for whatever kudos accrue to the
distributor of LEAA funds in the Commonwealth.
The Committee's relationship with the Attorney General:
If the criminal justice system is more politicized in
Massachusetts than in some other states it probably has
something to do with the way in which the Attorney General
goes about his business. The Attorney General has a staff
assistant serving as his special liaison to the Governor's
Committee. Committee staff members have suggested that
three considerations are uppermost in the Attorney General's
232
mind when grants have come before the proposal review
board. First, will the proposed project favorably
influence the Attorney General's personal power base.
Second, will law enforcement efforts in the Commonwealth
be enhanced (would a project make it easier to do the
job that needs to be done). And third, will the proposed
project be technically feasible. Legislative interference
in the operations of the Governor's Committee has been
kept to a minimum. A Republican Governor and a Democratic
Attorney General seem to balance each other out.
Interface with the Washington and Regional LEAA Offices:
In 1972 the Justice Department completed a reorganization
of its regional offices. New York, New Jersey, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands became part of a separate
region. They were previously part of the Boston regional
office. The new staff included Raymond Bowles, former
majority leader of the New Hampshire state legislature,
and William F. Powers, former Massachusetts Commissioner
of Public Safety as chief regional LEAA administrators.
The shuffling of the regional office followed closely an
overall reorganization of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in Washington. More than anything else
the reorganization was designed to fend off some of the
flak that resulted from public disclosure of fiscal misman-
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agement of LEAA funds at the state level. 3
According to the legislation, the Washington LEAA office
was supposed to approve annual state plans. The regional
office was supposed to evaluate and approve the Massachu-
setts plan in conjunction with the Washington office.
The regional office was responsible for determining whether
or not all the provisions of the plan were within the
scope of the Act, and whether or not the plan was truly
comprehensive. In practice, the evaluations were super-
ficial and inconsistent--necessarily so, given the large
number of plans considered by the federal government each
year and the ambiguity of the goals of the LEAA program.4
In 1970 the Massachusetts Annual Criminal Justice Plan
was nearly rejected. The Washington Office felt that
there was not enough attention given to quantifying objec-
tives and specifying how far each program would go. The
regional office, on the other hand, objected to the overly
precise specification of projects and the small size of
4 3 LEAA Newsletter, Volume 1, No. 10, July 1971, p. 5. See also
Hearings before a Subconmittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, House of Representatives, Ninety-second Congress, first session,
The Block Grant Programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (Part I).
44 Moore and Greenberg, op. cit., p. 45.
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the grants described in the plan. Thus, one arm of the
federal government complained about too much specificity,
and the other about insufficient specificity.4 5
Although Washington and the regional office retained some
power over the distribution of LEAA funds in Massachusetts
they did not exercise this power in any consistent or
obvious way. Neither the power to review and approve
state plans nor the power to allocate discretionary
monies apart from block grants gave the Department of
Justice much control over the use of LEAA funds in Massa-
chusetts.
The Committee's relationship with the Massachusetts State
legislature: From 1969-1971 the state legislature kept
pretty much out of the affairs of the Governor's Committee
--allowing the Governor and the Attorney General to run
things their own way. The Secretary of the State's Joint
Committee on Federal Financial Assistance indicated that
to the best of his knowledge most of the LEAA money in
the state was being used "for administration, a little
for radios and police cars, but mostly for administration."
Several legislators attended an LEAA-sponsored conference
4 sIbid.
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for state officials in February of 1971, but those attend-
ing got little if anything out of it. State Senator Chet
Atkins suggested that the only purpose of the Conference
was to convince the state legislature to put up the money
to continue various LEAA-initiated efforts. Several
legislators indicated that there was no reason to get
involved in the LEAA program until their constituents
pressed them for assistance. Since the public-at-large
was almost totally ignorant of the LEAA program there was
not very much chance of that happening. For the most part
even those members of the General Court involved in
criminal justice-related activities were blind to the
strengths and weakness of the LEAA program in Massachu-
setts.46 On occasion a member of the legislature has
46The only consistent exception was Democratic State Senator Chester
Atkins of Acton. Atkins accused the Sargent administration of "reck-
less mismanagement" of LEAA funds and charged that the Republican
governor had "squandered hundreds of thousands of dollars" in order to
create "a new state bureaucracy"--in 1972, spending $600,000 deciding
how to allocate $13 million. Atkins also charged that increasing
staff costs had siphoned off money that should have been going to
cities and towns to help them curb crime. He also criticized the
Governor's Camittee for making the application process so ccmplex
"that those agencies most in need of funds were unable to compete
successfully with larger agencies top-heavy with bureaucratic assist-
ance." Boston Herald Traveler, September 2, 1972. Whatever his poli-
tical motives, Atkins was the only member of the state legislature who
took the trouble to find out about the LEAA program and to raise ques-
tions about the basic assumptions underlying the distribution of LEAA
money in the state.
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suggested to the Attorney General that legislators be
added to the Governor's Committee. Nothing has come of
such requests.
The LEAA program has been insulated from legislative
scrutiny partly as a result of the low level of state
matching funds required by law. Most matching funds have
come in the form of in-kind contributions, and the state's
share has not been allocated through the normal state
appropriations process. Most legislators are not aware
that annual state expenditures for the Governor's Public
Safety Committee serve to maintain the staff of the state
planning agency that in turn allocates millions of dollars
a year to cities and towns in Massachusetts.
Relationships with big cities--the MAD Squad: The
Governor's Committee staff was worried because its program
development efforts overlapped similar efforts underway in
several cities. The critical question was when to involve
local planning staffs and how to build up local planning
capabilities. With the move to non-competitive grants
and the thrust toward major cities, the staff attempted to
build stronger ties with city planning agencies and mayors'
offices. A Metropolitan Area Development Squad was
assigned to make field visits to various cities and towns
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(usually taking a few days and involving discussions with
several dozen community officials including police chiefs,
DA's, judges, juvenile officers, and community action
groups). A series of strategy drafts was prepared in an
effort to determine whether or not particular cities were
interested in the concepts or ideas which the MAD Squad
was trying to sell and whether the city was willing to
accept the priorities indicated in the state plan. The
MAD Squad's first approach was through local city planning
departments, but they quickly changed direction. They
found that most local planning departments were concerned
primarily with physical planning, that they had no skill
or expertise in the criminal justice area, that it was
too easy for criminal justice planning money to get caught
up in other city planning projects, and that local city
planners for the most part had little credibility in their
own communities. The MAD Squad attempted to promote
separate planning activities under the direct supervision
of the mayor. In 1970-71, their focus shifted exclusively
to strengthening criminal justice planning capabilities in
high-priority cities such as Boston, Cambridge, New
Bedford, Springfield, Fall River, Worcester, and Lynn.
Summary: The organization and membership of the Governor's
Committee has had a definite impact on the distribution of
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LEAA funds in Massachusetts and has contributed to many
of the problems of institutionalizing systematic reforms
in the criminal justice system. The relationship between
the Governor and the Attorney General which evolved out
of the close personal ties between Volpe and Richardson
created an interesting situation. The Governor (who holds
all appointive powers) and the Attorney General (who heads
the proposal review board) keep a careful eye on each
other and on the operation of the LEAA program. The member-
ship of the Governor's Committee, with its heavy weighting
toward district attorneys and other criminal justice
professionals and its minimal representation of community
groups, accounts for the overall priorities enunciated in
the annual state plan. The staff (in consultation with
the Attorney General) is more or less able to determine
which projects will receive funding. The sheer number of
grant requests considered annually (just under 100 grant
requests in 1969 were reviewed in six meetings, and just
under 90 in 1970 in about four meetings) does not allow
Committee members sufficient time to evaluate proposals.4 7
The staff,.however, has the time to prepare a complete
dossier on each prospective grantee. For the most part
staff evaluations are the key to funding decisions.
4 7Moore and Greenberg, o_. cit., p. 34.
239
The technical advisory committees have been relatively
unimportant. The state legislature has been totally
divorced from the funding process. Most legislators
have stayed at arm's length because they have not been
pressed into action by their local constituencies. The
Proposal Review Board has been the mechanism through
which the Attorney General has exercised primary control
over the granting process; although, with the move toward
non-competitive funding and the relative increase in
the importance of priorities laid down in the annual
state plan, Committee members have been able to exercise
a greater degree of influence. There has been little if
any log-rolling in the proposal review process, at least
insofar as particular cities and their representatives
on the Committee are concerned.
It should be clear that the organization and membership
of the Governor's Committee have played a large part in
the allocation of LEAA funds. If the committee member-
ship had been changed to reflect a wider segment of the
general population, or if representatives of specific
state agencies had been added or dropped, the overall
priorities indicated in the annual plan might have been
different. If representatives of the state legislature
had been appointed to the Committee, the grant-giving
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process would have been more highly politicized, but as
a result many more locally-initiated projects (as opposed
to state-generated projects) might have been funded. If
the Governor wished to exert more of a controlling
influence over the committee he could have eliminated the
Attorney General as head of the Proposal Review Board.
In any given year he could have channeled federal funds
into selected state agencies, thereby reducing the pressure
for increased state taxes. The Governor might also have
decided to replace the large city strategy with a more
distributive suburban orientation--particularly because
the Governor has not been interested in strengthening the
political fortune of the Mayor of Boston. The lack of
control exercised by the federal and regional LEAA
offices has given the state a great deal of latitude. If
the staff were not quite so competent and the Committee
not quite so scrupulously honest, the allocation process
might well have been wrought with corruption.
While it is relatively easy to see that the allocation of
LEAA funds has been affected by the organization and
membership of the Committee, it is not quite so obvious
what changes might enhance the prospects of institution-
alizing key innovations or reforms in the criminal
justice system. By cutting back on the number of official
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representatives of the criminal justice system that serve
on the Committee, the chances of implementing important
reforms could be diminished. The logic of the argument
is apparent, but there may be a flaw. In the final
analysis, reforms are implemented from the bottom up.
That is, modifications in police procedure or court
administration need to be acceptable to the men and women
who staff these institutions on a day-to-day basis. Pres-
sures from above have to be taken seriously, but if a
proposed reform is administratively unmanageable, techni-
cally infeasible, or a threat to the professionals at the
bottom, it is unlikely that the endorsement of a top
state official sitting on the Governor's Committee is
going to make it work. It is also important to consider
the kind of reforms that state and local officials think
are required as compared to the reforms that community
or neighborhood representatives are likely to desire.
Assuming a difference of opinion is likely, which group
is more apt to have its fingers on the pulse of the communi-
ties involved? If there is a strong negative reaction to
a proposed innovation at the local level, reform is very
likely to go by the boards. Of course, the chances of
a state legislator, a community representative, or even
a cop on the beat coming up with a startlingly new techni-
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cal innovation are very slim.48 This raises a fundamental
question about the overall objectives of the LEAA program.
Ideally there should be a balance on the Committee (and
among the staff) between those sensitive to the needs and
aspirations of neighborhood groups, consumers, and lower
level professionals who make the system work and those
free to contemplate new approaches and ideas from outside
the professional criminal justice system. To the extent
that the membership of the Committee and the interests of
the staff have impacted the process of institutionaliza-
tion, a better balance might have enhanced the chances of
successful reform.
Community Representation and Citizen Participation
On March 24, 1970, Governor Sargent named five minority
representatives to the Governor's Committee: Attorney
David Nelson, Chairman of the Massachusetts Defenders;
4 8Dr. Jerome Miller, former Head of the Department of Youth Services,
is cynical about the possibilities of implementing reforms in any way
other than through strong and aggressive leadership at the top of state
agencies. Miller also suggests that the state planning agency should
not be funding innovative projects outside the system, rather, the
Governor's Committee should be feeding its funds to key individuals in
line agencies who can use the federal funds to barter out of the exist-
ing state system and to set up alternative programs. Miller feels that
the switch to non-competitive grants has lessened the chances of re-
form. He argues that unless the Committee opts for an approach such
as California has taken, which is to contract with specific state
agencies for certain kinds of programmatic reforms, nothing of any
importance is likely to result.
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Donald Taylor, Executive Director of the South End Neigh-
borhood Action Program in Boston; Gwendolyn Jefferson,
Planning Director for the Roxbury-North Dorchester Area
Planning Action Council; Frank Baily, of the Springfield
Model Cities Program, and Alex Rodriguez, of United
Community Services (and a leader in the Puerto Rican
community in the Boston area). These appointments gave
the Committee its first minority and neighborhood represen-
tatives. (Nelson and Baily shifted jobs shortly there-
after and resigned from the Committee.)
The original LEAA legislation specified only that members
of state planning commissions should be "representative
of the law enforcement agencies, units of general local
government, and public agencies maintaining programs to
reduce and control crime." There was no requirement in
the legislation for non-public, community, or minority
group representation. 9 In Massachusetts, the 1969 state
plan made a commitment to broadening community develop-
ment, stating that it was "essential that a constructive
plan be developed to involve the total community."
4 9Scott -Lassar, "The Administration of Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration Grants in Illinois 1969-1970," a report of the Chicago
Law Enforcement Study Group, Evanston, Illinois, 1971, p. 8. For a
further discussion of "guidelines as a source of control" see B.
Douglas Harman, op. cit., p. 144.
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Has community representation on the Governor's Committee
enhanced the funding prospects for community-initiated
proposals? What role have various citizens' groups played
at the state and local level in setting criminal justice
priorities for LEAA spending? Have the community repre-
sentatives on the Committee been able to influence the
overall allocation of LEAA funds for neighborhood and
minority needs? Have minority and community attitudes
toward the LEAA program changed? And finally, if an
increase in minority and local community participation in
the allocation of LEAA funds in Massachusetts is warranted,
what will be required to bring it about?
A survey of state planning agencies completed in 1970 by
the Urban Coalition indicated that most state planning
agencies "suffered from an across the board shortage of
representatives from public and private social service
agencies and from citizen and community interests."
Although there were some minority participants in some
states, almost all were either local government represen-
tatives or criminal justice officials. As of May 1970,
only 4% of the individuals serving on state planning agen-
cies represented citizen and community interests. 50 De-
s National Urban Coalition, Law and Disorder III, State Planning and
Programming Under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, op. cit., p. 9.
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spite Justice Department claims to the contrary, state
planning agencies have been dominated by criminal justice
officials.51
A court suit initiated under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 charged that the composition of the state
planning board in Mississippi discriminated against blacks
and other minorities and that the narrow composition of
the board had a detrimental effect on the programs funded
by the state. Throughout the country, very little empha-
sis was given to programs designed to strengthen the ties
between criminal justice agencies and the community.
Although former Attorney General John Mitchell issued
regulations forbidding discrimination in employment by
state and local agencies receiving LEAA funds, an internal
Justice Department report charged that the LEAA had not
withheld funds from police departments engaged in such
s"Ibid. The Coalition cited a speech made by Charles Rogovin, LEAA
Administrator until June 1, 1970, in which he said that boards should
have
"representation frcm the general community. This is, re-
presentatives from many diverse groups who have no profes-
sional ties to the criminal justice system also should be
included on advisory boards. Some of these should be
Negroes and members of other minority groups. And it fur-
ther means that all the camrmunity representatives should
be given a meaningful role to advise, consult, express
their concerns, give their judgements, help shape the best
program possible. This process should occur not only at
the state level, but also at the local level where cities
and counties develop advisory boards to help draft programs
for meaningful local law enforcement improvements."
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practices.s2 The fact is that the Justice Department
failed to develop clear Title VI guidelines for the LEAA
program or to set up a system for processing complaints.
In 1972, the Civil Rights Commission reported that the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had no staff
member with responsibility for determining whether state
and local programs were in conformance with civil rights
law. 3
Officials in the community relations service of the Depart-
ment of Justice admitted that LEAA had not tried to alert
community groups to the opportunities available under the
LEAA program, nor had state agencies set up any machinery
to prompt minority interest. As of 1975, most state
agencies had not provided adequately for the participation
of persons with links to community groups and community
problems. No effort had been made to withhold LEAA funds
from state and local agencies practising discrimination
of any kind.
5 2Robert Smith, "Justice Agency Called Indecisive on Civil Rights,"
New York Times, August 13, 1971; Ronald Ostrow, "Justice Department
Unit Hit as Subsidizer of Bias," Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1971;
also National Journal, January 29, 1972, p. 187.
5 3Urban Coalition, Law and Disorder II, op. cit., p. 10.
247
The isolation of the criminal justice system frcm other
influences and resources in society is a major cause of
the system's backwardness. Until linkages are made
with private agencies, civic organizations, volunteer
groups, and grass roots organizations, it will be diffi-
cult to develop effective crim prevention programs to
inprove community relations. 5 4
With the appointments of Jefferson, Taylor, and Rodriguez,
Massachusetts responded at least in part to the charges
leveled by the Urban Coalition. As it turns out, though,
community representation on the Governor's Committee had
little or no effect on the pattern of grant allocations.
Jefferson, Taylor, and Rodriguez did not find that their
involvement on the Committee gave new leverage to commun-
ity and minority groups anxious to bring about major
reforms in the criminal justice system. The problems
they encountered in trying to influence the Committee
suggest that community representation at the state level
is not likely to produce significant modification in the
way LEAA funds are used. From the outset all three
community representatives were overwhelmed by the
cameraderie, jargon, and unfriendliness of the other
committee members.
Taylor and Rodriguez did not attend very many meetings.
Gwenn Jefferson, who sat not only on the Committee but on
54Ibid.
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the Proposal Review Board as well, was the most outspoken
community representative. All three individuals viewed
their appointments with some ambiguity. To a great
extent they felt co-opted. Taylor indicated that he took
a position with some uneasiness. He saw himself as a
black man going into an organization "intent on buying
tanks to suppress blacks." As the only woman on the
Committee, Ms. Jefferson felt she was not taken seriously;
although in her own words, she "could speak up without
worrying whether her funds would be cut off [since she
didn't have any] or whether she would insult someone
[since she felt that the other Committee members did not
consider her to be on their level]." Her sense was that
most funding decisions were made by the Attorney General
and the Executive Director outside the formal meetings.
Committee members were limited to exerting what leverage
they could through personal and informal contacts with
the Attorney General and the staff.
Another problem that all three community representatives
encountered was the impossibility of keeping abreast of
all the grant proposals and draft versions of the annual
state plan. The stream of materials was overwhelming.
Unlike some of the criminal justice officials, the
community representatives did not have staff assistants
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to help them scan the constant flow of documents.
Rodriguez and Jefferson both received calls from Boston
community groups seeking support for proposals. Their
efforts to advocate some of the Boston proposals, however,
were undercut by having to work through Boston's Safe
Streets Committee as well as through the Governor's
Committee. (The Boston-state relationship is a complex
one and is discussed below.) Some of the Committee
members have commented on Gwen Jefferson's ability to
influence the outcome of discussions involving community-
based projects, but she does not share their view. She
feels that she did not have the technical expertise
necessary to do battle with the Attorney General, the
staff, and the other members of the Governor's Committee.
Perhaps her comments carried some weight when certain
community-based projects were under discussion, but in
general she has had no expectation of turning the Committee
around on anything. Rodriguez took a different approach.
When projects which he was asked to support come up for
review (particularly in the area of police-community rela-
tions) he dealt directly with the Executive Director of
the Governor's Committee. Rodriguez decided his support
could best be registered in this way. If he could
convince the Executive Director, he hoped the rest of the
Committee would go along.
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According to Donald Taylor, the black community did not
take the LEAA program very seriously. For blacks and
other minorities, law enforcement is synonymous with
repression. Some members of the black community are
concerned about prison reform and efforts to hold down
the increasing crime rate in minority neighborhoods, but
they have not been able to organize around these issues.
Consumers or grass roots representatives of those most
directly affected by the criminal justice system
(prisoners, former addicts, etc.) might be able to offer
an alternative perspective of needed reforms but this
point of view is not shared by the majority of Committee
members. Professor Livingston Hall (another Committee
member) suggested that "former offenders have shown by
past actions that they don't believe in law and order";
it is all right to seek out their advice but they "should
not be entitled to share in decision-making." Hall also
believes that "the more grass roots a person is, the less
he seems to attend committee meetings." There may be
some truth to his assertion, but more than anything else,
poor attendance may be a reflection of the way Committee
members treat outsiders, especially non-professionals.
If all five appointees had remained on the Committee and
if they had been able to organize around a limited set of
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programmatic objectives, they might have been able to
rouse support for some of the community-based projects
that were turned down. The probability, though, that
community representatives without significant credentials
in the field could influence the overall philosophy and
priorities of the Committee, is indeed small.
Community representation at the state level has not
altered funding priorities. The same is true at the
city level where public involvement has been even more
limited. Local criminal justice coordinating committees
were set up in Worcester, Springfield, Cambridge, Fall
River, Lynn, New Bedford, and Boston.s5  They all
encountered serious difficulty.
For the most part, the task of involving non-professionals
at the local level is made more difficult by the lack of
clear-cut federal regulations requiring community input
into LEAA policies and programs. As long as state funding
priorities shift from year to year and the competitive
approach to grant administration is in effect, there is
almost no way to sustain continued citizen involvement at
the local level. Even with the switch to non-competitive
"sLaw and Disorder III (draft), og. cit., Chapter IV, p. 10.
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grants, the administration procedures created by the
state planning agency have rendered meaningful citizen
participation at the local level nearly impossible.
Figure II represents the steps involved in gaining
approval and securing funds for an LEAA project in the
city of Boston. The outline prepared by George Kuper
of the Mayor's Safe Streets Staff presents the background
against which efforts to promote citizen participation
must be viewed. It has clearly been impossible to keep
interested citizens abreast of the progress of each grant
proposal as it moves through the pipeline. The constant
looping of grant applications back through the city's
Office of Justice Administration and the Governor's
Committee staff means that projects are often very
different at the end from the versions community groups
approved at the outset. This, of course, can seriously
undermine any citizen participation effort.
In 1969 a Coordinating Committee for the Administration
of Justice was appointed by the Mayor of Boston; in the
same year a Mayor's Advisory Committee for the Administra-
tion of Justice, allegedly citizen-based, was also formed.
The Coordinating Committee was composed entirely of police
and other city officials, while the advisory committee
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Figure II
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR
LEAA PROJECTS IN BOSTON
(prepared by George Kuper, Mayor's Office, Boston)
Steps 1-4
Mayor'Is
Committee Mayor's aotStaff oittee Mayorror 's Comttee
Project -o
7Director
1. An idea for a possible project can come from many sources: a
component agency of the local justice system; the staff of the
Mayor's Committee; or local community-based agencies or groups.
Ideas are refined and hammered into a formal application format by
the staff of the Mayor's Comittee in cooperation with the Project
Director for the proposed project (if he is known at this time) or
with other persons interested in the initiation of the project.
Essentially, the application includes the following types of informa-
tion among others:
-- what the project will do
-- who will be involved in it
-- how much it will cost; how funds will be spent
-- the length of time projected
-how the project fits in city and state comprehensive plans
-- source(s) of future funding if LEAA must discontinue funds
2. The completed application is reviewed and endorsed or rejected
by the Mayor's Committee and then, if endorsed, is sent to the
Mayor for his signature.
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3. The application is then submitted to the Governor's Comittee, and
roughly the following actions are taken by that agency:
a. the application is reviewed in its general program area.
b. an individual staff recommendation is placed on the
application--as to the individual merits of the proposal
as well as its applicability to the Commonwealth's
priorities as determined by the Governor's Committee in
cooperation with LEAA.
c. the application is sent to the Proposal Review Board, which
then makes its recommendation (to fund the project or not)
to the Governor and the Attorney General.
This review/recommendation process normally takes about 10 to 12 weeks,
though it can take longer.
4. If a decision is made to award funds for the project, the
Governor's Committee does the following:
-- gives a verbal advice of the award to the Mayor's Committee
-- confirms the award via telegram
Subsequently, the Mayor's Committee receives from the Governor's
Committee a grant award.
The grant award is often made conditionally, subject to the Governor's
Committee' s acceptance of a detailed workplan (a fuller description of
all activities involved in the project).
Steps 5-7
agee to S 1m1 1m in writing by th Project Dietr Th Prjet'
Mayor' Comittee Project Mayor ' s Committee Mayo Mayor ' s
Staff Mor's Directo Staff e sn t ar t th Committee
Federal Funds Staff
Coordinating
Offficer
5. The terms and conditions attached to the grant award must be
agreed to in writing by the Project Director. The Proj ect Director's
agreement is then sent back to the Mayor'Is Committee staff .
6. The Mayor's Committee staff then sends the award to the city
Federal Funds Coordinating Officer; from there, it goes to the Mayor's
Office for his signature. The Mayor's signature on the award creates
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what is, in effect, a contract between the Governor and the Mayor
for the performance of the project.
7. The grant award is then sent back to the Mayor's Committee staff.
Steps 8-10
8. The Mayor's Committee staff then undertakes
simultaneously:
two activities
-- the Mayor's Committee staff returns the signed grant award
to the Governor's Comnittee and submits both an initial
cash request and a report of expenditures on the project.
-- the Mayor's Committee staff submits the grant award to the
Boston City Council for the council's authorization of the
receipt and expenditure of funds for the project. (Note:
the City Auditor cannot expend funds without an order
passed in council, signed by the Mayor.)
At this stage of the overall process, two things are happening: the
Governor's Committee is processing a check (in response to the cash
request), and the City Council is preparing to issue an order in council,
accepting the grant award. Ideally, both these activities should occupy
about six weeks each. In reality, the City Council often acts in a shorter,
or longer, period of time.
The time within which the Governor's Committee processes the cash
request and prepares a check is lengthened considerably if the Governor's
Committee determines that it should require the submission of a workplan
by the Project Director and the Mayor's Committee staff.
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9. The culmination of the activities of the Governor's Committee
(after requesting and reviewing a workplan, if one is deemed necessary)
is the preparation of a check which covers the first four months'
expenditures on the project. This check is sent to the Mayor's
Committee staff, which in turn deposits the check in the City Treasury.
The culmination of the City Council's activities is the issuance of
an order in council, accepting the grant award, and authorizing the
City Auditor to expend funds. After City Council acceptance, and the
Mayor's signature on the order in council, the City Auditor is notified
and he designates an account number for the project in the city's
financial records.
10. The action taken by the Governor's Committee (Step 9, above) means
that a project director may go ahead and initiate his project IF HE IS
ALREADY AN AGENT OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT, i.e., someone who has an
already-established relationship to certain city accounts. A Project
Director who falls into this category may proceed with the running of
his project and handle the financial transactions of the project in
either of two ways:
a. he may spend funds out of the accounts which he himself
controls; then the charges are taken out of these
accounts and entered into the project account (which the
City Auditor has already designated, see Step 9 above).
b. or, the Project Director may deal directly through the
project account. (For use of this method, approval is
needed from the Administrative Officer of the Mayor's
Committee staff, the Mayor's Committee chairman, and
the Mayor.)
Once his project is underway, the Project Director must supply the
Mayor' s Committee with quarterly reports, and reports on expenditures.
Steps 11-12
i
Mayor'sFinance
ttee Commission
Council Mayoritor Saf
Projecto ProjectProjectDirector DrectDirector
11. If the Project Director is not an agent of the city governent
(i.e., not a police department or corrections representative, for
example) a contracting procedure is undertaken.
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After City Council acceptance of the grant award (Step 9) and the
addition of the Mayor's signature, the Mayor's Committee Staff
initiates the contract procedure. A rough contract is drawn up by
the Mayor' s Committee staff and the Proj ect Director.
12. Then, two activities occur:
a. The Mayor's Committee sends a letter to the Finance
Commission, asking that public advertising be dispensed
with in connection with the contract, since the particular
talents of the Project Director and/or his associates
make him uniquely qualified to undertake the work.
b. The Mayor's Committee sends four copies of the contract to
the Project Director; he reviews the contract for
substance and requirements, signs the contract, and
returns it to the Mayor's Committee along with a performance
bond or a $100 certified check.
Steps 13-15
Mayor's
Finance Committee
Commission Mayor's 'sCitymittee Staff
theC cotatanih e ter toteiyaudtrfrsgaue
CommitteecontAugtitor Departm entfMay
Project Staff 
-- Project
Director Director
13. The Project Director returns the signed contract to the Mayor's
Committee staff. The Mayor's Committee staff then awaits a letter from
the Finance Commission stating that public advertising has been dispensed
with. When the letter is received., the Mayor's Committee staff forwards
the contract and the letter to the City Auditor for signature.
14. The contract is then sent to the city Law Department for review by an
assistant corporation counsel and signature by the Corporation Counsel.
15. The contract is then sent to the Mayor for his signature.
Once the contract is signed by the Mayor, the Project Director receives
a copy of the executed contract, and he may begin work on the project.
Note: Ideally, the contracting procedure should occupy approximately
six weeks; in reality it usually takes 10 to 12 weeks.
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Note on Non-Competitive Applications
The procedures just described are applicable to the competitive
application process; further steps precede the application in the
non-competitive area:
--the development and writing of a comprehensive city plan
for use of LEAA funds on crime control and prevension projects
-- the inclus ion of the city' s plan in the overall state plan
-- LEAA approval of the overall state plan
-- state authorization for the city to write and submit an
application in the non-competitive area
At this point, the application process becomes the same as the process
already described.
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included (in addition to police and other officials)
representatives of the clergy, community organizations,
and business interests. In 1971 these two committees
were merged to form the Mayor's Safe Streets Act
Committee.s5
The powers of the Mayor's Committee have never been
clearly defined.5 7 The Committee has tested various roles
vis a vis the Mayor, the city council, and the state
planning agency. Some committee members complain of an
overbalance of law enforcement personnel and an under-
representation of community people. Members of the
Mayor's Committee have experienced extreme frustration
in trying to prepare long-range criminal justice plans
for the city. This frustration has been due in part to
the slow flow of LEAA funds from the state to the city
and in part to the Committee's own organizational problems.
Although state funds are committed annually, they arrive
slowly. Projects have been delayed time and time again.
Individual project directors have lost interest in some
cases before the funds finally arrived from the state
planning agency.
56Office of Justice Administration, The Mayor's Committee, report
prepared for the Boston City Council, 1971.
s7Law and Disorder III (draft), op. cit., Chapter IV, p. 28.
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Boston has tried to set its own priorities, but there
are definite conflicts between the interests of the city
and those of the state planning agency. The city's
Office of Justice Administration is a line agency set up
to spend the state's LEAA money. It acts as a buffer
between the SPA and groups and departments at the city
level which have projects in mind. Staff members at the
state level resent (what they feel to be) the interference
of the Mayor's Committee. They have complained (unjustly)
about low levels of competence in the city. The Mayor
has given the Office of Justice Administration and the
Advisory Committee little if any support. The City
Council only recently endorsed the Committee's efforts
and provided financial support for the OJA.58 A number
of community groups have come to the Mayor's Committee
and to the OJA staff requesting LEAA funds. The staff has
had to say that they do not have funds to spend for new
projects, but they are there to help in the application
"For the first year or so of the program, the City Council was
literally unaware of the planning Committee's existence. By the time
it was informed of the Cammittee's operations the staff had been
increased to 45, a situation that created considerable hostility on
the Council's part (it has since been reduced to 22 including clerical
help). The Mayor's Committee seems to have overcome that hostility
and has begun to develop a cooperative working relationship with the
City Council elected in January 1972.
261
process. The OJA is looked upon as a funding agency
but not as an advocate for city and community interests.
In short, Boston's efforts to capitalize on the LEAA
program have been hindered by the very problems that
those suspicious of the block grant approach raised at
the outset.
The Mayor's Committee has worked hard to develop effective
community involvement and awareness--both at the policy-
making level and in the administration of programs
(selected by the Governor's Committee for funding). The
structure of the LEAA program, however, which places
final decision-making power in the hands of the state
planning agency, has complicated the city's job. The
relationship between the Mayor's Committee and the
Governor's Committee has been characterized by distrust
and a lack of cooperation. The city is given a commit-
ment of funds each year, but the OJA staff still has to
justify projects on a year-by-year basis and to show
how its requests fit in with the overall priorities
indicated in the state plan.59 The- delays involved in
"The rocky working relationship between the city and the state
agency is apparent in correspondence between Fred Scribner (OJA) and
Arnold Rosenfeld (SPA), March 26, 1971, and May 10, 1971; Peter
Borre (OJA) and Arnold Rosenfeld, May 27, 1971; and an internal
memorandum to William Kramer, Deputy Director (SPA) from Richard
Geltman, Acting Manager-Program Development (SPA) dated August 4, 1971.
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getting money from the Governor's Committee to Boston and
from Boston to the community have eroded public confidence
in the city agency. At a minimum there have been three-
to six-month delays between the award of grants by the
state and the subsequent receipt of money by the grantee.
In some instances, delays have been as long as fourteen
months. 60 Simply put, the state has been unwilling to
cater to Boston's (or any other city's) individual planning
needs. The regional discretionary grant program has also
created difficulties for the city. 61
6 0Ibid
61In the spring of 1970 the Boston Office of Justice Administration
applied for four discretionary grants. All four were approved (one
for vertical policing services was solicited by LEAA in Washington).
Subsequently there were arguments over who would administer the
grants--the state, the region, or the Washington office of LEAA.
Following the LEAA reorganization, it was decided that the regional
office would administer discretionary grants for Boston. In 1971
the Boston OJA inquired of the regional LEAA office whether or not
there was an application deadline for discretionary grants or whether
proposals would be considered on a first come, first serve basis.
They were told that the regional office would consider applications
at any time and that as late as June, 1971 more than half the dis-
cretionary funds available to the regional office had not been com-
mitted. Two weeks later, the OJA was told that Washington had over-
committed discretionary funds and that Boston would have to forget
about the various grants they had submitted save for $600,000 which
the city could apply toward whatever grant proposals they preferred.
Apparently the Governor's Committee staff sent a letter to the
regional office asking the federal government to take back some of
the discretionary funds that had been awarded to Boston since these
funds were being spent without the prior approval of the Governor' s
Committee.
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With regard to city-state relationships, the two most
difficult problems have been the incompatibility of city
and state funding priorities and the process of fixing a
level of anticipated funding for the city. The potential
for community participation at the local level depends to
a great extent on the resolution of these two issues.
The city is willing to acknowledge that its plans for the
allocation of LEAA monies must reflect state-wide priori-
ties:
Some local projects may be components of broader
programs which require coordination among local
units of government; for example, there might be
a need to centralize crime statistics, or to
coordinate programs in such areas as services to
released offenders;
Unless there is some degree of compatibility
between city and state programs the potential
for information exchange and the transfer of
solutions to other comparable jurisdictions is
diminished. 12
While Boston accepts the fact that its plans must reflect
state-wide priorities, the city also wants enough flexi-
bility to be responsive to local circumstances. Because
the capacity of various Boston agencies to absorb and
6 2 Peter Borre, "Proposed City-State Planning Procedures, updated
draft, Spring, 1972.
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implement new programs may not be commensurate with the
rest of the state, the relative emphasis and hence the
relative funding assigned to specific priority areas in
Boston might best be left up to the city.63 However, if
this means that Boston has to compete for its funds (from
a pool of money set aside by the state for non-priority
items), then the opportunity for meaningful citizen
participation will be lost.
The city needs to be able to develop an annual operating
plan with the expectation of receiving an agreed upon
percentage of the total Safe Streets award made to the
state over a period of years. 64 Citizen participation,
if taken seriously, is a long and drawn out process.
Constant shifting of state priorities and ad hoc adjust-
ments in the city's proposed criminal justice programs
have seriously undermined efforts to involve community
representatives in the design and implementation of LEAA
projects.
Some mechanism such as a city-wide coordinating council
is needed to establish a point of entry for interested
6 3Ibid.
6 4Ibid.
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community groups. Local groups can not and should not be
expected to deal directly with line agencies in the city
(which invariably apply for and receive the lion's share
of all LEAA funds). If such coordinating councils and
their staffs are to succeed as brokers, they must be able
to depend on a continuous flow of money from the state.
The state planning agency is too distant from neighbor-
hood groups to successfully elicit their involvement.
With a guaranteed level of funding and the right to set
local priorities, the city could handle this responsibility.
Many of the programs funded in the city of Boston,
especially the detoxification program, 65 various citizen
security projects, 66 and the community residential centers
6 SThe Boston Alcoholic Detoxification Project was planned to reduce the
number of public drunkenness arrests by the Boston Police; to save
space and time of police, courts, and correctional personnel and faci-
lities; to demonstrate a cost-effective method for the treatment of
alcoholics; and to improve the quality of health care received by
homeless alcoholics. The components of the program included a three-
man civilian Street Rescue Team which approaches men who were drunk in
public view and offers them an opportunity to voluntarily enter a five-
day drying out program. The team has patrolled police district #4 in
Boston, transporting willing intoxicants to a seventy-seven bed detoxi-
fication unit.
66The objective of the Citizen Security Projects is to increase the
security of people in specific high crime neighborhoods of Boston.
One program ("My Friend the Policeman") was designed to familiarize
school children with the law enforcement process; another (Sav-vbre)
was aimed at improving police-community relations and involving neigh-
borhood people in efforts to improve security.
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for delinquent and pre-delinquent children, 67 hold out the
promise that at least one goal of LEAA--to improve and
change the criminal justice system--might be met. But the
pressures to design a new program each year and to obtain
quick results, the uncertainty surrounding funding levels,
and the lack of a firm commitment from the city to take
over projects once LEAA funds are phased out put the future
of these projects in doubt. It is easier to design
sophisticated communications systems which are tangible
and visible and which, once established, require little
if any further funding.68
It is possible that the state plan should be nothing more
than a collection of city plans and a related shopping list
6 7The crmmunity residential center for juveniles has involved support
for the DARE residential Youth Center on Blue Hill Avenue in Dorchester.
The center provides an alternative to incarceration for youths who have
been involved in the criminal justice system and for those youths in
need of residential care. DARE has been a controversial project and
is discussed later on in this Chapter.
6 8There has been a running battle between the Mayor's Committee and
the Governor's Committee concerning Part E funds (special LEAA block
grant appropriations for juvenile delinquency and corrections). The
Governor's Committee has refused to distribute any Part E funds (in
1972 the allocation of Part E funds to Massachusetts was over
$1,300,000) to cities or counties on the grounds that state correction-
al and juvenile delinquency programs are more important than anything
the cities might come up with. See letter from John A. Fiske, Chair-
man, Mayor? s Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee to Attorney General
Robert Quinn, dated March 23, 1972.
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of projects which the state planning agency could promote
on a multi-city or regional basis. This approach would
more closely approximate a pure form of revenue sharing
than the consolidated block grant approach adopted by
LEAA. The direct aid to cities approach has its own
shortcomings. Although Boston has the manpower to staff
a local criminal justice planning agency, many other
cities do not. Some of the projects that Boston has
chosen to fund only treat the problems of lawlessness and
criminal justice symptomatically. In most instances, it
would make more sense to implement reforms in the prison
system, the courts, and in the way in which drug offenders
are handled on a state or area-wide basis. This suggests,
perhaps, that police-community relations, citizen
security, and community-based treatment and rehabilitation
efforts in which local input is a key ingredient for
success ought to be handled by the cities with shared
funds, while other programmatic reforms ought to be
coordinated at the state level and funded through the
Governor's Committee.
In the absence of such a policy, neither community repre-
sentatives on the Governor's Committee nor coordinating
councils at the local level are likely to advocate
community and minority interests in an acceptable way.
The time is ripe for a shift in funding strategy. If
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Donald Taylor is right, local groups (especially minority
groups) are now more interested than ever in becoming
involved in efforts to reform the criminal justice
system. The only way for community input to work is for
the Governor's Committee to relinquish some decision-
making power to municipal coordinating committees that
can demonstrate a reasonable planning capability and can
show evidence of adequate representation of minority
and neighborhood groups. Obviously other conditions
would also need to be met, but a shift in strategy may
well be a necessary precondition to effective community
participation in the LEAA program.
Strengthening Criminal Justice Planning Capabilities at
the Local Level
If the Safe Streets Act was designed merely to fight
crime in the nation's largest cities, then the block grant
feature of the program could just as well have been eli-
minated. If Congress had intended to develop a system of
aiding the large cities with serious crime problems, a
direct, categorical grant system would have been more
appropriate.69 However, Congress had another objective:
the transfer of grant-in-aid powers to state governments
and the promotion of interjurisdictional planning for law
enforcement. It follows, therefore, that one important
6 9B. Douglas Harman, O_. cit., p. 152.
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indicator of the LEAA program's success is the extent to
which state planning agencies have been able to strengthen
criminal justice planning capabilities at the local level.
In Massachusetts, a portion of the funds coming into the
state has been used to establish planning offices in
several of the largest cities. Unfortunately, this effort
has been inconclusive. By late 1972, the state agency
was still doing most if not all of the criminal justice
planning in the Commonwealth. Moreover, an underlying
struggle had developed between the local criminal justice
planners and the staff of the Governor's Committee.
Essentially, this involved control over the definition of
municipal planning responsibilities and the determination
of local funding priorities.
While the Governor's Committee accepted in principle the
need to strengthen local criminal justice agencies,
members of the staff moved slowly and cautiously. The
Metropolitan Area Development squad spent considerable
time reconnoitering. They were not averse to using
planning and action grants as "bribes" to get the "right"
planners hired or to capture the attention of an uninter-
ested Mayor. 70 Local planners placed by the SPA were
70Interview with Tom Sweeny, Governor's Comnittee Staff, former head
of the Area Development Squad.
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treated more or less as extensions of the state bureau-
cracy. They were fed a continuous diet of state planning
rhetoric and held in check by the switch to non-competi-
tive grants which put them more or less at the mercy of
the Governor's Committee. While a number of localities
tried to strengthen their commitments to criminal justice
planning, the state continually changed the rules of the
game. Each year it became more difficult to find
something appropriate on the annual shopping list of
competitive grants, to learn when to go the discretionary
route and when to deal directly with the state, and to
know how to handle the necessary paper work and approvals.
The SPA staff tried to map out long-term strategies for
each high-priority city. These strategy drafts (insofar
as they touch on spending priorities) reflect state-wide
multi-year forecasts submitted to Washington. In effect,
the local planners' job has been reduced to little more
than processing successive rounds of LEAA grant applica-
tions (in accordance with the state' best estimate of
local needs). For the most part, local planners have
had no input into annual state plans, nor have they had
access to the strategy drafts which have more or less
sealed their fate for the next several years.
7
'These observations were confirmed in interviews with local criminal
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The tension that developed between the state and the
Boston criminal justice planning agency portends similar
conflicts between the state and other cities such as
Worcester, Springfield, Lynn, New Bedford, Fall River
and Cambridge. For towns such as Malden, Lowell, and
Lawrence which have not been at the top of the priority
list, the problem of professionalizing local criminal
justice planning has been equally severe, but for
different reasons.
There are actually several separate issues at stake, and
each has a bearing on the problem of institutionalizing
reforms in the criminal justice system. First, how
should the state go about the business of building up
local planning capabilities? Second, once local agencies
have been established, what is it that they ought to
be doing? And third, as soon as local planning offices
are operating on their own, what adjustments need to
justice planners including John Wheeler (Worcester), Harry Weinroth
(Lawrence), Norman Duncan (Springfield), Thcmas Tight (Cambridge),
Richard (Torto (Lynn), Barry Monihan (Fall River), Bill Allen
(Boston), Dana Skiff (Malden), Ben Baker (New Bedford), James Bretta
(Somerville), and Lou Simmons (Lynn). See also a memorandum from
Harold Kraner (former head of planning for the Governor's Committee)
to the staff dated July 22, 1971, in which it was stated that no
mechanism has existed for involving local criminal justice agencies
(or even other state agencies) in the preparation of the annual plan.
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be made in the way the state agency relates to them?
The Metropolitan Area Development (MAD) squad has been
in charge of efforts to strengthen local planning. The
staff has the power to review local appointments prior
to the actual payment of state funds. In some instances
where mayors have tried to appoint their own candidates
as project directors or as local criminal justice
planners, the SPA staff has attempted to block the
appointments. Occasionally the staff has offered to
strike a bargain--accepting a Mayor's candidate for the
post of project director but holding out for their
own shoice of assistant director.
Arnold Rosenfeld (the Executive Director) argues that
the selection of project personnel should be a local
decision, but his staff has found it difficult not to
interfere. For example, after investing considerable
time and effort in building local support for the LEAA
program in Fall River, the staff decided that it could
not permit the city to turn the program over to someone
they judged to be incompetent. Members of the MAD squad
went directly to the Mayor. They explained that the
man the city had in mind for the job could not be trusted;
they also reminded the mayor "how important mutual trust
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could be in securing funds from the state. 7 2
In general, the MAD squad has not been satisfied with the
level of planning in most of the target cities, but
perhaps they have expected too much too soon.7 3  In
Springfield the MAD squad was convinced that the local
criminal justice planner had alienated most if not all
the actors in the local system and that he was giving
the Governor's Committee a "bad name." They went out
of their way to undermine his efforts. (They were
apparently annoyed when he pushed the city into a
discretionary [vertical policing] project of which the
staff disapproved.) When he subsequently left Springfield,
the Governor's Committee did its best to influence the
selection of his replacement. It is clear that by with-
holding support and approval, the SPA has hindered the
development of certain local planning agencies.
In 1972, the MAD squad outlined four major functions
for a local criminal justice planner: (1) grant admini-
stration--paper processing; (2) grant management (for
7 2Interview with Peter Connolly, Governor's Committee Staff, Metro-
politan Area Development Squad.
7 3The new head of the MAD squad, James Peters, formerly the criminal
justice planner for Cambridge, seems to have a more realistic notion
of the problems likely to crop up at the local level.
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which they felt managerial but not necessarily criminal
justice skills were required); (3) program development--
assessing local needs and designing responses; and (4)
actual criminal justice planning--overall coordination
of criminal justice activities at the local level
(something the staff felt that no city had yet been
able to handle). A careful examination of planning
grants awarded to various cities over the past few
years indicates that most if not all the money for plan-
ning has been spent primarily to facilitate the flow
of project applications and awards to and from the
Governor's Committee.74 Nine out of every ten tasks
described in planning grant requests have related solely
to grant administration and management: "developing,
with the Committee on Law Enforcement, an acceptable
administrative structure"; "assuming responsibility for
financial reporting of all area projects"; "complying
with and providing technical assistance in meeting LEAA
budgetary conditions"; "submitting competitive and non-
competitive grant applications"; "providing the Governor's
Committee with first-line monitoring and evaluation of
action projects"; "informing potential applicants of the
74For example, see approved planning grant applications from New
Bedford (February 1, 1972 to December 31, 1972), Cambridge (March
1, 1971 to December 31, 1971), and Worcester (January 1, 1972 to
December 31, 1972).
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eligibility requirements for programs"; "providing
assistance in the recruitment and selection of staff
and consultants for projects"; etc. Most planning
grants have been awarded for nothing more than managing
on-going projects funded by the Governor's Committee.
The state agency has tried to influence the selection
of local criminal justice planners in an effort to weed
out professionals who have no allegiance to the priori-
ties set by the Governor's Committee. The staff
admits, though, that a local planner must have the con-
fidence and full support of key municipal officials.
In spite of the Executive Director's "hands-off policy,"
members of the MAD squad have not been afraid to press
local officials--condemning and praising candidates
under consideration for local positions. This has
created serious problems for some of the local planners
who ultimately owe their jobs to friends on the
Governor's Committee, but whose day-to-day survival
depends on their allegiance to local policy-makers.
During the start-up phase of the LEAA operation in
Massachusetts, it made sense for the MAD squad and other
members of the state staff to pick up a large part of
the municipal planning burden. The continued use of
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outside consultants, however, to handle organizational
and evaluative tasks at the local level is much harder
to justify. Clearly this has not helped to build local
skills and resources (except insofar as getting money
into the local system via successful grant applications
can be viewed as part of an overall game plan). Consul-
tants have been used to confirm decisions already made
by state and local officials; to get things done in a
hurry; to present an allegedly objective point of view;
and to generate new ideas (based on the latest research).
It appears that Massachusetts has fallen into the same
trap that snared a number of other states:
Rather than address the long-term personnel needs of
the [criminal justice] system and create the internal
capacities which are required if the programs are to
succeed, Federal and State managers of the block
grant programs have in too many cases turned to
outside consultants who, in the wake of whatever
short-run benefits they provide, leave little of
lasting value. Often their rost remembered legacy
is the exorbitant bill for their services.7 "
Nationally, seven consulting firms received more than
$11 million in LEAA funds from 1969 through 1972. Five
of those firms chalked up almost $175,000 in Massachusetts,
while various locally-based groups received additional
hundreds of thousands of dollars for consulting work in
areas such as communications technology and police
7 Monahan Report,, op. cit., p. 48.
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management.76 The reliance on consultants in Massachusetts
although justified to some extent on the grounds that
certain tasks had to be completed in a hurry, has pumped
little if any new life into local planning agencies. In
some cases outside consultants have done more to humili-
ate local planners and criminal justice officials than
to help them. Moreover, few if any consultants have
achieved substantial breakthroughs in the criminal
justice field. In the long run, day-to-day involvement
in the life of a city remains the only means of affecting
the organization and operation of local service delivery
systems.
There are other ways in which the state agency might
have used its leverage to build up local capabilities:
by encouraging the hiring of civilian personnel (as
7 6Consulting firms in Massachusetts which have benefitted from the
LEAA program include MITRE (emergency communications systems); Data
Architects (record keeping systems); Arthur D. Little (police
hardware); Harbridge House (Management Studies); Technical Develop-
ment Corporation (Corrections). Also, see Monagan Report, op. cit.,
p. 123 for a detailed listing of consultant contracts in Massachu-
setts.
77For example, see the report prepared by David Johnston et al.,
Governor's Committee Police Management Studies: A Proposal for New
Directions, which critiques the police management studies prepared
by professional firms.
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administrative assistants or as professional record
keepers) or by promoting minority recruitment efforts.
The Governor's Committee failed to move in either of
these directions.
Assuming the cities can reach a point where they are
able to secure the necessary skills and resources, what
is it that they ought to be doing? There are various
roles that local planners and planning agencies might
play. Depending on whether the criminal justice system
in the city involved can best be characterized as
"cohesive" (working toward a common set of goals under
strong centralized control); "complex" (working toward
a common set of goals under multiple leadership); "compe-
titive" (working toward conflicting goals under multiple
leadership); or "fragmented" (without clear goals or
recognized leadership)--the planner has a different role
to play. 7 8
Traditional planning theory suggests that a single role,
that of technician, is appropriate and sufficient in a
7 8The planning roles presented here are based on a section entitled,
"Political Roles of the Planner" in City Politics and Planning, by
Francine R. Rabinovitz (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 79-117.
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cohesive situation. Here the planner plays certain core
roles centering around technical research and the provi-
sion of expert advice. He might also undertake long-
range efforts aimed at raising the community's level of
tolerance to planning. Only in a cohesive situation,
where all the components of the political and service
delivery system are operating in harmony, can the planner
survive merely by "doing factual studies on non-contro-
versial subjects or when requested by leaders, factual
studies on controversial subjects." 7 9
In more "complex" situations, the planner must perform
blatantly political roles. He has to have the "resources
to change masters as well as the skill to institutionalize
himself." Where the leadership is indecisive or
constantly shifting, the planner has to be able to "choose
" Ibid., p. 112. In a memorandum dated May 26, 1970 Peter Ross
(formerly of the Governor's Comittee staff) suggested that
"there are a variety of constituencies the local criminal
justice planner might represent. Given firm mayoral leader-
ship and interest he might serve primarily as the mayor' s
spokesman and ambassador. He might drift into a comfortable
relationship with the police, often the strongest element in
the local system. He might, and perhaps ideally ought to,
develop a good working relationship with all the key actors
involved, while avoiding heavy dependence among and main-
taining a relatively closer relationship with the Mayor and
the Governor's Committee program staff."
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allies and change alliances." In a "competitive" system,
one, for example, in which the police chief has one set
of objectives, the city council another, and the mayor
still a third, the planner has to assume the role of
"broker":
While some routine decisions fall to the advisor who has
institutionalized himself as an expert with legitimate
functions, important issues that might become the subject
of conflict between competing groups are avoided by
existing leaders. When action is needed and policy dis-
agreements arise, answers can only be found if bargain-
ing is encouraged. 8 0
In such situations :the planner must help to specify alter-
natives and negotiate solutions. It may also be that
when the planner's visibility as broker is low and other
actors receive the credit for solutions, his effectiveness
is enhanced.
In a totally fragmented system, routine decision-making
is relatively unimportant. To achieve action in a
fragmented system the planner must not only maintain
alliances but act as a mobilizer--bringing together
resources and sufficient energy to support change. To
accomplish this the planner often has to commit himself
to specific plans.*8 1
8 0 Rbinovitz, p. cit., p. 113.
8 1Ibid., p. 114.
281
Since law enforcement and criminal justice systems at
the local level (and at the county and state levels as
well) are terribly competitive and fragmented, the most
appropriate roles for the local criminal justice
planner are those of mobilizer and broker. The least
appropriate role is that of technician (i.e., grant
administrator). To be most effective, local planning
efforts must be moved out from under the political
domination of the chief executive and into the mainstream
of community life. Local planners need to decide what
makes sense at the local level and to organize around
very specific sets of issues. All these tasks are likely
to be impeded as long as the state planning agency con-
tinues to set local priorities, to shift its emphasis
and procedures from year to year, and to encourage local
criminal justice planners to cast their lot with munici-
pal chief executives.
An obvious conflict between the state and the local plan-
ning agencies has resulted from the relative emphasis
that each attaches to innovation. Local planners have
been anxious to reinforce existing strengths in the
community and to bolster sagging agencies. The state on
the other hand continues to search for fresh approaches
or unique arrangements that more often than not fall
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outside the existing criminal justice system.8 2 Because
institutionalization of reforms (especially in fragmented
political settings) depends on the planner's ability to
work with local officials and agency heads, it makes
more sense to involve various officials (as well as
community groups) at the outset than it does to wait
until after an innovation has been tested outside the
normal channels. The explosion comes when a local
criminal justice planner realizes that the time spent
filling out forms and completing project reports for
the state is time lost from the real work of assessing
local priorities and mobilizing community resources. In
the final analysis, LEAA funds constitute less than 10%
8 2The implicit distinction here between innovation and reform
probably ought to be spelled out. Aiken and Alford propose as a
definition of innovation, "the generation, acceptance, and irrple-
mentation of new ideas, processes, products, or services," "Com-
munity Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, Sept. 1970,
pp. 843-864. James Q. Wilson suggests that "an innovation is a
fundamental change in a 'significant' number of tasks. What is
'fundamental' and 'significant' cannot be given a precise,
a priori definition, for in our scheme the meaning of these terms
can only be determined by the organizations themselves." "Innova-
tion in Organizations: Notes Toward a Theory," in James D. Thompson,
Approaches to Organization Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1966), p. 196. For present purposes the introduction
of a new technique or a new technology which impacts only the style,
rate, or efficiency of task performance constitutes innovation.
Reform as used here implies altered structural arrangements within
and between agencies; either a realignment of responsibilities
(power), a redefinition of roles (status), or an adjustment in the
notion of client needs.
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of the $700 million allocated annually for criminal
justice activities in Massachusetts; after a while the
local planner may decide that LEAA monies entail costs
that outweigh the accompanying benefits.
The Governor's Committee has not provided adequately for
the involvement of local planners in the preparation
of annual state plans. Communities that have invested
in local staff improvements have been subjected to the
once over lightly that characterizes MAD squad visits.
This has been as close as local officials have come
to formal contact with the state planning agency at a
point where it is still possible to influence the
annual state plan.
Larger cities should not have to deal with the state
agency on a project by project basis; instead, they
ought to receive unencumbered block grants (with appro-
priate "strings" attached) from the state.3 Over time,
8 3The state should definitely not relinquish funds without adequate
guarantees of citizen participation, metropolitan collaboration,
auditing, and regular project reporting and evaluation. Operating
policies defining the ground rules of such a city-state relation-
ship have been prepared by the Boston Office of Justice Administra-
tion. See the memorandum from John Merrill to Arnold Rosenfeld
dated March 31, 1971 plus attachments. This is a remarkably well
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staff members at the Governor's Committee (particularly
the MAD squad) should be preparing to put themselves
out of business. Eventually only basic research,
information exchange, and a stable of in-house specialists
ought to remain at the state level, as well as, perhaps,
a residual technical advisory service for smaller towns
or clusters of communities seeking to explore cooperative
approaches to law enforcement (although even their
requests might be handled by the nearest big-city agency).
The Governor's Committee cannot afford to meddle with
local appointments to the same extent that it has in the
past. Such interference only serves to split the allegi-
ance and to undermine the effectiveness of local planners.
All in all, attempts to strengthen local criminal justice
planning capabilities and to implement significant reforms
in the criminal justice system are likely to fail if the
staff at the state level is unwilling to relinquish plan-
ning responsibility to those cities willing to accept
the challenge.
thought out set of policies and procedures, but it is all based on the
assurption that Boston is entitled to 25% of the block grant monies
coming into the state. The rationale for that assumption can easily
be challenged.
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The Failures of Congressional Leadership
Congressional critics attribute the shortcomings of the
LEAA program to the inadequate supervision and direction
provided by the Justice Department and to the lack of
effective fiscal and programmatic controls at the state
level. But the blame belongs in large part on the
shoulders of the Congress itself. The inefficiency and
conflict that characterize the LEAA program are part
of the price being paid for the luxury of creative
ambiguity in the preparation of federal legislation.
Efforts to dilute and obfuscate the explicit purposes of
basic enabling legislation (in an attempt to build
broader political support) have lead to serious problems.
Congressional infatuation with innovation as a program
objective has also been counter-productive.
Congress settled for the rhetoric of "fighting crime in
the streets" when nothing less than an all out commit-
ment to fundamental reform in the operation and basic
organization of the criminal justice system was required.
By shirking its responsibilities the Congress contri-
buted to the abuses that have occurred at the state level;
to the conflict that has built up between state and local
government over how shared revenues ought to be spent; to
the undue politicization of efforts to improve law en-
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forcement and the criminal justice system; and to the
misdirected efforts that have been made thus far to
evaluate the impact of LEAA-funded projects.
In remarks made before the House Committee on Legal and
Monetary Affairs, Charles Rogovin, President of the
Police Foundation and former LEAA Administrator, branded
the Law Enforcement Assistance Program a failure:
* . . What is far more important about LEAA, in my
judgment, is that it has in the main failed to give
policy leadership to the criminal justice agencies it
supports, and therefore has become a giant subsidy
program, making little contribution to the improve-
ment of criminal justice administration in the nation.
. . . It was, to be sure, easy to underestimate the
complexity of what Congress asked for-comprehensive
criminal justice planning. There was no precedent for
coordinated planning in police, courts, and correction
reform. . . . The second major problem in achieving
Congress' objectives has been that too much money has
become available too quickly for action projects. Lest
we forget, this program has grown from $63 million in
1969 to $529 million in 1971. Without effective plan-
ning, without development of people who can do the
planning, without strong administration of the overall
program, the LEAA has been compelled by the sheer
availability of money to spend less than judiciously.
The pressure, in a field like this in which there is so
much intense public and political interest., to spend has
led to massive dispensing of money without careful ana-
lysis either before or after the money is spent.
The unavailability of sophisticated and experienced
criminal justice planners, and the pressure on everyone
to spend too much too quickly has been ccmpounded by
the public's simplistic notions about crime. I think
that many people truly believed that the existence of
LEAA and federal money would lead quickly to declines
in crime. Those expectations have led criminal justice
agencies to spend on things they hoped would lead to
short-run statistical achievements, rather than on
287
things which lay the basis for real improvement.
. . . The third major problem is that the role of the
LEAA has been murky since the beginning. The statute
* . . created a block grant program which places basic
policy responsibility in the states. LEAA has no
direct operational responsibility over the states'
criminal justice elements, but in theory is given
authority to guide the reform of these elements.
This would seem to require that LEAA establish objec-
tives, but it has not been done. I cannot emphasize
enough how significant this failure has been. It has,
in my judgement, had a debilitating effect on every-
thing LEAA has done. It has meant that although
Congress has appropriated $860 million so far, there
have been no priorities and no clear policies other
than Congressional direction to emphasize organized
crime and civil disturbance programs . Further there
has been no attempt to measure what LEAA does. And
indeed, most shocking of all, there is not even a
knowledge of what LEAA funds are being spent on. Is
this a situation Congress would tolerate elsewhere?
If the Office of Education could not tell Congress
how the public's money is being spent, would Congress
continue to increase each year the appropriation of
the Office of Education?8 4
The problems that Rogovin cites stem from the failure of
the Congress to exercise leadership in designing the
program and in overseeing its'operations. If the Congress
had been more precise about the components of the criminal
justice system that it hoped to change and about the
nature of the changes that it hoped to achieve, the Law
8 4Remarks of Charles H. Rogovin, President of the Police Foundation
before the House Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary Affairs of the
Committee on Government Operations, October 5, 1971, p. 6.
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Enforcement Assistance Administration would have had the
mandate it needed. Instead, the states have been
allowed to run wild, in many cases spending money indis-
criminately. They have purchased outlandish police
hardware and in some cases have duplicated pre-existing
social service programs already paid for with federal
dollars.85 LEAA's review of state plans has produced
little in the way of guidance, while technical assistance
to the states has not been forthcoming from the Justice
Department. It is difficult to understand how the fiscal
abuses documented in the Monagan Report (and mentioned
in the Urban Coalition critiques) were able to slip by
unnoticed. Perhaps, part of the problem was that Congress
failed to anticipate the need for a centralized auditing
mechanism. To some extent this followed from the misplaced
reliance on state government that generally typified the
8 5 The General Accounting Office reported that one-third of the alloca-
tions approved by the state planning agencies in New York and Cali-
fornia were for
"projects dealing with the underlying causes of crim rather
than the criminal justice system. Many of these projects
[were] in program areas administered by other Federal depart-
ments and agencies, notably' the Departments of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, and Labor, and the Office of Economic
Opportunity."
Statement of Gregory J. Ahart., Deputy Director, Civil Division, GAO,
before the Legal and Monetary Affairs subcomittee, July 22, 1971,
p. 6.
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attitude of those favoring block grants. The level of
competence and compliance has varied from state to state.
Without uniform federal audits the weakest states have
fallen prey to corruption and the strongest states have
done their best to bend the rules.
The second problem (aside from financial abuses) that can
be traced back to the failure of the Congress to spell
out its objectives is the conflict between the states and
the cities. In the absence of firm federal direction,
the states have been left to their own devices. In part,
this is what block grants were supposed to do; on the
other hand, without an overarching set of nationally agreed-
upon objectives to back them up, the states have in some
cases discriminated arbitrarily against individual cities.
In fact, the extreme flexibility promoted at the national
level has fostered a certain arbitrariness on the part of
state planning agencies. Since some big cities are in a
position to match their professional manpower against
that of any state, the big cities have no reason to
believe that the judgments of state officials have been
anything other than arbitrary. This problem has been
further aggravated by the lack of clearly defined indicators
of success. State planning agencies have developed their
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own criteria for evaluating projects. Without the
federal government as arbiter there has been no reason
for the cities to accept the states' criteria. Perhaps
the problem boils down to one of trust. The states were
given administrative responsibility for the LEAA program,
but it was never made clear why. They certainly had no
edge in manpower and up until the late 1960's they had
given little if any indication of a willingness to tackle
the difficult crime problem in urban areas. In the
absence of a clear and understandable mandate from the
Congress there is no reason for the cities to defer to
the states, especially in a field like law enforcement
which has traditionally been a local domain. In short,
the Congress gave the states very little to work with and
the cities little, if any, reason to accept the judgment
of the states.
Not only did Congress fail to spell out overall goals and
objectives, it also avoided setting priorities of any
kind. Thus, when one state chose to focus its energies on
correctional reform and another on the development of
sophisticated police information systems there were no
grounds on which the Justice Department could disapprove.
This, of course, fueled the political fires at the state
level. At the outset, the Governors were in control. They
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had the power to appoint whomever they liked to advisory
committees. The membership of the state planning boards
was purposely open-ended. It quickly became apparent
though that state advisory commissions stacked in favor
of the police or other interest groups were able to tilt
spending priorities in their direction.
In the absence of federal guidance, the states have done
their best to imagine what it is that the federal govern-
ment is really looking for. But again, what has gone
unsaid at the national level has been paraphrased in ways
most likely to enhance the political prerogatives of the
Governor and his staff. Inevitably this led to a struggle
for control over LEAA funds in the state. The competition
among cities and towns served to politicize law enforce-
ment and criminal justice planning. This may have helped
to stir up citizen interest; on the other hand, it also
encouraged state and local politicians to jump on the law
enforcement bandwagon at campaign time--muddying the waters
and unduly heightening local expectations. As planning
efforts became more politically charged, state and local
officials were forced to overemphasize the innovative
character of approved projects and to fund those efforts
most likely to yield short-term, highly visible results.
Neither of these two trends has done very much to focus
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attention where it belongs: namely, on the need for
fundamental institutional reform (i.e., changes in civil
service regulations; redefinition of police and court
functions; deinstitutionalization of correctional and
juvenile facilities, etc.).
The failures of Congress have been well camouflaged. The
Nixon administration (which has been too closely identi-
fied with the LEAA program to afford criticizing it), has
pointed to the "decreasing increase in crime rates" as a
measure of the program's success. 8 6 The Democratically
controlled House Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary
Affairs blamed the failures of the program on the inepti-
tude of the states and on the poor judgment of Justice
Department officials. Other observers have listed the
constant turnover in agency leadership and the original
troika arrangement (designed to check the powers of former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark) as the basic impediments to
the program's success. If these arguments are stripped
away, however, it is obvious that the basic fault lies
with the Congress. The goals of the LEAA program are
confused. Some states are still struggling to show how
specific projects can help to lower crime rates. Other
86LEAA Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1972, p. 1.
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states continue to channel LEAA funds into social service
projects with no more chance of curing poverty and
inequality than whole-hearted national efforts of an
earlier decade.
In the absence of federally defined measures of success,
the states and cities are bound to feud over criteria
for project refunding and continuation. As long as inno-
vation rather than reform is touted as the program's
objective, the chances of putting money where it will do
the most good are relatively small. In the final
analysis, Massachusetts has no choice but to justify its
major city strategy in bald political terms. The deci-
sion to drop all but a handful of the largest cities and
towns could not be justified by anything contained in
the enabling federal legislation. Unless Congress clari-
fies its intentions with regard to the LEAA program the
battle over funding priorities is likely to be won on
totally political grounds, minimizing still further the
chances that groups out of power have of influencing
resource allocation decisions.
Breaking Through Entrenched Relationships in State and Local
Government and Advancing the Cause ofRegional Planning
Many constructive proposals have been put forward regard-
ing reforms that have long been needed in the criminal
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justice system. Although Congress has not been parti-
cularly helpful in providing such direction, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Admini-
stration of Justice and the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations have developed long lists of
carefully researched recommendations.87 In the area of
court reform, they have identified the need for simplified
and unified court structures, the abolition of lower
courts of limited jurisdiction, the promulgation of
uniform rules of practice and procedure, and the need
for new recruitment, testing, and training programs to
prepare administrative personnel capable of handling
drastically improved management systems.88 In the
correctional field, there has been a long-standing need
for a shift from custodial to rehabilitative care as
well as a call for substantial upgrading of personnel
and facilities. The corrections system has always been
badly fragmented and isolated both physically and admini-
87President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967), Chapter 13, pp. 279-292; Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Relations in
the Criminal Justice System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971). Also see ACIR reports on Court Reform, Police
Reform, Correctional Reform, undated.
8 8COurt Reform, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
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stratively from the police, the courts, and prosecution.
Individual municipalities have not been able to afford
qualified correctional personnel or to develop rehabili-
tative programs. Regionalized approaches to corrections
(which have been suggested as one way of establishing a
fiscal base and a client population large enough to
enable progressive rehabilitation programs) have not
succeeded.
The police task force of the President's Commission out-
lined various problems plaguing local police departments,
suggesting that "existing selection requirements and
procedures in the majority of departments . . . [have]
not screen[ed] out the unfit." It is not surprising,
therefore, that far too many of those charged with the
protection of life and property "are not respected by
their fellow officers and are incompetent, corrupt, or
abusive." 8 9 Educational requirements for the police
have been minimal and even in instances where police
departments have employed more rigorous selection
standards, they have tended to hinder rather than to
enhance recruitment efforts. 9 0 Closely related to the
89Police Reform, op. cit., pp. 1-I.
90Ibid.
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problem of recruitment is the issue of training. There
have been recommendations for reforms of all sorts, but
the sorry fact is that the LEAA program has not been a
suitable vehicle for addressing any of these needs.91
A review of LEAA annual reports indicates that the most
common items purchased by police departments under the
Safe Streets Program have been crime labs, computers,
communications gear and helicopters.9 2 LEAA's hardware
orientation has been criticized in many quarters;
unfortunately, the most outspoken opponents of the
program have missed the point. They have not been able
to explain why meaningful reforms in the criminal
justice system have not been forthcoming. One possibility,
rarely mentioned, is that the block grant approach to
federal grants-in-aid may be the wrong device for breaking
through the entrenched relationships that continue to
nourish traditional approaches to law enforcement and
"
1James F. Ahern, Police in Trouble (New York: Atherton Press, 1972),
pp. 233-238. Ahern, former police chief of New Haven, has spelled
out in detail the failures of the LEAA program and has suggested
alternative strategies for federal intervention in the law enforcement
field.
9 2Nick Kotz and Bob Woodward, "U.S. Adrift in Crime Fight," The
Washington Post, July 23, 1972.
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criminal justice. Traditional agencies prefer to use
LEAA funds for hardware rather than to open themselves
up to reforms that might threaten job security or
confuse existing lines of authority. Certainly part of
the problem of institutional reform has been the inability
of state planning agencies to shake the foundations of
timeworn criminal justice institutions.
In this regard, the history of the LEAA program in Massa-
chusetts is instructive for several reasons. First,
Massachusetts has been one of the few states to imple-
ment at least a few important reforms. On the other hand,
Massachusetts has tried and failed to promote a region-
alized approach to criminal justice planning. Success
in the first instance was achieved through the able and
creative leadership of the Commissioner of the State's
Youth Services Department and through a strategy of
compromise that enabled the Governor's Committee to
build upon the strengths of an existing state agency.
The demise of the regional planning effort in the Common-
wealth points up the dangers of trying to implement
governmental reform without first understanding the
nature of the existing institutional structure. Still a
third case involving the Roxbury Defenders illustrates
quite plainly the folly of trying to implement reforms
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from the "outside" -- especially reforms which threaten
those in power. All three examples suggest basic flaws
in the block grant approach to criminal justice planning.
Programs in Massachusetts aimed at combatting juvenile
delinquency and diverting delinquent youths from the
conventional justice system received more than $2 million
in LEAA funds from 1969 to 1971 (including over
$500,000 in discretionary support). Most of the money
was used to underwrite the efforts of Youth Services
Commissioner, Jerome Miller, whose desire to close down
correctional facilities in favor of community-based
residential centers for delinquent youth was not
extremely popular with the state legislature. In fact,
his entire program would not have been feasible without
LEAA support. The initial availability of LEAA funding
in Massachusetts coincided with Commissioner Miller's
original appointment. Prior to leaving at the end of
1972, Miller was able to use the Governor's Committee
funds whenever the legislature was unwilling to finance
his ideas.
To the extent that juvenile diversion and community
resource development efforts initiated by the Governor's
Committee work, it was primarily because they meshed with
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Miller's overall approach to juvenile justice reform in
the Commonwealth. There was some pulling and tugging
back and forth between the Commissioner and the staff
of the Governor's Committee; nonetheless they served each
other well. Five Youth Resources Bureaus (YRB's) begun
in 1969-1970 provided a mechanism for coordinating
services for delinquent youths in Brockton, Cambridge,
New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcester. The Youth
Resources Bureaus originally shared the model of
diagnosis, treatment by referral, and follow-up outlined
by the President's Crime Commission." As the bureaus
evolved in response to local problems they found it
necessary to collaborate with other youth-related insti-
tutions in an effort to alter the overall pattern of
agency interaction with delinquents and pre-delinquents. 4
The hope was that these bureaus would divert significant
numbers of juveniles from the justice system and help
to reduce the number of young people referred for court
action by the police. While still in their early stages,
9 3Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1972 Comprehensive CrTninal Justice
Plan, Governor's Comittee on Law Enforcemnt and the Administration
of Justice, p. C-30.
9 4Ibid.
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they have already given strong indication of bringing
about important changes. 9 5
An additional $365,000 in block grant money was used to
support residential centers in Boston, Lynn, New Bedford,
and Springfield. Of the four community centers funded
in 1971, two are currently in operation and two are soon
to open. Clients have been referred to the centers by
the Department of Youth Services, the courts, the police,
as well as private agencies. In addition to counselling
delinquents, resident staff workers have made contact
with entire families in an effort to cope with more
deeply-rooted problems. Both the YRB's and the residential
centers have been sustained by the support of the Depart-
ment of Youth Services. 96
The Governor's Committee provided almost $850,000 in
1969-71 to help the Department of Youth Services manage
9 5 Law and Disorder III (draft), op. cit., Chapter IV, p. 23.
96The Youth Services Department operates its own grant-in-aid program
with funds provided by various federal agencies. DYS has been in-
volved in a great many community-based programs that go well beyond
just LEAA-funded operations. See Josephine Lambert and Deborah Drew,
"Final Report: Youth Resource Bureau Technical Assistance Program,"
Governor's Committee, June 20, 1972, for a more complete discussion
of LEAA's YRB effort.
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its operations and reorganize its programs. In 1972
DYS received $1,000,000 in LEAA funds. This money was
awarded as a flat grant. LEAA found something good that
it wanted to hang on to, especially since the YRB-DYS
effort received very high praise in Washington. This
was important to the SPA which was straining to build
its own credibility with the central LEAA office. On the
other hand, the Division of Youth Services extracted a
fine price for its non-interference in LEAA-funded
efforts--$1,000,000 in 1972 alone. What it boils down
to is that the Governor's Committee found a strong and
able ally (in an existing state agency), an agency that
was able to make things happen. Whatever institutional
reform occurred can be credited to working through
the existing system (albeit under the rather special
circumstance of creative and far-sighted state leader-
ship). The fact that Commissioner Miller served as a
member of the Governor's Committee was incidental. Under-
standably, he would have preferred to retain complete
control over all juvenile justice programs in the state
as well as final say over the preparation of portions
of the LEAA annual plan dealing with juvenile delinquency.
The LEAA staff, however, was not willing to relinquish
such control. Both agencies carried staff specialists
with a similar range of skills. In fact, staff members
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moved from one agency to the other. By working out an
acceptable compromise with Commissioner Miller, LEAA
was able to guarantee long-term support for its juvenile
justice projects. Miller, on the other hand, used LEAA
funds to put the state legislature over a barrel. By
late 1972, Massachusetts was well on its way to shutting
down all traditional juvenile correction facilities in
the state and building an alternative system with LEAA
funds. Eventually the state legislature will have no
choice but to go along; in the meantime, LEAA has given
the Department of Youth Services a way of dealing with
staunch opposition at the state and local level.
This suggests that line agencies can help to spur innova-
tive projects that depend in part on official cooperation.
An executive agency such as the Governor's Committee must
forge alliances. In some instances, executive agencies
may have to pay a high price for the support they need.
In the final analysis, it might have been more efficient
to channel federal funds directly into the Youth Services
Department. At least that would have been one way of
eliminating the wasteful duplication of personnel at the
state level. While LEAA was setting up another set of
community advisory committees to oversee juvenile delin-
quency operations at the local level, DYS had already
moved to put such bodies into effect (although they had
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little success). Again, this duplication cost a great deal
(especially in terms of community credibility) and accom-
plished very little. Finally, while DYS seriously began
to regionalize its activities, LEAA limited its scope
primarily to a few large cities. If in the long run,
LEAA-funded projects have to depend on state support for
survival, the lack of regional endorsement will be very
hard to overcome.
One interesting sidelight is that DYS was forced on occa-
sion to defer to the Governor's Committee even when pro-
fessional judgement suggested another course. One
instance of this is the case of D.A.R.E. (Dynamic Action
Residence Enterprise), Inc., an organization headed by
Gerald Wright. D.A.R.E. set up numerous community resi-
dences for young men just out of correctional institutions.
Wright received funds from the Department of Youth
Services as well as the state's Division of Child Guardian-
ship for the support of residence programs in Boston,
Cambridge, Brookline, and elsewhere. In 1969-1970 he
also received assistance from the Governor's Committee.
Toward the end of 1970, however, his relationship with
the Governor's Committee began to deteriorate. The
Committee decided to sponsor a statewide program of resi-
dential treatment centers and Wright was in the way. There
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were two issues at stake; first, whether or not the
Governor's Committee would support continuing programs
(someone else's) or only help to initiate new projects
(for which they could take all the credit); and second,
whether the Governor's Committee would involve D.A.R.E.,
Inc., in the effort to design a statewide program. In
1971 William Kramer, then Deputy Director of the Governor's
Committee, decided that the D.A.R.E. program was not being
run effectively.97 When the Governor's Committee wanted
to hire an outside consultant to help design the state-
wide residential treatment program, Wright, who had the
qualifications, was passed over for the job. He sub-
sequently challenged the Committee's choice of consultants
and argued publicly that the task could best be handled
by D.A.R.E., Inc. (which needed the money). From then
on, there was no chance of reconciliation. Wright pushed
hard, using Gwenn Jefferson and other members of the
Governor's Committee to win a short-term continuation of
project funding, but basically the Committee staff did
its best to sabotage his efforts. 9 8  They switched the
9 7See correspondence between Gerald Wright, Arnold Rosenfeld, and
other members of the Governor's Committee staff including about thirty
or more letters and memoranda written during the period of January 29,
1970 through May 19, 1971.
"
8Letter from Gwendolyn Jefferson to Arnold Rosenfeld dated August 26,
1971.
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residential youth center program into a non-competitive
grant category, forcing Wright to deal with the Boston
Office of Justice Administration (which had to dip into
its overall annual allocation to help keep Wright's
operation afloat). When that failed to stop him, the
staff tried to foist him off on the Department of Youth
Services (forcing them to pick up the tab for D.A.R.E.'s
operations as part of their overall LEAA appropriation).
The more Wright persisted, the more the staff was deter-
mined to sever their connections with him. Throughout
this process, Commissioner Miller's support for Wright
never flagged--to some extent, Wright's activities have
helped to light the path of deinstitutionalization that
Miller was following. Yet, Miller did not or could not
bully the Governor's Committee into supporting Wright's
operation. He might have jeopardized his own delicate
arrangement with the Committee. D.A.R.E. survived with
other help, and in fact, has continued to work with DYS.
In this instance, institutionalization and innovation
were the farthest things from the minds of the Governor's
Committee staff; the issue was solely one of personalities.
Wright felt he should have been invited to play a major
role in the development of the statewide program; the
staff was determined to get him out of their hair. The
key point is that Miller was not able to intervene in
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Wright's behalf even though DYS endorsed the D.A.R.E.
program. Perhaps this is not an overwhelmingly important
point; D.A.R.E. survived and the Governor's Committee
did in fact institute a community-based program for
juvenile offenders, but it does suggest that the state
planning agency was able to extract concessions from a
powerful line agency by using the leverage of LEAA funds.
The question of regionalization, raised earlier in con-
junction with the DYS program, requires further elabora-
tion. The Governor's Committee had great difficulty
formulating a response to Section 303 (as amended) of
the LEAA legislation which states that
no state plan shall be approved as comprehensive unless
the administration finds that the Plan provides for the
allocation of adequate assistance to deal with law
enforcement problems in areas characterized by both
high crime incidence and high law enforcement activity.
The Committee's tragic relationship to a number of regional
planning agencies in the state best illustrates this point.
Toward the end of 1970, William Toole, Executive Director
of the Southeastern Regional Planning and Economic Develop-
ment District (SRPEDD) was notified that his request for
additional LEAA planning funds would not be approved. The
reasons given were first, the Committee's recently adopted
policy of placing priority on its planning and action
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programs in high crime areas and in urban centers; second,
the structure of the regional planning agency (similar
to that of all regional planning agencies in Massachusetts)
which allegedly "had no relationship to law enforcement
or criminal justice problems"; third, SRPEDD's failure to
elicit project proposals from its thirty member communi-
ties; and fourth, what the state felt was inadequate
staff capability in the area of criminal justice planning.9
In the end, SRPEDD lost the battle, as did all the
regional planning agencies in Massachusetts, but the
official position taken by the Governor's Committee was
never presented very convincingly and a residue of ill
will still lingers.
Toole's rebuttal to the Governor's Committee pointed out
that:
(1) The amendments to the Crime Control Act did not say
that all money had to go to major cities, nor did
it imply that all assistance had to be channeled
directly to the cities (as opposed to going through
regional planning agencies);
(2) The causes of crime while not necessarily regional
in nature, certainly lent themselves to regional
solutions;
(3) F.B.I. figures indicated (even at that time) that
crime rates were increasing more rapidly in suburban
and rural communities than in urban centers;
"Letter from Arnold Rosenfeld to William Toole dated January 6, 1971.
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(4) Planning for housing, transportation, recreational
needs, economic development, and community facilities
(which traditionally had fallen to the regional
planning agencies) was clearly related to planning
for law enforcement and criminal justice. Moreover,
SRPEDD has a special Law Enforcement Supervisory
Committee which included representatives of local
police, courts, and other law enforcement agencies.
(5) In trying to serve its member communities, the
regional planning agency attempted on numerous occa-
sions to have some input into the annual state com-
prehensive plan, but found it impossible to penetrate
the closed shop at the Governor's Committee;
(6) SRPEDD did not see as its first and foremost goal
the formulation of specific grant applications.
Rather it viewed the initial stages of planning more
in terms of inventorying local criminal justice needs
and resources and prodding member communities in an
effort to formulate goals and policies to help guide
the regional planning effort;
(7) Contrary to the Committee's interpretation, SRPEDD
had an on-going relationship with New Bedford and
Fall River (the two largest cities in the Southeast
Regional District);
(8) The needs identified by SRPEDD's regional inventory
were not covered in the Committee's competitive grant
shopping list for 1970-1971. Thus, grant applica-
tions were not submitted on behalf of the smaller
towns in the area since their priorities apparently
were of little interest to the state planning agency;
(9) SRPEDD had been in the criminal justice planning
business for only a year and a half when the Governor's
Committee decided that the agency did not have suffi-
cient staff capability to carry out comprehensive
planning, programming, and technical assistance. Yet,
SRPEDD had accomplished far more in that short time
than some of the larger cities which the Governor's
Committee ultimately decided were in the best position
to utilize LEAA funds;
(10) The Committee turned down SRPEDD's request for addi-
tional planning funds needed to hire a full time staff
specialist in criminal justice planning at the same
time as they criticized the regional agency for its
lack of technical expertise;
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(11) The Committee's complaints about the use of con-
sultants seemed hard to justify in the face of
state reliance on consultants for very similar
work in the start-up phases of its operations.100
Regional planning agencies in Massachusetts do not have a
long and glorious history of accomplishment. At best,
they have provided a rather clumsy vehicle for the prepara-
tion of comprehensive land use plans and the disposition
of area-wide reviews required by various federal programs.
Nevertheless, at the time the Governor's Committee snubbed
them so unceremoniously, the regional planning agencies
represented the only available mechanism for area-wide
planning in the state. Moreover, they had shown an
ability in at least a few instances to develop working ties
between cities and suburban communities in areas such as
solid waste disposal and transportation, while the state
had been unable to accomplish as much. How then did the
Governor's Committee justify its decision to abandon
regional planning agencies after only a year and a half?
The Committee staff misunderstood the nature of sub-state
regional planning. They assumed that they would have no
trouble converting these all-purpose agencies into exten-
sions of the Governor's Committee (in much the same way as
1 00Letter from William Toole to Arnold Rosenfeld dated January 20, 1971.
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they tried to dominate the development of local planning
agencies). Second, they exacerbated an already difficult
situation by offering little if any direction at the
outset. For example, had the state required SRPEDD to
hire a full time criminal justice planner as a precondi-
tion for its first planning grant, many of the state's
later objections would not have arisen. Third, the all-
consuming major city strategy blinded the staff to the
need for a balanced approach. Perhaps, more than anything
else, it was the regional planning agency's unwillingness
to spend 90% of its time dealing with the problems of
one or two central cities that aggravated the state
planning agency. In Massachusetts big cities along with
all the other member communities have only one vote on a
regional planning commission (representation is obviously
not based on population). There was bound to be conflict
over how staff time would be spent. Besides, as soon as
the cities discovered that they were eligible to receive
their own grants, there was no incentive for them to work
through the regional planning agency. Thus, the Governor's
Committee espoused a self-fulfilling prophesy. By wooing
the cities directly, they guaranteed that the regional
planning agencies would never be able to work effectively
with the large target cities. Moreover, as long as the
state failed to take account of the needs of smaller
311
suburban and rural communities, there was little incentive
for member communities to endorse significant investment
of staff time in LEAA related activities.
The SPA hoped to work out from the six or seven target
cities--building metropolitan collaboration step by step.
Such a plan was bound to fail; not only because the
Governor's Committee was competing with existing regional
planning agencies (which had much more to offer suburban
communities in the way of federal dollars), but also
because after five years of big city favoritism the
Governor's Committee had little if any credibility in
the suburbs. Even if the major city strategy was justi-
fied, there was no reason to drop the regional planning
effort altogether. A more balanced approach in the short
run, even if somewhat ineffective, would have allowed
the Committee to keep its options open.
In many other states, county governments play an important
role in the LEAA program, adjudicating local grant appli-
cations and apportioning a fixed percentage of the total
block grant awarded to the state. In Massachusetts,
county government performs almost no role in the political
life of its citizens. Although there may be some advan-
tage to having one less layer of bureaucracy inserted
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between the big cities (which clearly need assistance)
and the state planning agency, counties have in some other
states been able to accomplish more in the way of inter-
agency and area-wide cooperation than the state planning
agencies.10 1  In the long run, because county government
has not been important in Massachusetts, it would have
made even more sense to utilize the existing regional
planning agencies to catalyze metropolitan and area-wide
planning efforts.
A third perspective on strategies for institutionalizing
LEAA projects is provided by the Roxbury Defenders
program. The objectives of this effort were to create
a public defender's office in the Roxbury-Dorchester area
which would provide legal services in criminal cases
and through limiting its caseload provide full and complete
services to its client community. The Defenders provide
legal advice without first being appointed by the court.
They also provide in-house or by referral, related social
r oMichael Milakovich, The Politics of Block Grant Law Enforcemnt
Assistance: A Study of the Impact of the Omnibus Crime Control Act on
Local Government Agencies, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University, Political Science, 1971. Also see the discussion concern-
ing South Carolina in Law and Disorder III (draft), op. cit.,
Chapter IV.
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services.1 12  The project was part of a multi-year
strategy aimed at improving both the image and the
actual processes in the lower criminal courts.
The primary emphasis was on providing full services to
indigent defendants. It was thought that the full-
service approach would influence the long-standing public
defenders program in Massachusetts, as well as focus
public attention on the legal service needs of the poor.
For maximum effect, the project was tied in to the Model
Cities program and other neighborhood groups in the
Roxbury area of Boston. An effort was made to ensure
community involvement via an advisory board comprised
of a majority of community representatives which
exercised (jointly with the regular Massachusetts
Defenders Committee) operating and supervisory responsi-
bility (including control over staff hiring). The
project received over $100,000 in 1971 and $250,000
($100,000 less than requested) in 1972. Although the
project has been proclaimed a success by the community
and the Governor's Committee, the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee has not been willing to assume administrative
responsibility for the Roxbury office. As it turns out,
102 1972 Corroehensive Criminal Justice Plan for Massachusetts., op. cit..,
p. C-19.
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the Massachusetts Defenders Committee is run by lawyers
who have been around a lot longer than the young crowd
that staffs the Roxbury office. These old timers wanted
no part of the Roxbury experiment.1 0 3  They felt that the
Roxbury effort was ill conceived from the outset, meaning
that they objected to the amount of money being poured
into this one project. Moreover they had little if any
faith in the notion of the community advisory boards.
The salaries of the Roxbury group were way out of line
with the fees paid to court-appointed defenders in other
parts of the state. The Committee reasoned that if the
legislature wanted to assume responsibility for the
Roxbury Defenders project and incorporate it into the
regular defenders' program it would have to raise the
salaries of all public defenders in the Commonwealth. At
one time, the Massachusetts Defenders ran a Roxbury office
with one man (at $7,900). In 1972, the Roxbury Defenders
had a staff of nine. One underlying point is that black
lawyers had not been available at the salary level
usually paid by the Massachusetts Defenders Committee. In
addition, the all-black Roxbury office (where salaries
were well above the average) did not appeal to the leader-
10 3Interviews with Edward Rimbolt, Chief Counsel, and Frank Nowlan,
Executive Secretary, Massachusetts Defenders Committee, May 24, 1972.
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ship of the Defenders program..04
The State Defenders' office is not likely to take over
the Roxbury operation especially since the young upstarts
in that office have built a reputation and community
rapport of their own. Originally the lower court
justices treated the Roxbury group with contempt; but
that passed with time. As a one-shot experiment, the
Roxbury project has been successful, but the impact on
the Defenders system in general has been practically nil;
moreover, the chances of the Roxbury office being assimi-
lated into the system are minimal.
The examples cited above indicate that the LEAA program
can indeed spur reform in the criminal justice system,
but that most promising strategy involves the cooptation
of existing line agencies. The Governor's Committee has
not had the strength needed to force adoption of interest-
ing and successful experiments conducted outside the
system. LEAA funds have made it possible for a dynamic
state Commissioner to barter his way out of a backward
state system. In the long run the legislature will be
1 0 4Ibid. One spokesman for the Massachusetts Defenders Program asked
why there should not be all-Irish offices or all-Italian offices as
well.
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forced to come around (especially if the Department of
Youth services succeeds in dismantling the entire
juvenile justice system before the legislature can stop
it). The same, however, can not be said for the Massa-
chusetts Defenders Committee. By working outside normal
channels, the Governor's Committee minimized its chances
of success. Likewise, by spurning existing regional
planning agencies, the Committee doomed to failure future
efforts at regionalizing law enforcement. This is not
so much a reflection on the Governor's Committee as it
is on the tendency of block grants to encourage independent
state agencies to circumvent the entrenched powerholders
in state and local government. In the long run a cate-
gorical grant program aimed at specific reforms would
probably have accomplished just as much without the
attendant problems of waste and duplication. The argument
that states are likely to administer federal grant-in-aid
programs more effectively because they are familiar with
local politics does not hold up. If anything, state
governments are more likely to get involved in petty
disputes because they have a tendency to remain too close
to day-to-day operations at the local level. Although
the Governor's Committee has been able to buy support
for its efforts to reform the juvenile justice system,
the price has been high and there has obviously been no
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guarantee that worthwhile projects (such as D.A.R.E.,
Inc.) would not be dropped for the wrong reasons.
Simple Models and Measures of Reform
There is little or no agreement on how best to measure the
relative effectiveness of alternative approaches to
reforming the criminal justice system. To the extent that
the nature of the crime problem is unclear, the relative
merit of alternative solutions are difficult if not
impossible to assess. Descriptions of the criminal
justice system and the ways in which its various components
fit together are available (see Figure III for an over-
simplified model), but it has been terribly hard to invent
ways of analyzing the short- and long-term costs and
benefits associated with various interventions designed
to enhance the system's effectiveness. In other fields,
when problems of measurement seemed insurmountable, re-
phrasing the question often helped to break the deadlock.
In this instance, perhaps the problem is to decide
whether the justice system ought to be evaluated in terms
of its capacity to prevent or forestall criminal activity
(or even neutralize criminal tendencies) or whether it
should be evaluated in terms of the efficiency with which
known offenders are apprehended. In a sense, the problem
may be less one of measurement than one of definition.
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Figure III
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Source: Alfred Blumstein and Richard Larson, "Analysis of a Total
Criminal Justice System," in Drake et al.,, eds., Analysis
of Public Systems (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972), p. 319.
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If it were possible to distinguish between law enforcement
and crime prevention, the chances of developing successful
monitoring devices, of predicting the probable return on
investments in new technology, or of anticipating costs
and future manpower requirements would be greatly
enhanced. Although, secondary problems including the
invention of appropriate indicators and the discovery
of adequate data sources would still have to be resolved.
Several attempts have been made to model the criminal
justice system. 1 05  A linear model has b.een prop.osed which
depicts the workload, associated personnel requirements,
and the related costs incurred each step of the way follow-
ing crimes of various types. 106 Cost projections are
based on estimates of future arrest rates. A second model
which can forecast the costs of a total criminal career
(considering the probability of rearrests) and the con-
sequences of alternative actions within the criminal
justice system aimed at lowering recidivism probabilities,
10 5C.G. Hazard, "The Sequence of Criminal Prosecution," Proceedings of
the National Symposium on Science and Criminal Justice, June 22-23,
1966 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office); and D.M. McIntyre,
Law Enforcement in the Metropolis (Chicago: American Bar Foundation,
1967), cited in Alfred Blumstein and Richard C. Larson, "Analysis of
a Total Criminal Justice System," in Drake, et al., eds., Analysis of
Public Services (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972).
10 6R. H. Roy, "An Outline for Research in Penology," Operations Re-
search, Vol. 12, 1964, cited in Blunstein and Larson, op. cit., p.320.
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has also been suggested. 10 7 Although helpful from the
standpoint of projecting future costs and manpower
demands, these models are heavily constrained by the number
of assumptions that need to be made regarding future
arrest rates and institutional arrangements. In short,
such modeling efforts have only been helpful insofar
as they had exposed assumptions about the structure and
operation of the justice system that still need to be
tested. Perhaps over time, it will be possible to
build models that take into account not only the many
public and private mechanisms outside the system that
play a part in controlling criminal behavior but also the
deterrent effects of the criminal justice system itself. 108
Efforts to develop more sophisticated models have been
hampered by a lack of reliable data. Data on the extent
of crime, costs of operations, recidivism characteristics,
arrest rates, parole violations, etc., have tended to be
incomplete, unavailable, or of questionable accuracy.1 0 9
1 0 7
"Prevention and Control of Crime and Delinquency in California,"
Space General Corporation, El Monte, California, July 29, 1965, cited
in Blumstein and Larson, Op. cit., p. 320.
1 08 Blumstein and Larson, op. cit., p. 354.
109President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, op. cit., p. 253.
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Finally, the problems of constructing performance
measures (assuming the availability of insightful models
and reliable data) present serious obstacles. In areas
such as law enforcement or criminal behavior, there is
no way to avoid the full range of dilemmas associated
with social measurement. 1 10  For example, it has long been
recognized that assigning equal weights to all criminal
offenses included in a composite index is clearly unsatis-
factory. Yet, though degrees of seriousness exist among
criminal offenses, acceptable scales by which to weigh
different offenses have not been created. 1 1
The paucity of simple models that might be used to test
the efficacy of alternatives to the existing criminal
justice system has had a debilitating effect on operating
agencies such as the Governor's Committee. The scarcity
of reliable data and the extreme difficulty involved in
developing measures to monitor the impact of LEAA-funded
efforts has seriously undermined the credibility of the
Safe Streetst-Program.
11 0Albert D. Biderman, "Social Indicators and Goals," in Raymond Bauer,
Social Indicators (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), Chapter II.
" 
1 Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, The Measurenent of Delinquency
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), especially Chapter XV.
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On October 20, 1971, the Justice Department announced that
a National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals would be funded through LEAA grants
and contracts (totalling about $5 million). If that
Commission has been successful, the results have certainly
not been well publicized. In Massachusetts, the research
sponsored by the Governor's Committee (which ought to be
concerned about finding ways of overcoming the difficul-
ties mentioned above) has been directed solely at the
evaluation of specific projects.m The pitfalls of
evaluative research have been well documented.'1 3  The
1 1 2 The evaluative research effort has been organized around a limited
number of large studies, each focusing on a cluster of related pro-
grams currently in progress or recently completed. Research has been
structured around specific policy-oriented questions. Project evalua-
tions planned for 1972 included police personnel development, police
operations models, community-based corrections, Department of Youth
Services deinstitutionalization, prosecution and defense improvement,
and police communications systems. The total budget for research in
1969-1971 was under $200,000, although the projected allocation for
1972 was $300,000. Because the research has been used to inform
funding and continuation decisions relative to on-going projects, the
entire evaluation effort has been disruptive and has become a source
of constant irritation to project directors. In general it would make
more sense to separate research activities from project monitoring
responsibilities.
1 1 3Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Action Programs: Readings in Social
Action and Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); and Irving
Louis Horowitz, ed., The Use and Abuse of Social Science (New Bruns-
wick: Transaction Books, 1971).
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most serious is the danger of scholarly assessments becom-
ing entangled in the politics of day-to-day project manage-
ment. In the long run, action research (aimed at measuring
the efficacy of solutions) cannot substitute for basic
research (directed at enhancing public and professional
understanding of a problem). If the Justice Department
remains incapable of organizing the requisite research,
the difficulties of justifying the existence of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration will continue to
mount. It may be necessary for each state planning agency
to assume part of the responsibility; although, with the
non-random distribution of skills and resources throughout
the country, there may well be severe diseconomies asso-
ciated with such a decentralized approach to research.
Efforts to build formal models, to simulate the behavior
of various law enforcement sub-systems, and to monitor
the impact of public investments in various mechanisms for
reforming the criminal justice system, all have one thing
in common. They require agency officials and public
policy makers to define what it is they are trying to
accomplish. In the end, the most serious obstacle to
measuring the success or failure of the law enforcement
effort will be the inability of legislators and administra-
tors to come up with a common definition of what it is
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they have been trying to accomplish within certain
spending limits (where spending is measured not just in
dollar terms, but in this case in terms of individual
freedom as well). The disorganization and fragmentation
of the LEAA research effort to date both confirms and
feeds the confusion over the program's purposes and the
goals of the criminal justice system.
Summary and Conclusions
The LEAA program has had no appreciable impact on the
crime rate in Massachusetts (or in any other state for
that matter); moreover, the agencies responsible for law
enforcement and criminal justice seem to be having more
trouble than ever. Decisions regarding the allocation
of LEAA funds have been left pretty much up to the states.
Although the Governor's Committee has altered its priori-
ties several times during the past few years, Massachusetts
has made an honest and professional attempt to distribute
block grant funds in accordance with federal guidelines.
In 1971, the Governor's Committee formally adopted a
major city strategy aimed at channeling LEAA funds into
six or seven large urban areas with relatively high crime
rates. Yet, overall, city size and not crime rate best
explains the pattern of grant allocations in Massachusetts
from 1969 to 1971.
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Almost $17 million in action money has been spent to
improve police, court, and correctional performance in
the state and to combat juvenile delinquency, drugs, and
other criminal offenses. Unlike many other states,
Massachusetts can claim that a serious effort has been
made to promote institutional reform. The Governor's
Committee has not been willing to settle merely for the
acquisition of hardware or machinery designed to increase
police efficiency.
Among the high priority target cities, the distribution
of block grant monies has been uneven. To some extent,
this has been because certain municipalities have been
unable to develop grant management capabilities acceptable
to the staff of the state planning agency. On the other
hand, middle-sized cities and smaller towns have been dis-
couraged from submitting grant applications even when they
have given every indication of possessing the capability
of using LEAA funds effectively. The innovative character
of grant applications has not been as important in deter-
mining the outcome of funding decisions as has the member-
ship of the Governor's Committee (which sets the overall
priorities contained in the annual state plan). These
priorities and the adoption of the major city strategy
reflect the strong influence not only of the dominant
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actors in the criminal justice system, but also of the
Attorney General and the Committee staff. The Governor
has exerted very little influence over the Committee
even though he controls the appointments process. The
state legislature has remained oblivious to the purposes
of the LEAA program.
The move away from competitive grants coincided with the
shift to a major city strategy. Each high priority city
(where priority was determined not just by crime rate
and population, but by other factors such as the presence
of a model cities program) was.given an opportunity to
claim an annual percentage of the overall state alloca-
tion. Each city was also asked to justify individual
project proposals after each year and to restrict itself
to projects falling within the priorities set annually
by the Governor's Committee.
The state has failed to take advantage of existing regional
planning mechanisms or to invent new ones. Thus, a funding
bias in favor of big cities with professional grant manage-
ment capabilities has been further reinforced while
smaller cities and towns have been neglected. More than
anything else, funding probabilities have hinged on local
planning and grant management capabilities. Specifically,
327
applicants have not only had to mobilize local agencies
and policy makers, to coalesce agreement around a unified
approach to a particular problem, to gain support for
local matching arrangements, and to develop the technical
resources needed to carry out proposed tasks, but they have
also had to convince the staff of the Governor's Committee
that what they were proposing was innovative and matched
the state's annual funding priorities. To the extent that
the allocations process has not adequately reflected local
needs (in the target cities as well as elsewhere) the
problem can be traced back to the Committee's failure to
involve local planners and criminal justice officials in
the development of the state plan. The staff of the
Committee has run a closed shop. This is not to say that
no effort has been made to take account of local needs.
The MAD squad has grappled with that responsibility very
diligently. However, the strategy drafts prepared by the
Governor's Committee can not possibly substitute for
broader municipal participation and feedback.
The original goals of the LEAA program were relatively
obscure. Thus, it is hard to say whether or not they
have been met. If one objective was to spend a lot of
money very quickly and to offer at the least a pretense
of concern for the problems of crime and lawlessness, then
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that objective has been met. If the goal was to reduce
crime, the program has failed. But under the best of
circumstances, there was not nearly enough money (insofar
as money could have made a difference) to significantly
reduce crime rates in a single city or town. The fact
is, that LEAA allocations have amounted to only a drop in
the bucket compared to overall state and local appropria-
tions for law enforcement and criminal justice. Without
significant reforms in the system, LEAA funds could not
possibly have counteracted the impact of normal spending.
If the goal of the LEAA program was to reform the criminal
justice system, then it has failed, but not completely.
The effort to institutionalize innovative ideas or reforms
and to influence day-to-day operations of the police, the
courts, and correctional facilities has been impeded by
(1) a lack of citizen involvement and community participa-
tion in the definition of local criminal justice needs and
in the formulation and implementation of actual projects;
(2) the inability of the Governor's Committee to break
through entrenched power relationships at the state and
local level (except in the unusual case of the Department
of Youth Services); (3) the difficulties involved in
developing a professional planning capability at the local
level and of transferring major planning and programming
responsibilities from the state to the cities and towns;
and (4) the mistrust and suspicion generated by the lack
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of Congressional leadership which seriously undermined
state-local relationships. In the few instances where
reform has taken hold, the key factors have been strong and
creative leadership within existing line agencies and
decentralization of responsibility for project planning
and implementation.
The LEAA experience in Massachusetts suggests that there
are a number of problems with block grants:
(1) State agencies are not likely to have any better sense
of local needs than the national government. If any-
thing, the psychological distance between Washington
and most cities and towns is an advantage.
State governments are close enough to want tight control
over local activities, while Washington agencies, once
they have finished fussing over eligibility requiremnts,
are prepared to let municipalities stand or fall on
their own. A meddling state agency not only confuses
matters, but also retards the development of local
capabilities.
(2) States are likely to use block grants to establish
bureaucratic equivalents of analogous federal agencies.
Especially when funds are channeled through executive
offices at the state level, there is a strong possibility
that line agency capabilities will be duplicated, thereby
wasting federal dollars.
(3) Without explicit national guidelines (which ought to be
built into enabling legislation and not administrative
regulations) the states do not have sufficient credibility
with the cities to back up funding priorities. To the
extent that block grants imply a lessening of national
direction and control, they can kick off a series of
arguments between cities and state agencies regarding the
choice of evaluative criteria by which to judge local
needs and to evaluate the relative impact of particular
projects.
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(4) Middle-sized cities and small towns are not likely to
receive an equitable share of block grant funds
because they lack the management capabilities needed
to impress state agency staff. It appears that a high
level of grantsmanship is as necessary to shaking the
state "money tree" as it is to winning grants frcm
Washington.
(5) Annual grant competitions at the state level militate
against effective citizen involvement. Unless cities
are guaranteed a pre-arranged share of the state funds,
it is difficult to generate local enthusiasm. Moreover,
citizen participation is a long and drawn out process
that cannot be manipulated to meet artificial deadlines.
(6) The failure to require a hard cash match at the state
level has minimized the involvement of state legis-
lators and thereby limited their knowledge of the LEAA
program. Without their involvement not only has infor-
mation been bottled up at the state level, but there has
been no way of ensuring public accountability. Although
legislative involvement might tend to politicize the
grant allocation process somewhat more than is desirable,
it would at least guarantee that the staff of the state
planning agency, which presently enjoys unbelievable
autonomy, would have to account for its actions.
(7) The emphasis on innovation seems counterproductive.
Putting aside the fact that it is almost impossible to
agree on what is innovative and what is not, the preju-
dice against using block grant funds to sustain on-going
operations can seriously curtail reform efforts (assuming
that reform can come about by working within the existing
system).
(8) As long as the states have the final say, basic research
needs will be neglected. In an action setting, interest
centers around evaluation and the assessment of specific
projects. Although evaluative research is necessary, it
cannot substitute for basic research aimed at clarifying
underlying issues and at exploring alternative problem
definitions.
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Chapter IV: The Partnership for Health Program
-- 314(d) in Massachusetts
Under the Partnership for Health Act of 1966, sixteen cate-
gorical grants-in-aid were consolidated into a single block
grant to the states. Reacting to the charge that categori-
cal grants were too restrictive and led to a narrow focus
on disease rather than a more general concern for client
needs, Congress increased the latitude allowed each state
in addressing health problems and in setting priorities for
the allocation of federal funds. Section 314(d) of the Act
established a formula grant eliminating separate allocations
for tuberculosis control, heart disease control, venereal
disease control, cancer control, chronic disease services,
mental health services, home health services, dental health
services, radiological health services, and general public
health services.
Underlying the push for decategorization was an attempt to
build a more effective partnership between the national
government and the states. Plans for the allocation of
314(d) money were to be approved by a single state agency
empowered to formulate a comprehensive health plan for the
entire state. Improvements in the states' health planning
capabilities, it was argued, would justify the increased
decision-making responsibility relinquished by the Congress.
Five years later, in 1972, state public health officers
admitted that they had not been able to institute signifi-
cant improvements or reforms under the Partnership for
Health. They argued that this had more to do with the lack
of new money provided under 314(d) than with the decategori-
zation of health grants. The evidence suggests, however,
that most states used block grant monies in precisely the
same way as they had used the earlier categorical grants.
The addition of two key spending controls (namely a manda-
tory 70% pass-through for local health services and a 15%
allocation specifically for mental health) accomplished
very little. In Massachusetts, while the mental health
department managed occasionally to channel 314(d) funds
into interesting community-oriented projects, the funds, for
the most part, were squandered. The public health department
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used its block grant funds almost exclusively to underwrite
expenditures that should have been covered by normal state
appropriations. Neither the comprehensive health planning
agency charged with overseeing the Partnership for Health
Program not the areawide health planning bodies also estab-
lished under the 314 program played an active role in
monitoring or initiating 314(d) projects.
The public health department clearly did not use 314(d)
funds in the manner intended by Congress. This raises the
serious question of accountability. Secondly, 314(d) funds
did not contribute in the least to the development of com-
prehensive health planning capabilities at the state, sub-
state, or local levels. The hoped-for partnership (between
the various levels of government and between public and
private participants in the health care system) failed to
materialize. Finally, the lessening of federal restrictions
on public health grants enabled the state to set up a
federal "slush fund" and to hold down normal state alloca-
tions for health services.
Most cities and towns remained uninformed about the
existence of the 314(d) program even though 70% of the
block grant funds were supposed to be allocated for improve-
ments in community health services. Although state funds
were used every year to meet federal matching requirements,
the state legislature had little if any involvement in the
program.
In 1970, 100 million dollars was spent on 314(d) programs
in the United States, almost 2 million dollars in Massachu-
setts. There are few if any accomplishments to recount.
In short, the results do not speak well for decategoriza-
tion or for the block grant approach to intergovernmental
fiscal transfers.
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Comprehensive Health Planning and 314(d) in Massachusetts:
An Overview
In November, 1966, Congress enacted Public Law 89-749, The
Comperhensive Health Planning and Public Health Services
Amendments of 1966, better known as the Partnership for
Health. In December, 1967, the law was amended (90-174)--
extending the period of authorization (see Chapter II).
The Partnership for Health provided the impetus for com-
prehensive health planning in the United States as well as
substantial and long-awaited revisions in the way grants
for public health and mental health services were admini-
stered.1
'In 1961 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations issued
a report entitled, "Modification of Federal Grants-in-aid for Public
Health Services" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office). The
report acknowledged that categorical grants for public health services
(which had been in effect since 1935) had become permanently supportive
rather than stimulative; increased flexibility should be provided for
the states; and amalgamation of those grants related to the general
operation of public health agencies was desirable. The Commission,
after reviewing all the possibilities, decided that it did not favor
the substitution of a single block grant for the existing cateogrical
grants. ACIR did suggest, however, that legislation be enacted amend-
ing the Public Health Services Act of 1944 and authorizing, at the dis-
cretion of the Governor, the transfer of up to one-third of the funds
in any one grant category to other categorical programs. It was sug-
gested that this flexibility should apply to categorical grants for
general health assistance, venereal disease control, cancer control,
heart disease control, and tuberculosis control.
The Commission listed ten reasons why it was not recommending a switch
to block grants: (1) block grants require larger federal outlays than
categorical aids since they broaden programmatic objectives and
increase the number of eligible recipients; (2) they encompass program
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In enacting the Partnership for Health, Congress declared
that
fulfillment of our national purpose depends on promoting
and assuring the highest level of health attainable for
every person, in an environment which contributes posi-
tively to healthful individual and family living; that
attainment of this goal depends on effective partnership,
involving close inter-governmental collaboration, offi-
cial and voluntary efforts, and participation of indivi-
duals and organizations; and that Federal financial
assistance must be directed to support the marshalling
of all health resources--national, state and local--to
assure comprehensive health services of high quality for
every person. 2
areas broader than the sum of the categorical aids thereby widening the
area of application of national standards and increasing national con-
trol over state affairs; (3) they enforce a centralization of state
administrative organization in the interest of simplifying national
audit and review of block grant program funds; (4) they im-pair the
application of sanctions for state failure to act to meet national
objectives; (5) they dilute national objectives sought by the Congress
since the aids are not specifically directed toward specific ends;
(6) they reduce the number of appropriation items and may make an
appropriation appear large in terms of the vaguely defined need;
(7) they do not, in the end, lessen the need for categorical aids-
a specific national problem still requires the introduction of a new
categorical program to obtain an immediate allocation of state funds
for that purpose; (8) the transition from categorical to block grants
requires an increase in federal funds to assure that no state loses
any funds and that all states are brought up to a minimum level;
(9) they do not ensure or even encourage the uniform development of
programs on a nation-wide basis; (10) they are not likely to stimulate
the appropriation of state and local funds for development of programs
to meet new problems of national concern.
2 Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments
of 1966, Section 2. In part, the background for these policies can
be found in the series of reports prepared beginning in 1965 by the
National Commission on Comnunity Health Services. The Commission was
created by the American Public Health Association and the National
Health Council. Six separate task forces worked to develop policy
recommendations in the areas of Environmental Health; Comprehensive
Personal Health Services; Health Manpower; Health Care Facilities;
Financing Community Health Services and Facilities; and the Organiza-
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In addition,
to carry out such purposes, and recognizing the changing
character of health problems the Congress finds that
comprehensive planning for health services, health
manpower, and health facilities is essential at every
level of goverrment; that desirable administration requires
strengthening the leadership and capacities of state health
agencies; and that support of health services provided
people in their commnmities should be broadened and made
more flexible.
Five major provisions of public law 89-749 were aimed
directly at achieving these goals. Two provisions dealt
with comprehensive health planning and three with the provi-
sion of federal funds for public health and mental health
services, the training of comprehensive health planners,
and demonstration projects:
(1) Statewide comprehensive health planning: Federal
funds were provided under section 314(a) for the
establishment of a single agency in each state to
coordinate comprehensive health planning efforts.
Eash "a" agency was responsible for the develop-
ment of a comprehensive health plan (indicating
both the public and private facilities and the
tion of Community Health Services. Twenty-one community self-studies
provided the background data. See the summary report, Health is a
Community Affair (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) and the
task force reports which were published by Public Affairs Press,
Washington, D.C., 1967.
3Ibid.
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manpower needed to provide the necessary range
and level of services). Each state agency was
charged with the task of encouraging cooperation
among governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions and groups. In addition, this section of
the law provided for the establishment of a state
health planning council with a membership composed
of a majority of "consumers" of health services
(defined by the Surgeon General as those who
live where health problems exist) along with
representatives of major provider groups. These
councils were set up to advise the state 314(a)
agencies in the preparation and implementation
of federally approved comprehensive health plans.
(2) Areawide comprehensive health planning: The
second major provision of the law, contained in
section 314(b), focused on the need for comprehen-
sive health planning at the areawide (sub-state)
level. Federal funds were set aside for public
or non-profit private agencies engaged in organi-
zational or actual comprehensive health planning
efforts. A private agency, in order to be
eligible for 314(b) funds, had to have a majority
of "consumers" on its board of directors. Public
agencies had to have advisory councils that met
the same test. Applications for federal support
under this section were to be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate 314(a) agency. The
grants, it was assumed, would extend and expand
the successful areawide health facilities
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planning experiences of the Hill-Burton program.4
Two other provisions of the Act outlined the ways in which
federal funds for the support of comprehensive health
services would be administered:
(3) Block grants for comprehensive health services:
Section 314(d) provided for the elimination of the
traditional categorical grants that funnelled
federal money into state public and mental health
departments, and called instead for consolidated
block grants. Beginning in 1935, federal funds
were awarded along cateogrical of "disease"
lines--for example, for the control of tuber-
culosis, venereal disease, heart disease, and
cancer. State and territorial health officers
had objected to the rigidity of the categorical
grant system. Funds not utilized in one category
could not be transferred to another. In response
to such charges, Congress decided to allow the
states to identify their own health needs, to
develop their own health plans, and to utilize
federal funds as they saw fit. Plans for the use
of 314(d) money were to be reviewed by the "a"
agency in order to ensure conformance with the
state's comprehensive health plan.
For a reviei of the organizational problems encountered by 314(b)
agencies see Lana B. Stone, From Organization to Operation: The
Evolving Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning Scene (Minneapolis:
Health Service Research Center, 1969).
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Federal shares were to be determined annually
using the average per capita income and popula-
tion for each state. The federal share would
range from 33-1/3% of the costs in states with
the highest per capita income to 66-2/3% for
states with the lowest per capita income. The
funds were to be used "to make a significant
contribution toward providing public health
services in the various political subdivisions
of the state." (This was subsequently amended
to require a mandatory 70% pass-through to
cities and towns.)
(4) Project grants for health services development:
The second service program, covered by Section
314(e), had to do with the awarding of grants
for the development of health services. These
funds were to be made available to any public or
non-profit private agency involved in the provi-
sion of health services. Such project grants
had traditionally been a catch-all source of
support for academic, private, and research
groups. Again, grant applications for 314 (e)
money were to be reviewed by the "a" agency
for conformance with the state plan.5
sDepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare, A Directory of Selected
Health Services Funded Under Section 314(e) of the Public Health
Service Act, May, 1971. In Massachusetts, 314(e) funds were used to
support the Massachusetts Health Research Institute (Clinical Labora-
tory Improvement and Evaluation in the Cmmonwealth of Massachusetts);
The Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc.; and The Ecumenical Center
in Roxbury (Community Health Education Project; The Outreach Program
for the Problem Drinker).
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(5) Grants for training, studies, and demonstrations:
The last major provision of the Act, Section
314(c), provided federal funds for the support
of training programs, studies, and demonstration
projects. These funds were to be used to
support academic centers throughout the country
in developing curricula, degree programs, and
continuing educational opportunities for com-
prehensive health planners. These funds were
designed particularly to ensure that the manpower
needed to staff comprehensive health planning
agencies at both the state and areawide levels
would be available.6
The Partnership for Health Act was passed in the last days
of the 89th Congress, just after the Titles 18 and 19 of
the Social Security Act (medicare and Medicaid) had been
approved. Although there was not enough time to hold the
necessary Congressional hearings, it was agreed to pass
the law and wait until the following session to approve the
necessary appropriations. As a result, the program did
not become operational until 1967.
The passage of the 314 program marked the first time that
the health care system in the United States was viewed as
6For a national listing of 314(c) programs see Reference Guide to Edu-
cational Opportunities in Health Planning (Minneapolis: Health Service
Research Center, April, 1970).
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a complex set of inter-related parts. In order to make
comprehensive health planning possible, physical, mental,
and environmental health problems had to be attacked
simultaneously. In addition, the relationship of health
to a whole series of other factors including housing,
education, occupation, welfare, transportation and recrea-
tion was emphasized for the first time.7 The introduction
of the consumer (as a full partner) was also an important
step in pulling together the public and private fragments
of the health care system. Finally, the realignment of
intergovernmental responsibilities for the planning and
implementation of health services was accepted as an essen-
tial component of the comprehensive health planning activi-
ties envisioned by the Partnership for Health legislation.
On June 23, 1967, Massachusetts Governor John Volpe desig-
nated the Executive Office of Administration and Finance
as the state agency to administer comprehensive health
7A more detailed exploration of these interrelationships can be found in
the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies report, Planning for
Health Services and Facilities and Its Relationship to City and Regional
Planning Activities (Cambridge, 1967), especially in William W. Nash,
"An Overview: Forging Effective Links Between Health Services and
Facility Planning and City and Regional Planning," pp. Bl-B82.
341
planning funds in Massachusetts.8 The Executive Office of
Administration and Finance was assigned the task of coor-
dinating health planning activities in consultation with
the Departments of Public Health, Mental Health, Public
Welfare, Education, Natural Resources, as well as private
and voluntary health agencies. The hope was that the
designation of the central state planning agency (which
reported directly to the Commissioner of Administration
and to the Governor) would facilitate inter-departmental
communications and joint planning activities.
A state health planning advisory council was appointed.
Council members were selected to represent various state
agencies as well as non-governmental groups. (See Figure IV).
A majority of the Council members were consumers whose
major occupation involved neither the administration of
health services nor the provision of health care. The
Council was required to meet several times a year. Appoint-
ments were made by the Governor, and Council members were
organized into a series of task forces (dealing with
health facilities, health information systems, health
8Letter of designation from Governor John Volpe to Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, John Gardner, June 23, 1967.
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Figure IV
OFFICE OF COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PLANNING
Advisory Council
(As of December, 1971)
Dr. Harold Demone, Jr. (Chairman), Executive Director
United Community Services
Mrs. Doris G. Andrews, Executive Director
Massachusetts Nurses Association
Dr. Vincent Barnaba, Director
Berkshire Rehabilitation Center
Mrs. Howell Bates, President
Massachusetts League of Women Voters
Dr. Joseph Bickford
Mr. William Bronstein, Vice-President
Plymouth-Home National Bank
Mr. Irving Chase, President
Henry Thayer Company
Mrs. Clarence Clark, President
Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs
Professor William J. Curran
Harvard School of Public Health
Mr. Archibald Dalton, Executive Director
Massachusetts Tuberculosis and Health League
Mr. James 0. Dunn, Financial and Business Consultant
Dr. James Dunning
Harvard School of Dental Medicine
Mr. Joseph Faria, Vice-Chairman
Fall River Trust Company
Dr. Martin Feldstein, Department of Economics
Harvard University
Dr. Bernard Frieden, Department of City Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Alfred Frechette, Commissioner
Massachusetts Department of Public Health
Mr. Arthur Gartland
Cronin and Gartland
Mr. Frederick Glynn, Director of Social Services
Veterans Administration Hospital
Dr. Milton Greenblatt, Commissioner
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
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Mr. Benjamin Jones, President
Monarch Life Insurance Company
Mr. Richard Knight, Selectman
Town of Newbury
Mr. Paul L'Antigua
State School Employees
Mr. John Levis, Commissioner
Massachusetts Vocational Rehabilitation Commission
Mr. John Lund, President
New England Envelope Manufacturing Company
Mr. Elwyn Mariner, Research Director
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
Mr. John McManus
Boston Typographical Union
Dr. John Norcross
Lahey Clinic
Mr. J. Kinney O'Rourke, Executive Director
Massachusetts League of Cities and Towns
Mr. Robert Ott, Commissioner
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare
Mr. Albert C. Palmer, Vice-President, Administration and Planning
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company
Dean Howard L. Reed
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy
Mr. Robert Reidy
Maurice F. Reidy Company
Mr. William Robinson, Executive Vice-President
Massachusetts Hospital Association
Mrs. Joanne Ross
Commonwealth Service Corps
Mr. Neil Sullivan, Commissioner
Massachusetts Department of Education
Miss Mary Susich, County Health Officer
Barnstable County
Mrs. Rita Welch
Massachusetts Federation of Nursing Homes
Mr. Robert Van Wart, Executive Director
The Community Council of Greater Springfield
344
services, health manpower, and environmental health).
Each task force was asked to produce a report for inclusion
in the state comprehensive health plan.9
The scope of comprehensive health planning in Massachusetts
has been broadly defined as "encompassing health services.,
facilities, and manpower to meet the physical, mental and
environmental health needs of the people of the Common-
wealth" and "the financial and organizational resources
through which these needs may be met." 1 0 Comprehensive
health planning has encompassed attempts to assess the
current health needs of the population; to determine the
current level of health services; to project medium and
long-range future health needs; to propose development pro-
grams to meet such health needs, and to remedy current
lacks; and to recommend ways of implementing proposed
9Several Task Force reports are included as appendices to A Comprehen-
sive Health Plan for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, March, 1970.
1 0
"State Comprehensive Health Planning Program for Massachusetts,"
undated memorandum prepared by the Office of Comprehensive Health Plan-
ning, Executive Office of Administration and Finance. In an effort to
better document health needs in Massachusetts, the Governor's Advisory
Council to the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning conducted a
series of public hearings throughout the Commonwealth. A summary of
these hearings was published under the title, Health Care in Massachu-
setts: The People Speak, Autumn, 1970.
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programs including, where appropriate, changes in organiza-
tion and structure of government agencies.
In addition to the state health planning agency, six area-
wide (or sub-state) health planning bodies were also
formed."1 Grants for areawide comprehensive health planning
[314(b)] were made to cover part of the cost of regional
efforts to organize areawide health planning groups; and
to implement areawide comprehensive planning programs.
Organizational grants (for up to two years) were provided.
Most communities needed to spend considerable time and
effort developing the necessary working relationships.
Various organizational options were available to potential
314(b) agencies. They could build themselves into the
framework of existing areawide planning agencies (councils
"Region I: Western Massachusetts Health Planning Council, Inc.
(Springfield); Region II: Ccmprehensive Health Planning Council of
Central Massachusetts, Inc. (Worcester); Region IV: North Shore Health
Planning, Inc. (Peabody); Region VII: Comprehensive Health Planning,
Inc. (Middleboro); Regions III, V, VI: Health Planning Council for
Greater Boston, Inc. (Newton); Region VIII: Merrimack Valley Health
Planning Council, Inc. (Andover). The regional designations refer to
an all-encompassing set of sub-state regional planning areas established
by the Executive Department of Administration and Finance. Unfortunately,
both the Public Health and the Mental Health Departments had separate
sub-state service areas of their own design that did not quite coincide
with the sub-state regional boundaries used by the Department of Admini-
stration and Finance.
346
of government; "701" planning agencies); the councils
organized from scratch; they could expand existing county
health departments or health planning agencies; or they
could expand existing voluntary organizations." In
Massachusetts all six 314(b) agencies were created espe-
cially to play the roles suggested by the Partnership for
Health legislation. Thus, the 314(b) agencies in Massa-
chusetts began with certain advantages. First, each non-
profit organization was geared directly to the task of
comprehensive health planning and had no other competing
commitments. Second, each agency was organized in a
manner best suited to the region in which it was located.
Third, pre-existing hostilities between various provider
groups did not present special obstacles (although strong
working relationships which might have been helpful in
getting started were also not present at the outset). By
the end of 1972 each 314(b) agency had organized its own
area advisory council.
Before any 314(b) applications were submitted, working
relationships first had to be established between the "a"
1 2 These options are presented in more detail in National Association
of Counties Research Foundation, Corprehensive Health Planning: A
Manual for Local Officials., Washington, D.C.., 1971, "Organization and
Support for 314(b) Agencies," pp. 21-36.
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agency and the "b" applicants. The "a" agency tried to
make sure that the necessary back-up support, consulta-
tion, and assistance were available. "b" agency applica-
tions were sought from organizations that conformed to
statewide health service development priorities in terms
of geographic location and population served. In general,
the "b" agencies in Massachusetts had a difficult time
piecing together the cooperative relationships vital to
their success. 13  They had trouble developing a broad base
of local financial support. The need for a diversity of
funding sources was stressed by the state planning agency,
1 3Not only in Massachusetts, but in other states as well, "b" agencies
had difficulty getting organized. In cases where areawide agencies are
nothing more than reconstituted Hill-Burton area advisory councils
(whose focus had been exclusively on hospital planning) the agencies
were unable to catalyze broad-based support. Two other problems that
handicapped (b) agencies were finding Executive Directors with the
ability and training to operate successfully in such unstructured roles,
and secondly, finding qualified staff. One criticism of the 314(c) pro-
grans has been their failure to turn out qualified planners to staff
tat and "b" agencies.
For the most part, money was not as much of an impediment as was anti-
cipated. Local shares were raised with the help of area-wide hospitals.
Even the best agency directors, though, were hampered by constant pres-
sures from regional HEW offices, from "a" agencies (although in many
states the "a" agencies had little to do with the "b" agencies once
they were formed), and from citizen advisory councils (which basically
controlled agency operations). See Organization for Social and Techno-
logical Innovation, Surveys of Selected "a" and "b" Agencies, Cambridge,
1971. OSTI also ran a series of discussion sessions early in 1972 for
"b" agency directors for a dozen or so states which confirmed the above
(interview with Dan Freeman, OSTI, January 2, 1972).
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not only because the "b" agency's fiscal base reflects the
extent of its local support, but also because it indicates
the likelihood of the agencies' potential effectiveness.
Reasonable assurances of local support were required
either in the form of cash or firm written pledges adequate
to finance at least six months of the agencies' operations.
Federal funds could only be used to support up to 50% of
"b" agency costs. 1 4
Each 314(b) agency was supposed to have a chance to review
314(d) grant allocations made within its boundaries, but
this did not turn out to be the case.15  The "b" agencies
have yet to achieve their stated goals, although the
problems they have encountered seem more idiosyncratic than
structural. The only common theme seems to be that the "b"
1 4Corrprehensive Health Plan for Massachusetts, 2E. cit., Appendix C,
"Review Criteria for 314(b) Organizational Grants."
i sThe original expectation was spelled out in Helen O'Meara, "Relation-
ship between the State and the Regional Comprehensive Health Planning
Agencies in Massachusetts," draft position paper, June, 1970. The fact
that the "b" agencies were not involved in 314(d) review and comment
activities was confirmed via telephone interviews with Grant Heggie
(Western Massachusetts Health Planning Council), May 11, 1972; Ann
McGrath (Cormprehensive Health Planning Council of Central Massachusetts),
May 11, 1972; Carroll Colly (North Shore Health Planning Council),
May 11, 1972; David Houghton (Regional VII, Corrprehensive Health Plan-
ning, Inc.), May 11, 1972; Edward Steele (Health Planning Council for
Greater Boston), May 11, 1972; and Don Douglass (Merrimack Valley Health
Planning Council), May 18, 1972.
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agencies have not had the clout necessary to mobilize the
various public and private agencies and organizations
involved in health care delivery.
The 314(a) agency received an average of more than
$120,000 a year from the federal government between 1967
and 1972: 1967--$47,600; 1968--$94,200; 1969--$145,100;
1970--$157,400; 1971-$143,000; and 1972--$147,300. The
flow of 314(d) funds into Massachusetts is indicated in
Table XII. The comprehensive state plan has never been
reviewed at the national level. Rather, continuous checks
have been made by the regional office for compliance with
Federal regulations. That is, every year, several regional
officials check to see that the proper documents are filled
out and that various administrative requirements are met
(these include establishment of consultation and supervision
of services procedures; compliance with merit system
procedures; compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act; establishment of a separate organizational unit for
planning; establishment of methods for payment of in-patient
care; etc.). Annual work programs proposed by the Depart-
ments of Mental and Public Health along with progress and
expenditure reports are required. Assertions made in these
reports relative to compliance are all that federal and
regional officials use to ascertain whether funds should be
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Table XII
314(d) FUNDS AWARDED TO MASSACHUSETTS
Fiscal Year Federal Allotment
Federal
Share* State and Local
1968
public health
mental health
1969
public health
mental health
1970
public
mental
1971
public
mental
1972
public
mental
health
health
health
health
health
health
5-year total
$ 1,177,900
207,900
1,314,400
232,000
1,788,700
315,60 0
1,769,200
312,200
1,818,800
321,000
$ 9,257,700
44.46 $ 1,471,400
259,700
44.80
43.98
43.95
43.64
1,619,500
285,000
2,278,400
402,000
2,256,300
398,200
2,348,900
414,600
*Federal share of costs is given according to the formula indicated in
section 314(d) part 5. The federal share is a percentage greater than
33-1/3 % and less than 66-2/3%. The per cent federal share is 100% - x%
where x is to 50 as the state per capita income is to the average
U.S. per capita income. In the computation of benefits to the states,
there is thus a double compensation for poverty--once when the federal
allotment to the state is computed and again when required state
matching proportion is computed.
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awarded for another year.'6
Once the work program is submitted, the state is free, it
appears, to do whatever it wants with the money, subject
only to an annual expenditure report and occasional
audits. The work program is essentially a statement of
how appropriations will be used for a given year, while
the comprehensive plan is supposed to be a long-range
document outlining the full range of programs and assessing
health care needs in the state. As it turns out, the
federal government has paid little or no attention to the
content or scope of the comprehensive state plan; only
the annual departmental work programs are required for
continued federal support." No date was ever set fixing
a time by which state plans had to be submitted. In fact,
as of May, 1972, Massachusetts was the only state in the
New England region even claiming to have a plan.
According to the director of the regional office of compre-
6Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Services,
"Procedure for Completion of Certification and Budget," HSM-561-1 and
"State Plan Checklist," HSM-577-1.
7 Interview with Andrew Johnston, Director, Federal Regional Office for
Comprehensive Health Planning, May 3, 1972.
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hensive health planning, there does not have to be a direct
relationship between the goals expressed in the state
plan and the expenditure of "d" money; the expenditure
need only be "free of conflict with the state plan." No
one is quite sure what "free of conflict" means. Amend-
ments to the 314 legislation required that 314(d) expendi-
tures be reviewed by the "b" agencies, yet the regional
office openly acknowledges that such approvals have not
been forthcoming. From the standpoint of HEW regional
officials, the most annoying problem in Massachusetts
has been that they have not been able to get a budget from
the state health department indicating anything more than
total state-federal expenditures for health. The annual
expenditure reports list only combined expenditures by
program area (i.e., environmental health, tuberculosis
control, etc.), and not the specific allocation of 314(d)
funds. 314(d) funds have been buried somewhere in the
public health department's $45 million budget.18
The regional office uses a "checklist" to review state
compliance each year. One requirement is that each state
show evidence of its efforts to notify communities that 314(d)
funds are available. In Massachusetts, this has been
18Ibid.
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handled by placing an advertisement once each year in the
public health department bulletin. Even that single
advertisement fails to mention anything about the purposes
of the 314(d) program or to indicate the kinds of project
proposals that might be entertained in a given year. Both
the state and the regional officials involved have sug-
gested that this is largely an artificial requirement.
They argue that since the federal government has not
increased 314(d) funding levels, the states are not respon-
sible for meeting the mandatory 70% pass-through require-
ment. The public health department has gone so far as to
suggest that "all of its programs are geared to meeting
local needs" and, therefore, no formal pass-through is
necessary.
The matching arrangements provide yet another escape hatch.
The state has only to demonstrate that an overall match
has been made. This is not hard to do since the annual
state budget is much larger than the amount of money coming
in under the 314(d) program. Having demonstrated an
overall match, the state need not actually use any 314(d)
funds for community projects if it can show that at least
the equivalent amount in state funds has already been
allocated for "community-related purposes." The final point
is that most of the 314(d) funds coming into Massachusetts
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are locked into ongoing salaries of civil service employees.
Thus, 314(d) funds have for the most part been trapped in
the Department of Public Health's administrative structure
and have rarely seeped through to cities and towns."9
The regional office was informed by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in Washington that they were not to
disallow any expenditure of 314(d) funds that was "mini-
mally acceptable." In effect, this means that the states
have had carte blanche. In part, this can be attributed to
a claim made by several states (most notably New Jersey)
that 314(d) formula grants constitute an "entitlement"
which cannot be withheld, regardless of whether or not
the national government feels 314(d) are being used wisely.
The issue of entitlement has not been settled in court, but
HEW has been willing to permit a very loose interpretation
of the law rather than face a battle with the states?0 The
"Interview with Dr. Robert Godersky, Assistant Regional Health Plan-
ning and Coordination Director, designated liaison officer with Massa-
chusetts for 314(d) funds, May 3, 1972.
2 0Interview with Dr. Robert Godersky, May 8, 1972. Both New York and
New Jersey decided to challenge the HEW requirements by not turning in
reports or plans. The Regional HEW Director (Dr. James Kinney, now
Executive Director of the American Public Health Association in Wash-
ington, D.C.) disapproved of the states' actions and refused to release
314(d) funds. The states managed (through either the Secretary's office
in HEW or the Health Services and Mental Health Administration to get
"their money." [Dr. William Putnam, currently Regional Director for the
New York area, has denied that funds were ever withheld from New Jersey
or New York (personal correspondence dated May 22, 1972).]
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only time the regional office pressed Massachusetts on the
operation of the 314 program was when it seemed as if too
large a proportion of 314(a) funds was being used for
contract services. If more than 50% of the state's annual
appropriation is used for outside services, the state can
be "found not in accordance with the merit system required
by federal law." Even in this case, though, the state
work program and the comprehensive plan were approved on
the condition that steps be taken to correct the situation.
314(d) Allocations in the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health
In 1968, when Partnership for Health funds first began to
flow into the state, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health set up a committee (including representatives of
three different sub-bureaus) to allocate 314(d) money.
Elaborate guidelines were prepared to guide municipalities
and non-profit groups interested in submitting grant
requests. 2 1 The members of the committee quarreled among
themselves. They could not agree on how to spend the money
or on the level of state supervision needed to keep local
21Massachusetts Department of Public Health, "Developmental Grants for
Community Health Services," 1967-1968, including General Instructions,
Grant Application Forms, Financial Considerations, and Guidelines for
Evaluating Projects, 19 pp.
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administrators in line. The process of selecting grant
recipients was haphazard. Priorities were not set in
advance. After looking at all the applications submitted
in a given year, a handful were selected (with annual
awards never totalling more than $150,000).22
2 2In 1968-1969, nine projects received a total of just under $150,000.
There is no way of determining exactly how much of this was 314(d)
money and how much came from state funding for community health ser-
vices. The best guess is that all projects funded under the heading
of "community health service activities" and "home health" were sup-
ported out of 314(d) funds, including the following:
Grant Recipient
Comprehensive home health
program
Social Service Consultant
to a municipal day care
licensing authority
Comp. Family Health Care,
Piedmont-Univ. Park Area
Homemaker-Home Health Aide
Service of Greater Fall
River
Regional Comp. Homemaker
Home Health Aide Services
of Greater Worcester
Comp. Post-Partum Clinic
Comprehensive Health
Services in a
Semi-rural area
Development of Home Health
Services for Malden
Burbank Hospital
Associated day care
services of metro-
politan Boston
Worcester Health
Department
Homemaker-Home Health
Aid, Inc.
Family Services Org.
of Worcester
Wesson Maternity
Hospital, Springfield
Wing Memorial Hospital
and Community Health
Center, Palmer
Malden Community
Nursing Association
Project Title
Amount
of Grant
$11,840
16,532
49,24o
12,000
16,)433
25,000
7,000
4,000
Initial
Funding
Date
5/1/68
7/1/68
7/1/68
7/1/68
9/1/68
9/15/68
10/1/68
1/1/69
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When a new deputy Commissioner for public health was
appointed in 1970, he abolished the committee and assigned
the task of allocating 314(d) funds to the department's
planning office. (See Figure V, Organization Chart for the
Department of Public Health.) Projects funded in 1968 and
1969 were phased out. The following year, the deputy
commissioner reclaimed 314(d) allocation responsibilities
for himself.
From 1967 to 1972, 314(d) allocations to the public health
department remained at approximately $1,600,000 a year
(see Table XV). For the most part these funds were encum-
bered by prior commitments. A great number of jobs were
tied to the old system; and because of civil service re-
strictions, there was no way of escaping these financial
obligations. Since operating costs continued to mount and
Initial
Amount Funding
Project Title Grant Recipient of Grant Date
Regional Visiting Nurse Beverly Visiting Nurse $ 2,000 1/1/69
Association Project Association
Many of these same projects were supported for a second year at the same
or a slightly reduced funding level: Wesson Hospital--$25,000; Burbank
Hospital--$7,000; Greater Fall River--$5,000, etc. No new projects were
listed for 1970.
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the state legislature did not increase its annual appropria-
tions at a commensurate level, less and less money became
available for interesting or innovative community-based
projects or even for new activities within the agency itself.
In 1971, only $50,000 was set aside for community projects.
Most of this money was used to bolster sagging relation-
ships with the "b" agencies. 2 3 The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner decided which regional agencies would
best be able to use an infusion of funds; they then
invited only those agencies to submit grant applications.
An additional $150,000 of unencumbered funds was used to
supplement agency expenditures for car pool, postage, and
other miscellaneous items and to strengthen the department's
office of planning. Finally, in 1972, all 314(d) funds for
community-oriented projects were cut off. 2 4  In 1972, the
entire block grant was used to cover normal departmental
administrative costs.
2 3The "b" agencies were never informed that what they were actually
receiving was 314(d) money. All the 1971 awards, including prcmises
of 1972 funds totalled $49,000. (That did not include separate grants
of $25,000 made in 1971 and 1972 to the Boston-Brookline Health
Resources Organization.) Of the $49,000, $41,000 was allocated to
"b" agencies for survey and planning work.
2 4Interviews with Dr. Ernest Cook, Deputy Commissioner of Health,
November 11, 1971 and May 10, 1972.
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The public health Department took little or no interest in
the activities of the 314 (a) agency. Public health alloca-
tions of Id" money in no way reflected the objectives
outlined in the state's comprehensive health plan. Moreover,
it was clear to all concerned that key public health
officials resented the efforts of the Office of Comprehen-
sive Health Planning. Undoubtedly, this had something to
do with the fact that in thirty-nine of the fifty states
public health departments were designated as "a" agencies.
No one in the public health department in Massachusetts
was convinced that the Executive Office of Administration
and Finance was in a better position to coordinate
comprehensive health planning activities in the state.
When the first comprehensive health plan appeared in 1970,
it was severely criticized by representatives of the public
health department. Nevertheless, few if any changes were
made. Whether or not the modifications proposed by public
health personnel were in fact useful or even reasonable
is not important. The public health department made no
subsequent effort to contribute to the preparation of
comprehensive health plans nor did they take "a" agency
recommendations seriously
Public health officials made no secret of the fact that the
70% pass-through requirement was not being honored or that
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314(d) funds were used primarily to cover trivial office
expenses that should actually have been financed out of
regular state appropriations.25 The only time the public
health department bothered to submit a report regarding
314(d) expenditures (to the regional office of Health,
Education, and Welfare) was late in 1969. And that report
merely outlined how "d" funds would be used in fiscal
1970. Interestingly enough, no change from the line item
budget of earlier years was proposed.2 6 In fact, the pre-
existing categorical grant headings were still used to
organize the 314(d) budget in 1970.
Numerous references have been made to the convenience and
flexibility that supposedly resulted from the switch to
block grants. Because 314(d) funds have been kept in a
separate account, the public health department has had the
2 5Interview with Dr. Cook, ibid.; interview with Richard Seder, Office
of Planning, Department of Public Health, November 11, 1971; interview
with Robert Godersky, op. cit.; interviews with Betty Caso, Division
of Community Services, Department of Public Health, May 15, 1972, and
May 22, 1972; interview with Alice Crimmins, Budget Section, Department
of Public Health, November 11, 1972.
2 6Public Health Service Plan [314(d)] for 1970, submitted to Mabel
Ross, M.D., Regional Health Director, Public Health Service, Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, May 13, 1969 by Alfred
Frechette, Commissioner of Public Health. The plan is very vague and
although various objectives are indicated, no information is given
specifying how much money would be spent to achieve each objective (or
how much money would come from 314(d) and how much from other state
funds).
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luxury of bypassing the central purchasing office whenever
it desired to buy certain items such as furnishings or
equipment.
A number of public health officials have suggested, somewhat
sheepishly, that $1.6 million a year was not nearly enough
to promote reforms in the health care system or to signi-
ficantly improve local health services. They also admit,
though, that no serious effort was made to experiment along
these lines.
Table XIII summarizes 314(d) expenditures in the Department
of Public Health from 1968-1971. Over $6,000,000 in
314(d) funds was allocated to Massachusetts during that
period, but only $4,500,000 has been accounted for in
departmental records. Presumably, the remaining $1,500,000
fell into "working reserves" carried forward each year
and used to cover unanticipated office expenses. [The
"working reserve" is a slush fund; once money is transferred
in, expenditures are no longer indicated in the 314(d)
records. ]27
The application process: The process by which the public
2 7This suggestion was made by Dr. Cook, o_. cit.
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
EXPENDITURES OF BLOCK GRANT [314(d)] FUNDS
Budget Title 1968 1969. 1970 1971 Totals
Bureau of Administration
Central Administration
Health Statistics
Health Research
Planning
Health Education
Car Pool Budget
Training and Research
Full time
Other
Office of Administration
Research
$ 101,959,94 $
14,969.96
88,228.11
37,590.80
6,617.33
1,329.00
110,836,76 $
16,554.50
81,195.93
47,234.31
2,424.00
11,899.76
180,555.98 $
24,761.94
115,464.52
35,901.23
244,491.77
143,243.01
82,395.52
127,526.81
44,547.55
38,867.34
19,310.82
$ 637,844.45
56,286.40
143,243.01
82,395.52
412,415.37
165,273.89
38,867.34
6,617.33
3,753.00
31,210.58
Bureau of Environmental
Sanitation
Division of Sanitary
Engineering Central Office
Lawrence Experimental Station
Amherst Laboratory
Division of Sanitation
N. E. Interstate Water Pollution
Control Conmission
Air Pollution Control
Metropolitan Boston District
Water Pollution Control
Bureau of Consumer Products
Central Office
Laboratory
25,325.20
6,690.74
3,989.55
29,404.56
10,436.57
32,920.80
6,731.40
4,103.20
25,109.05
10,477.22
36,807.64
1,766.41
4,075.45
32,005.50
12,771.35
48,164.15
6,247.87
5,643.70
143,217.79
21,436.42
17,811.90
86,519.11
33,685.14
U-)
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Budget Title 1968 1969. 1970
Bureau of Preventive
Disease Control
Cancer Control
Clinics
Administration
Heart Disease Control
Clinics
Administration
Conmunicable Disease
Venereal Disease Control
Administration
Clinics
Dental Health
Unit in Dental Health
Boston University Harnessing
Growth and Development
Radiation Control
Alcoholism
Services to the Chronically Ill
and Aged Development and
Consultation Unit
Nursing Homes and Related
Facilities
$ $ 75,528.63 $
79,037.09
8,847.55
52,944.97
937.08
1,053.00
10,1474.08
3,774.36
97,841.84
72,346.70
4,432.80
1,000.00
2,169.87
4,702.80
1,500.00
89,255.26
40,208.48 50,710.73
96,096.76 $
74,616.92
3,160.00
91.60
6,1414.80
91,872.66
66,516.76
11,672.04
53,964.30
205.53
7,072.00
500.00
66,020.23
$ 183,297.43
79,037-09
200,927.92
8,847.55
52,944.97
8,735.41
2,053.00
7,163.60
12,643.95
14,891.96
1,500.00
344,971.99
10,565.86 168,001.83
1971 Totals
-)-
Table XIII
(Page three of five)
Budget Title 1968 1969. 1970
Bureau of Health Services
Local Health Control
Southeastern-Lakeville
Northeastern-Tewksbury
Rutland (Central District)
Amherst (Western District)
Pittsfield (Western District)
Nursing
Social Work Division
Nutrition Division
$ 21,275.20 $
6,923.75
13,287.25
12,715.30
21,486.58
9,1469.36
22,915.86
20,395.11
6,536.55
13,481.09
12,905.20
28,487.07
10,015.46
25,370.03
$ 24,328.95
6,190.00
16,988.60
19,837.60
34,802.75
10,102.12
31,644.81
$ 21,185.08
7,986.98
16,573.57
39,075.61
36,392.59
9,524.49
11,283.28
$ 87,184.34
27,137.28
60,330.51
84,533.71
121,168.99
39,111.43
91,213.98
Maternal and Child Health
Services
Family Health Services-Administration -
Division of Maternity and
Child Health
Bureau of Child Health and
Development-Day Care Training -
Services for Crippled Children -
Bureau of Maternal and Adult
Services-Eliot Center, Harvard St. -
Bureau of Hospital Facilities
Division of Hospitals
Bureau of Tuberculosis and
Institutions
Division of Tuberculosis
Administration
Hospital Care
Clinics
Drugs
18,636.91
13,607.02
21,113.09
9,073.20
15167.84
2,160.80
16,222.50
17,500.00
25,902.85
62,860.36
107,175.99
2,160.80
16,222.50
17,500.00
65,652.85
62,860.36
9,073.20
121,950.85
1971 Totals
ul
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Budget Title
Sanatoria
Lakeville State Hospital
Rutland Heights Hospital
Western Massachusetts Hospital
Lemuel Shattuck Hospital
Pondville Hospital
Massachusetts Hospital School
Tewksbury Hospital
Capital Outlay-Department
Bureau of Institute of
Laboratories
Institute of Laboratories
Biologic Laboratory
Diagnostic Laboratory
PKU Program
Streptococcal Investigation
Rubella Study Program
Mumps Virology
Nashoba Health Unit
Group Insurance
Massachusetts Comnittee for
Children and Youth
Local Area Research and
Demonstration Project
M. C. H. Consultant
Medical Care Program
Comprehensive Public Health
and Medical Care Programs
1968
$$
200.00
12,027.12
36,012.03
5,685.33
3,400.00
69,231.88
4,250.00
1969.
$
1,846.50
21,097.24
40,593.50
6,690.16
87,517.13
19711970
$
22,409.08
57,574.50
46,181.13
94,810.47
119,014.78
Totals
$
22,409.08
2,046.50
127,934.83
134,180.03
16,993.62
3,400.00
275,763.79
4,250.00
Table XIII
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Budget Title 1968 1969, 1970
Categories Added After
1968-1969
Community Health Service
Activities
Patient Care Operations
Division of Food ard
Drug-Central
Food and Drug Laboratory
Division of Medical Care
Radiation Control
Hane Health
Boston-Brookline Comprehensive
Health
Total Four Year Expenditure
Total Federal Allocation
to Public Health
$ $ $ 631.64 $89-70 31,242.28
- - 34,013.24
- - 11,981.05
- - - 34,1408.46
- - - 50,368.62
- - - 26,517.52
- - - 25,000.00
$ 892,283.80 $ 956,423.09 $1,251,294.95 $1,457,001.37
$1,177.900.00 $1,314,400.00 $1,788.700.00 $1,769,200.00
$ 31,873.92
89-70
314,013.24
11,981.05
34,1408.46
40,368.62
26,517.52
25,000.00
$4,557,003.21
$6,050,200.00
Difference* $ 285,617 $ 357,977 $ 537,406 $ 312,199
*The differences shown above represent unliquidated obligations as of June 30th of each fiscal year. These
funds are carried forward and constitute a working reserve that the Department can draw on at will.
1971 Totals
oW
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health department allocated funds was indeed very in-
formal.28  For the most part, "d" grants were made in
response to open-ended inquiries from community agencies
and private or non-profit provider groups. In 1971, for
example, twenty-seven inquiries were received regarding
potential projects, although in many cases formal grant
applications were never actually submitted. Most project
applications involved nothing more than a few telephone
calls and an outline of a contract for services. 29
Members of the Board of Health in Somerville indicated an
interest in broadening the scope of nursing services
provided by that city. An informal request was made for
a grant of $800 to cover tuition associated with a "nurse
practitioner training program" for a public health staff
nurse. (The city of Somerville ultimately received $1,000
for this purpose.) Another request was made for a small
grant to cover the salary of a part-time planner involved
in evaluating the need for a health center in East Somer-
ville. The request was later withdrawn at the request of
neighborhood residents.
2 8Cf . footnote 25.
2 9Memorandum to Richard Seder from Betty Caso, Michael Price, and
Barbara Seigal, April 7, 1971, summarizing current status of project
grant applications. 7 pp.
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The program director at Grafton State Hospital identified
one hundred patients who needed neither the intensive care
provided at the hospital nor nursing home services. A
residential setting, it seemed, would be more suitable
and less costly than hospital care. When a private resi-
dence (capable of accommodating twenty-five people) was
made available to Grafton Hospital by the city of Worcester,
the hospital requested a grant of $9,000 to cover operating
costs. A request from the Worcester Rehabilitation Center
for a grant to provide rehabilitation services to ex-drug
addicts was referred to the Worcester Model Cities program
and to Worcester State Hospital which were already involved
in drug programs. A third request from Worcester, seeking
support for a short-term training institute on addiction
was subsequently withdrawn. After discussions with the
Central Regional Health Office (one of the state health
department's sub-state regional field offices) the
Worcester Community Service Agency was able to identify
more promising sources of funds.
The Boston Headstart Program indicated informally that it
was interested in hiring health aids. They failed to follow
up on their initial inquiry. The Franklin County Public
Hospital in Greenfield requested a grant of $8,000 to
cover "consulting, staff assistance, and data processing"
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costs associated with a projected survey of community health
needs. Ultimately, the hospital, in conjunction with the
"b" agency in the area, received a combined two-year grant
of $24,000 to survey health needs and resources in Franklin
County.
The Family Planning Center in Lowell first proposed and
then withdrew a request for general support. As it
turned out, the state health department's Division of
Family Services was already providing funds for the center
and, in addition, a separate federal grant application for
family planning funds had already been filed. The Cape
Cod Hospital asked for help in developing its computer
facilities; that request was referred to the HEW Regional
Office.
The Crescent Court Health Center in Brockton sought funds
to support "a well baby pediatric family-oriented service
for low income families" in the Brockton City Hospital
health service area. The Division of Family Health Services
was already involved in the effort and the local CAP
agency had submitted a federal grant application for
family planning money for the same area. Nevertheless,
funds were ultimately provided to the "b" agency in the
Brockton area for a vastly modified version of the project.
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Children's Hospital in Boston submitted a request for a
small grant. They were seeking funds to pay the salary of
a nurse specializing in out-patient care of children
suffering from endocrine disorders. The public health
department informed them that their request would be
trecorded," but that money would "probably not be avail-
able for such a project." The Visiting Nurse Association
submitted a request for funds to support pre-school child
health services for the town of Danvers. This application
was channeled through the Northeast Regional Office
(another of the state health departmentt s regional field
offices).
Boston City Hospital requested funds for a "travelling
telecommunications system" that would link up Boston City
Hospital with various nursing homes in the area. The
Fall River Model Cities program sought a grant to supple-
ment a proposed neighborhood health project. Morgan
Memorial, Inc. wanted money to cover the training of
rehabilitation aides. (They were told that the Massachu-
setts Rehabilitation Commission should support such
projects.) The Model Cities agencies in New Bedford and
Springfield requested funds for dental care and home-
making services. Inquiries were also received regarding
a half-way house for the Athol-Gardner-Greenfield area and
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a home care program at Athol Hospital. The Boston Model
Cities agency requested a grant for a "lead poisoning
prevention survey" and North Shore Children's Hospital
wanted money to set up a young adult health service.
Almost half the inquiries were shunted off to other
agencies or bureaus in the Public Health Department. In
the end, only three of the twenty-seven projects were
funded directly (Somerville: Nurse practitioner, $1,000;
Boston City Hospital: Telecommunications, $7,000; Athol
Community Health Service Agency: a combined two-year
grant of $14,000).
The Commissioner's Office acting independently of the
Community Service Division and the Planning Office awarded
$24,000 (a combined two-year award) to Franklin County
Public Hospital in Greenfield for their proposed community
health survey. It was decided, however, that this project
would be administered by the Western Massachusetts Health
Planning Council in an effort to foster better relations
with the "b" agencies. Along the same lines, the
Region VII Comprehensive Health Council was awarded
$7,700 to develop an area-wide health information system
(this project was originally submitted by Greater Brockton
Health Centers, Inc. under the title "Essential Core Staff
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for the Crescent Court Clinic"). It was felt that the
"b" agency needed to collect more data before a community
health center could be considered. The Commissioner's
Office allocated $3,000 to the Merrimack Valley Health
Planning Council. They did not ask for any money nor had
they submitted an application, but the Commissioner felt
they were the weakest "b" agency in the Commonwealth and
could use the help. Finally, in 1971, the Commissioner's
Office dipped into the 314(d) account to support the
Boston-Brookline Health Resources Organization (this
project is discussed below). This decision was not made
in consultation with the planning office or the community
health service section of the department. In fact, only
the Commissioner's office was involved in the negotiations.
Several things ought to be pointed out about the application
and review process. Groups receiving 314(d) funds did not
specifically apply for them. In most cases, they were not
even aware that federal funds targeted especially for the
improvement of community health services were available
through the public health department. Of the twenty-
seven potential applicants who inquired about funding in
1971, more than a third were discouraged from submitting
formal applications. Staff members in the community
service division decided that their projects were "probably
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not appropriate." Since the Commissioner had made it clear
to the staff that only $50,000 would be available for
such projects [even though over $1,700,000 in 314(d) money
was coming into the department], every effort was made
to keep the number of requests to a minimum. This way,
staff time involved in making decisions could be reduced
and the problem of making choices minimized.
No overall priorities of any kind were set. The only
criterion of "fundability" seemed to be whether or not
other money (federal or state) was available for the same
purpose. Most proposals came from hospitals seeking
supplementary funds. Almost every applicant required
extensive consultation with the state agency since very
few were qualified or able to formulate specific project
proposals or the necessary back-up documentation. Perhaps
this accounts for the Health Department's preference for
contracts (which they could draw up themselves), rather than
for grants based on project proposals. In some cases,
personnel hired with federal funds were scheduled to
receive higher salaries than people with equivalent re-
sponsibilities in state and local civil service positions.
This upset state agency officials. Neither state nor
local political figures intervened in the grant review
process. This is largely because most state legislators
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and local officials have been unaware of the 314(d) program.
Some effort was made (at least in 1971) to involve various
public health department bureau chiefs in reviewing the
technical aspects of grant requests, but in the end most
of the money allocated went directly through the Commis-
sioner's Office, by-passing even the minimal review proce-
dures that had been set up. The key point is that the
availability and utilization of 314(d) money was masked
from public view. Recipients were told that they were
receiving "community service money", not 314(d) funds.
The involvement of "b" agencies was incidental to the
grant review process, and no effort was made to use 314(d)
money to strengthen health planning or service delivery
capabilities in local public health departments. Overall
priorities were not set, even for the use of the small
fraction of the 314(d) funds set aside for community
projects.
The Boston-Brookline Health Resources Organization: BBHRO
was established in 1971 in an effort to provide an integra-
tive mechanism capable of pulling together various pieces
of the health care delivery system in the town of Brookline
and in the Boston neighborhoods of Brighton-Allston, Fenway-
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Mission Hill, and Jamaica Plain.so Its purposes are not
unlike those of a "b" agency, the only difference is that
BBHRO has been unusually successful while the performance
of its counterpart in Boston, The Health Planning Council
for Greater Boston, has been relatively undistinguished.
In 1971 BBHRO received $25,000 in "d" money from the
department of public health and $3,200 in "d" money from
the department of mental health. This was the first and
only time that the two departments collaborated on a "d"
grant. In 1972, Public Health maintained its $25,000
commitments (in spite of a change in departmental leader-
ship) and Mental Health increased its contribution to
$15,000. An additional $60,000 a year was contributed by
the city of Boston and the town of Brookline. There are
several issues raised by BBHRO's success in obtaining
314(d) funds. First, how was BBHRO able to secure 314(d)
funding even though they were in direct competition with
the "b" agency in the Boston area? Second, why was BBHRO
able to mobilize area-wide health planning and service
delivery activities, while the "b" agencies had so much
difficulty? Finally, does the case of BBHRO suggest a
3 ODescriptive data on the Boston-Brookline Health Resources Organization
was taken from BBHRO's Final Report to the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health, May 10, 1972.
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strategy for the use of 314(d) money more likely to bring
about significant and lasting reforms in the health care
system than the current approach to 314(d) allocations?31
BBHRO has a number of distinguishing characteristics:
(1) The area it serves (a "minimized boundary" with
a population of 207,000) is neither as small as
an individual neighborhood nor as large as a
whole metropolitan area. It presents an oppor-
tunity to take collective action which no one
neighborhood could take, while allowing the
possibility of dealing more intensively with
the details of a local problem than is possible
for an agency operating on a metropolitan or
state-wide basis.
(2) Its boundaries are convergent with an existing
service area (the Massachusetts Mental Health
Center).
(3) BBHRO is dominated by consumers with two-thirds
of its directors elected by the membership of
neighborhood health committees. It has provided
for strong and meaningful representation of
principle public agencies and provider-organiza-
tions as well.
(4) BBHRO has an activist orientation. This puts it
in a different category from the agencies
fostered under Sections 314(a) and (b), which
are devoted solely to planning.
"These questions were explored with Mr. R. Hopkins Holnberg, Executive
Director of BBERO, in interviews on May 25, 1972 and January 3, 1973.
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BBHRO has adopted a variety of tentative statements of
purpose over the past few years. Most of the statements
resemble those promulgated by 314 (a) and (b) agencies. The
difference, though, is the stress on implementation and
BBHRO's view of itself as a "provider of last resort."
During the summer of 1971, the national government announced
its intention to convert the Public Health Service Marine
Hospital, located in Brighton, to "community management
and use." This was a major concern to the neighborhood
health committee in Brighton-Allston which sought BBHRO's
assistance in analyzing proposals from various institutions
anxious to be selected as the agent for "community manage-
ment and use." In response to many deficiencies in the
applications that were submitted, BBHRO formulated an
"application" of its own. Since BBHRO was not a provider
institution, it application was obviously ineligible, but
they did succeed in outlining certain key principles aimed
at protecting the neighborhood's interests. BBHRO stressed
community participation in the continuing governance of
the public health service hospital; and expansion rather
than contraction of the ambulatory services and establishment
of a community service pre-paid group practice. The Health
Planning Council of Greater Boston, the "b" agency which
officially reviewed all the "community management and use"
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proposals, expressed strong support for the ideas contained
in the BBHRO application. Since that time BBHRO has been
actively engaged in pursuing these objectives. The experi-
ence helped to mold BBHRO's aggressive style of operations.
In 1971, the city of Boston was preparing a proposal to
the national government for the establishment of a compre-
hensive program to deal with the difficult problem of lead
paint poisoning in the city. Without waiting to be invited,
BBHRO jumped in--not only to provide technical assistance
when they thought they could be helpful, but also to extend
the proposed lead paint poisoning program into the rela-
tively small high-risk area of Brookline. BBHRO ultimately
helped to reshape the proposal.
A third major event in the evolution of BBHRO was the
selection of its staff. The director, "Hop Holmberg, is
experienced and aggressive. His staff has grown to five
and a "Boston-Brookline Collaborative Center" has begun
in response to the difficulties involved in finding appro-
priate treatment and care for emotionally disturbed
children. BBHRO served as a conduit for $30,000 in founda-
tion money to support the continued development of a center
for the emotionally disturbed. The pattern of fostering
such developments under the BBHRO umbrella with the intention
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of eventually setting up separate corporate entities is
the model for BBHRO's future activities. In each of the
four principle BBHRO neighborhoods, a Task Force promotes
home services for the elderly and the handicapped (with a
particular stress on nutritional needs). This effort
has been noted as one of the best in the Commonwealth by
the Commissioner of Elderly Affairs.
In the eyes of the public, the activities of BBHRO and the
regional "b" agency are synonymous, although the strains
between the two organizations continue to grow. BBHRO has
invested considerable effort in "reviewing and commenting"
on over $100,000 of proposed health facility construction
projects in the area. This is an official "b" agency
function.
Boston has always had a group of remarkably enlightened
health officers. Many of these individuals promoted the
BBHRO concept. More than anything else, their support
helps to explain why and how joint public health-mental
health backing was generated for BBHRO. The most important
person, it seems, was Don Scherl, former director of
community services at the Massachusetts Mental Health
Center, a resident of the Mission Hill area, and as of
1971, deputy to the Secretary of Human Services for Massa-
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chusetts. Under the state's reorganization plan, both the
Mental Health and Public Health departments were subsumed
under the Secretary of Human Services. Without some sort
of pressure from the top it is hard to believe that the
two departments would have collaborated unless they each
knew nothing of the other's support; or the project
involved was presented in two entirely different ways.
Neither was true in this instance. Other actors in the
funding process were Jack Ewalt (Professor of Psychiatry
at Harvard, a director of the Massachusetts Mental Helath
Center, a close associate of the Commissioner of Mental
Health, and an associate of Don Scherl) and Alfred
Frechette (Commissioner of Public Health and a long-time
resident of the Boston-Brookline area). In both the
public health and mental health departments, BBHRO funding
was handled directly through the Commissioners' offices.
The BBHRO staff helped members of the state legislature
formulate proposals regarding state funding of area-wide
health planning bodies and assisted the Governor's Office
on the issue of "certification of need" relative to
capital construction of health facilities.
Three factors seem to account for BBHRO's success. First,
its executive director did not wait to be invited in when
important issues arose. Second, BBHRO began not only with
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strong support from a number of the most important figures
in Boston's "health world," but also with strong grass
roots endorsement. Third, the staff was able to use a
few key issues (public health hospital conversion, lead
paint poisoning) to establish itself as an activist organi-
zation that could get things done.
In the Boston-Brookline area there is a great deal of
organized activity in the health field and it is not diffi-
cult to find an issue around which to rally community
support. In addition, BBHRO (unlike the "b" agencies) is
made up of identifiable neighborhoods, each with its own
history of active interest in health. The Boston "b"
agency has to grapple not only with an enormous range of
different communities and interest groups sprawled through-
out the metropolitan area, but also with an illustrious
board of directors that has been somewhat insensitive to
neighborhood needs and consumer involvement. The "b"
agency has had a hard time finding narrow enough topics
on which to focus its energies but which still are of
sufficient interest to a majority of the group's member
communities.
To a great extent BBHRO's success may be related mostly to
its location and its friends. Even if that is true,
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though, it still represents one of the few encouraging
examples of how 314(d) funds have been used effectively.
For one thing, the success of BBHRO suggests that 'd"
funds can be used collaboratively at the local and regional
level. Perhaps if the two state health departments took
a real interest in the "b" agencies they might give them
the additional clout they need to be successful. Secondly,
if BBHRO's success can be attributed to its somewhat
limited boundaries, perhaps this suggests that "b" agen-
cies ought to be building alliances among well organized
and identifiable neighborhoods. At present, the "b"
agencies are operating within totally artificial bounda-
ries. It may also be that the only way to mobilize
fragmented components of the health care system is to
work through new institutional mechanisms. Long-standing
hostilities between different provider groups are hard
to overcome. Moreover, existing agencies and organizations
(many of which are left over from an earlier time) are
unfamiliar with the techniques that must be used to
promote and sustain consumer participation. 314(d) money
was used, in the case of BBHRO, as seed money. In the
long run, it is quite clear that BBHRP will have to iden-
tify its own sources of support. Nevertheless, with a
budget of only $100,000 a year, BBHRO has been able to
build a constituency and to promote important projects in
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an area overpopulated with ineffective health care delivery
agencies and organizations. This suggests that $1,600,000
a year in "d" money might well have been used to promote
reforms in the health care system and to improve local
health services. Finally, insofar as strategy is concerned,
perhaps "d" money ought to be channeled through "catalytic"
groups and not hospitals seeking only to expand their
services. If "b" agencies can not show success in mobiliz-
ing local resources, then perhaps "d" money ought to be
given to new organizations to use as leverage.
Project Monitoring and Evaluation: The public health
department has not attempted to evaluate or monitor any of
the projects it has funded with 314(d) money. Since per-
formance has never been taken into account in figuring
annual appropriations, there has been little cause for state
agency follow up. Since progress reports have not been
required of the local grantees and contracts (which public
health prefers to more elaborate proposals and application
forms) have rarely specified measurable programmatic
objectives, it is impossible to know whether 314(d) funds
have had any impact on the overall quality of health care
or the level of community health services in the Common-
wealth.
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In July 1972, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare stripped Massachusetts of its role in administering
a multi-million dollar grant-in-aid program designed to
provide health services for children and pregnant women.
The regional office accused the Public Health Department
of fiscal mismanagement after discovering that (1) it
was unclear how more than $20 million had been spent over
six years; (2) there were extended delays (over a year in
some cases) in making payments to hospitals which were
providing care for the beneficiaries of the program;
(3) expenditure reports were filed with gross inaccuracies
(and deviations from budget items had been made without
required revision and permission); and (4) different types
of grants to the states were intermingled without adequate
controls. No one in the public health department denied
any of the charges. 3 2
The point of this somewhat disheartening account is that
the amount of money involved has very little to do with
the state's willingness or ability to handle its grant
management responsibilities. In the case of the 314(d)
program, it was not just the relatively small size of the
3 2 Carl Cobb, "U.S. Ehds Mass. Control of $3.5M Health Program," Boston
Globe, July 1, 1972.
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annual grant that accounted for the department's inability
and unwillingness to evaluate, follow-up, or monitor its
operations. Perhaps one explanation is that both the
original legislation and the administrative regulations
established by the Public Health Service were terribly
vague as far as the objectives of the 314(d) program were
concerned. Since it was never clear what purpose 314(d)
grants were supposed to serve (should they be used to seed
innovative projects; to cover administrative costs in the
face of inadequate state appropriations; to strengthen
local health department, or rather, to bolster community
health programs operating solely out of the state agency),
evaluation was somewhat irrelevant. Since the state legis-
lature has been unconcerned about how state matching
funds for 314(d) are used (which is not surprising given
that state legislatures only take an interest when asked
to appropriate money for specific purposes), and since
HEW has not required the state to submit project evalua-
tions, there has been absolutely no pressure to take
monitoring responsibilities seriously. Thus, there is no
way to know which projects have been successful or to suggest
which should be adopted or duplicated by other communities.
If program evaluation and monitoring were required, a dis-
proportionate share of each year's grant would undoubtedly
be used to build up and sustain an expanded administrative
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staff in the state agency.3 3  The trade-off is inevitable.
In any case, the issue has not come up, since the prevail-
ing image of 314(d) has been that of an entitlement rather
than a consolidated set of categorical grants for which
the states have to demonstrate a minimum level of perform-
ance to be eligible.
314(d) Allocations in the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health
The total budget of the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health is approximately $150 million a year. In recent
years, the Department has emphasized the development of
community-based mental health facilities; efforts to lower
the census of state mental hospitals; and the recruitment
and training of community mental health workers. Special
efforts have been made to expand rehabilitation programs
for drug-dependent persons and narcotics addicts, and
to enhance mental health services for children, especially
the mentally retarded. All of these programs have been
33There would undoubtedly be a battle between the line agencies and the
Executive Office of Administration and Finance over who would have
responsibility for project evaluation. On the one hand, the "a"
agency would be in the best position to judge whether or not "d" grants
were helping to meet the objectives laid out in the state comprehensive
health plan; on the other, the conflicts that such an arrangement would
generate clearly would further undermine an already tenuous relation-
ship.
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handled through the department's own facilities (admini-
stered on a regional basis) as well as through community
self-help treatment groups (which operate under contract
to the state). With the support of legislative appropria-
tions aimed at providing professional staff for forty
catchment areas in the seven mental health regions of the
state, mental health services in the Commonwealth have
been decentralized to a sub-regional or "catchment area
level." 3 4 (See Figure VI.)
While the 314(d) account has been the largest single dis-
cretionary fund administered by the department (other
federal funds have traditionally been earmarked for parti-
cular institutions), annual 314(d) appropriations for
mental health have not exceeded $321,000 since the program
began. It is not surprising, therefore, that up until very
recently 341(d) funds were controlled almost exclusively by
34Each of the catchment areas has a population of 75,000 to 200,000.
There are seven regional offices with budgeting, planning, and service
functions. Each has a 21-member board selected by the Commissioner
from a list of fifty nominees prepared by a local nominating committee.
Each region has an advisory council but these vary in strength. Some
are mandated by law and others are not. Several regions have not been
able to organize advisory councils at all. The Governor's Office has
introduced legislation which would leave area boards alone, but would
require that regional councils be formed consisting of 3 members fron
each area board and 10 gubernatorial appointees. Each region would
then select two members to serve on the statewide Advisory Board toget-
her with the Governor's sixteen appointees.
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a single person in the mental health department--Dr. B. H.
Hutcheson, Assistant Commissioner for Children's Ser-
vices.35 Contrary to the situation in public health where
314(d) funds were locked into salaries protected by civil
service, mental health has used its 314(d) funds almost
exclusively for discretionary projects, many of which have
demonstrated some of the advantages of flexibility that
grant consolidation was supposed to provide. From 1968-
1972, cities and towns (which were supposed to reap dis-
proportionate benefits under the decateogrization program)
received little if any direct aid. In some instances,
314(d) funds were used to cover salary increases for state
personnel while state funds slowly worked their way through
the accounting system.s6 In other cases, 314(d) funds were
3 5Comments on the scope and operation of the 314(d) program in the
Mental Health Department are based on interviews with Joseph Finnigan,
Director of Budget and Cost Control for the Department of Mental Health
Health, May 8 and May 30, 1972; George Grosser, Assistant Commissioner
for Training, Planning, and Research, May 5, 1972; Dr. B. H. itcheson,
Assistant Commissioner for Children's Services, May 26, 1972; Julia
Saab, Administrative Assistant to Dr. Hutcheson, May 5, 1972; Dr. Wil-
fred Bloomberg, Deputy Commissioner for Mental Health, May 1, 1972;
Alan Becker, Assistant to the Comnissioner of Mental Health, May 10,
1972; Carol Brill, head psychiatric social worker for the Boston Uni-
versity/Boston City Hospital Child Guidance Center, May 23, 1972;
Dr. Anderson, Assistant Commissioner for Cammunity Services, May 23,
1972; Jill Kushner, Administrative Assistant to Dr. Grosser, May 10,
1972; Edward Goodwin, Accountant for the Department of Mental Health,
May 5, 1972; Mrs. Joyce Brinton, Assistant Director of the Harvard
Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, May 30, 1972.
3 6Interview with Joseph Finnigan, op. cit. Federal funds were used
more often than not to put people on the department payroll and then
to locate them in department facilities, agencies, or organizations
collaborating with the department.
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used to cover basic administrative costs that should have
been handled through regular state appropriations. In
most cases, community-oriented projects initiated by the
mental health department involved little or no input from
citizens or the municipal officials. As in the case of
the public health department, the availability of 314(d)
funds was a well-guarded secret known only to a small
number of health professionals with direct personal
contacts in the mental health department.
Although the mental health department decentralized its
operations, sub-state mental health regions were not coin-
cidental with "b" agency boundaries, and "b" agencies
were not involved at all in approving or commenting on
314(d) grants. Recently, the department made a special
effort to "rationalize" its grant management procedures:
application forms were created, progress reports required,
and efforts were made to tighten up the accounting system.
Allocations were still not made with reference to the state
comprehensive health plan or to any other set of priorities
specified by the department. 37 In large measure, this can
3 7The mental health department submitted annual progress reports to the
regional office of Health, Education, and Welfare in which they attempt-
ed to lay out department funding priorities and to relate mental health
appropriations to the broad goals outlined in the state ccmprehensive
health plan. Discussion with members of the mental health staff, how-
ever, indicate that these attempts were little more than window dressing
and that the institutional planning capability in the mental health de-
partment has been very weak.
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be attributed to the relatively small amount of money
involved. A number of mental health officials have sug-
gested that the level of funding did not justify the
creation of elaborative administrative machinery. In addi-
tion, the amount of money sharply limited the extent to
which the department was willing to encourage cities and
towns to submit proposals (since most of them would stand
very little chance of being funded). Although the mental
health department has used its 314(d) funds to support a
number of sophisticated and highly appropriate projects, the
same problems that diminished the effectiveness of the
block grant program in the public health department took
their toll here as well.
The Allocation Process: Up until 1972, the only person in
the mental health department knowledgeable about the opera-
tion of the 314(d) program was Assistant Commissioner for
Children's Services, Dr. Bellenden Hutcheson. He had
almost complete control of the funds, although the Deputy
Commissioner could certainly have overruled him if he
wanted to. The relatively small sum of money involved
protected Dr. Hutcheson from higher-level interference.
When a new Deputy Commissioner took office in 1971, he
appointed a federal funds committee (Dr. Hutcheson was made
executive officer) and brought in the accounting department
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in an effort to monitor the expenditure of 314(d) money.
Annual appropriations to the mental health departments
were generally divided up as follows: $12,000 to each
of five or six assistant commissioners; $85,000 for a
"grab-bag" of community-oriented projects selected on a
competitive basis; $60,000 for staff development (training
and internships); and $100,000 for departmental administra-
tive expenses including travel, conferences, equipment and
publications . 38
The 314(d) Committee met regularly to evaluate applications
and to determine how much money would be spent for commun-
ity projects. Applications were accepted from all public
and private agencies, but very few people had access to
any information about the availability of the funds. No
special effort was made to publicize the 314(d) program.
Thus, most applicants were professionals who heard about
the program through the grapevine. The $85,000 set aside
for community-oriented projects was considered seed money,
supposedly only available for a year or two. However,
since the 314(d) guidelines prepared by the mental health
department provided little if any guidance in project
381nterview with Dr. Wilfred Bloomberg, op. cit. A review of the budgets
contained in the 1969 and 1971 progress reports to HEW confirmed these
figures.
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selection, and since each assistant commissioner had
complete control over his individual sub-accounts, it was
possible in several cases for projects to receive contin-
uous funding.
The Assistant Commissioner for Community Services (who
also received an allocation of $12,000 to use as he liked)
was not invited to sit on the federal funds committee. He
had no say in the evaluation of project proposals." In
some cases, 314(d) funds were used to ease the cash flow
problem in the department. In July of every year, a number
of employees (for whom only limited funds were available)
were switched to consultant status (fee for service
contracts) and paid out of state funds; in November when
the federal check arrived, these employees were transferred
to the 314(d) account. When federal funds ran out (and
every effort was made to ensure that annual appropriations
were depleted) these employees switched back to state funds.
This process became a little more complicated in 1972 when
the Executive Office of Administration and Finance decided
that the rather skimpy forms completed by state agencies
3 9Interview with Dr. Anderson, op. cit. Dr. Anderson suggested that
he was given $12,000 a year and his job was to spend it. If he asked
any questions, he felt he might lose the $12,000 allocated to him and
kick off a battle with the other Commissioners.
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hiring consultants would no longer be acceptable. Since
then, formal contracts have been required, and it has
become easier to find out what 314(d) funds have been used
for (although in many cases project descriptions have
been terribly exaggerated). Such exaggerations are most
obvious when informal budget documentation (prepared only
for departmental purposes) is compared with annual progress
reports submitted to the regional office of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. Sub-accounts represent-
ing nothing more than open-ended awards to assistant
Commissioners, have been described as "projects." For
example, Dr. Hutcheson's administrative secretary, whose
salary was paid out of 314(d) funds, was listed as an
expenditure under "program development in the office of
Children's Services" and as part of a project "to handle
inquiries from the field relative to the delivery of
children's services" and " to influence budget content in
conformity with federal-state plans."'0 Another Assistant
Secretary used 314(d) funds to cover his secretary's
salary under a project titled "Community Services" alluding
to "the preparation of a monthly newsletter." '4 In addi-
40Department of Mental Health, Progress Report (July 1, 1971-March 30,
1972), Section 314(d) of the Public Health Service Act, May 15, 1972,
p. 12.
41Ibid., p. 9.
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tion, 314(d) funds were used as "bail-out" money to cover
unanticipated costs or project overruns.42
Although 314(d) funds were used as pin money by the assist-
ant commissioners, it would be unfair to suggest that the
mental health department frittered away its entire 314(d)
allocation. Numerous administrative and supportive expendi-
tures (including payments for data processing and research
activities) were extremely valuable. These expenditures
are always difficult to bury in the line-item budget sub-
mitted annually to the state legislature. Since the
legislature is notorious for its unwillingness to support
research or planning, 314(d) funds and other similar funds
play an important supplemental role. This suggests, though,
that the legislature needs to be turned around and not that
the 314(d) program is necessary for an effective inter-
governmental partnership.
Fellowships for departmental trainees and interns were
funded annually with 314(d) money. Departmental spokesmen
admit that the $60,000 used annually for staff development
might be an inappropriate use of 314(d) money; however,
since the state legislature is willing to finance only
psychiatric residents and not training programs for other
42 Interview with Joseph Finnegan, op. cit.
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mental health professionals (such as psychologists or
social workers), the practice persists. Almost $8,000 was
set aside each year to cover travel costs incurred by
staff members attending conferences. Traditionally,
$12,000 was spent for the publication of the Massachusetts
Journal of Mental Health (which after three years could
hardly be called an innovative project). These 314(d)
expenditures were not unreasonable, but it would be diffi-
cult to argue that they contributed in any direct way to
the improvement of community health services in Massachu-
setts. Moreover, it is certainly not clear why national
funds (as opposed to state or private money) should have
been used to cover costs such as these, or why these funds
could not have been administered just as effectively (or
ineffectively) by the regional HEW office.
Mental health 314(d) allocations for certain years are
extremely difficult to track down. The attached budgets
(Tables XIV and XV ) for 1969 and 1971 help to give a
general idea how 314(d) money has been used. Since annual
expenditures have remained relatively constant, these two
tables provide a fairly accurate picture of the essential
characteristics of 314(d) allocations in the mental health
department.
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Table XIV
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH 314(d) ALLOCATIONS
1969
s-1 State Clinic Services:
Boston University Child Guidance Center $ 9,000
Cambridge Mental Health Center 13,600
Springfield Guidance Center 12,300
Newton Mental Health Center 5,000
Mystic Valley Clinic 11,500
Central Office, DMH 10,000
Equipment 8,000
s-2 Travel 8,000
s-3 Community Mental Health Monographs 11,000
s-4 Clinic Data Processing System 7,500
s-5 Key Punch Machine 480
s-6 Professional Program Development--Office of
Deputy Commissioner 12,000
s-7 Laboratory of Community Psychiatry 13,000
s-8 Electronic Data Processing and Retrieval
Systems 30,620
s-9 Research Planning, Training and Program
Development 12,000
s-10 Mental Retardation--Program Development 12,000
s-11 Inservice Training 3,400
s-12 Community Mental Health Service Program
Development 12,000
s-13 Area Board Inservice Education, Information 6,000
s-14 Children's Services 12,000
s-15 Administrative 3,500
s-16 Research Report Journal 1,200
s-17 Remedial Program for Perceptually Disturbed
Children 5,000
s-18 Half-way House Effectiveness Study 500
s-19 Study of School Failure Remediation 4,200
s-20 Public Attitudes Toward Mental Health
Care 3,000
s-21 Ecological and Demographic Studies of the
Commonwealth 3,000
s-22 Selection of Children in Roxbury for
Chapter 750 Program 1,200
s-23 The Promotion of Citizen Participation 1
$247,000
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Table XV (Page one of two)
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH 314(d) ALLOCATIONS
1971
s-1 Boston University Child Guidance Center $ 14,000
s-2 Travel 8,000
s-3 Senior Supervisor in Education for
Planning, Research and Training 11,000
s-4 Inservice Training 4,000
s-5 Professional Program Development--Office of
the Deputy Commissioner 12,000
s-6 Mental Retardation Program Development 12,000
s-7 Community Services (Assistant Commissioner) 12,000
s-8 Research Planning and Training
(Assistant Commissioner) 12,000
s-9 Program Development--Office of Children's
Services (Assistant Commissioner) 12,000
s-10 Massachusetts Public Health Association 750
s-11 Massachusetts Association for Mental Health 1,500
s-12 Management Training Program 4,000
s-13 Monographs and Related Printing Activities 14,000
s-14 Massachusetts Journal of Mental Health 2,500
s-15 Equipment, Supplies including Video Equipment 8,000
s-16 Community Development of Programs for Children
(computer programming for regional data
analysis) 19,000
s-17 Development of Community Programs (grab-bag) 72,350*
*Approximate breakdown of s-17 account:
Laboratory of Comunity Psychiatry (Harvard) $18,000
Boston-Brookline Health Resources Organization 15,000
Attleboro-Wheaton Children's Project 1,500
Fidelity House--Lawrence, Massachusetts 3,500
Boston State Hospital Adolescent Services 3,000
Grace Church Nursery School 2,500
Greenfield Health C np Association 6,260
Worcester State Hospital Program for the Elderly 5,2
Model Cities Coordinator 2,000
Training Program for Foreign Physicians 4,000
University of Mass. Joint Training Program 10,900
Association for Mentally Ill Children 4,500
$75,480
(Page two of two)
s-18 Springfield Guidance Center
(State Clinic Services)
s-19 Department of Education Joint Program
(Chapter 750 certification)
s-20 Community Mental Health Think Tank
s-21 Management and Related Information System
(Assistant Commissioner)
s-22 Area Board Workshop/Conference
s-23 Psychological Training (Internship)
s-24 Psychological Training (Internship)
s-25 Psychological Training (Internship)
s-26 Psychological Training (Internship)
s-27 Social Work Training
s-28 Psychiatry Training (Internships)
$ 2,1400
5,000
4,000
40,000
1,500
3,800
3,800
4,700
4,700
15,000
16,000
$320,000
400
Table XV
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The monies assigned to each assistant commissioner as well
as the funds used for general-purpose administration
within the state agency (i.e., travel, information systems
development, printing, and staff salaries) have consistently
eaten up 70-80% of the total 314(d) allocation to the
department. Although these funds have provided administra-
tive flexibility, they have not served any national purpose.
From the inception of the program, the 70% pass-through
requirement was not met. The intention of the original
legislation was clearly that 70% of all 314(d) funds be
spent within (but not necessarily by) local units of
government. This would exclude general state administra-
tive expenses even if they were aimed at upgrading community-
related services provided by state offices. At best, the
mental health department has spent 20-30% of its annual
appropriations for community-based projects. Several of
the community development projects selected on a competi-
tive basis clearly have served the intentions of the
Partnership for Health program. (It is interesting to
note that the mental health department spent more money
on competitive community-oriented projects than the public
health department even though mental health has received
no more than 15% of the total allocation of 314(d) money
in any given year.) Perhaps if the 70% pass-through
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requirement had been enforced and the mental health depart-
ment had been given greater control over a larger share
of 314(d) money, many more interesting and useful projects
designed to enhance community health services might have
resulted.
Illustrative Projects: Projects that seem to have won
general approval include:
--a training program for community "caretakers"--a
demonstration effort funded in the Taunton area (for
about $6,000) to teach clergy, family doctors, and
others likely to come into contact with those who
need help, how to handle referrals and how to take
case histories. In a single year more than eighty
individuals were served by the training program.
--a model cities coordinator--a staff member was hired
to coordinate the work of the mental health department
and the state model cities office. She was able to
identify professional resources and to tie together
project proposals for model city groups around the
state.
--foreign physician training program--a special curri-
culum was developed to assist the 77 foreign medical
school graduates who needed special tutoring in order
to pass new state certification exams by January 1,
1975. They were tutored in the use of colloquial
English and medical English. Funds would not have
been available soon enough from the state legislature
to ensure that many of these physicians who played key
roles in various state hospitals would have been able
to pass the necessary exams.
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Another project points out some of the defects in the
314(d) allocation system. A grant was awarded to the Cam-
bridge-Somerville Mental Health Area to develop a unified
data collection system. A multi-year contract with RCA
led to the development of an experimental data system for
maintaining accessible patient and cost information to
be used in evaluating and controlling community-based
services.43 The Cambridge-Somerville area was selected by
the mental health department as an appropriate area to
test the applicability and the efficiency of the model data
system. The Mental Health Department agreed to furnish
the technical assistance and the software for the data
system while the local mental health association promised
to make personnel, space, and office equipment available
for the collection and processing of information. The
state department of mental health contracted with RCA
(for $80,000 over a nine-month period) to determine who
was getting what care, what the cost per unit of service
was, and to develop a measure of program effectiveness.4 4
4 3 R.C.A. Systems Development, "Development of a Mental Health Area
Management Information System," Contract Progress Report No. 1, Septem-
ber, 1971.
4 4Interview with Laurie Luft, Assistant for Program Evaluation to the
Area Director (Cambridge/Somerville) and Dr. Reed, Director of the
Cambridge Mental Health Association, May 15, 1972; interview with
Dave Winter, RCA representative at the Department of Mental Health,
May 23, 1972.
4o4
The decision to use Somerville as a case-study area (al-
though not inappropriate) was an afterthought.4 s Negotia-
tions between the Assistant Commissioner for Planning (in
the State Department of Mental Health) who had pushed for
the development of the data system in the first place and
the head of the Cambridge-Somerville Center led to the
signing of a contract. Although a review committee which
included key figures in Cambridge-Somerville was established,
the clinicians who were to provide the day-to-day service
were never consulted or involved, nor were consumer repre-
sentatives. Both groups reacted negatively to the pro-
posed project. The clinicians refused to take the time
to fill out the required forms while many patients raised
questions about the confidentiality of the information
being sought. Additional funds had to be appropriated to
hire research assistants to fill out the forms and to
conduct the required interviews when the clinicians refused
to participate. After more than a year, no decisions were
made about how to use the information that was finally
collected. Efforts to raise additional funds needed to
4 5Interview with Laurie Luft, op. cit. The first choice for a pilot
area was the Erich Lindemann Center in Boston, but construction on the
building fell way behind and it appeared that the patient load at the
Lindemann center would be unusually small. Cambridge-Somerville
served a large, diversified population and had its own centralized
information system.
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institutionalize the data collection system were fruitless
since the legislature refused to put any money toward the
project.
The experiment was less than successful because it was
imposed by the mental health department on an unsuspecting
community agency (whose director was not smart enough to
turn down the funds). Area board members were not involved
at all in the design or implementation of the project.
Moreover, no attempt was made to justify the investment
of 314(d) money in data systems as opposed to other compet-
ing community needs. Since each assistant commissioner
had the option of setting his own priorities there were no
countervailing voices to question this 314(d) allocation
decision.
The $85,000 in 314(d) money set aside annually for
community-oriented projects went to provider rather than
consumer groups. In large part, this was the result of
the relatively informal and closed information loop
through which word of the 314(d) program travelled. In
the final analysis, few if any 314(d) projects were
actually community-initiated; most were developed by
universities or hospital-affiliated groups of professionals.
Absolutely no attempt was made to tie 314(d) allocations
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to "b" agency needs and priorities. In fact, in at least
one regional office, there was real conflict between the
"b" agency director and the mental health regional coor-
dinator who allegedly refused to share information about
the status of certain mental health projects. 46
Evaluation and Follow-up: The mental health department
did not engage in any systematic evaluation of projects
funded with 314(d) funds. Project directors were asked
to submit annual statements describing their activities,
but no attempt was made to document what has actually
transpired. Since project objectives were not spelled
out, it was impossible to undertake meaningful evaluations.
Even simple descriptive summaries, however, prepared by
independent evaluators might have enabled at least some
institutional learning to take place. Perhaps it is
unfair to fault the department of mental health for its
failure to monitor or follow-up 314(d) projects. Such
a small amount of money was involved. Yet, if the public
health and mental health departments had collaborated
(or if the "a" agency had somehow gotten involved), it
might have been possible to set up one relatively efficient
mechanism for project evaluation.
4 6Interview with Ann McGrath, Executive Director, Comprehensive Health
Planning Council of Central Massachusetts, May 11, 1972.
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Although Id" money in mental health was labelled as seed
money, many of the projects initiated in 1968-69 were
still receiving 314(d) support in 1972 (including the
Harvard Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Boston
University-Boston Hospital Child Guidance Center, the
Massachusetts Journal of Mental Health). Since the funding
process has been highly personalized, it is not surprising
that some projects are still receiving aid. As long as
priorities are not constantly shifting and funding is
based primarily on personal professional contacts and not
performance, projects can easily become permanent fixtures
in the 314(d) budget. In short, there is no way to justify
cutting off funds for a project once it has started since
neither performance nor changing state priorities has
anything to do with the allocations process.
Neither the state legislature nor the governor has attempted
to influence 314(d) allocations. The regular mental
health department budget has always exceeded the required
state matching share. 47 The state legislature has not had
47 The mental health department must "put up" $400,000 to get the
$320,000 allotted for state mental health. This has not presented any
problems because the mental health department has been able to show
more than a total of $400,000 allocated each year for community ser-
vices.
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to appropriate money explicitly for the 314(d) program.
Consequently, most legislators have not been aware that
their constituents have been eligible for support under
the Partnership for Health.
Some of the projects funded under the community grab-bag
and even on occasion a project funded independently by an
assistant commissioner have approximated the intentions
of the original 314(d) legislation. Most of the grants,
however, have been too small and too loosely conceived to
have any chance of catalyzing reform in the health care
delivery system. All in all, there has been little to
justify decategorization of health grants or to suggest
that the state government has been better able to identify
and serve local needs than the Washington bureaucracy. If
anything, the availability of a 314(d) slush fund has taken
the pressure off the state legislature to meet its respon-
sibilities in the health-care field.
Key Factors in the 314(d) Allocation Process
Several factors have contributed to the terribly slipshod
manner in which the states have managed the 314(d)
program. 48 First and foremost has been the attitude toward
4 8Many of the conclusions in this section are based on a report pre-
pared by Leonard Robins, "The Impact of Decategorizing Federal Programs:
Before and After 314(d)," Health Services Research Center, Minneapolis,
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block grants prevailing among state officials. Formula
grants have been viewed as entitlements and not as
awards requiring at least a minimal level of performance.
This interpretation is reinforced by the laxity with which
regional HEW officials go about the job of auditing and
monitoring 314(d) expenditures. Second, the 70% pass-
through requirement has not been taken seriously. Prac-
tically no effort has been made to inform cities and
towns about the availability of 314(d) funds. As long as
the demand for money is minimal, the states will be
content to use block grants for general administrative
purposes. Third, the goals of the 314(d) program were
never made explicit. Thus, the states have received little
if any guidance regarding the use of 314(d) money. In
the absence of a strong push from Washington or a carefully
articulated set of legislative objectives, state officials
are disinclined to use block grants for local health
services, especially since state health departments have
themselves been financially undernourished. Finally, the
anticipated increase in 314(d) appropriations never mater-
ialized. Thus (d) money never constituted a large enough
Minnesota, 1971 in which the responses of public health officials from
all fifty states to a rather elaborate questionnaire regarding the
allocation of 314(d) funds were sumrmarized. An abbreviated version of
Robins' findings was published in the American Journal of Public Health,
January, 1972 under the same title, pp. 24-29.
proportion of the state's health budget to significantly
alter traditional administrative arrangements or to allow
for the establishment of even the most basic evaluative
machinery.
The notion of entitlement: The state health officers in
charge of 314(d) allocations have praised the flexibility
permitted under the block-grant program.4 9 The removal
of various regulations on the use of health grants was
intended to allow state agencies to spend shared revenues
as they saw fit. Of course, the original ACIR proposal
for modification of public health services grants would
have accomplished the same thing without a total relinquish-
ment of national responsibility. ACIR proposed that the
governors be authorized to transfer funds from one cate-
gorical account to another in response to specialized
state needs. 50 Although decategorization has helped to
eliminate some of the "red tape" associated with federal
grants-in-aid for health services, it has led to many of
the problems predicted by the critics of block grants.
4 9Robins, op. cit., quotes extensively from open-ended comments made by
state health officials on the flexibility of the 314(d) program.
5*Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Modification of
Federal Grants-in-Aid for Public Health Services, op. cit.
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It is important to understand what happened when what
seemed to be unnecessary regulations were lifted. Somewhat
surprisingly, state agencies continued to use 314(d) funds
in much the same way as they had under the old categorical
system.51  Earlier cateogrical grants were used to pay the
salaries of state employees who came under the protection
of civil service regulations. The switch to block grants
did not minimize the need to maintain these salaries.
Secondly, as soon as the states were no longer required to
submit annual plans outlining how monies had been or
would be used, local officials lost what leverage they had
on the expenditure of federal funds. After decategoriza-
tion, the states were only required to assert that each
proposed use of 314(d) funds would not directly conflict
with existing state comprehensive plans (which in turn
were not scrutinized for compliance with national objec-
tives). In the absence of formal plans available to the
public, state officials could arbitrarily put off local
requests for assistance. The state was no longer forced
to commit itself to a program of any kind; thus city
and town officials had no means of gearing local programs
to state priorities or of checking to see whether or not
5 Robins, op. cit., point out that this has been true in other states
as well as Massachusetts.
their requests were turned down arbitrarily. In addition,
state public health departments were not required to touch
base with related public agencies and private groups.
When formal documentation and plans were required, the
state felt obliged to make some effort to clear proposed
expenditures and project priorities with interested groups.
Once state health officials realized that the federal
government was taking a hands off policy, they no longer
felt obliged to observe any of the niceties of interagency
or intergovernmental collaboration.
With the lessening of federal restrictions, the executive
branch was no longer able to justify a hefty national
investment in the cost of federal program administration.
Officials who had handled the job of monitoring state
and local expenditures were expendable. Regional HEW
officials soon realized that there was no way they could
monitor 314(d) expenditures or evaluate the outcome of
314(d) projects in a serious or systematic way. Under the
open-ended block grant approach, an even greater invest-
ment in regional audit and review functions should have
been forthcoming. There was no way to routinize grant
management procedures once the states were allowed such
broad discretion.
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Under the Partnership for Health there has actually been
far less communication between federal and state officials
than there was under the old categorical system. Pre-
viously, state officials were obliged to check with
federal program officers every time minor exceptions to
the categorical grant guidelines were desired. Under the
new block grant system, state officials had no reason to
work through their counterparts at the national level. As
it turns out there was more of an intergovernmental "part-
nership" before the passage of the 314(d) program than
after. Without the pressure of federal review and evalua-
tion, state-local contact fell off. The flow of money
through to local units of government was reduced to a
trickle. Both the hands-off policy at the national level
and the state's failure to maintain contact with federal
and local officials can be traced back to the prevailing
attitude toward block grants. Under the 314(d) program,
federal grants-in-aid have been viewed as something to
which states are entitled regardless of past performance
or proposed objectives.
The failure to pass-through the required 70%: The Partner-
ship for Health legislation required that at least 70% of
the state's portion of "d" money be used solely for the
development and support of local community services. These
414
local services were to be provided by local agencies or in
part by state agencies. It was expected that this would
vary according to pre-existing patterns of organization and
divisions of responsibility. It was clearly intended,
however, that only those services provided in and for local
communities were to be paid from the 70% allotment. With
the remaining funds, state public and mental health
agencies were supposed to expand their capacity to direct,
plan and evaluate programs and to provide consultation and
technical assistance. One of the key provisions of the
legislation was that the programs and services paid for
out of 314(d) funds would be selected in accordance with
the planning decisions made by the "a" agency and its
consumer advisory council.
From the inception of the program, up until 1973, Massachu-
setts failed to observe the mandatory pass-through require-
ment. Cities and towns in the state were not made aware
of the existence of the 314(d) program. The "a" agency
was uninvolved in 314(d) allocations while the "b" agencies
were given absolutely no role to play in either planning
for or evaluating "d" expenditures. In effect, the public
and mental health departments did.tributed 314(d) funds
according to their own interpretation of state and local
needs. In reviewing the few community-based projects that
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have been funded with 314(d) money, it is clear that most
projects were fashioned with little or no input from
community groups or local officials. For the most part,
state officials parceled out 314(d) funds to professional
associates and provider groups (particularly those affili-
ated with hospitals). If nothing else, this suggests that
line agencies are not inclined to use federal funds to
rock the boat. In the absence of national pressure for
citizens or consumer input at the local level or a special
focus on institutional reform, line agency officials have
not generally used 314(d) funds to promote new and better
approaches to the provision of community health services.
State officials have argued that the pass-through require-
ment meant only that the funds had to be used to provide
services for local communities (which public health
officials claim that they do with every dollar in their
budget) and not that the state had to work with local
officials and citizen groups to develop new service delivery
capacities in cities and towns. The failure of the state
government to observe the mandatory pass-through requirement
has in large part been due to the emergent concept of
block grants as an entitlement.
The failure to make the goals of the program explicit: One
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advantage of the old categorical or project grants was that
they allowed the federal government to focus public atten-
tion on special health problems. This provided a means of
marshalling public and private resources in a timely manner.
In opting for block grants, Congress relinquished all
responsibility for the definition of health-care priorities.
When the Partnership for Health was originally debated in
Congress, there was strong opposition to block grants from
various special interest groups representing professional
organizations (such as the American Dental Health Associa-
tion) which had traditionally provided services funded
under the old categorical grants. They were worried that
the level of funds set aside for their specific activities
would drop if allocation decisions were left to the states.
They were right. Once categorical grants were replaced
with a block grant, the largest portion of "d" money went
to cover state administrative costs. Since the various
interest groups were organized nationally but not at the
state level, they lost any leverage they had over the
allocation of funds. Although special-interest groups
have at times presented a distorted view of health needs
in order to suit their own purposes, they have also served
as watchdogs--holding public officials accountable for the
definition and scope of particular services. These groups
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have not reappeared at the state level, and the informal
monitoring and review functions that they played has not
been picked up by any other organizations.
The code words of the 314(d) program were coordination,
integration, flexibility, and intergovernmental partnership.
No effort was made to set targets of any kind regarding
anticipated reductions in levels of disease or increases in
the scope of services to be provided to key client groups.
Once flexibility was substituted for more precise goals,
partisan groups lost interest in the program. The defini-
tion of health needs and the task of evaluation were left
to the states; but they were only too glad to sidestep
these responsibilities.
The failure to appropriate new money: When the Partnership
for Health bill was originally proposed, there was hope
that the level of funding for health services and health
planning would increase sharply. In 1967 (the last year
under the old categoricals), Congress appropriated $55 mil-
lion for the categorical formula grants. In fiscal year
1968, under the new block grants, Congress appropriated
$62.5 million. In fiscal year 1969, the appropriation
increased slightly to $66 million, barely enough to cover
the costs of program maintenance. 52
In fiscal year 1970, the states received $100 million for
314(d), but $18 million had to be used to cover project
grants for tuberculosis which were discontinued. s In
short, the adoption of the 314(d) program did not result
in a dramatic increase in federal aid to state health
departments. This is significant for two reasons. First,
it suggests that block grants are not as elastic as might
be expected. That is, categorical grants for maternal and
children's health as well as for crippled children [which
existed prior to 314(d)] continued to increase. In addi-
tion, new categorical programs in health were added. Had
all of these been incorporated into a block grant, the
level of appropriations might have grown as expected. But
the partnership for health was not enough to satisfy
either the Congress or the special-interest groups. Both
continued to push for greater federal expenditures in the
health field. Neither was satisfied with the idea of
adding incrementally to the new block grant programs. That
would not have provided the visibility that these groups
were seeking.
52Robins, op. cit., (APHA), p. 26
3 sIbid.
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In part, the fact that decategorization failed to bring
about any startling changes in state health programs may
be explained by the relatively constant level of funding,
for unless new resources are injected into a situation,
things tend to continue roughly as before.5 4 Although the
block-grant approach gave the states additional freedom,
it did not substantially increase the slack resources
available to state health officials.
It appears that without strong federal pressure and an
explicit definition of national need, line agencies at
the state level are likely to slip into a pattern of grant
allocation most responsive to short-term financial needs
imposed by civil service regulations. A substantial
increase in discretionary resources might counteract this
trend, but this assumption has still to be tested.
Summary
The new federalism proposed by President Nixon had at its
core a concern for greater governmental efficiency and
responsiveness. Decategorization was heralded as a first
step in that direction. Under the old categorical system,
54Charles Lindblcm, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administra-
tion Review, 19: 79-88, Spring, 1959.
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federal grants-in-aid allegedly distorted state priorities.
Since categorical grants provided two dollars of service
for every one dollar of state expenditure, the natural
tendency was to spend money on federally-supported
services, even if they were not the highest priority.
The states also argued that the national government did
not understand the nuances and shadings of local needs and
problems. Hence, national intervention aimed at solving
problems in all fifty states could not possibly meet the
special needs of any single state. Also, state officials
charged that federal grants-in-aid had grown so numerous
and so complicated that they had become inaccessible to
all but the most skilled grantsmen. The hope was that
decategorization could overcome these problems and restore
a more favorable balance to the American federal system.
The results have not been encouraging. The 314(d) experi-
ment suggests that state governments are less interested
and less attuned to local problems--particularly city
problems--than the national government. Administrative
structures at the state level have been particularly ill-
suited to the job of allocating block grants. Although
less cumbersome and less formal than the national bureau-
cracy, state agencies have tended to be secretive, and
responsive only to personal and highly professional inquir-
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ies. The state government has shown very little concern
for the details of grant management and accounting. State
officials have not been held accountable to any one. Once
out from under the close scrutiny of the federal govern-
ment, the states have ignored the basic intentions of the
Partnership for Health program and failed to observe the
most rudimentary guidelines governing the allocation of
314(d) money. Massachusetts has made no effort to evaluate
or monitor the impact of 314(d) funded projects or to
probe the successes and failures of various efforts to
strengthen community health services. Finally, the states
have been unable to tie planning to program implementation
or to promote widespread involvement of client or consumer
groups in efforts to improve regional and local health
care delivery.
From the standpoint of state public health and mental health
officials, 314(d) funds have provided new flexibility. That
is, the agencies have been able to use federal funds in
almost any manner without having to justify their actions
either before or after. Although the option of shifting
money from one pre-existing category to another is now
available, no effort has been made to determine what
special needs exist. In addition, civil service obligations
have sharply limited the flexibility that many proponents of
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the block-grant concept thought would be forthcoming.
Funds were supposed to flow through to cities and towns
more quickly since most of the red tape was being elimi-
nated. Moreover, once ultimate authority was transferred
to the states, cities and towns were supposed to be able
to find a more sympathetic ear than they had been able
to find in Washington. If the Massachusetts experience
is at all indicative, and the evidence seems to suggest
that it is, the added flexibility that has come with the
block grant has not resulted in any appreciable gains for
cities and towns.
The 314(d) experience in Massachusetts suggests serious
problems with block grants:
(1) The mandatory pass-through requirement has been
ignored. This has largely resulted from the
national government's failure to take its audit-
ing and monitoring responsibilities seriously.
If block grants are designed to reduce the size
of the federal budget by cutting back on federal
administrative staff, then we will be locked into
a situation in which there will be no capacity for
auditing and monitoring state expenditures. As
soon as that happens, there is a strong possi-
bility that federal guidelines will go unheeded.
(2) The attempt to tie comprehensive planning to
project funding failed, partly because planning
efforts were divorced from grant management
responsibilities and partly because the goals of
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the 314(d) program were never made explicit by
the Congress. The failure to define national
program objectives in measurable terms puts the
states in an all-powerful position. Once a
program has begun under a very vague mandate,
neither the cities nor the national government has
any grounds upon which to object to state spending
patterns. Once the Congress gives away its
policy-making prerogatives, the cities are at the
mercy of state officials.
(3) The failure to require a hard cash match from
states has limited state legislative involvement
in the grant-giving process and has protected
state agency officials from any kind of legisla-
tive review. Although legislative involvement
may not be desirable in and of itself, it can at
least guarantee that state administrative offi-
cials have to account publicly for their actions.
In addition, legislative involvement might help
to channel information through to cities and
towns, thereby creating a more effective demand
for project funding at the local level.
(4) Once the red tape that local officials claim is
so incapacitating has been eliminated, the result
is that local officials have no way of finding
out about priorities for 314(d) spending nor any
way of holding state officials accountable for
the scope and level of project funding. It turns
out that the publication of plans serves several
hidden functions. In addition, the more informal
the grant-giving process becomes, the fewer
chances non-professionals have of receiving
support.
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(5) Because block grant funding was not increased
beyond the level that existed under the old
categoricals, there was little chance of stimu-
lating new ways of managing state and local
health services, especially since most of the
funds were encumbered by long-standing civil-
service obligations. Block grants cannot remain
static over time, they must grow to accommodate
changing public perceptions of national need.
Yet, neither the Congress nor special-interest
groups seem content to add incrementally to an
undefined pot of money. The visibility of such
actions is insufficient.
(6) The arbitrary 15-85% split between mental health
and public health has been an obstacle to effec-
tive experimentation in Massachusetts. The
mental health department--because it does not seem
to be as incapacitated by earlier civil-service
obligations--has been free to use 314(d) funds
more imaginatively. Although the Governor could
have intervened to shift the percentage in favor
of the mental health department, he remained
aloof. In part, this may be because earlier
categorical grants were the private domain of
health department officials or because the subtle-
ties of decategorization may not have seeped
through to the state executive office.
(7) The mental health department is paying a price
for its inability to establish effective mechan-
isms for consumer and citizen participation at
the local level. Had they been able to rally
popular support for their programs, they might
have had the backing needed to force the Governor
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to adjust the 85-15% split. In this case, the
failure to publicize the 314(d) program and to
involve local groups in program activities has
come back to haunt the state agency.
Decategorization has failed. There is hardly even a need
to evaluate the outcome of specific projects supported
under the 314(d) program. Very little money has actually
been used to support community-based projects. In the few
cases where project grants have been made to local groups,
they have been extremely small, unrelated to overall plan-
ning efforts, and available only to provider groups intent
on expanding existing patterns of health care. Most of
the 314(d) money allocated to Massachusetts has been used
to underwrite state administrative costs supposedly prohi-
bited under the Partnership for Health legislation. More
than anything else, the failure of decategorization can
be traced back to the elimination of planning and project
review requirements and to the emergence of the concept of
state entitlement.
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Chapter V: Decision-Making and Resource Allocation
in State Government
Resource allocation decisions in state government are in-
fluenced by federal and state legislation, planning require-
ments, national politics, and other external factors. They
are also molded by internal incentives and controls that
shape the perceived survival needs of state and local offi-
cials, limit the flow of timely information through profes-
sional channels and impose even more powerful constraints
on administrative behavior. Together these internal and
external factors account not only for the overall pattern
of block grant allocations, but also for difficulties
involved in achieving lasting institutional reform via block
grants or any other form of intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fers.
The lessons of LEAA and 314(d) in Massachusetts are sum-
marized along with a series of propositions regarding the
possibilities of achieving institutional reform through the
allocation of shared revenues. In addition, I have tried
to identify the key variables and decision rules that
explain how block grants are allocated by state administra-
tive agencies.
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Background
The question of how states decide to allocate federal block
grants must be answered apart from the larger question of
how state governments decide to allocate their own inter-
nally generated tax revenues. Decisions to allocate tax
money for education, housing, or environmental protection
are made in separate policy arenas. Each decision depends
on a different set of policy-makers and reflects the input
and involvement of separate interest groups. In this
context, it may be pointless to postulate an all-encompass-
ing, state-wide political system that processes disparate
policy inputs and environmental variables and grinds out
expenditure decisions in a consistent and explainable
fashion.1 On the other hand, it does not seem at all
unreasonable--given the highly constrained and relatively
transparent set of choices associated with the administra-
tion of federal grants-in-aid--to assume that the processes
by which state officials allocate block grants can be
explained in terms of a consistent model of administrative
behavior that applies equally well to grant allocations
in education, health, transportation, or criminal justice.
In general state budgeting seems to involve a set of
'Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
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relatively autonomous processes only "occasionally linked
on the floor of the legislature or in the chief executive's
office." Block grant allocations, on the other hand, may
best be explained by a set of administrative influences
that apply across the board.2
To understand block grant allocations, it is necessary to
evaluate the factors which shape the pattern of grant
allocations and also the organizational and environmental
variables that impede the use of block grants to promote
institutional reform. Some political scientists have sug-
gested that legislative malapportionment, party competi-
tion, interest group activity, and voting behavior account
for the outcome of state resource allocation decisions,
but for the most part their findings refer to legislative
and not administrative actions. In a few isolated in-
stances, attempts have been made to explain policy adop-
tion (i.e., expenditure decisions) in terms of the roles
2For a general review of the evidence regarding decision-making and
resource allocation in state government, see Herbert Jacobs and Michael
Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the
Study of State and Local Politics," The Journal of Politics, Volume 30,
No. 2, May 1968, pp. 510-538.
3Jacobs and Lipsky, note 2 above, cite the work of a great many authors
including Froman, Sharkansky, Fisher, Sachs, Dye, Easton, Chaffey,
Zeller, and Dawson.
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played by intervening institutions such as school commit-
tees or budgetary agencies. Even in these cases, though,
the linkages between political inputs and policy outputs
have for the most part gone unexplained.4
Competing theories of organizational behavior (all of
which are based on the theory of the firm) have been used
to explain resource allocation decisions in still other
terms. 5 The most important groups--the institutionalists
(Barnard, Selznick, and Thompson), the Carnegie School,
and the "scientific" school of policy analysis have failed
to come up with theories of administrative behavior that
help to explain how block grants are allocated by state
administrative officials.6 Selznick and Thompson, while
opening up new vistas in the study of complex organizations,
were unable to provide more than a static image of how good
leaders exert a strong influence on the life of an organi-
zation by shaping overall objectives and how organizations
4Jacobs and Lipsky note Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and
Thomas H. Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), and Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State
Expenditures in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).
5For a sunary of the contributions of the various schools of organi-
zational theory, see Joseph L. Bower, "Descriptive Decision Theory
from the Administrative Viewpoint," in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth
J. Gercen (eds.), The Study of Policy Formation (New York: The Free
Press, 1968), pp. 103-148.
6Ibid.
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seek to maximize efficiency by continually adjusting
approaches to on-going tasks. 7 The Carnegie School, re-
presented by Cyert, March, and Simon, attempted to system-
atize and elaborate earlier propositions regarding the
"interaction of individual motivation and formal organiza-
tional structure."8  Their behavioral models, however, were
derived solely from experience in the private sector. It
is not clear that their findings apply as well to admini-
strative behavior in public agencies. The scientific
school of policy analysis, encompassing the work of Downs,
Buchanan, and Riker, has tried to construct a "deductive
model of the political process" based almost entirely on
the economic principle of maximization.9 They assume an
unreasonably high degree of rationality on the part of
decision-makers. Although they have succeeded in document-
ing various "pathologies" in formal organizations, they
7Philip Selznick, Leadership and Administration (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957); Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1961).
8Richard M. Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); James March and Herbert
Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958); Herbert Simon,
Administrative Behavior (New York: MacMillan, 1945).
9Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957); Janes M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Theodore
Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962
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have not been able to predict decision-making outcomes or
resource allocations patterns in state government.
The various schools of political science, public admini-
stration, and organizational theory offer a rich source
of ideas and testable propositions. But in order to explain
how states allocate block grants it is necessary to take
account of our unique intergovernmental system. The proposi-
tions presented here assume that administrative behavior
in state agencies is shaped in part by a set of external
constraints including laws, federal and state regulations
(such as civil service requirements), guidelines governing
grant administration, levels of federal funding, and pre-
existing governmental arrangements as well as by a set of
internal constraints including professional attitudes
toward citizen participation, perceived administrative
survival needs, and the norms of professional behavior
in public agencies.
The Lessons to be Learned from LEAA and 314(d) in
Massachusetts
The case studies presented in Chapters III and IV suggest
that there may be an implicit trade-off between the
devolution of decision-making power to the states and the
extent to which the federal government can generate and
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sustain institutional reform. If this is true, internal
constraints that infuse the intergovernmental system may
be to blame.
This can be seen most clearly in the case of the LEAA
program. Large cities received a disproportionate share
of block grant funds. Smaller cities and towns had a
difficult time tapping this source of revenue with any
regularity. Only a few researchers concerned with states
and local politics have explained why city size is such
an important factor. Population size can imply resource
availability, community heterogeneity, bureaucratic
complexity, or the frequency of elite social interaction.10
In this case, size is probably an analogue of profes-
sional planning and management capability at the local
level which in turn explains most variations in block
grant allocations.
The Safe Streets Act required that special attention be
given to the needs of high crime areas. A careful inves-
tigation of grants awarded between 1969 and 1971 indicates,
however, that no significant correlation exists between
crime rate and level of grant allocations or (for a very
1 0Jacobs ard Lipsky, op. cit., p. 532.
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large sample of cities and towns) between crime rate and
population (even though crime rates are very high in the
four or five largest cities in the state). Thus, the
pattern of grant allocations did not reflect the key
objectives of the LEAA programs. It is quite possible,
though, that administrators in charge of the LEAA program
perceived the largest cities to be in greatest need of
LEAA assistance. Crime rates are relatively high in
many of the largest cities. Moreover, the general public
is convinced that the crime problem is basically a central
city problem.
At the outset, several other external constraints seemed
as if they might be important, but ultimately they turned
out to have little if any bearing on the ultimate pattern
of LEAA grant allocations. Party politics, for example,
played almost no role in grant allocations. The competi-
tion between a Republican Governor and a Democratic
Attorney General had a neutralizing effect. Since the
state legislature was never forced to appropriate matching
funds explicitly for use by the Governor's Committee,
individual legislators had no occasion to learn about the
program. Consequently, they rarely attempted to intervene
in the grant-giving process.
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Because the objectives of the LEAA program were not spelled
out in the original legislation and because state politics
did not weigh as heavily on LEAA grant allocations as they
might have, state administrative officials retained a
great deal of discretion. This tended to heighten the
importance of each administrator's own perception of his
role and to exaggerate the use of professional (as opposed
to political) criteria in evaluating grant proposals.
If the importance of city size as an explainer of grant
allocation patterns is not linked to external factors such
as legislative requirements or party politics, what
accounts for its strength? First of all, only cities that
submitted grant applications were eligible for funds.
Cities without the professional planning and managerial
abilities to formulate adequate proposals had no chance
at all of receiving support. Submitting a proposal was a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for receiving
funds. Proposals had to dovetail with the changing priori-
ties laid out in the annual state plan. This was possible
only if local applicants were hooked into the flow of up-
to-date information either through a representative on the
Committee or through personal contact with members of the
staff. Even if a proposal were right on target, it still
could not survive without staff endorsement and sustained
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internal support. As long as state administrators retain
the power to review and modify requests (to bring them
more into line with agency rhetoric and priorities), to
make recommendations regarding project feasibility and
local resources, and to evaluate program effectiveness,
only those cities with professional grantsmen viewed by
state administrators as "part of the club" can count on
the continued staff approval needed to win grant approval.
An independent study by the Bureau of Government Research
at the University of Oklahoma has revealed that city size
best helps to explain variations in the extent to which
local officials are familiar with grant-in-aid programs."1
In part, this may be because large cities need to rely
more heavily on shared revenues to balance their budgets.
Thus, local officials have no choice but to familiarize
themselves with the full range of intergovernmental fiscal
transfers and the way they work. This may have a bearing
on the pattern of LEAA funding. Most big cities have
already made an investment in federal grant coordinators.
Moreover, special grants (most notably for urban renewal)
"
1F. Ted Hebert and Richard Bingham, Personal and Environmental Influ-
ences Upon the City Manager' s Knowledge of Federal Grant-in-Aid Pro-
grams (Normal, Oklahoma: University of Oklahma, Bureau of Government
Research, 1972).
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have been available primarily to big cities. These have
provided sufficient overhead to cover the cost of profes-
sional grantsmen. If it is true that the procedures for
obtaining grants apply equally well to most if not all
fields in which federal and state aid is available, and if
it is true that in order to survive, local grantsmen must
continue to bring in money, it is not hard to see why big
cities have been most successful in snaring federal funds.
The internal constraints that define the administrative
culture in state government are somewhat fuzzy. Very
broadly, administrative culture may be thought of as a
widely shared, patterned view of the proper scope and
behavior of administrative agencies and specifically of
the ways of behaving in public matters (proposing programs,
administering services, managing conflict) that are thought
to be legitimate.12 It is hard to find a good measure of
administrative culture and even more difficult to show
linkages between that culture and the behavior of govern-
ment officials.'s Perhaps the most useful notion is one
1 2 James Q. Wilson, "City Politics and Public Policy, " in James Q.
Wilson, ed., City Politics and Public Policy, op. cit., p. 12.
1 sIbid.
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proposed by Williams and Adrian. 1" They have suggested
that the dominant administrative culture is a class-based
concept of what government should do that is shared by key
administrative officials. The professional norms which
permeate this culture are reinforced by the methods and
criteria for selecting administrative personnel and by the
availability of discretionary resources with which cities
and towns can buy professional staff members who can talk
the same language as state bureaucrats. This explains,
for example, why the Metropolitan Area Development Squad
was so anxious to have a say in the selection of local
criminal justice planners and why local officials so
often turn to part-time consultants. In the first instance,
state officials were anxious to minimize initial conflict
between their own objectives and those of local planners
who might not share a common notion of what was expected
of the Governor's Committee. In the latter case, smaller
communities that can not afford full time federal grant
coordinators can buy part-time consultants who may be better
equipped to tap the professional lines of communication.
Although the state planning agency was required to submit an
14 Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "Community Types and Policy
Differences," in James Q. Wilson, ed., City Politics and Public Policy,
op. cit., pp. 17-36.
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acceptable comprehensive criminal justice plan in order to
be eligible for LEAA action money, the procedures and
guidelines promulgated by the central and regional LEAA
offices had little direct impact on the pattern of grant
allocations. Indirectly, the plan-making requirement
forced certain facts out into the open which subsequently
filtered back to eligible grant recipients. Information
characterizing the beliefs and priorities of state admini-
strative officials can be critically important to eligible
grant recipients attempting to pitch their applications to
current thinking at the state level. Although the flow of
information regarding priorities or procedures for block
grant allocation is controlled by administrative officials,
an external constraint such as a plan-making requirement
can counteract the normal tendency of the internal admini-
strative culture to keep this information bottled up.
A review of the 314(d) experience confirms many of these
findings and suggests still other lessons. The legislative
purposes of the Partnership for Health were as blurred as
those of the LEAA program. And state health officials
were handcuffed by additional external constraints such as
civil service restrictions. Nevertheless, they too
enjoyed some discretion. Moreover, at times it seemed as
if public health officials preferred to bow to civil service
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regulations just to avoid having to make decisions about
how to spend block grant funds.
A comparison of 314(d) and LEAA allocations suggests that
the impact of the plan-making requirement in the law en-
forcement field was substantial. In the absence of a
formal plan, information regarding the availability of
314(d) funds circulated only through limited professional
channels. Locally-generated proposals for financial
support to improve health services were rarely keyed to
particular notions of how the state health agencies proposed
to use block grant funds. In fact, in most instances,
communities did not even address their proposal specifically
to the 314(d) program. The availability of the funds was
well concealed, ostensibly because there was not enough
money to fund very many locally-generated proposals. State
health agencies preferred not to raise expectations.
The failure to require a formal plan outlining how 314(d)
funds would be used put consumer and community groups at a
disadvantage. Unlike provider groups, they had no way of
testing reactions to various ideas they might have had.
In addition, the lack of formal planning requirements
hampered local initiative and minimized pressure on state
officials to justify the use of 314(d) funds or document
state needs.
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Pre-existing governmental arrangements also had an impact
on the allocation of 314(d) funds. The decision to name
the Executive Office of Administration and Finance as the
state's "a" agency obviously forced a wedge between the
state planning agency and the state health departments.
314(d) funds that did seep through to the local level were
not used to meet priority needs indicated by the comprehen-
sive health planning agency. In the law enforcement area
the Governor's Committee had no control over the plans
established by various line agencies involved in the
criminal justice system. They could try to buy support,
but that turned out to be an expensive and wasteful strategy.
In the same sense, the historical unimportance of county
government in Massachusetts undercut the possibilities of
promoting sub-state regional planning in either the health
or the law enforcement field. With each state agency
trying to set up its own sub-state regional structure,
there was very little chance of establishing credibility
at the local level. Because these regional units were not
popularly elected nor sustained by their own taxing power,
they tended to be unstable and unresponsive. Thus, pre-
existing governmental arrangements explain at least in
part why LEAA and 314(d) allocations did not help to rein-
force existing state plans or to promote alliances among
clusters of communities.
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One external constraint imposed on both the LEAA and the
314(d) programs was a mandatory pass-through requirement.
LEAA officials were supposed to pass through 75% of all
action money to units of local government, while health
officials were required to pass-through 70% of all block
grant funds. Between 1969-1971 neither requirement was
met. This problem was most serious in the health field.
Only 58% of the LEAA action money allocated to Massachusetts
was passed through to local units of government. If
counties are considered as local units of government, then
66% was passed through. Putting aside the county question
for a moment, mental health officials passed through 40%
of their annual 314(d) appropriation while the public health
department allocated only 15% of its annual block grant
for the improvement of health services in local communities.
LEAA administrators were keenly aware of the pass-through
requirement. Although they were somewhat over the limit
in 1969 and 1970, it was only in 1971 that they actually
kept more than 25% of their block grant for the use of
state agencies. In almost every case, LEAA administrators
feared that federal officials were watching their spending
records very closely. If they were too far off the mark,
they would jeopardize continued funding. Health officials,
on the other hand, were convinced that they would not be
punished for failing to pass through the required 70% to
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cities and towns. This belief was sustained by federal
and regional officials who openly acknowledged that states
were entitled to 314(d) grants regardless of how they used
their money. A federal audit of LEAA funds was completed
in 1972--three years after the program began. After
five years, the 314(d) program has never been audited, in
part because the responsible federal administrative agency
suffered staff cutbacks with the switch to block grants.
March and Simon have suggested that when resources are
relatively unlimited, organizations need not resolve the
relative merits of sub-group claims, conflicting activities
may go on unchecked. 15 Because the LEAA program was well
funded from the outset and allocations increased annually,
there was more than enough money to move in all directions
identified by the various members of the Governor's Committee.
The District Attorneys and the police chiefs, for example,
were both served by the LEAA program. The Attorney
General and the Governor's Committee itself were able to
win support for "pet" projects. Even the community repre-
sentatives on the Governor's Committee were on occasion
able to secure financing for proposals which under tighter
funding limitations certain members of the Committee would
undoubtedly have opposed. Lavish LEAA financing put the
"March and Simon, op. cit.
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Governor's Committee in a position to buy support from key
line agencies. The health departments, on the other hand,
had relatively little money; certainly not enough to
entice unwilling partners to cooperate. The level of
314(d) funding did not increase as expected. Since the
funds were further split between the two line agencies,
there was not nearly enough money to underwrite substan-
tial reforms in the traditional patterns of health care
delivery.
Although the external constraints enumerated above clearly
had a significant impact on the pattern of 314(d) alloca-
tions, various internal factors played even more of a
role. Two norms of professional behavior stand out as key
factors in the grant allocation process. One is the
tendency of state administrative officials to strive for
consistency. That is, they try very hard to treat similar
classes of requests for aid in the same manner. In part
this is an attempt to avoid controversy; in addition, it
is the logical outgrowth of efforts to routinize decisions
so that the personalities of individual administrators are
subservient to the operational objectives of the state
agency.
Administrators tend to favor proposals coming from cities
or agencies with whom they have worked closely. As
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professionals, though, they are compelled to strive for
objectivity. They attempt to give the impression that
the needs of the department and not those of other state
agencies or community groups take precedence. More often
than not, this conflict is handled through a number of
subtle techniques, all of which relate to the flow of
privileged and timely information regarding funding priori-
ties and the design of grant applications. The annual
state plan can not provide such inside information. Only
through personal contact with state administrative offi-
cials can applicants gain this competitive edge.
To the extent that annual state plans are important, it
is because they provide models of successful grant applica-
tions. Also, state officials are very sensitive to claims
that they have acted arbitrarily. This might attract
undesirable public or political attention. Thus, published
plans provided potential applicants with the documentation
they needed to show that they had been discriminated
against. Once one city receives a grant for a particular
kind of project, other cities want to follow suit. State
officials meanwhile are continually afraid that a rejected
applicant will be able to use the annual state plan to
back up his claims that communities with similar needs have
been served, while he has not. In the case of the 314(d)
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program, where no annual plan was required, state agency
officials were not under as much pressure to deal con-
sistently with eligible applicants (who had neither
successful models or documentation of annual priorities).
The second norm of professional behavior that shapes grant
allocation patterns is the strong desire of state admini-
strators to avoid non-routine decisions. The LEAA staff
pushed for the shift to non-competitive funding as a
means of avoiding the problem of deciding between a great
number of very different grant proposals. The health
department preferred not to publicize its grant program.
With only a small amount of discretionary money available,
it did not want to invest in the grant management staff
that would have been needed to adjudicate the widely
diverse proposals allowed under the 314(d) block grant
program. In part, this helps to explain why the public
health department preferred to retain its old categorical
distinctions and budget lines. Pooling all the block grant
money and creating a truly discretionary fund within the
agency might have provoked tremendous internal conflict
among the staff. Each bureau chief would have wanted a
share of the money. As it turned out, the mental health
department decided to share most of its 314(d) funds among
its assistant commissioners rather than face the prospect
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of having to set priorities or create a central mechanism
to adjudicate a wide range of proposals.
For the Governor's Committee, which was set up specifically
to allocate discretionary funds, this was less of a
problem, at least at the outset. However, as the LEAA
staff became more entrenched and administrative officials
staked out areas of specialization for themselves, there
was a push to set up grant categories and to channel grant
applications through a set of pre-arranged networks so
that all applications for juvenile delinquency programs,
for example, would be handled in a routine manner. The
equilibrium that state agencies seem to strive for is one
in which all discretionary funds are set aside in advance
for special uses and all decisions within each category
are handled in a routine and consistent manner. The push
in this direction seems to come from state administrative
officials who, unlike politicians, prefer to retain a low
profile and avoid controversy.
The final lesson to be learned concerns the way state
agencies react to the notion of innovation. The key factor
in explaining patterns of grant allocation is staff en-
dorsement. Staff support only comes when professional
expectations and survival needs are met. Applications
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which conform to previously accepted models and which do
not require administrative officials to make non-routine
decisions likely to attract attention are more likely to
be successful. Within the political milieu in which
state administrators operate, innovation is risky. First,
because innovation may spark political controversy. When
the public is aroused, governors or agency heads are quite
willing to sacrifice adminsitrative officials. Thus,
innovation can pose a threat to an administrator's
survival. Second, innovations may fail in very obvious
ways. Even if they are not controversial, projects that
fail attract attention and impugn the judgement of the
officials involved. In short, there are strong pressures
against even trivial innovation or experimentation. How
do these pressures affect the pattern of grant alloca-
tions? For one thing, grants are more likely to go to
professional provider groups (than to consumer or community
groups). This was especially true in the case of 341(d)
grants. Provider groups were most likely to expand or
reinforce existing patterns of service delivery. This
in turn pleased the health professionals to whom state
administrators looked for approval. Consumer or community
groups, on the other hand, were likely to propose counter-
institutional projects posing a threat to existing profes-
sional norms. This was true in the law enforcement as well
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as the health field. Innovations only occur when high
level professionals in positions of power are willing to
be identified with them. Only in this way can state
administrators be sure that they can gain professional
approval for their actions.
An innovation adopted throughout the country is a mark of
administrative success. Within the professional ranks of
state administration, innovation is associated with
status. On the other hand, survival needs and the immedi-
ate constraints posed by the administrative culture often
cancel out the desire to promote innovation within a state
bureaucracy.
Some Propositions Concerning Resource Allocation and
Institutional Reform in State Government
Three important propositions emerge from the findings
discussed above:
1. As city size increases so do the chances
that a municipality will be able to secure
funds from the state bureaucracy.
This might also be stated as follows: the larger the city,
the greater its ability to initiate grant-getting activi-
ties. This has less to do with political factors such as
party politics or membership on committees and more to do
with the level of municipal resources, the ability to retain
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professional grantsmen, and the opportunity to write off
professional staff on other federal grants.
There is evidence to suggest that city size is important
for still another reason. There is a high correlation
between city size, the age of a city, and the clarity of
power relationships and lines of authority. In older (and
larger) cities, the procedures for gaining clearance on
grant proposals are more easily decipherable.16  Presum-
ably, older cities have had a longer time to work out
patterns of interaction, alliances, factions, or coalitions:
In su,ch communities the state of knowledge in the
community system about the orientations, needs,
and probable reactions to varying proposals for
community action is likely to be quite high, thus
increasing the probability of developing a suffi-
ciently high level of coordination in order to
[win endorsement for a project proposal].' 7
A municipality must initiate the grant-getting process.
Without the professional expertise and a decipherable ad-
ministrative system, communities are less likely to snag a
grant from the state bureaucracy.
1 6Michael Aiken and Robert Alford, op. cit., p. 662.
17 Ibid.
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2. As the level of discretionary funding for
state block grant programs increases, party
politics and other external constraints
become less important while internal admini-
strative constraints become more important
in explaining resource allocation decisions.
As the level of discretionary resources increases, it
becomes necessary to expand and professionalize the admini-
strative apparatus at the state level. As Martha Derthick
has pointed out, bigness makes subordinates less visible
and thus more difficult to control. In addition, big
organizations are more likely to attract professionals who
bring with them their own ideas about how things should be
done.18 A corollary of the above is that as block grant
programs become less constrained by federal rules and regula-
tions, the state political system (particularly the chief
executive) has more rather than less influence over how
shared revenues are allocated. This argument can not be
extended too far. State politicians are capable of re-
creating external constraints. If state politicians do
not step into the breach and federal officials persist in
treating block grants as entitlements, the importance of
internal administrative constraints will increase.
"Martha Derthick, "Intercity Differences in Administration of the Public
Assistance Programs: The Case of Massachusetts," in James Q. Wilson,
ed., City Politics and Public Policy, op. cit., pp. 243-266.
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3. The less precise the rules, regulations, and
planning requirements imposed by the federal
government, the lower the probability that
consumer or community groups (i.e., those out
of power at the local level) have of receiv-
ing an equitable share of block grant funds
coming into the state.
External constraints can indeed influence block grant allo-
cations, but only if they are reinforced continually by
federal review and audit. Plans and regulations serve two
functions. First, they regularize administrative behavior
by setting certain limits and performance standards.
Second, they provide community or client groups with pro-
tection against administrative high-handedness at the
state level.
When the federal government dealt only in categorical
grants there was a mechanism for putting an issue on the
national agenda: should an aided activity be undertaken
or not? 19 Questions were raised that might not have been
otherwise. The switch to block grants has permitted the
states to set the political agenda. Community or consumer
groups could force an issue out into the open by pressing
a municipality to apply for a categorical grant, but this
1 9Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970), Part III, p. 201.
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is not possible under the block grant system. States have
used a large portion of their shared revenues to build
and maintain bureaucratic structure. They have also
attempted to control the flow of information regarding the
availability of block grant monies. They have set aside
as much money as possible for pre-arranged, non-competitive
purposes in an effort to avoid conflict and to routinize
decision-making.
It was hoped that the decentralization of decision-making
responsibilities would make state governments and their
subdivisions better able to administer federal funds. The
principal aim was to strengthen intergovernmental coopera-
tion, although not at the expense of pluralism.20 The
block grant system has centralized power in the hands of
state administrative officials. These officials have
been less accessible, less accountable, and less prone to
innovation than their federal predecessors. They have
been even more likely to respond to highly professional
requests. They have been unresponsive to requests from
community or client groups outside the entrenched power
structure at the local level. If anything, the switch to
block grants has done more to threaten pluralism than to
promote it.
20Ibid., p. 234.
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Most, if not all, of the variations in 314(d) and LEAA
grant allocation patterns can be explained in terms of
the internal and external constraints described above.
However, it is much more difficult to account for the
successes and failures associated with efforts to use
block grants to promote institutional reform. Both the
LEAA program and the Partnership for Health were designed
to generate fundamental changes in intergovernmental and
institutional approaches to delivering public services.
Four propositions regarding block grants and institutional
reform emerge from the case studies presented earlier:
1. The greater the level of funding for block
grant programs, the greater the chances of
generating innovative programs aimed at
institutional reform.
The more lavishly a program is funded, the better the
chances of surfacing project proposals aimed at institu-
tional reform. Projects funded by both the public health
and mental health departments (with the exception of the
Boston-Brookline Health Resources Organization) proposed
little more than slight variations on traditional themes.
Training programs in mental health were not designed to
bring new professionals into the field, they merely
extended opportunities for those who had already traveled
the traditional road to professional success. Community-
based projects that received 314(d) support were rarely
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community initiated and infrequently involved client or
consumer groups in their design or implementation (viz.
the RCA contract for a health information system in
Cambridge-Somerville). Most of the projects funded through
the public health department were aimed at extending the
service capacities of existing hospital-controlled
networks. Rarely were funds used to mobilize the fragmented
components of the public and private health care systems or
to stimulate the kinds of partnership that had been alluded
to in the original legislation.
The LEAA program was used in some states to stockpile
police arsenals, but in Massachusetts the situation was
somewhat different. Some of the state's LEAA money was
used, not to beef up the existing components of the
criminal justice system, but (as in the case of the Youth
Resources Bureaus or the Roxbury Defenders Program) to
redefine the law enforcement problem and to serve new
constituents in different ways. Nevertheless, most of
the money did not go to reform the prosecutorial or the
corrections system, it went to strengthen the hand of those
controlling existing institutions. Because there was more
than enough money to go around, reform-minded groups were
able to latch on to a small share of the funds. Innova-
tion, though, was certainly not the result in most cases.
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This is not to say that all innovations or reforms are by
definition "good," or that state administrators are always
fearful of sponsoring innovative projects. However, until
the notion of experimentation (which implies a high rate
of failure, but a modicum of institutional learning) gains
acceptability in the public sector, pressures against
innovation or reform are likely to smother even trivial
administrative initiatives. Only in a situation of great
opulence, once traditional interests have been served, is
innovation likely to flourish.
2. In the absence of a cash matching requirement
at both the state and local levels, admini-
strative officials are not likely to be held
accountable for the allocation of block grant
monies. The less administrative officials
feel compelled to account for allocation deci-
sions, the less the chances of promoting
significant institutional reforms.
The state legislature's non-involvement in both the LEAA
and the 314(d) grant awards processes was surprising. The
situation is very different at the national level where
Congressional committee members use what leverage they
have to win grants for their home towns. This reinforces
the point argued by Representative Wilbur Mills: only if
a unit of government has responsibility for raising
revenues will the political officials involved take their
management responsibilities seriously. Of course, there are
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many corollaries to this rule. Only if their constituents
are actively involved in seeking block grant awards, will
legislators take an interest in how funds are allocated.
Block grant allocations to state agencies tend to fall
into a separate administrative sub-system well insulated
from the political pressures that normally affect state
allocations.
Public officials tend to exaggerate the potential effective-
ness of grant-in-aid programs. If the grant-giving process
is highly politicized, the claims on annual state block
grants are likely to escalate. This is not necessarily
desirable, but such proclamations do become part of the
public record. Public utterances not only shape the
thinking and action of administrative officials, they also
provide an impetus for community or client groups searching
for some means of support. The depoliticization of grant-
in-aid programs that seems to have accompanied the switch to
block grants has been a boon to state administrators. They
have been able to maintain their invisibility.
3. The less defined the purposes of federal
programs managed by state bureaucracies,
the greater the likelihood that unrestricted
funds filtering down to cities and towns will
be controlled by the entrenched power
structure.
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Although many interest groups could not be classed as
reform-minded, they have traditionally served a watchdog
role, the value of which has often been underestimated.
The number of consumer-oriented and public-interest lobby-
ing groups has grown substantially. In the health field,
under the old categorical programs, dental associations
made sure that funds were channeled into dental clinics.
Under the block grant program, no money has been set
aside for dental care, and when several model cities
groups approached the public health department for aid in
setting up community dental health clinics, they were told
that money was not available for such purposes.
In the police and correctional fields it was almost
impossible for citizen groups to win LEAA grant awards of
any significant size. Funds for these activities were
channeled through professional provider groups and long-
standing state and local agencies. In the absence of
strong federal pressure, states showed little inclination
to require meaningful citizen or client input in the pre-
paration or implementation of local grant proposals. State
administrative officials have often been too close (in
personal and professional terms) to local administrators
to push for citizen involvement that might create political
difficulties and costly delays. Unless grants are specifi-
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cally designed by the Congress to promote citizen input,
it is not likely to occur. The issue of racial or sex
discrimination did not come up in Massachusetts; however,
in other states when federal pressures for equal employ-
ment have been relaxed, discriminatory practices have
reappeared.
All in all, the LEAA and 314(d) case studies suggest that
unless the Congress is very precise about the national need
it intends to serve with each grant-in-aid program, and
unless the federal government provides continual supervi-
sion and surveillance, shared revenues are likely to
strengthen only those groups already in power at the state
and local levels.
4. The more decision-making power is vested
in new staff agencies (as opposed to tradi-
tional line agencies), the greater the
chances are of promoting significant insti-
tutional reform.
This proposition underscores the current wave of opposition
to ineffective civil service regulations. Staff agencies
created especially to administer discretionary funds are
less constrained by prevailing expenditure patterns and
timeworn traditions. Moreover, if an agency is exempt
from civil service regulations, as in the case of LEAA staff
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in Massachusetts, the greater the chances of attracting
top-notch professionals. Once again, this is not always
the case; however, the LEAA experience in Massachusetts
suggests that executive staff officials unencumbered by
civil service regulations are more likely to support
innovative projects. It might seem as if line agency
staff members protected by civil service would be more
willing to gamble on a risky but exciting prospect, while
non-protected staff members would be more conservative.
This is not so. Professionals in civil service usually
have long-term career aspirations and hesitate to rock the
boat for fear of jeopardizing their advancement. LEAA-
types, or other executive staff administrators, are in
and out of government. An innovative project for which
they can take credit enhances their prestige on the
outside even if it fails miserably. They can always blame
their lack of success on the civil service-types and the
politicians.
All four propositions point to one overriding concern:
if the objective of grant-giving in the federal system is
to provide organizations or governmental agencies with
funds that can be used not only to enhance the efficiency
of existing service mechanisms, but also to alter the
underlying decision rules and administrative structures in
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existing institutions, then internal constraints on
resource allocations ought to be neutralized and external
controls on administrative behavior ought to be reinforced.
Isolating the Key Variables and Decision Rules
External constraints on administrative behavior in state
agencies have only an indirect bearing on grant alloca-
tions. For example, federal regulations require a manda-
tory pass-through to local units of government, but some
administrative apparatus has to be set up to mobilize
interest at the local level, to process applications, and
to ensure that all available funds are spent in every
year. To a great extent, external constraints serve to
energize state administrative agencies while internal
factors channel the flow of energy. Thus, the critical
question is, how does the administrative culture translate
external constraints into behavioral norms that guide the
day-to-day activities of state officials?
I have isolated three factors that seem to characterize
administrative behavior in state government: role
specialization, self-preservation, and self-gratification.
Each state administrator displays a need to redefine his
role in increasingly specialized terms. He also seeks to
protect himself from political controversy as well as
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to maximize his own self-gratification. A framework for
thinking about the interaction of internal and external
21
constraints is suggested in Figure VII.
Role Specialization: State officials are continually
searching for a more precise definition of the image they
want to present to the outside world. They are also
anxious to clarify the lines of responsibility and the
hierarchy of decision-making power within their agencies.
The more specialized an administrator's functions are,
the easier it is for him to understand the image he is
expected to present. The more specific his functions, the
clearer his decision-making authority within an agency.
Thus, there is continual pressure on an agency administra-
tor to define his role in increasingly specialized terms.
However, there are two other competing drives--one pushing
toward self-gratification and the other toward self-
preservation--which limit an administrator's willingness to
become too highly specialized. Self-gratification depends
in part on an administrator's leverage over critical
information. More information is available if he can move
2
'The diagrammatic approach used throughout this chapter is adapted
from a similar effort to model city expenditure decisions. See Arnold
Meltsner's excellent study of The Politics of City Revenue (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971), Chapter III.
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Figure VII
RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNAL TO EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
ON DECISION MAKING
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freely within the agency. If he is too highly specialized
he may lose contact and credibility with co-workers and
diminish his access to timely information sources. Self-
preservation demands that an administrator come as close
as possible to satisfying the competing demands of all
interest groups who might in some way provoke political
controversies regarding his actions or decisions. To be
of service, an administrator must be able to answer
questions and get things done, but if he is too highly
specialized, his scope of action will be limited and his
ability to serve interested clients will be constrained.
There are four initial steps that an administrator must
take to define his role. He must interpret the explicit
limitations on his authority contained in federal and
state guidelines and legislation. He must interpret
implicit federal and state expectations regarding his
performance and anticipated programmatic outputs. Third,
he must assess the present and future availability of
resources. And finally, he must evaluate the pre-existing
network of institutional and governmental arrangements.
The explicit boundary conditions described in guidelines
of various sorts may define the range of responsibilities
associated with positions allowable under existing funding
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arrangements. For example, if an agency head is required
to submit an annual state plan, he can derive a fairly
precise notion of his responsibilities by reading the
criteria that federal administrators will use to evaluate
his plan. If a state official is hired to manage the
flow of federal funds, he can develop a fairly detailed
sense of the accounting activities for which he will be
responsible merely by reading the reporting and auditing
requirements imposed under federal and state regulations.
Interpreting implicit federal and state expectations
regarding program output is somewhat more difficult. Each
administrator must decide for himself what the governor
and his department head expect to achieve politically in a
given year. In the criminal justice field, for example,
staff members spent a great deal of their time trying to
figure out what the priorities of the Attorney General
and the Executive Director were. This concern is always
in the back of an administrator's mind when he talks with
eligible grant recipients. State officials are also very
conscious of what the thinking in Washington is at any
point in time. Federal reports and newsletters circulate
rapidly and frequently among state officials.
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Present and anticipated levels of funding also shape an
administrator's definition of his own role. If funds
are scarce and continued funding is uncertain, he is more
likely to define his role narrowly in an effort to make
it easier to do all that is expected of him. In part, this
is because other staff members are also likely to be
guarding their turf rather carefully. An expansive inter-
pretation of administrative roles in a time of budget
stringency can escalate conflict within an agency. And
the "troublemakers" are likely to be the first to go.
When resources are scarce, administrators are likely to
be much less communicative with potential grant recipients.
Since the chances of winning a grant are more limited, the
competition among program administrators is likely to
increase. Administrators are more cautious about investing
their time in or risking a fight over any specific proposal.
When funds are more generally available, potential grant
applicants have freer access to inside information and
administrators are more likely to become involved in a
personal and self-interested way. In the final analysis,
administrators want very much to be associated with
successful applications. When chances of funding are low,
administrators are more selective. Thus, the availability
of resources shapes not only the push toward specialization
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and greater definition of administrative roles within an
agency, but also the posture that an administrative
official assumes in dealing with the outside world.
The fourth step (and these are not necessarily in sequence)
an administrator takes in order to define his role more
precisely is to size up the pre-existing institutional and
governmental arrangements. If, as in the case of the LEAA
program, staff members find that they have line agency
counterparts, they may specialize in a slightly different
area. An LEAA juvenile delinquency specialist, for
example, would try to avoid similarity between his role
and that of his counterpart in the Department of Youth
Services. Every administrator strives to define his role
in unique terms. In part, this stems from his concern
for self-preservation (he does not want to appear expend-
able). It also has something to do with administrative
self-gratification (he feels more important if he has
skills and responsibilities that no one else shares).
Having defined the image that he wants to present to the
outside world (taking account of existing lines of
authority within the agency),an administrator modulates
that role in each contact with an eligible grant recipient.
Depending on his personal reaction to the recipient, to
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the organization he or she represents, or to the idea
presented, an administrator will adjust his public posture
to suit the occasion. Never failing, however, to present
as highly specialized an image of his responsibilities
as possible. In some cases he may seek to avoid further
contact and in others he may try to enhance his public
image to ensure continued contact. If administrators are
dissatisfied with the range of role definitions available
to them or if higher-ups are threatened by a lack of defini-
tion among those below, modifications may well be made in
hiring practices or staffing arrangements. If administra-
tors at the very top are dissatisfied, they have the
option of totally reorganizing an agency. High level
administrators can move to define their own roles in more
specialized terms by publicly reorganizing everyone else
beneath them. Seven steps toward achieving greater role
specialization are outlined in Figure VIII.
Self-preservation: State administrators seek to protect
themselves from political controversy. There are at least
six actions that administrative officials can take to
increase their chances of survival. They can set up an
advisory body to act as an intelligence gathering mechanism;
set up a buffer mechanism to protect themselves from direct
political pressure or to justify funding decisions;
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routinize decision-making procedures; build alliances with
key agencies and organizations in order to minimize the
risks associated with the adoption of innovative or con-
troversial projects; seek to satisfy the demands of all
interested groups; and they can develop sure-fire criteria
for evaluating funding decisions.
Advisory bodies are set up, not because administrators
believe they need help, but because they need a device
for canvassing public opinion and building credibility with
politicians and local groups. One way to minimize unantici-
pated public reaction is to provide for broad representa-
tion on a policy advisory board, another is to avoid
controversial areas altogether. The Governor's Committee
was set up to amplify public feelings on law enforcement
and to lend credibility to agency operations.
Buffer devices are different from intelligence-gathering
mechanisms, although in the case of the Governor's
Committee a single mechanism was set up to serve both
purposes. More often than not, buffer mechanisms are
aimed at legitimizing decisions by involving eminent pro-
fessionals. The technical advisory committees set up by
the state planning agency were designed to legitimate
funding decisions on technical grounds. In the health
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department, questionable proposals were routed through
various bureau heads to spread final decision-making
responsibility. Not only can this approach help to
diffuse outside political reaction by making it almost
impossible to figure out "where the buck stops," but it
also can provide a measure of internal security. By
relying on other professionals, each administrator mini-
mizes his chances of being blamed for a mistake. In this
way, the existence of strong buffer mechanisms enhances
the prospects for innovation and experimentation.
Every time an official is forced to make a non-routine
decision his anxiety quotient rises because he has no
way of knowing the outcome. The more an agency is able
to routinize its decision the more secure its members are
likely to be. Of course, routinization minimizes the
prospects for innovation. Routinization is also a logical
concomitant of role specialization. As agencies increase
in size and specialization, decision-making and resource
allocation procedures must be routinized to ensure that
the work gets done. Routinization is also a form of pro-
tection against claims of discrimination. There is a
real desire to treat all applicants within a certain class
or range of proposals equitably. Routinization is the
outcome.
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Routinization must compete with self-gratification. Part
of the excitement and professional reward associated with
state administration is the satisfaction derived from the
implementation of projects ultimately duplicated by other
states. In short, self-gratification depends in part on
an administrator's willingness to break out of the tradi-
tional pattern. The history of state government suggests
that self-preservation is its own reward.
One way of protecting against outside political pressures,
especially those aimed at blocking serious reforms, is to
build alliances with key agencies and organizations pre-
viously identified with an innovative approach. In the
case of LEAA, the Governor's Committee was able to forge
an alliance with the Department of Youth Services. When
the legislature balked at efforts to deinstitutionalize
the juvenile correctional system, it was the Commissioner
of Youth Services and not the Executive Director of the
Governor's Committee who bore the brunt of the attack.
This process can work in other ways as well. The Boston-
Brookline Health Resources Organization was funded primar-
ily through the intervention of high level officials in
the office of the Commissioner of Human Services. The
public health department, in an effort to squelch possible
charges from local groups (who might have learned that
472
BBHRO was receiving a grant way out of line with other
community-oriented awards) divorced itself entirely from
the funding decision. Staff members washed their hands
of the decision, claiming that it did not go through the
regular channels. The Deputy Commissioner of Public
Health assumed full responsibility. By forging an
alliance with political appointees higher up, state admini-
strators can sometimes manage to fund innovative projects.
The most basic rule of administrative self-preservation
in a public agency is that it pays to satisfy the demands
of all possible interest groups, even at the expense of
a logical or rational system of priorities. One of the
reasons that the Governor's Committee has done such a
good job of protecting itself from political controversy
is that it has had an extraordinarily large amount of
money to give away. Almost all interested groups have
received at least a token award.
Finally, it is in an administrator's self interest to make
sure that the criteria used to evaluate particular
projects are guaranteed to show success. This, of course,
undercuts the long-run usefulness of research, but in the
short run agency-sponsored research is primarily meant to
confirm the reasonableness of past decisions. In the
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mental health department, the typical indicators of
success were whether or not the grant recipient was glad
to receive the funds and whether or not the proposed
project worked to the satisfaction of the grantee. There
are very few situations in which a grantee is likely to
report failure. The various actions that an administrative
official can take to ensure its self-preservation are
shown in Figure IX.
Self-gratification: For state administrative officials,
self-gratification comes in several forms: approval
from professional peers and politicians, the wielding of
power, and self-satisfaction based on the outcome of
actual decisions.
Annual federal reports or regular newsletters provide
capsule summaries of what is being done in various states.
Favorable mention--especially by name--is very important
to a state administrator. Even if he is not mentioned
by name, he can still take pride in the kudos awarded to
his agency. Laudatory comments from other professionals
(administrators at the federal, state, or local levels)
reinforce a sense of personal self-esteem. An interesting
trade-off comes when an administrator must decide (in a
situation of resource scarcity) whether or not to fund a
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wildly innovative community-initiated, consumer-oriented
project or a modestly fashionable improvement, proposed
by a professional colleague, aimed at enhancing the
efficiency of an existing service operation. In the
short run, the kudos from fellow experts may be extremely
rewarding, but the applause fades quickly and nothing
will be heard later on about the project. A risky
community-based project might incur the wrath of fellow
professionals, but it might also catch on around the
country, propelling the administrator involved to instant
and in some cases permanent stardom.
The process of "catching on" is in itself curious. Why
would a second state duplicate a project tried elsewhere?
One reason might be pressure from federal officials. A
second might be political applause from an official in
one state that reverberated in the ears of a political
official in another state. The Governor has often sug-
gested to his agency chief that he would look favorably
upon a similar project in his own domain. The situation
is still further complicated by the fact that state
political officials are very likely to wait for local
political reaction before publicly endorsing a project.
That means that local political reaction in one state may
trigger a multi-state chain of events.
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Aside from the personal sense of reinforcement provided by
public expressions of approval, administrators seek power.
To that end, administrators look favorably upon an expan-
sion of their role or level of responsibility. The
constant thrust toward ever-increasing responsibility is
constrained by an equally strong concern for self-
preservation. As power expands so does political vulner-
ability. Some state administrators--especially those
committed to the bureaucracy for life--are not necessarily
interested in expanding the scope of their responsibili-
ties if it means redefining their roles. Role changes can
be threatening. "Lifers" prefer to solidify privileges
such as seniority, to increase their salaries, and to
otherwise enhance their prestige without having to rede-
fine their roles. "In-and-outers," especially LEAA-types
moving back and forth between the public and private
sectors, may wish to move through several incarnations in
very different roles in order to enhance their visibility
and noticeability on the outside.
Power can be wielded in several ways from within an admini-
strative agency. First, administrators can provide
timely information to friends in the hope of improving
their chances of winning project awards. To the extent
that planning requirements, for example, are weak, the
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power of an administrator increases with control over the
flow of information. The point is that information is
not available to just anybody. Only a qualified profes-
sional whose thanks reinforces a state administrator's
sense of his own power is important. This is why communi-
ties without professional grantsmen are unable to tap
the flow of privileged information.
A second way in which administrators wield power is by
modifying grant proposals after they have reached the
agency. This is done to improve the funding prospects
of an eligible applicant. The amount of homework that
an administrator does can also determine how successful a
grant application is likely to be. If there is strong
negative reaction to a proposal from advisory committee
members (or even administrative higher-ups) a staff
member can sometimes overwhelm the opposition with a
highly detailed and well-researched statement of need. The
process of advocating favorite proposals is one that
allows an administrator to test his strnegth against others
in the agency. Thus, the outcome (the funding decision)
can serve to affirm an administrator's sense of his own
power.
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Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the least important
source of self-gratification is the extent to which an
administrative decision brings about a result or a change
in the outside world. In the criminal justice field,
every official subscribes to the goal of lowering the
crime rate. In the health field, every administrator
longs to contribute to the improvement of health services.
There is a great deal of self-satisfaction gained from
administrative choices or actions that result in such
improvements. The problem, however, is that achievements
of this kind are difficult to discern. (The crime rate,
for example, has not gone down.) Moreover, it is almost
impossible to trace success back to a particular admini-
strative action. (Even if the crime rate went down, it
would be impossible to say that the LEAA program was the
cause.) Every administrator makes an implicit connection
between his day-to-day actions and the more abstract
goals toward which he is generally working. For the most
part, the theoretical models that help each administrator
make these connections are not very well thought out.
There is very little opportunity within an operating agency
to debate the merits of alternative theories of how
change comes about; moreover, many officials accept the
fact that changes will remain invisible until long after
they have moved on to other jobs. If nothing else, this
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is a handy rationalization for a basic inability of most
public agencies to demonstrate visible success. Although
administrators seek concrete evidence to prove that
projects which they have helped to fund have been
successful, this is one form of self-gratification that
is usually submerged.
The various sources of self-gratification are summarized
in Figure X and the complete set of internal incentives and
controls hidden in the administrative culture is presented
in Figure XI.
Summary and Conclusions
In light of the model presented above, the sources of ad-
ministrative resistance to citizen participation, regional
collaboration and plan-making become clear. Citizen
participation blurs the role of the professional bureau-
crat, it threatens his self-preservation, and he receives
little if any gratification from supporting non-profes-
sionals. To assume that consumers or citizen representa-
tives have a better sense of what ought to be done or a
better idea of the way projects ought to be handled, is
to assume that an amateur can replace a certified profes-
sional. The majority of state administrators acknowledge
federal rules and regulations requiring citizen input with
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some bitterness. They feel compelled to implement some
approach to citizen participation, but when the process
bogs down (as it usually does) most administrators are
quite content to let things ride. Neither the health
departments nor the Governor's Committee has been able to
sustain effective citizen participation.
State administrative attitudes toward regional collabora-
tion are somewhat more confused. If sub-state regionalism
is talked about in terms of decentralizing the activities
of state agencies, most state administrators are likely
to respond neutrally or positively. Administrative decen-
tralization of state agency staff may create certain
jealousies and initial confusion regarding role definition.
That is, state agency staff who roam the cities and towns
of the Commonwealth may lose some jurisdictional preroga-
tives under a decentralized setup. In many cases, they
may be cut off from city and town officials who provide
them with an important source of self-gratification. How-
ever, as long as decentralization involves little more
than a reshuffling of colleagues, sub-state regional
approaches to block grant administration do not present
insurmountable obstacles. When sub-state regionalization
implies strengthening multi-purpose middle-level govern-
ment--counties or regional development authorities--state
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officials are likely to be very much opposed. Inter-
larding another layer of government means that state offi-
cials are likely to lose power, turf, discretion, role
definition, and access to key sources of self-gratifica-
tion.
State administrative reactions to federal planning require-
ments fall somewhere between reactions to citizen parti-
cipation and regional decentralization. Plan making
requirements (the more explicit they are) limit admini-
strative discretion. They short-circuit the flow of
privileged information, thereby diminishing state leverage
over local officials. Moreover, by publicizing the
nature and dimensions of successful programs, planning
requirements stimulate additional demands for money or
services from non-professionals and politicians. In
short, plan-making requirements reinforce external con-
straints on decision-making and minimize the importance
of internal incentives and control, generated by the
administrative culture in state government.
Any attempt to model decision-making and state resource
allocation is handicapped in several ways. First, it is
extremely difficult to describe administrative behavior
in terms that are verifiable and measurable. It is hard
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to test relationships between variables such as role
specialization, self-gratification, and self-preservation.
What do these variables actually measure? In part, they
are indicators of individual perceptions and aspirations.
In any single agency, there are bound to be disagreements
among administrators as to just how threatening a
certain event or activity is likely to be. Organizational
theorists have never been able to overcome the difficulties
involved in trying to describe organizational goals as the
aggregate of individual expectations. Are the goals those
of the top administrators? Do organizations have goals,
or only the people in them? If the people in an organiza-
tion disagree, how are goals selected? If goals change
over time, how does a researcher freeze an organization
at a given point in order to study its behavior? My
attempt to explain block grant allocations is built on
the assumption that individual state administrators are
likely to react in a similar manner under similar
externally-generated circumstances. No two administrators
will act in exactly the same way, but the range of behavior
will probably not fluctuate dramatically. To the extent
that perceptions are the same, behavior is likely to be
similar.
It is probably not possible to develop models of state
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administrative behavior powerful enough to predict the
resource allocation patterns likely to result from
alternative arrangements of external and internal
constraints. However, the two case studies presented here
(as well as the many others alluded to in the preceding
chapters) indicate that it may very well be possible to
gauge state administrative behavior under various grant-
in-aid arrangements. For example, it should be possible
to predict how cities of different sizes are likely to
fare under a block grant as opposed to a categorical
grant format or whether proposals aimed at institutional
reform are likely to be funded when external constraints
such as plan-making requirements are eased. It may be
possible to do better, but it is not easy to see how.
The hidden incentives and controls operating in the
administrative culture often cause results contradictory
to those that might otherwise be expected in light of
external constraints. Thus, administrative systems do
not act in counter-intuitive ways; rather, they act in
ways that are very understandable as long as all the
important internal constraints are taken into account.
The two empirical findings that I draw out of this study
are (1) that medium-sized cities (under 100,000) and small
towns are not likely to receive an equitable share of block
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grant funds distributed by state agencies, and (2) state
agencies are not likely to award block grant monies for
community-initiated or consumer-based projects aimed at
reforming existing institutional arrangements or service
delivery systems. Perhaps, in summary, it would be
useful to clarify once again the distinction between
innovation and reform. The two are synonymous when inno-
vation refers to a redefinition of (1) the nature or scope
of the problems that institutional pieces are designed to
deal with; (2) the criteria for measuring institutional
success; (3) the criteria for selecting professionals
to staff delivery systems; or (4) the lines of authority
(power relationships) among new or emerging public and
private entities involved in the delivery of particular
services. Innovation does not imply reform when it refers
only to efforts to improve the functioning (efficiency)
of existing service systems (insofar as the problems to
which they are addressed remain the same; the pattern of
services delivered does not change; the power relation-
ships within the institutional network remains constant).
This distinction does not speak to the issue of good
versus bad reform. The only other distinction that I have
been concerned with is that between reforms proposed by
non-local providers and those proposed by local consumer
groups.
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Since, as was mentioned in the Introduction, I came to
this study with an interest in prescribing a strategy
designed to benefit those out of power in urban settings,
the critical question is, how can the internal incentives
and controls that shape administrative behavior (decision-
making) in state government be counteracted so that they
do not work against the interests of the poor and the
disadvantaged. This question is addressed directly in
the chapter that follows.
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Chapter VI: A New Perspective on Revenue Sharing
and Strategies for City Survival
This Chapter attempts to summarize the strengths and weak-
nesses of alternative revenue sharing strategies. More
specifically, I have tried to strike down the prevailing
myths associated with President Nixon's general and special
revenue sharing proposals. Drawing on the LEAA and 314(d)
experiences in Massachusetts, as well as on the model of
state administrative behavior presented in Chapter V, a
more powerful federal strategy is presented aimed at meet-
ing the special needs of the poor and the disadvantaged in
urban areas. To a great extent, city survival will depend
on an expanded national commitment to categorical grants-
in-aid as well as a move away from the block grant propo-
sals (special revenue sharing) suggested by President Nixon.
The most highly redistributive strategy (and thus, the most
desirable from the standpoint of the urban poor) would
involve national assumption of welfare costs, balancing
grants to metropolitan areas, and a streamlined system of
categorical grants-in-aid. It is important, in addition, to
keep in mind that urban areas have special needs that trans-
cend the welfare needs of particular segments of the popula-
tion. Thus, strategies that redistribute income must be
balanced with strategies that focus on the management of
other aspects of national urban growth and development.
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The Principles of Fiscal Federalism
Musgrave and Polinsky have suggested five basic principles
of fiscal federalism:
(1) the princile of diversity: The federal system should
leave room for variety and differences in fiscal arrange-
ments pertaining to various states and localities.
Communities may differ in their preferences for public
services and should not be forced into a uniform pattern.
(2) the principle of equivalence: The spatial scope of
various public services differs. The benefits of some
services are nation-wide, such as defense; others are
region-wide, such as roads and flood control; and still
others are local, such as city police or street lighting.
Similarly, the incidence of certain taxes can be confined
to some areas more readily than others. For fiscal
arrangements to be truly efficient each type of service
must be voted on and paid for by the residents of the
area which benefits.
(3) the principle of centralized redistribution: The redis-
tributive function of fiscal policy (i.e., progressive
taxation and transfers) should be centralized at the
national level. Otherwise, redistribution becomes ineffi-
cient and locational decisions become distorted.
(4) the principle of locational neutrality: Regional fiscal
differences tend to interfere with the location of
economic activity. Some degree of interference is an
inevitable cost of fiscal federalism, but it should be
minimized. Differential taxes which (in the absence of
off-setting differential benefits) distort location
decisions, should be avoided.
(5) the principle of centralized stabilization: The use of
fiscal instruments for purposes of macro (stabilization,
growth) policy must be handled at the national level.
State treasuries, like regional federal reserve banks,
can not make stabilization policy on their own.'
'Richard Musgrave and A. Mitchell Polinsky, "Revenue Sharing--A Critical
View," in Financing State and Local Government (Boston: Federal Reserve
Bank, 1970), pp. 17-52.
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Because these principles are subverted to some extent by
the imperfections of "real-world" fiscal institutions and
historical forces, the design of fiscal federalism must
also:
(6) correct for spillovers: Benefit spill-overs between
jurisdictions lead to inefficient expenditure decisions.
This calls for correction by higher levels of govern-
ments.
(7) ensure minimum provision of essential public services:
The national government should ensure that each citizen,
regardless of which locality he or she resides in, is
provided with a minimum level of essential public ser-
vices including health care, education, and welfare.
(8) equalize fiscal positions: While redistribution is pri-
marily an inter-individual matter, the existence of
sharp regional differences in the balance between fiscal
capacity and need among governments can not be disre-
garded entirely. Some degree of fiscal equalization
amng governments is called for so that minimum service
levels can be secured with more or less comparable tax
efforts.2
With these principles in mind, it is not difficult to assess
the merits of the general and special revenue sharing
proposals put forward by President Nixon and others. The
State and Local Assistance Act of 1972 (a modified version
of the general revenue sharing bill proposed by President
Nixon) provides over the next five years for the allocation
for $30 billion through the states to local units of govern-
ment (see Chapter I). There are no restrictions on the way
in which state government can use its one-third of the funds,
2 Ibid., p. 3.
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and minimal restrictions on the use of the other two-thirds
by counties, cities and towns. They must use the funds
for high-priority purposes and cannot use the money to
match other federal grants. Under this plan, the principle
of diversity is certainly respected. Restrictions on the
use of the money are kept to a minimum. The principle
of equivalence has also been observed since the allocation
formula is designed to take account of tax effort, popula-
tion, and per capita income. The principle of centralized
redistribution was set aside, at least to the extent that
the allocations formula included in the State and Local
Assistance Act fails to take poverty into account
explicitly.3 The goal of redistribution was submerged in
order to avoid political controversy. Locational neutrality
is certainly preserved, but only because the amount of money
involved is not large enough to make one area any more or
less attractive than any other.
Centralized stabilization was not considered in the design
of the general revenue sharing bill. If anything, a tax
cut or tax credit arrangements would be far more effective
3For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the State and Local
Assistance Act of 1972 see Nation's Cities, October, 1972.
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as a stabilization device. The State and Local Assistance
Act passed in the Fall of 1972 does not correct for the
spillover of service costs or benefits; it does not
guarantee a minimum level of essential public services to
all individuals; and it does not include a strong equaliza-
tion factor. In fact, since tax effort (as opposed to
need) is rewarded, existing inequalities may be rein-
forced. Should a state adopt a more progressive tax
system, or should a municipality find a way to cut its
taxes, it will lose money under the general revenue sharing
formula approved by the Congress.
President Nixon's special revenue sharing proposals (calling
for consolidated block grants to the states) in areas such
as urban community development, education, health, law
enforcement, and manpower, are very similar to the 314(d)
and LEAA programs. Only under the proposed community
development act, would funds flow directly into metropolitan
areas. For all other programs, money would be administered
by state governments. Although it might seem that block
grants take account of the principle of diversity, this
is not the case. The Massachusetts experience suggests
that state agencies are likely to internalize a rigid and
rather narrow sense of purpose. Ultimately, block grants
are more likely to serve a rather limited set of state-
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defined needs at the expense of local options. The
principle of equivalence is sacrificed under a block grant
approach. General revenue sharing allows most allocation
decisions to remain at the local level. Under block
grants, however, decision-making power is re-centralized
in the hands of the state government. The redistributive
power of grants-in-aid seems to diminish when decision-
making power and discretion reside at the state level.
For example, states have shown an unwillingness to
respond to city interests even though cities have experi-
enced disproportionate needs. Moreover, block grants,
distributed according to a simple population formula, put
authority in the hands of state governments which histori-
cally have shunned redistributive policies. The principle
of locational neutrality might or might not be observed
under a block grant program, depending on how the state
defines block grant eligibility. In some cases unique
locational disadvantages already distorting the location
of economic activity might be reinforced. If state admini-
strators respond only to highly professional inputs, then
medium-sized cities and small towns will probably receive
less than a fair share of the funds. Block grants serve
no apparent stabilizing function, and by shifting allocation
responsibilities to the state level, corrections for
spillovers among states become impossible.
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It may be unfair to generalize about the extent to which
different grant-in-aid strategies respect the principles
of fiscal federalism. The impact of any system depends
largely on the criteria that Congress uses to allocate
funds to the states and on the criteria that the states
themselves use to distribute funds to cities and towns.
If the national government gives up the right to set
explicit (redistributional or other) standards, the
behavior of state administrative officials suggests that
federal revenues might not be shared in accordance with
the basic principles of fiscal federalism.
To what extent do categorical grants respect these same
principles? For one thing the principle of diversity is
sacrificed because eligibility criteria are set for the
country as a whole. On the other hand, as long as there
are a great many categoricals available, states and
localities have an opportunity to choose grant programs
most directly in line with their special needs. The
principle of equivalence is upheld under the catego.rical
system primarily because federal administrators are able
to exert a great deal of discretion in calculating
particular awards. Luckily, they are self-conscious
about compensating for cost variations involved in provid-
ing services in different areas. Since the burden falls
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on the localities--who must submit proposals in order to
be eligible--local choice and participation in the
decision process is assured. While centralized redistri-
bution is certainly possible under a categorical grant
system, past experience suggests that redistribution has
not been a conscious goal. The principle of locational
neutrality is respected, in fact, even catered to under
certain categorical grant programs aimed at improving the
relative status of poor areas. Categorical grants can
also play a small role in stabilizing economic growth
by helping communities hedge against fluctuations in
the private market. Categoricals cannot be classed,
though, with more powerful stabilization devices such as
tax policy or price controls.
Categoricals permit corrections for spillovers because
they go to small enough areas to allow for differential
adjustments. They also help the federal government
guarantee a minimum level of goods and services to needy
target groups. Equalization of fiscal positions has not
been achieved through categoricals, although major
metropolitan areas certainly received the largest share
of the benefits from the categorical programs initiated
during the 1960's. All in all, the categorical grant-in-
aid system has many advantages even though it may not be
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an efficient device for redistributing or equalizing
income.
Overall, a combined system of equalizing grants (general
revenue sharing weighted heavily in favor of needy
areas and poor groups) plus a system of categorical
grants administered by decentralized national agencies
(in order to avoid red tape) constitutes an ideal blend.
Together they uphold all the principles of fiscal federal-
ism. Under such a combined system (which already exists
in Canada) block grants to the states (such as those
proposed by the Nixon administration) would not be needed.
In light of the vicissitudes of administrative behavior
at the state level, it might make more sense to eliminate
block grant revenue sharing altogether.
The Urban Institute recently published a study examining
the redistributive impact of alternative revenue sharing
formulae.4  Table XVI presents a state-by-state analysis
of the projected outcomes associated with the best known
revenue sharing formulas. Column 1 shows the per capita
grant that each state would receive per $1 billion of
4Charles J. Goetz, What is Revenue Sharing? (Washington: Urban Insti-
tute, 1972).
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DEGREES OF REDISTRIBUTION UNDER ALTERNATIVE REVENUE-SHARING FORMULAS
1969-70 Average Results).
Grant Redistiribution Ratios for Alternative Formulas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
$ per Overall Effort- Overall
capita Mills Weighted Income Mills
Coll.- Straight Urban Local Pop. (Ad- Mills Tax State
Based Popu- Popu- Inverse Govt. ministra- Effort Incen- Govt.
Grant lation lation Income Formula tion Bill) Formula tive Formula
Alabama 2.98 1.65 1.06 2.21 1.64 1.58 0.83 0.77 0.80
Alaska 5.07 0.98 0.00 0.82 0.60 3.27 0.77 2.14 1.45
Arizona 3.82 1.29 1.42 1.42 1.37 1.44 1.34 0.90 1.12
Arkansas 2.67 1.84 0.63 2.53 1.67 1.67 0.91 0.76 0.83
California 5.46 0.90 1.25 0.77 0.98 1.06 1.41 0.99 1.20
Colorado 4.23 1.16 1.28 1.20 1.21 1.24 1.12 1.29 1.21
Connecticut 7.85 0.63 0.75 0.49 0.62 0.52 0.58 0.48 0.53
Delaware 6.28 0.78 0.85 0.70 0.78 0.79 0.71 1.90 1.31
Florida 4.36 1.13 1.17 1.21 1.17 1.06 0.79 0.48 0.64
Georgia 3.71 1.33 0.93 1.52 1.26 1.23 0.81 0.97 0.89
Hawaii 5.09 0.97 0.96 .085 0.92 1.13 1.50 2.52 2.01
Idaho 3.13 1.57 0.21 1.88 1.22 1.68 1.33 1.86 1.59
Illinois 6.43 0177 0.93 0.65 0.78 0.66 0.74 0.84 0.79
Indiana 4.79 1.03 0.81 1.03 0.96 0.92 0.75 0.78 0.76
Iowa 4.01 1.23 0.63 1.26 1.04 1.33 1.31 0.90 1.11
Kansas 4.14 1.19 0.72 1.18 1.03 1.18 1.02 0.77 0.90
Kentucky 3.23 1.53 0.91 1.91 1.45 1.48 0.98 1.09 1.04
Louisiana 3.39 1.45 1.17 1.81 1.48 1.66 1.15 0.48 0.82
Maine 3.64 1.46 0.50 1.59 1.12 1.32 1.16 0.53 0.84
Maryland 6.06 0.81 0.92 0.74 0.83 0.80 0.87 1.55 1.21
Massachusetts 5.76 0.85 1.12 0.76 0.91 0.83 1.02 1.48 1.25
Michigan 5.61 0.88 0.96 0.81 0.88 0.92 0.97 0.80 0.88
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Redistribution Ratios for Alternative Formulas
(5)
Overall
Mills
Local
Govt.
Formula
(6)
Effort-
(7)
Weighted
Pop. (ad- Mills
ministra- Effort
tion Bill) Formula
(8) (9)
State Overall
Income Mills
Tax State
Incen- Govt.
tive Formula
Minnesota
Mississippi
Misouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Grant
(1)
$ per
capita
Coll.-
Based
Grant
(2)
Straight
Popu-
lation
(3)
Urban
Popu-
lation
(4)
Inverse
Income
4.20
2.18
4.53
3.40
3.93
6.72
4.51
6.26
3.10
6.49
3.36
2.74
5.37
3.54
4.42
5.08
5.01
2.93
2.80
3.60
4.26
3.20
1.17
2.26
1.09
1.46
1.25
0.73
1.09
0.79
1.59
0.76
1.47
1.81
0.92
1.39
1.11
0.97
0.98
1.68
1.76
1.37
1.16
1.54
1.00
0.57
1.02
0.51
0.84
0.85
0.44
1.14
0.80
1.02
0.60
0.27
0.98
0.98
0.89
0.98
1.34
0.73
0.34
.89
1.22
1.79
1.19
3.35
1.13
1.65
1.28
0.62
1.17
0.66
1.97
0.61
1.75
2.23
0.88
1.61
1.16
0.94
0.95
2.19
2.11
1.70
1.26
1.88
1.12
2.06
1.08
1.20
1.13
0.74
0.90
0.86
1.45
0.80
1.27
1.43
0.92
1.33
1.05
0.96
1.09
1.53
1.41
1.32
1.21
1.74
1.31
2.56
0.93
1.62
1.30
0.81
0.91
0.68
1.99
0.91
1.31
2.45
0.75
1.38
1.20
0.85
0.89
1.48
2.09
1.21
1.01
1.70
1.27
1.62
0.72
1.43
1.11
0.86
0.69
0.74
1.40
1.43
0.91
1.75
0.58
0.88
1.06
0.81
0.89
0.89
1.83
0.76
0.68
1.36
o10
1.99
0.84
0.57
1.53
0.75
0.48
0.48
0.48
1.01
1.90
1.50
0.85
0.48
0.56
2.10
0.48
0.53
1.21
0.48
0.48
0.48
1.59
1.63
1.23
0.64
1.48
0.93
0.67
0.59
0.61
1.20
1.67
1.21
1.30
0.53
0.72
1.58
0.64
0.71
0.55
1.16
0.62
0.58
1.48
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Redistribution Ratios for Alternative Formulas
(5)
Overall
Mills
Locll
Govt.
Formula
(6) (7)
Effort-
Weighted
Pop. (Ad- Mills
ministrat- Effort
tion Bill Formula
(8) (9)
State Overall
Income Mills
Tax State
Incen- Govt.
tive Formula
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
District of
Columbia
3.81
4.39
5.28
3.48
4.43
4.00
1.29
1.12
0.93
1.41
1.11
1.23
5.90 0.83
0.00
1.00
0.88
0.48
0.89
0.00
1.43
1.88
1.19
0.88
1.81
1.15
1.35
0.72
1.74
1.10
0.90
1.23
1.05
0.86
0.99
1.47
1.00
1.02
1.36
1.31
1.70
0.81
1.59
0.80
0.99
0.95
1.53
1.43
1.04
2.26
1.30
0.48
0.73
2.27
0.48
1.92
1.05
0.74
0.84
1.90
0.96
0.48 0.76
Source: Charles J. Goetz, What Is Revenue Sharing? (Washington: The Urban Institute,1972), pp. 51-52.
Note: The principles underlying Columns 2, 3, and 4 are those used in the bill proposed by Wilbur
Mills (see Chapter I) to determine the interstate distribution of funds for local governments.
Straight population and urban population require no additional explanation, since the
grants are simply allotted in direct proportion to a state's share of these national
population measures. The equalization-weighted population grant takes the state's straight
population and adjusts it upwards or downwards to reflect the extent to which the state's
per capita income diverges from the national average. Column 5 is merely an average of the
previous three columns, since the Mills bill would give equal weight to each of these
principles in determining the funds to be distributed to local governments. Column 6 shows
the results under the effort-weighted population formula proposed in the administration's 1971
bill. Column 7 reflects a different effort formula, in which revenue rather than population
is weighted by the effort index. The formula is used in the Mills bill to determine roughly
one-half the distribution to state governmetts. The other half would be based primarily on
state personal income tax collections (Column 8). Finally, the overall state government
results under the proposed Mills bill are indicated in Column 9.
Grant
(1)
$ per
capita
Coll. -
Based
Grant
(2)
Straight
Popu-
lation
(3)
Urban
Popu-
lation
(4)
Inverse
Income
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shared revenues if allotments were distributed on the basis
of the proportion of federal income taxes collected.
Successive columns indicate the redistribution ratios
(i.e., the ratio of a modified grant to the same state's
grant under the collection-based plan) associated with
other allocation models. The redistribution ratio is an
approximate measure of interstate redistribution since it
compares a state's share of its input into the revenue
sharing fund with its share of the receipts. A ratio of
1.25 may be interpreted as indicating that a state gets
back $1.25 for every $1.00 it contributes. 5
The Nixon administration's proposed version of general
revenue sharing would have allocated all grants within a
state on the basis of tax collections (i.e., in proportion
to revenues raised by the various units of government).
Such a formula would have minimized the redistributiveness
of interstate allocations, since higher income units
would have received higher per capita grants. Variations
on this bill included the Muskie bill which proposed to
modify collection-based grants by a poverty factor
calculated according to the relative proportion of low
income families and families receiving government assistance
5Iid., p. 49.
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in a local area. Other variations included an adjustment
to favor larger-sized government units, specifically
large urban centers. 6
The recipients of generally shared revenues would under
every formula be governments and not individuals. There
remains a strong possibility that any equalization effort
among broad geographic areas might be offset by the way
in which state and local governments use their share funds.
Recipient governments can use revenue-sharing funds to
cut taxes or to initiate new programs; the specific manner
in which they do so strongly affects the degree of redis-
tribution that takes place among individual citizens.7
One way of estimating how state-local units might spend
revenue sharing grants is to extrapolate, on a function-
by-function basis, their previous marginal propensities
for spending new revenues. Past experience suggests that
state-local governments tend to allocate fifty per cent
(50%) or more of their new revenues to education. Signi-
ficant state-to-state differences exist in other areas.
Weidenbaum has suggested that the ratio of people-oriented
6 ibid., p. 60.
7 Ibid., p. 61.
8James L. Plunmer, "Federal-State Revenue Sharing, " Southern Economic
Journal, July 1966, pp. 122-124.
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expenditures (such as health, welfare, etc.) to physical
capital expenditures (such as highways and natural
resources) may be inversely related to the interstate
redistributiveness of the different revenue sharing
formulas. 9 Likewise, marginal tax provisions might be
extrapolated in order to estimate how state and local
governments will adjust their tax decisions in response
to revenue sharing grants. If revenue sharing funds,
which come from the more highly progressive federal income
tax, are used to hold down the regressive property tax,
then lower income groups receive special benefits.
All in all, revenue sharing is a rather sloppy method of
achieving equalization or redistribution. Only if the
Congress were to impose restrictions on the use of equal-
izing grants would significant redistribution occur. For
example, if equalizing grants could only be used to cover
operating costs for municipal social services (health,
education, welfare) then redistribution would definitely
occur.
Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Federal Aid to State and Local Governments;
The Policy Alternatives," in Revenue Sharing and Its Alternatives,
Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967), especially pages 658-659.
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Prevailing Myths About Block Grant Revenue Sharing
Putting aside the brand of general revenue sharing adopted
by the Congress in 1972, important decisions regarding de-
categorization or block grant revenue sharing remain. It
is important to dispel some of the prevailing myths about
block grant revenue sharing.
Myth #1: Revenue sharing will help to alleviate the
fiscal crisis at the local level.
The suggestion is that block grants will provide a more
progressive pattern of public taxation and expenditure by
sharing pooled federal tax dollars and minimizing the need
for local reliance on regressive tax sources such as the
property tax. By substituting federal tax dollars for
locally generated funds, municipalities will be able to
keep the tax rate down. This, in turn, it is argued, will
help cities to retain industry and to bring back upper
income residents--thereby starting a cycle of city revival.
The fact of the matter, however, is that the revenue
short-fall at the state and local level is much less severe
than was predicted several years ago.10 In 1972-73 several
10W.H. Robinson, "Financing State and Local Government: The Outlook
for 1975," an occasional memorandum prepared by the Council of State
Governments based on the work of the State and Local Finance Project
headed by Dr. Selma J. Mushkin.
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states experienced a revenue surplus for the first time
in many years. In most cases, some of these funds were
returned to localities." The fiscal crisis at the
local level is not on the revenue side, it is actually
on the expenditure side of the ledger. Fiscal problems
at the local level revolve mostly around the inadequacies
of local fiscal planning and management.12
Municipal budgets have been generously padded to provide
political patronage. City governments have been unable
to develop sufficient skill in collective bargaining to
cope with the demands of public employee unions. Politi-
cians have decided that the political costs of strikes
are greater than the escalating dollar costs built into
municipal contracts that give unions everything they
demand. In addition, many cities have been trapped
into expensive pension arrangements that will cause the
costs of city government to rise dramatically in future
"In January of 1973 both California and North Carolina announced nulti-
million dollar budget surpluses. In both states, the Governor proposed
to return substantial amounts of money to local taxpayers through tax
refurds.
12See "The Irrpact of Federal Grants-in-Aid in Richmord, Virginia," pre-
pared for the Federal Regional Council in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania by
the Richmond Study Task Force, December 13, 1971. Also Philip Dearborn
et al., "Fiscal Emergencies in Major American Cities.," (draft) Advisory
Comission on Intergovernmental Relations (Washington, D.C., 1973).
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years even though the quality of services may not increase.
Finally, suburban politicians have been unwilling to
forge metropolitan alliances, thus cities have not been
able to recoup suburban tax dollars that might be used to
underwrite the costs of key city services enjoyed by all
metropolitan residents. In the case of cities which have
tried to assess industries for the real costs associated
with pollution, individual municipalities have been un-
successful. As long as they are in competition with one
another, no one wants to lose the competitive edge. How-
ever, if the national government requires metropolitan
financing of education, the enforcement of strict environ-
mental standards, and the provision of minimal levels of
public services, all cities would benefit. For the most
part, these are management and organizational issues that
have to do primarily with the way in which costs are allo-
cated and revenues are managed. The income from block
grants, especially those with few strings attached, will
have little bearing on the improvement of fiscal management
at the local level.
Myth #2: Block grant revenue sharing will help to
curb the centralization of power in the
national government.
States and localities rely heavily on national help (over
20% of all local revenues come from categorical grants of
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one kind or another). Block grant revenue sharing will
allegedly promote decentralization by halting the prolif-
eration (and perhaps even by replacing) the vast array of
public programs controlled by the President and the
Congress. In part this ignores the fact that block grants
also hinge on continual Congressional appropriations and
approval. Moreover, it seems very clear that state
governments are more likely to interfere with local deci-
sions than the national government. From a local
(especially a neighborhood) perspective there is not much
difference between centralizing authority in the hands of
the federal government or the hands of the states; except,
perhaps, that historically the national government has
been more inclined to serve urban interests.
Myth #3: Block grant revenue sharing will eliminate
the distorting effects of federal categori-
cal grants and minimize the ineffectiveness
and inefficiency associated with the cate-
gorical grant-in-aid system.
By virtue of their matching requirements, it has been sug-
gested that categorical grants distort local priorities
and stifle creativity at the state level. The poorer the
state, the greater the tax effort that must be made to
achieve the required match; hence the less there is left
over for non-aided functions. On the other hand, the
Massachusetts experience suggests that if matching require-
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ments are removed at both the state and local level, public
accountability will diminish. Moreover, without the
leverage of political accountability, there is a strong
possibility that block grant funds will be used to cover
basic state administrative costs and will not flow through
to cities and towns.
Part of the inefficiency of the categorical grant system
is directly traceable to the curator mentality in the
Congress as well as federal agencies. Programs that outlive
their usefulness are protected by officials whose personal
survival hinges on grant continuation. The self-serving
bureaucrat may indeed prevent creative and effective use
of funds by states and localities. However, the establish-
ment of block grants will not minimize the continued
proliferation of categorical grants. Block grants can not
satisfy special interest groups and individual Congressmen
aiming for continual visibility. Block grants may cut down
the number of categoricals in the short run, but probably
not over time.
Myth #4: Block grant revenue sharing will lead to
greater popular control over public spending
and governmental decision making since states
and localities are a lot closer to the diverse
interests and needs of citizens living in
different parts of the country.
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One view is that block grant revenue sharing, by placing
unencumbered funds at the disposal of smaller governmental
units, will guarantee each citizen a larger role in the
decision-making process. Further, if states and localities
are required to make hard decisions about the allocation
of large amounts of federal money, citizen participation
at state and local levels is likely to increase. This has
not been borne out by the LEAA and 314(d) experiences in
Massachusetts. Without federal controls which normally
accompany categorical grants, states are likely to eat up
large amounts of money creating bureaucracies analogous
to federal agencies. Citizen participation at the state
level is relatively impossible, and without required
matching funds from the state legislature it is difficult
to develop sufficient legislative involvement to ensure
that state administrative officials are held accountable
for their actions. In terms of the pass-through of money,
the block grant funds that do reach cities and towns are
invariably controlled by provider groups linked to profes-
sional circles at the state level. While categorical
programs are able to mandate (and to some extent enforce)
citizen participation requirements, block grants have been
used to relieve the pressure on political power holders
to involve powerless groups in local allocation decisions.
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Myth #5: Block grant revenue sharing is likely to
increase public policy innovation at the
state and local level through the strength-
ening of local initiatives.
Critics of the categorical grant system have argued that
truly creative federalism requires diversity and dissent.
These are stifled when rules come down from on high. They
argue that if new ideas do not well up from the local
level, the authority of the central government will grow
and rigidify. Recent experience with block grants suggests
that external constraints imposed by the Congress and
executive agencies have more chance of stimulating innova-
tion (through intense competition for limited funds) than
is likely under a block grant system in which states assume
they are entitled to funds regardless of past performance.
A second assumption is that the strongest impediment to
state innovation has been a lack of funds. Legislatures
are engaged in a constant race to find new revenues just
to keep already established programs alive. Yet many state
politicians are fearful of the political costs associated
with tax increases. State governments have been reluctant
to commit funds to new programs that might not work. The
same pressures are likely to undercut innovation under a
block grant system as well. The first reaction to general
revenue sharing (after the passage of the 1972 Act) was a
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clamoring for tax reductions. Suggestions that shared
revenues be used to undertake new programs were beaten
down. One other fact is also clear: states and localities
are not likely to use shared revenues to support basic
research that might better inform the future investment
of public funds. States are more likely to use evaluative
research to reinforce the rightness of past administrative
decisions. The economies of scale that could be realized
by assigning research with national implications to the
best possible research outfit will certainly be lost if
research responsibilities are shifted to the state level.
A New Strategy for City Survival
More than anything else, competition among governmental
units binds the federal system together. Not cooperation,
but conflict ensures the survival of a dynamic and respon-
sive system of government. In order to guarantee dispro-
portionate benefits for the poor, pressure must be applied.
If a particular policy outcome is desired at the state
level, pressure must come from the national and local
levels. Likewide, if certain results are desired at the
national level, it is necessary to build up pressure from
below. My assumption is that policy-making and resource
allocating mechanisms in the federal system are sensitive
enough to respond to these changing demands.
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If those most in need of assistance cannot win support at
the national level, they have little chance of receiving
special attention from the states or localities. Basically,
what is needed is a strategy that can build sufficient
pressure at the national level to counteract the hidden
incentives and controls that operate at the state and local
levels. To the extent that block grants minimize the role
of Congress and executive agencies in setting policy objec-
tives and allocating funds for specific purposes, groups
out of power at the local level are likely to suffer--
particularly those in urban areas. To the extent that
block grants are used as a substitute for categorical grants,
urban and minority interests are likely to lose out.
It is important to distinguish between the two overriding
objectives of a city survival strategy: first, to ensure
the well-being of disadvantaged groups and poorer segments
of the population for whom the private market does not work.
The second objective is to spur reform in the governing
structures and to resuscitate basic city management systems.
At best, general revenue sharing (if its allocation formula
is truly aimed at redistributing income and designed to
guarantee a substantial flow of funds directly through to
units of local government) might help in the first regard.
A welfare assistance plan, though, which allocates funds
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to municipalities on the basis of the proportion of poten-
tial recipients residing in their area, would be a far
more efficient redistributional device. 13 Only categorical
grants backed up by the power (and resources) of the
national government can be of any use in achieving the
second objective. Meanwhile, block grants to the states
are not likely to help in either regard.
The seven point city-survival strategy suggested below is
not new because it is original, rather it seems new
because it runs counter to the direction in which present
trends seem to be taking us. In addition to equalizing
grants aimed at a major redistribution of income, several
other elements of a city-survival strategy might include
(1) expansion and strengthening of categorical grants-in-
aid; (2) grants to ensure citizen participation and to
build effective consumer demand for institutional reform;
(3) implementation of more stringent plan-making require-
ments; (4) development of local planning capabilities
through improved technical assistance programs; (5) hard
cash matching requirements (on a sliding scale) at the
state and local levels; (6) renewed commitments to govern-
mental learning through basic research; and (7) a new
IsMusgrave and Polinsky, op. cit., p. 18.
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focus on sub-state regionalization and metropolitan collabo-
ration.
Strengthening categorical grants-in-aid: the advantages
of categorical grants are indisputable: they focus public
attention on timely issues; they provide funds to needy
groups even in jurisdictions which are unable or unwilling
to help; they translate public concern into a mandate for
very specific kinds of improvements; and they give groups
out of power at the local level some means of sustaining
themselves.
The disadvantages of categorical grants as they have been
managed up until the present time are also obvious.
Something must be done to make sure that outdated or
outmoded grants do not survive beyond their usefulness.
This might be accomplished by creating a joint Executive-
Congressional review committee charged with the task of
weeding out ineffective grant-in-aid programs.1 In
addition, if the objectives of each grant-in-aid were
defined more precisely and if periodic performance reviews
were required by law, this would make it easier to overcome
political opposition to the elimination of unworkable
14See Title VII of the proposed Balanced National Growth ard Development
Act of 1972 submitted by Hubert Humphrey. The bill would set up a Con-
gressional review comnittee to monitor grant-in-aid programs on a regu-
lar basis.
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grant programs. Something also has to be done to cut down
on the red tape involved in grant administration. In
part, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has
demonstrated how this might be achieved through the admini-
strative decentralization of grant-giving responsibilities.
Narrowing the number of customers that each office has to
serve allows for re-personalization of application and
review procedures. In addition to defining the purposes
of each grant program more narrowly, Congress should
encourage flexibility in the selection of methods by which
units of local government seek to meet the objectives
specified at least at the outset. This would mean that a
far greater amount of money would have to be devoted to
evaluative research at the national level. During the
first years of a program, experiments would be tried in
order to test alternative approaches to implementation.
However, within a relatively short time, a decision would
be made specifying the models that work most successfully
under different sets of circumstances.
The problem of figuring out how to measure the impact of
a new program might be minimized by defining the program
objectives more narrowly. Moreover, grant-in-aid programs
might be aimed primarily at achieving short-term results.
Thus, every program would be designed to produce meaningful
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results within a few years (although the definition of
success might be continually revised as experience with
particular programs accumulated).
The national government will have to remain in the community
development business as long as private market forces fail
to meet the needs of those groups unable to create an
effective economic demand for certain goods and services.
Categorical grants may in fact be necessary in almost all
areas in which they have developed in the past, although
it is quite possible that some of the newer approaches to
the provision of housing, education, and health services
via vouchers or consumer allowances might make more sense
than the traditional supply-side tactics of the past. In
any event, more precise policy objectives for each program
will be needed if large expenditures are to be justified.
Building an effective demand for institutional reform:
314(d) and LEAA grants were awarded mostly to professional
provider groups. These groups were far less inclined to
push for substantial reform in the organization of service
delivery systems than consumer or community groups. Unless
special grants continue to be available along the lines of
those provided under the OEO and Model Cities programs to
catalyze the formation of organized citizen and consumer
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groups, the pressure for wholesale reform of unworkable
institutions at the local level will be minimized. At
best, grant-in-aid programs can only begin the process of
institutional reform. Only a continued push for change
at the local level will produce successful results. Block
grant programs, because their purposes are diffused, make
it difficult to sustain strong community or consumer
involvement.
The second element in a city survival strategy would be a
series of categorical grants to consumer and community
groups aimed at guaranteeing the continuation of community
organizational efforts and capitalizing on past invest-
ments in the Community Action Program, OEO, and the Model
Cities programs. If they accomplished little else, these
efforts served to create a layer of indigenous community
leadership capable of rallying support for certain politi-
cal causes.
More stringent plan-making requirements: All states and
localities ought to be required to prepare detailed plans
in order to qualify for general or special revenue sharing
and especially for categorical grants. Planning require-
ments provide for the development of specific performance
standards and target objectives as well as a clear indica-
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tion of how citizen or consumer input will be handled.
Moreover, plans indicate how similar funds were used in
previous years and how priorities were set. Assurances
should be included in every plan guaranteeing that appro-
priate public and private agencies were contacted in the
course of the planning process. Above all, grant recipi-
ents should be required to prepare plans suitable for
general public distribution. Planning requirements should
not be so complex that plans can not be widely disseminated
and discussed. In some cases special funds ought to be
made available to encourage the preparation of plans in
various media (such as films, tabloids, posters, etc.).
The hope would be to reach a wider audience.
Stringent plan-making requirements are one sure way of
building broader participation in the decision-making
process and of counteracting many of the undesirable
incentives and controls that tend to shape administrative
behavior.
Technical Assistance Programs: Unless planning and manage-
ment capabilities in medium-sized cities and small towns
are enhanced, these communities are likely to miss out on
their fair share of unrestricted grants as well as on
categorical funds. In the short run, professional exchange
programs that bring trained planners from federal and state
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agencies to medium-sized cities and small towns for
extended periods of time would be helpful.15 Every effort
should be made to prohibit the use of planning funds to
hire consultants. If communities are too small to afford
full time planning staffs, they should be encouraged to
work collaboratively with neighboring communities. In
addition, if executive agencies were decentralized to the
area level (along the lines of the HUD model), it will be
feasible to assign federal technical assistance staff
members to work with communities most in need of help.
State agencies also ought to maintain technical assistance
teams capable of providing special help in the preparation
of grant applications or planning documents.
In the long run, two additional steps may be necessary:
special assistance to schools which train professional
planners and a system of licensing at the state or national
level. These two steps should be viewed in combination.
Planning schools ought to be training professionals
capable of operating in local agencies or city departments,
but for the last several years planning schools have been
I sU.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Local Strategies to
Affect State Plan Allocations of Federal Funds, Community Development
Evaluation Series No. 3, January 1972, p. 6.
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floundering. Although the number of planning programs
has increased, the quality of the training effort has
lagged. Perhaps a sharpened focus on urban management
priorities at the municipal level (at least in some of the
schools) could be encouraged by special training grants.
Moreover, if professional credentialization (similar to
the system used to screen municipal engineers and archi-
tects) were a condition for federal planning assistance
grants, at least some of the schools would pay attention
to the unmet need for planner-managers capable of dealing
with the problems of municipal administration. Without
a move toward credentialization or licensing, a mere
increase in the flow of funds to planning schools would
probably not produce professionals capable of designing,
administering, and evaluating municipal programs. Too
many schools are caught up in the vagaries of national
policy planning or highly specialized efforts to employ
sophisticated mathematical and systems techniques to the
design of idealized delivery systems.
Hard-cash matching requirements: All grants to states
should require an explicit cash match from the state
legislature. This would serve to put key issues on the
public agenda and to ensure a greater flow of information
about grant programs to cities and towns. Matching require-
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ments should reflect not only need and effort (in order
to achieve some measure of inter-state equalization) but
also performance. States or localities that meet their
target objectives might be allowed to reduce matching
shares in subsequent years. In this way, performance
would be rewarded. Rewards of this sort might present
some administrative difficulties, but in general there is
no reason why states or localities that achieve their
stated objectives (as opposed to some arbitrarily defined
set of standards) can not be given additional incentives.
Local units of government or consumer groups should also
be required to provide a cash match for categorical funds.
In part, cash matching requirements ensure a degree of
seriousness on the part of the applicant. Even more
important, however, is the fact that matching requirements
provide an organizational incentive and provide a prelimi-
nary test of community support for an idea. Categorical
grants ought to be available on a multi-year basis in
order to provide every opportunity for serious consumer
or community involvement. Matching shares might change
from year to year if standards of performance merit such
adjustments. (Matching portions would be due on a yearly
basis even though the initial grant might be authorized
for several years.) The key to matching requirements is
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a sliding scale that takes account of need and performance.
Evaluative and basic research: Funds for urban research
have been painfully limited. Efforts to improve our
understanding of technical and other aspects of urban
problem-solving have been dwarfed by the space effort and
basic research in the natural sciences. In other fields,
evaluative research has not been used as a substitute
for basic research and there is no reason to think that
we can develop a better understanding of the nature of
specific problems associated with urban decay, city
growth, or national development unless a great deal of time
and money is devoted to scholarly efforts. Analogies to
experimentation in the natural sciences are strained. Yet
the development of the social sciences has been stunted by
inadequate resources.
Metropolitan collaboration and sub-state regionalization:
Recent Supreme Court decisions on school financing may
force a new move toward metropolitan collaboration. The
notion of metropolitan government may be dead once and
for all, but that does not mean metropolitan collaboration
for selected purposes cannot be achieved. Without creating
additional special districts and adding to the prolifera-
tion of local units of government, it is still possible to
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encourage multi-municipal pacts for purposes of school
financing, transportation planning, pollution control, or
other activities of regional importance. One way of
moving toward such a system might be to calculate minimum
population requirements for categorical grant eligibility.
Within state government there seems to be a related trend
toward administrative decentralization. This is likely
to produce multi-functional sub-state regions charged
with reviewing, planning, and, in some cases, implementing
development activities of regional importance (i.e.,
airports, large scale housing developments, industrial
parks, etc.). In line with Circular A-95 distributed by
the Office of Management and Budget as well as the
Environmental Impact Reviews required by the Environmental
Protection Agency, many sub-state regional authorities
are acquiring additional clout. If these regulatory arms
of various state agencies are empowered to carry out
development functions as well (perhaps only when invited
to do so by localities) they might be even more effective.
One question that has not been resolved is whether or not
these agencies or regional authorities should be popularly
elected. In most states, sub-state regional bodies are
appointed. This seems to cut deeply into their political
strength. In the long run, sub-state regions (if they
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are viewed as decentralized units of state government)
ought to have popularly elected advisory boards with
significant power (or alternately, boards of popularly
elected local officials).
It should be clear that metropolitan collaboration and
sub-state regionalization are two different things. One
cannot substitute for the other. Sub-state regionaliza-
tion is a way of bringing the administration of state
government closer to the local level without losing sight
of regional interests. Metropolitan collaboration in
the design and operation of key service delivery systems
is a strategy for enhancing the efficiency of public
services. However, different services are best handled
in different ways; thus, alliances among municipalities
are likely to shift depending on the service being delivered.
I have only hinted at some of the elements of a city
survival strategy. Strategies that equalize income and
aim to reform unworkable service delivery systems at the
local level must be balanced with strategies that focus
on the management of other aspects of urban growth and
development. Many, if not most, of these issues are best
handled at the national level.
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A Special Focus on National Urban Growth Strategies
In 1970 the Congress passed legislation calling for the
creation of a national urban growth strategy and for the
preparation of biannual national urban growth reports.16
The first report appeared in 1972 and sidestepped the
question of what the objectives of a national growth
strategy for the United States should be.17 Other reports
appearing subsequently have suggested that perhaps we
should not have a deliberate strategy for controlling
national development." There is obviously room for dis-
agreement. However, one point is clear. In practically
every developed nation in the world, efforts to deal with
the problems of lagging regions, the over-urbanization of
large metropolitan cities, and the inefficiencies of
accelerated growth have ultimately come together under the
heading of national development strategies.19 It is hard
to believe that the United States will be able to deal with
these same questions without tackling them simultaneously.
"Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970.
17Report on National Growth 1972 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972).
1"Marshall Kaplan, et al., "Report on Land Use and Urban Growth,"
(draft) prepared for the Natona1l Acadenu of Scicnces, May, 1972.
"9Lloyd Rodwin, Nations and Cities (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).
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Thus, the problems of city survival must be viewed in a
larger context. There are actually five critical
variables that most national growth strategies seek to
balance: population flows, job flows, money flows,
environmental carrying capacity, and the alignment of
decision-making powers. The most difficult task has
been to translate broad policy into manageable objectives.
Many countries have gone on to invent new and more power-
ful incentive and control devices capable of directing
key policy variables toward certain ends. Ultimately,
new instrumentalities have emerged to facilitate more
advanced forms of strategic planning. The United States
has only recently begun to realize the difficulties
involved in formulating a coherent growth strategy.
City interests have been wary of growth strategy delibera-
tions, fearing in the short run that a broadening of
concerns would only dissipate scarce resources still
2 0For a more detailed discussion of some of these variables and ways of
manipulating them, see Lloyd Rodwin and Lawrence Susskind, "Land Use
Research Issues Suggested by a National Urban Growth Strategy," prepared
for the National Science Foundation Conference on Land Use Planning,
Boulder, Colorado, July 25-August 5, 1972; Lloyd Rodwin and Lawrence
Susskind, "New Communities and National Urban Growth Strategies," pre-
pared for the American Institute of Architects Conference on New Communi-
ties, Washington, D.C., November 3-6, 1971; Lawrence Susskind and Gary
Hack, "New Communities in a National Urban Growth Strategy," Technology
Review, February, 1972.
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further.21 This is a self-defeating position. First, the
importance of cities in the hierarchy of metropolitan
settlements (and thus the reasonableness of their claim
for special assistance) becomes even more apparent when
larger growth patterns are taken into account. Second, it
is quite possible that depopulation of larger cities and
highly limited growth in medium-sized cities would be ad-
vantageous. Only a carefully articulated national growth
strategy can guarantee that suburban areas will be forced
to accept their fair share of the poor and the disadvantaged
who traditionally have exerted a constant drain on city
resources. As a power block, city interests must exert
pressure at the national and state levels to ensure more
efficient and equitable patterns of urban growth. The only
way to accomplish this is to become actively involved in
the growth strategy debate.
In this larger context, it is apparent that problems in
cities are different from problems of cities. While social
welfare policies aimed at equalizing income may help to
deal with the relative deprivation of the poor who tend to
cluster in major metropolitan areas, only a focus on the
21For exanple, see a memorandum prepared by the National Urban Coalition
outlining recanmendations to the Domestic Council on the President's
National Urban Growth Policy Report, December 14, 1971.
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larger issues of national growth and development can
provide a handle for dealing with the structural
inefficiencies that plague all cities and towns. Also, it
should be clear that intergovernmental transfers (money
flows), whatever form they take, represent only one
variable in the city survival equation.
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Public Law 89-749
- 89th Congrests, S. 3008
November 3, 1966
To amend the Pubtle 11ealth Service Act to pronota and alist In the extension
and improvenent of couprehensive health planinyln and public heltb services,
to provide for a more eflective use of availaLle Federal funds for euch plan-
ning and services, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre.entatives of the
linited States of America in Conqrues asemblcd, That this Act ma Comprehensive
be cited Ps the "Comprliensive flealth Planning and Public Hau Health Plan-
Services Amendments of 19". - ning and Pub-110 Health
FINDINOS AND DECLARATON OF PURPOSE Servis end-
ments or 1966.
Se. 2. (a) The Congress declares that fulfillment of our national
purpose depends on promoting and assuring the highest level of health
attainable for every person, in an environment which contributes posi-
tively to healthful individual and family living; that attainment of
this goal depends on an effective partnership, involving close intergov-
ernmental collaboration, official and voluntary efforts, and participa-
tion of individuals and organizations; that Federal financial assistance
must be directed to support the marshaling of all health resources-
national, State, and local-to assure comprehensive health services of
high quality for every person, but without interference with existing
patterns of private professional practice of medicine, dentistry, and
.-related heafing arts.
(b) To carry out such purpose, and recognizing the changing char-
acter of health problems, thm Congress finds that coniprehensive plan-
ning for health services, health manpower, and health acilities is o sTI leo
essential at every level of government; that desirable administration 80 STAT. 1181
requires strengthening the'leadership and capacities of Sta'te health
agencies; and that support of health services provided people in their
communities should be broadened and made more flexible.
GRAmS 1oR CoMrPEIIENSIVE HEALTH PLANNING AND PUBLIC HEAJJM1
SERVICES
SEc. 3. Section 314 of the Public Health Service.Act (42 U.S.C.
246) is amended to read as follows:* se stat. 693.
4
'ORANTB FoR CoMPREHLENsIVE HEALTH PtNNINO AND PUBLIC HEALTH
"Grants to States for Comprehensive State Health Planning
"Sm. 314. (s) (1) AirnmorzATroN.-In order to assist the States
in comprtlehnsive .nd continuing planning for their current and
future ieclth needs, the Surgeon General is authorized (luring the
period be inning July 1, 196G, and ending June .20, 1958, to make
grants to States which have submitted, and had ipproved by the Sur-
goon General, State plans for comprehensive State health planning.
or tha purposes of carrying out this submetion, there are herelby
authorized to ho appropri.ted $2,500KW( for the, fEscal year ending
Juno o, 19.7, r.nd 55,wJ,000 for the fieal year ending June 30, 190G8.
"( -A S rr n[fj L co rr. rr nATn rALTu r.ANJNY.-
In order to L3 approvel for purpcosi of this sub-wction, a Stato plan
for comnirehens.ive State hrrilth planning must.-
"(A ) dsigInate, or provide for the c:.ablishmnent of, a single
Stato agvncy, which may be an inlterdepartIentA1l agency, ari the
1O-126 (6371 - 0 -89
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sole agency for adinistering or supervising the ndministrution
..of the Stat4"s health pIlnnin g functiors under the plan;
"(13) provide for the estab ishment of a Stato heatlh plannIng
council, which shall include representatives of State aid local
agencies and nongovernmental organizations and groups con-
cerned wit health, and of consumers of health services, to aki-
- vise such- State agency in carrying out its functions under the
plan, aid a maijority of the inebeshi p of such council shall cor'
-ist of representatives of consumers of health services;
set forth policies and procedures for the expenditure of
- -funmder the plan, which, in the judgment. of the Surgeon Gen.
era), are designied to' provide for comprehiensive State >ianinn~
for health serviccs (both public and private), including t e facilh
ties and )Cso3 required for the provision of such services, to
. meet tho hcalth needsof the peoplo of the State;
-V(D) provide for encouragng cooperative etforts among gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental agencies, organizaitions and groups
concerned with health services. facilities, or manpower, and for
80 STAT, nei coonerative efforts between such agencies, organizations, and
so s1AT. 1182 groups-and similar agencies, organizations, and groups in the
felds of education, welfare, and rehabilitation;
"(E) contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the
Surgeon General that the fuids paid under this subsection will
be used to supplement and, to the extent practicable, to increase
the level of funds that would otherwise be made available by the
State for the purpose of comprehensive health plarning .nd not
to supplant such non-Federal funds;
"(p) provide such methods of administration (including
- methods relating to the establishment and raintenance of per-
sonnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Surgeon General
shall exerciso no authority with resr-ect to the selection, tenure
of ofmee, and compensation of any individual employed in accord-
ance with such methods) as are found by le Surgeon General to
be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan;
Recordkeeping "(G) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in
requiremants.- tuch form and containing such information, as the Surgeon Gen-
eral may from time to time reasonably require, and will keep such
records and afford such access thereo as the Surgeon Genoral finds
necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such
reports;
"(H) provide that the State agency will from time to time, butnot ess often than annually, review its State pli ap )roved under
this subsection and submit to the Surgeon Genera appropriate
modifications thereof;
"(I) provide for such fiscal control and fand acccunt ing proce-
dures as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement. of and
accounting for funds paid to the Stat under this subsection; and
"(J) contain such additional information and assurances as the
Surgeon General may find necessary to carry out the purposes of
this subsect ion.
"(3) (A) STAT A .moTN T-.-IFroin th e sumins appropriated for such
purpose for each fiscal year, t he severea St ates sh all > enitled to allot-
-nents determined, in accordance with regulations, on the basis of the
population and the per capita income of the respective States; except
that no such allotIent to any Sat. for any fiscal year shall be less than
1 per cenum of the sumn appropr'tei for such fiscal year pursuant to
parPgvraIph (1). Any such allotment to a Stato for at fn'al year hr-ll
renan iralblo-for obligation by the State, in acordance with the
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provisions of this subsection and the State's plan approved there-
under, until tho close of the succeeding fiscal year.
"(B) The amount of any allolment to a State under subparagraph
(A) for any fiscal year which the Surgecon General deterininca': will not
be required by the State, during (he period for which it is available,
for the. purposes' for which allotted shall be available for reallotment
by the Surgeon General from time to time, on uch date or dates as ho
may fix, to other States with respect to which :ch a determination has
)ot been made, in proportion to the original allotments to such States 00 sUT, 1182
under subparagraph (A) for such fiscal year, but with such propor- 80 sTAT. 113
tionate amount for any of such other $tates being reduced to the
extent it exceeds the sum the Surgeon General estimates such State
needs and will be able to use during such period; and the total of such
reductions shall be similarly reallotted among the States whose pro-
portiflonate amounts were not so reduced. Any aniount so reallotted
to a State from funds appropriated pursuant to this subsection for a
fiscal year shall be deemed part of its allotment under subparagraph
(A) for such fiscal year.
(4) PAYM1s ENTS TO sTATEs.-From each State's allotment for a fiscal
year under this subsection, the State shall from time to time be paid
the Federal share of- the expenditures incurred during that year or
the succeeding year pursuant to its State plan approved under this
subsection. Such payments shall be made on the basis of estimates by
the Surgeon General of the sums the State will need in order to per-
form the planning under its approved State plan under this subsec-
tion, but with such adjustments as may be necessary to take account
of previously made underpayments or overpayments. The 'Federal
share' for any State for purposes of this subsection shall be all, or
such part as the Surgeon General may determine, of the cost of such
planmng.
"Project Grants for Arcawide Health Planning
"(b) The Surgeon General is authorized, during the period begin-
ning July 1, 19GG, and ending June 30, 1908, to make, with the approval
of the State agency administering or supervising the administration
of the St ate plan approved under subsection (a), project grants to any
other public or noinprofit private agency or organization to cover not
to exceed 75 per centum of the costs of projects for developing (and
from time to time revising) comprehensiveregional, metropolitan area
or other local area plans for coordination of existing and plannet
health services, including the facilities and persons required for pro-
vision of such services; except that in the case of project grants made
in any State prior to July 1, 19G, approval of such State agency shall
be required only if such State has such a State plan in effect at the
time of such grants. For the >urposes of carrying out this subsection,
there are hereby authorized to -appropriated $5,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1917, and $7(,50CO,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30,1968.
"Project Grants for Training, Studies, and Demonst ratiois
"(e) The Surgeon -General is also authorized, during the period
begioning July 1, 19GG, and ending June 30, 10GS, to niike graunts to
any pubbec or nonprofit, private agency, institution, or o(hr organiza-
tion to cover all or any part of te cost of >rojtects for traiiiing, tudic.s,
or demnonstrations hoolking toward (le < evelopinent, of improvNl or
more effective comprehensive iealth IIlinning throughout the Nation.
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For the purposes of carrying out this subsection, there are bereby
authorized to be appropriated $1,5(0,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 50, 1067, and $2,500,0OO for the fiscal year ending June 30, 10(8.
"GrantS for Comprehensive Public irealth Services
(d) (1) AUruoIzmo0 or ArRoi-nItATios.-There are authorized
- to be appropriated SG2,500,000 for the fi3eal yehr'ending June 30,
1968, to enab (e the Surgeon General to make grants to State health
or mental health authorities to assist the States in establishing and
maintaining adequate public health services, including the training
of personnel for State and local health work. The sums so appro-
priated shall be used for making payments to States which have sub-
mitted, and had approved by the Surgeon General, State plans for
provision of public health services.
Standards. "(2) STATE PLANS FOR PROV1lON or rPUiLIC i3.\rTII SERICE.-In
order to be approved under this subsection, a State plan for provision
of public health services mut-
"(A) provide for administration or supervision of adiinistra-
tion by the State health authority or, with respect to mental
health services, the State mental health authority;
"(B) set forth the policies and procedures to be followed in the
expenditure of the funds paid under this subsection;
"(C) contain or be su ported by assurances satisfactory to the
Surgeon General that (i) the funds paid to the State under this
subsection will be used to make a significant contribution toward
providing and strengthening public health services ii the various
political subdivisions in order to improve the health of the
people; (ii) such funds will be made available to other public or
nonprofit private agencies institutions, and organizations, in
accordance with criteria which the Surgeon General determines
are designsed to secure maximium participation of local, regional,
or metropolitan agencies and groups in the provision of such
services; and (iii) such funds will be used to supplement and, to
the extent practial, to-increase the level of lunds that would
otherwise be made available for the purposes for which the Fed-
. eral funds are provided and not to supplant such non-Federal
funds;
. . "(D) provide for the furnishing of public health services
under the State plan in accordance with such plans as have been
developed pursuant to subsection (a);
(E) provide that public health services furnished under the
plan will be in accordance with stafidards prescribed by regula-
tions, including standards as to the scope and quality of such
services;
"(F) provide such methods of adrministration (including
methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of per-
sonnel standards oIL a merit basis, except that the Surgeon General
shall exercise no authority wizzh respect to the selection, tenure of
- oflice, and compensat ion of any iidividual employed in accordance
with such metheds) as are found by the Surgeon General to be
necessary for the proper end elicient operation of the plan;
-t"(G) provide that the State health authority or, with respect
to ImItal health services, the Strte. mental hetafth authority, will
from time to time, but not less often than annuaily, review and
evaluate its State nhm approved under this subsection and submit
to the Surgeon Gcneral appropriate modifications thercof;
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(H1) provide that the State htenh aiuthiority or, with rv-pert Reordkeeping
to mental heah h servie'a. the State mentI healt h iutiotrity, will requi rem ents
mtke such reports, in such form and cont aining soeitt information,
its the Snrgeon General I may from time to time reasoniably require,
and will keep such records and afford su('h access thereto as the
Surgen GeiiIrali finds necessary t o assure i lie corrects it nd veri-
fication of such repots;
"(1) provide for such fiscal control and fund accounting Woce-
dures as mey be necessary to assure the proper dishnrsemtent of
and account mg for funds paid to the State under this stibsee ion
and
"() contain such additional infornation and assuaites as the$urgeon General nny find necessary to harry out the purposes of
tius subsection.
-(3) STA-M ALTMn:Ts.-From the sums it pyropriated to ntrry out
the provisions of this subsection the several States shall be entitled for
each fiscal year to allotments determined, in accordance with regula-
tions, on the basis of the population and financial need of the respective
. States, except. that no State's alotmuent siall be less for any year than
the total amounts allotted to such State under formula grants for
cancer control, plus other allotments tinder this section, for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1967.
"(4) (A) P.A m:wr Tv s-rmvs.-From each Sttte's allot tett under
this subsection for a fiscal year, the State shall be paid the Federal
hare of the expenditures incnrred during such year under its Stat-e
pilan approved under this subsection. Such patyments shall be made
from tine to time in rdvance on the basis of estimates by the Surgeon
General of the sums the State will expend under the State plaii, except
that. such adjustments as may be necessary shall be made on account
of previously made underpayments or overpayments under this sub-
"ection.-
"(R) For the pirpose of detennining the Federal share. for any
State, expenditures by nonprofit private a gencies, organizations, and
groups shall, subject to such limitations and conditions as may be pre-
scribed by-rerulat ions, be regarded as expenditures by such State or a
political suixfivision thereof.
"(5) FaorZtxA SLAr.F.-The 'Federal share' for any State for pur- "Fedral
poses of this subsection shall be 100 pcr centuma less that percentage share."
which benrs the same ratio to 50 per centum as the par capita income
of such State bears to the )er capita income of the Unted States;
except that in no case shall such percentage be less than 3 31/ per
centuin or more than 60% per centum, and except that the.Federal
share for the Commonweathi of Puerto hico, Guam, Aimerican Sam0ou,
and the Virgin Islands shall be GG* per centum.
"(6) Dr-rIrTNA-rios or rauim, sa IARs.-The Federal shares shall
ho determined by the Surgeon General betwcen .July I and Sepf ember 1
of each year, on the bansis of the nverage per capita incomes of each of
the States and of the Uited Staes for the. most recent year for which
satisfactory data ire available from the Department of Commerce,
and such detenninationt sh:lI be conclmive for the fiscal year begin-
ning or. the next Ju!v 1. The )Opulations) of the several States shall
x-he d teriied onl tie basis of the litecst figures for file popuhition 6f
the sevcral Sta;es ivaiaube from the Department of (onierce.
"(7) AtAKWImrnO or >UT1s wVTIN TIM STATrA.-At least 15 p.r
centum of a State's allotmuent under this emsection shall be available
C-n1ly to the Stiate Iental lenIth anuthority for :lie provision utnder the
State pirln of menteA (.11eath eric
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"Project Grants for JIeal(h Services Developinent
"(e) Ther are nuthorizA to be appropriated $62,500.000 for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, for grants to any public or nonprofit,
privete agency, institution, or organization to cover part. of the cost
of (1) providing services to meet henhlh needs of limited geographic
- scope or of sp.cialized regioa1 or national significance, (2) stimulat-
ing and supporting for an -itial period new programs of health serv-
ices or (3) undcrta:inr st ies, enonst rrt ions, or t raining designed
todevelop new methodls or improve existing methods of providing
health services. Such grants may be mr.de pursuaint to ause (1)
or (2) of the peceding sentence with respect to projects involving; the
furnishing of public health services only if such services are provided
in accordance with such plans r.s have been developed pursuant to sub-
section (a).
"Interchange of Personnel With States
"State." 1 (f) (1) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'State' means
a State or a political subdivision of a State, or any agency of either
of tho foregong cngaged in any activities related to health or desig-
nated or established pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2)
of subsection (a); the term 'Secreta ry' means (except when used in
paragraph (3)(D)) the Secretary of Ilealth, Education, and Welfare;
- and the term 'Department' means the Department of Health, Educa-
tion a'nd Welfare.
'12) The Secretary is authorized, through agreements or otherwise,
to arrango for assignment of officers and employees of States to the
Department and assignment to States of officers and employees in
the Department engaged in work related to health, for work which
the Secrefary determines will aid the Department in more effective
discharge of its responsibilities in the fiel of health as aithorized bv
law, including cooperrtion with Stptes nnd the provision of technicuil
or other assistance: The period of assigi nent of any oflicer or em-
ployee under an arrangement shall not exceed two years.
"(3) (A) Ofeers and employees in the Department assivmed to any
- State pursuant to this subsection shall be considered, luring such
assignment, to bs (i) on detail to a regular work assignment, in the
Department, or (ii) on leave without pay from their positions in the
Deartment.
- '() Persons considered to be so detailed shall remain as officers
or employees, as the case may be, in the Department for all purposes,
- except that the supervision of their duties during the period of detail
may be ovenied by agreement between t lie Department and the State
. involv.
"(C) In the case of persons so assigned and on leave without pay-
8(i) if the rate of compencsAtion (including allowances) for
their employment by the State is less tham the rate of copen sa-
tion (including rllowances) they wiould he receiving had they
continued in their regular assignment in the Departmnent, they
may receive supplemental salary pAyients from the Deuartinent
in tho amoiunt considered] by the S ecretary to be justified, but not
at a rate in excess of the ditierence between the State rate and the
Department int.; and
' (ii) they may be granuted annual leave and sick leave to the
extent authorizedl by law, but only in cireumnst ances considered by
the Secretary to justify npproval of such leave.
Such omerc-s rond employees ec leae without pay shall, notwithistrand-
ing any other provision of lawv, be etitled-
"(ii) to coniiuation of their inisurance under the Federal
60 Stat. 73G. Employies' Group Life Iisuriune Act of IW.O, and coverago
5 tCC 2091 nute.
so sTA. n1o6
-
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under thee Federal Emlployees Healtha Bienefits Act of 1159, so long 73 Stat. 700.
Os the De.pnrnent continues to coIlect- the cinployee's contribu- 5 IZC 3001 note.
tion from the oflicer or employee involved and to trnminit. for
tinicly dleposit into the funds created under such Acts the amount
of the eniployee's contributions and the Governimnts contribu-
tion from ap;ro wiations of the Depairtnient; and
"(iv (.) m the case of cOmmirsionedl officers of the Service, to
have th:eir service during their assignment treated as provided in
section 21.1(d) for such officers on leave without nay, or (11) in -s stat. 690.
the case of other oflcrs and employees in tho beparxnenit, to 42 USC 215.
credit the period of their assi iinent under the arrangement, under
this subsection toward per ic or longevity step increases and for
retention and leave accrual purpos;es, and, upon paynent into the
civil service retirement and disabilit?- fund of the pecentago of
their State salary, and of their sup.ement al salary, payments, if
any, which would have been deducted from a like Federal salary.
for th'e period of such assignment and payiment by the Secretary
into such fund of the amount wich Would have been payable by
him during the period o1 such assignment with respect to a like
Federal sahary, to treat (notwithstanding the provisions of the
Independent OWices Appropriation Act, 1959, under the head
'Civi1 Service Retirement and Disability Fund') their service 72 Stat. 1064.
during such period as service within the meaning of the Civil 5 usC 2267note.
Service Retirement Act; 70 Stat. 736.
except that no officer or employee or his beneficiary may receive S WsC 2251note.
nny benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act, the Federal
Employees Health lienefits Act of 1959, or the Federal Employees'
Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, based on service during an assign. 68 Stat. 736.
ment hereunder for ivhich the officer or employee or (if he dies without 5 ILC 2091 note.
naking such election) his beneficiary elects to receive benefits, under
any State retirement or insurance law or pro-am which the Civil
Service Conission determines to he similar. I'he bepartment shall
deposit currently in the funds created under the Federal Employees'
Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, tkie Federal Employees Health
Benefits Act of 1959, and the civil service retirement and disability
fund, respectively, the amount of the Governmcnt's contribution under
these Acts on account of service -with respect to which employee contri-
butions are collected as provided in subparagraph (ini) and the
imount of the Government's contribution under the Civil Service
Retirement Act on account of service with respect to which payments
(of the. amount which would have been deducted under that Act)
referred to in subparagraph (iv) are made to such civil service retire-.
ment and disability fund.
"(D) Any such o-Micer or emp loyee on leave without pay (other than
a commissioned ofilter of the Service) who sufiers disability or death
as a result of personal injury sustained while in the performrnce of
his duty during an assignment hereunder, shall be treated. for the
purposes of the Federal Eminployees' Conpensation Act, as though he 39 Stat. 742;
were an employee, as defined in such Act, who had sustained such 63 st&t. 854.
injur y in the performance of dit). When such5 rson (or his depend. 5 C 751 ncte.
ents, m case of death) entitled by reason of injury or death to benefits
under that Act is also entitied to benefits from a State for the same
injury or der.th, he (or his dependernta in case of death) shall elect -
which benefits lie will receive. Such election shall be indad vithin-one
year after thes injury or death, or such further time as the Secretary of
Labor nay for good cause allow, mid when made shall be irrevocable
unless ot hcrwvie proviled by law.
"(4) Assigniunit of ainy ofilcer or empiloyee in the Departient to a
State under this subsection maluy be made w ith or withiout reinburoS-
0 a. . .
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ment by tie St iie for the comiipelnsat iiion (or supl'entary e pen.sal-
tion), tiravel andl(] iiospo:1ation exeneI) s (to or from the plaeil of
assignnclt ), iid 1ow1 anuces, or any part thereof, of sth oflieer or
employce during the period of assignment, 1 d any sIeh vuii-
ment shall b. credited to the a ppropriation utilized for paying sich
com pensatio, travel or transport ation expenses, or allowilAnceS.
Transportation "(5) Ap;,ropriations to tho D)eP mrtment. shill be- available, i ate-
of household cordanee with tile standxii- -zed ,'vernnient travel regulations or,
goods. with respect to enmissionfd oficers of the Servie, the joint travel
regilations, the expenses of travel of ouficers and employees assigned
to Stat es in iider i a rra gllngement muder t his subsection oni eit her at det a il
or leave-without-pay basis umd, in accordance with applicable law,
,orders, aind regulat ions, for expenses of transportlat ion of t heir immedi-
ate families and expenses of transportation of their household goods
and personal etiects, inconnection with the travel of such officers and
employces to the location of their posts of assignment and their return
to their ofilcial stations.
"(6) Officers and employees of Statesv who al assigned to tile De
partment under an arrangeent under this stbsection may (A) hei
given appointnents ill the )zpart ment covering the periods of such
assignments, or ( 11) he considered to be o'n detall to the I)epartment.
Appointments of persons so assigned nay be made without regard to
the civil-service laws. Persons so appointed in the De >artient shall
be paid at rites of compensation determined ill icor ance with the
Ante, p. 288. Classification A et of I9-19, an11d shall not he considend to be oficers or
employees of the Service for the purposes of (A) the Civil Service
-0 Stat. 736. Retirement Act, (B) the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance
S USC 2251 note. Act of 1954, or (C) nless their appointments restlt. ill the loss of
68 Stat. 736. coverage ill a group health benefits plan whose premium has been paid
S USC 2091 note, in whole ,or in pail. by a State coitribtition, the Fcderal Flnioyees
73 Stat. 709. Health Benefits Act of 1959. State officers and employees who are.
S USC 3001 note. assigned to the Depalment without appointment shall not be con-
sidered to be ofilicrs or employees of tile Department, except as pro-
vided in subseet ion (7), nor shall they be paid at salary or wage by the
Service during the period of their asngnment. '1hei su ervnsion of the
duties of such persois during the assignment .may e governed by
agreement bet ween the Seevetary and the State involved.
Contlict-or- "(7) (A) Any Stale officer or eniployee who is assigned to the De-
Interest provi- partment. without appointment. shall nevertheless.he subject to the
slons, applica- provisions of sections 203, 24)5, 207, 28, and 209 of title IN of the
bility. United S1ates Code.
76 Stat. 1121. "(B) Any State oflicer.or employee who is givell 1an1 appoltlent
while assigned to tie lpartzment, or who is assigned to tile Depart-
ment without appoint lment, under an arrangement under this subsec-
tion, and who su ffe-rs disability or death as a result. of personal ijury
sustained while ill tie performnance of his duty durimg such assign-
ment shall be treated, for the purpose of the Federal Employees Com-
39 Stat. 742; pensation Act, as though he vere all employee, as define im such Act,
63 Stat. 854. who hAd sustained such injury iln tie performance of duty. When
S USC 751 note- such person (or his dependents, ill case of death) entitled by nason
of injury or death to bcfits under that Act is atlso entitled to benefits
from a ttate for tile same injury or death, he. (or his dependents, im
case of death) shall clct which belifits lie will Toceive. Such
election shrall b mllade within one year after the injury or deat hi, or
such further ine as thIe SecretMary of JAdor may for goxl cause allow,
and when wlrlde siall Le irrevocabli u ois therwise provided b)y law.
Trvel eypcnse "(8) The ap)prcplriationsjo to th DepartmnIut ,1hall be avaidauble, il
to plnes ('r Ic c e witI the standardied Governmncnt travel regulations,
a&s elgvrent.
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during the period of assignment and in the case of travel to and from
their places of arsigneint or appointment, for the payment of expenses
of travel of persons ass;igned to, or givel rippointments by, the Service
under an arrangement uider this subection.
"(9) All arrangements imder this subsection for assignment of
officers or employees in the Departiment to States or for assignment
of oflicers or employees of St ates to the Department shall be made in
accordance with regulations of the Secretary.
"General
"(g) (1) All regulations and amendments thereto with respect to
grants to States under subsect ion (a) shall be hade after consult ation
with a conference of the State henith planning agencies designated
or established pursuant. to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of
subsection (a). All regulat ions and amendments thereto with respect
to grants to States under subsection (d) shall be made after consults-
tion with a conference of State health authorities and, in the case of
regulations and amendments which relate to or in any way affect
n nts for services or other activities in the field of mental health, the
State mental health authorities. Insofar as practicable, the Surgeon
General shall obtain the agreement, prior to the issuance of such regu-
lations or amendments, of the State authorit ies or agencies with whom
such consultation is rMuired.
"(2) The Surgeon General, at the request of any recipient of a
grant under this section, may reduce the payments to such recipient
by the fair market. value of any equipment or supplies furnished to
such recipient and by the amount of the pay, all owaices, traveling
expenses, and any other costs in connection with the detail of an officer
or employee to the recipient when such furnishing or such detail, as
the case may be, is for the convenience of and at the request of such
recipient nud for the purpose of carrying out the State plan or the
project with respect to which the grant under this section is made.
Tihe amount by which such pryments are so reduced shall be available
for payment of such costs (including the costs of such equipment and
supplies) by the Surgeon General, but shall, for purposes of determin-
ing the Federal share-under subsection (a) or (d), bedeemned to have
been aid to the State.
"(3s Whenever tho Surgeon General, after reasonable notice and
opportunity for hearing to the health authority or, where appropri-
ate, the mental health authority of a Siate or a State health planning
agency designated or established pursuant to subparagraph (A) of
paragra)h 2) of subsection (a), finds that, with respect to money
paid to the State out of appropriations under subsection (a) or (d),
there is a failure to conip!y substantially with either-
" the [applicab)e provisions of this section;
" the State plan submitted under such subsection; or
"C applicable regulations under this section;
the Surgeon General shall notify such Stato health authority, mental
health authority,'or health planning agency, as the case may be, that
further payments will not be made to the Statc from appropriations
under such subs;ection (or in his discretion that further pamyments
will not be made to the State from such appropriations for activities
in which there is such failure), until he is satisfied that there will no
Ion -er be such failure. Until ho is so satisfied, the Surge-n General
sha.1 make no payment to such St ate from appropriations under such
subsection, or shall limit payment to activities in which there is no
such failure.
Payment redue-
'ti ons.
Non-Compu-
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"(4) For the purposes of this section--
"Nonpronit." "(A) rThe tern 'nonprofit' as applied to any private agency,
institution, or organization means one which is a corporation or
so SM, m i association or is owned and operated by one or mom corporations
0 STA, 1io or rssociations, no part of the uict earning3 of which inures, or
may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual; and
state," - "(B) The term 'State' includes the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the term 'United States' means the fifty
States and the District of Columbia."
74 Stat. 019.
42 USC 2 4 2g.
CONTINUATION OF GRANTS TO sCHOOLA or PUBLIC HEALTH
SEC. 4. Effective July 1, 19(7, section 300 of the Public Health
Service Act is amended by adding after subsection (b) the following
new subsection:
"(c) There are also authorized to be.appropriated $5,000,000 each
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, to enable the Surgon General
to make grants, under such terns and conditions as may prescribed
by regulations, for provision in public or nonprofit private schools of
public health aecrecited by a body or bodies recognized by the Surgeon
General, of comprehensive professional training, specialized con-
sultive services, and technical assistance in the ficids of public health
and in the administration of State or local public health programs,
except that in allocating funds made available under this subsection
among such schools of public health, the Surgeon General shall give
primary consideration to the number of federally sponsored students
attending each such school."
CONTINUATION OF AUTIOP7MATION FoR TRAININo oF PERsoNNEL FOR STATE
- AND LOCALI HEALTH WoUiN; COOPERATION IsETWFEN THE STATES
SE. 5. (a) Effective July 1, 19G, section 3!1 of the Public Health
Se Stat. 693. Service Act is amended by inserting "(a)" after "311." and by adding
42 USC 243. at the end of such section the following new subsection:
"(b) The Surgeon Generr.l shall encourage cooperative activities
between the States with respect to com prhcnsive and continuing ph.n-
ning as to their current and future health needs, the establishment and
maitenance of adequate public health services, and otherwise carry-
Ante, p. 1181, ing out the purposes of section 314."(b) Effective July 1, 1967, section 311 of the Public Health Service
Act is further amenaed by adding at the end of s-vbsection (b) thereof
the following new sentence: "The Surgeon General is also authorized
to train personnel for State and local health work."
EFTFcrvE DATE AND r.PEALER
Sr. 6. The amendments made by section 3 shall become effeetive as
of July 1, 1900, except that the provisions of section 314 of the
Public Hie.lth Service Act. as in effect prior to the enactiient of
this Act shall be effective until July 1, 1907, in lieu of the provisions of
subsections (d) and (e), r.nd the provisions of subsection (1) inofar
as they rtlate to such subsictions (d) and (e), of section 314 of the
Repeal. Public Health Service Act P-s amended by this-Act. Efiective July 1,
75 Stat. 824; 19G7, .sections 310 and 318 of the Public Scalth Service Act are
78 Stat. 447. repealed.
42 USC 247aj 247c.
* U.
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Swe. 7. Tie proisions enacted by thi Act s1u01 lm u1bjctd. to fle
prvvision! of leorgenizA iou 101inn Nfinnir 3 of 1910.
.Approved November 3, 1966.
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Public Law 90-174
90th Congress, H. R. 6418
December 5, 1967
To amend the Public Health Service Act to exteni and expand the authoriza-
tions for grants for comprehensive health planning and services, to broaden
and improve the authorization for research and demonstrations relating to
the delivery of health servicea, to improve the performance of clinical lab-
oratories, and to authorize cooperative activities between the Public Health
Service hospitals and community facilities, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and H1ouste of Representatites of the
United States of America in Congrees asembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967".
GRANTS FOR COMPREIENiFNIVE IE.ALH PI.ANNING .\ND PUB.IC HE.AALTIl
SERVICFS
SFC. 2. (a) (1) Subsection (a) (1) of section 314 of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 246, as amended by section 3 of the Compre-
hensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments
of 1966, Public Law 89-749) is amended (1) by striking out "1968"
the first. time it. appears and inserting in lieu thereof "1970" and (2) by
striking out "and $5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968
and inserting in lieu thereof "$7,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1968, $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and
$15,0(0),000 for the fiscal year -ending June 30, 1970".
(2) Subsection (a) (2) of such section is amended by redesignating
subparagraphs (1) and (J) as subparagraphs (J) and (K), respec-
tively, and by inserting after subparagraph (H) the following new
paragraph:
"(I) effective July 1, 1968, (i) provide for assisting each
health care facility in the State to develop a program for
capital expenditures for replacement, modernization, and
expansion which is consistent with an overall State plan
developed in accordance with criteria established by the Sec-
retary after consultation with the State which will meet
the needs of the State for health care facilities, equipment,
and services without duplication and otherwise in the most
efficient and economical manner, and (ii) provide that the
State agency furnishing such assistance will periodically
review the program (developed bursuant to clause (i)) of
each health care facility in the State and recommend appro-
priate modification thereof;".
(3) The last sentence of subsection (a) (4) of such section is
amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof ", except
that in the case of the allotments for the fiscal rear ending June 30,
1970, it shall not exceed 75 per centum of such cost'.
(b) (1) Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking out
"1968" the first time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "1970-
and by striking out "and $7,500,000 for the fiscal year ending .June 30,
1968", and inserting in lieu thereof "$7,500,000 for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1968, $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969.
and $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,1970'.
(2) Such subsection (b) is further amended by inserting imine-
diately after "project grants to any other public or nonprofit private
agency or organization ' the following: "(but with appropriate repre-
sentation of the interests of local government where the recipient
of the grant is not a local government or combination thereof or an
agency of such government or combination)".
(c) Subsection (c) of such section is amended by striking out "1968"
the first time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "1970" and by
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striking out "and $2,500,000 for .the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968"
and inserting in lieu thereof "$2,500,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1968, $5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969,
and $7,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970".
(d) (1) Subsection (d) (1) of such section is amended by striking
out "$62,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968," and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "$70,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1968, $90,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and
$100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970,".
(2) Effective July 1, 1968, subsection (d) (5) of such section is
amended by inserting "the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,"
after "American Samoa,".
(3) Subsection (d) (7) of such section is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new sentence: "Effective with respect
to allotments under this subsection for fiscal years ending after June
30, 1968, at least 70 per centum of such amount reserved for mental
health services and at least 70 per centum of the remainder of a State's
allotment under this subsection shall be available only for the provi-
sion under the State plan of services in communities of the State."
(e) Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking out
"$62,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968," and inserting in
lieu thereof "$90,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968,
*95,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and $80,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970,".(f) Effective July 1, 1968, subsection (g) (4) (B) of such section is
amended by inserting "the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,"
after "American Samoa,".(g) Effective July 1, 1967, subsection (c) of section 309 of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 242g(c)), as amended by section 4 of the Comprehen-
sive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of
1966 (Public Law 89-749), is amended by striking out "each" after
"$5,000,000" and by inserting after "the fiscal year ending June 30,
1968," the following: "$6,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1969, and $7,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970,".
RESEARCII AND DEMONSTRATIONS RELATING TO HEALTH FACILITIES AND
SERVICES
SEC. 3. (a) Section 304 (42 U.S.C. 242b) of the Public Health Serv-
ice Act is amended to read as follows:
"RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS RELATING TO HEALTH FACILITIES AND
SERVICES
"SEC. 304. (a) The Secretary is authorized-
"(1) to make grants to States, political subdivisions, univer-
sities, hospitals, and other public or nonprofit private agencie
iistitutions, or organizations for projects for the conduct of
research, experiments, or demonstrations (and related training),
and
"(2) to make contracts with public or private agencies, insti-
tutions, or organizations for the conduct of research, experiments,
or demonstrations (and related training),
relating to the development, utilization, quality, organization, and
financing of services, facilities and resources of hospitals, facilities
for long-term care, or other meaical facilities (including, for purposes
of this section, facilities for the mentally retarded, as defined in the
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers
Construction Act of 1963), agencies, institutions, or organizations or
to development of new methods or improvement of exis'ing methods
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of organization, delivery, or financing of health services, including,
among others-
"(A) projects for the construction of units of hospitals, facili-
ties for long-term care, or other medical facilities which involve
experimental architectural designs or functional layout or use of
new materials or new methods of construction, the efficiency of
which can be tested and evaluated, or which involve the demon-
stration of such efficiency, particularly projects which also in-
volve research, experiments, or demonstrations relating to deliv-
ery of health services, and
"(B) projects for development and testing of new equipment
and systems, including automated equipment, and other new
technology systems or concepts for the delivery of health services,
and
"(C) projects for research and denonstration in new careers
in healti manpower and new ways of educating and utilizing
health manpower.
"(b) Except where the Secretary determines that unusual circum-
stances make a larger percentage necessary in order to effectuate the
purposes of this section, a grant or contract under this section with
respect to any project for construction of a facility or for acquisition
of equipment may not provide for payment of more than 50 per centui
of so much of the cost of the facility or equipment as the Secretary
determines is reasonably attributable to research, experimental, or
demonstration purposes. The provisions of clause (5) of the third
sentence of section 605(a) and such other conditions as the Secretary
may determine shall apply with respect to grants or contracts under
this section for projects for construction of a facility or for acquisi-
tion of equipment.
"(c) Payments of any grants or under any contracts under this
section may be made in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in
such installments and on such conditions as the Secretary deems
necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
"(d) There are authorized to be appropriated for payment of
grants or under contracts under this section $20,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1968, $40,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1969, and $60,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970;
except that, for any fiscal year ending after June 30, 1968, such por-
tions of such sums as the Secretary may determine, but not exce ing
1 per centum thereof, shall be available to the Secretary for evalua-
tion (directly or by grants or contracts) of the program authorized
by this section."
(b) Effective with respect to appropriations for fiscal years ending
after June 30, 1967-
(1) section 624 of such Act is repealed; and
(2) the first sentence of section 314(e) of such Act is amended
by inserting "or" at the end of clause (1), by strikin out clause
(3), by striking out ", or" at the end of clause (2), by inserting
"(including related training)" after "providin services" in
clause (1), and by amending clause (2) to read:' 2) developing
and supporting for an initial period new programs of health
services (including related trainig)".
Any sums appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968,
for carrying out such sections 624 and 314(e) (3 which remain
unobligated on the date of enactment of this Act shall be available
for carrying out section 304 of the Public Health Service Act, and the
total of such sums (and any portion of the appropriations for such
year for such purpose obligated prior to such date of enactment in
carrying out such sections) shall be deducted from the authorization
for such year contained in such section 304.
Cost limi-
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COOPERATION WITH sTATES iN EMERGENCIES
SEC. 4. Section 311 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
243) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(c) The Secret ary may enter into agreements providing for cooper-
ative planning between Public Health Service medical facilities and
community health facilities to cope with health problems resulting
f rom disasters, and for participation by Public Health Service medical
facilities in carrying out such planning. le may also, at the request of
the appropriate State or local authority, extend temporary (not in
excess of forty-five days) assistance to States or localities in meeting
health emergencies of such a nature as to warrant Federal assistance.
The Secretary may require such reimbursement of the United States
for aid (other than planning) under the preceding sentences of this
subsection as he may determine to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Any reimbursement so paid shall be credited to the applicable
appropriation of the Public Health Service for the year in which such
reimbursement. is received."
CLINICAL LABORATORIES IMPROVEMENT
SEc. 5. (a) Part F of title III of the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. 262-3) is amended by changing the title to read: "LICENS-
ING-BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS AND CLINICAL LABORA-
TORIES", and by adding after section 352 (42 U.S.C. 263) the follow-
ing new section
"LICENSING OF LABORATORIES
"SEc. 353. (a) As used in this section-
"(1) the term 'laboratory' or 'clinical laboratory' means a
facility for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical,
imiimuno-hematological, henatologicaf, biophysical, cytological,
pathological, or other examination of materials derived from the
human body, for the purpose of providing information for the
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment
of, or the assessment of the health of, man;
"(2) The term 'interstate commerce' means trade, traffic, com-
mierce, transportation, transmission, or communication between
any State or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside
thereof, or within the District of Columbia.
"(b) (1) No person may solicit'or accept in interstate commerce,(irectly or indirectly, any specimen for laboratory examination or
other laboratory procedures, unless there is in effect a license for such
hiboratory issued by the Secretary under this section applicable to such
procedures.
"(2) The Secretary shall by regulation exempt from the provisions
of this section laboratories whose operations are so small or infrequent
as not to constitute a significant threat to the public health.
"(c) A license issued by the Secretary under this section may be
applicable to all laboratory procedures or only to specified laboratory
procedures or categories of laboratory procedures.
"(d) (1) A license shall not be issued in the case of any clinical
laboratory unless (A) the application therefor contains or is accom-
panied by such information as the Secretary finds necessary, and (B)
the applicant agrees and the Secretary determines that such labora-
tory will be operated in accordance with standards found necessary by
the Secretary to carry out the purposes of this section. Such standards
shall be designed to assure consistent performance by the laboratories
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of accurate laboratory procedures and services, and shall include,
among others, standards to assure-
"(i) maintenance of a quality control program adequate and
appropriate for accuracy of the laboratory procedures and
services;
"(ii) maintenance of records, equipment, and facilities neces-
sary to proper and effective operat ion of the laboratory;
"(iii) qualifications of the director of the laboratory and other
supervisory professional personnel necessary for adequate and
effective professional supervision of the operation of the labora-
tory (which shall include criteria relating to the extent to which
training and experience shall be substituted for education) ; and
"(iv) participation in a proficiency testing program established
by the Secretary.
"(2) A license issued under this section shall be valid for a period
of three years, or such shorter period as the Secretary may establish
for any clinical laboratory or any class or classes thereof; and may
be renewed in such manner as the Secretary may prescribe. The pro-
visions of this section requiring licensing shall not apply to a clinical
laboratory in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Associa-
tion, or a laboratory which has been inspected and accredited by such
commission or association, by the Commission on Inspection and
Accreditation of the College of American Pathologists, or by any
other national accreditation body approved for the purpose by the
Secretary, but only if the standards applied by such commission, asso-
ciation, or other body in determining whether or not to accredit such
hospital or laboratory are equal to or more stringent than the provi-
sions of this section and the rules and regulations issued under this
section, and only if there. is adequate provision for assuring that such
standards continue to be met by such hospital or laboratory; provided
that any such laboratory shall be treated as a licensed laboratory for
all other purposes of this section.
"(3) The Secretary may require payment of fees for the issuance
and renewal of licenses, but the amount of any such fee shall not exceed
$125 per annum.
"(e) A laboratory license may be revoked, suspended, or limited
if the Secretary finds, after reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing to the owner or operator of the laboratory, that such owner
or operator or any employee of the laboratory-
"(1) has been guilty of misrepresentation in obtaining the
license;
"(2) has engaged or attempted to engage or represented him-
self as entitled to perform any laboratory procedure or cate-
gory of procedures not authorized in the license;
"(3) has failed to comply with the standards with respect to
laboratories and laboratory personnel prescribed by the Secre-
tary pursuant to this section;
"(4) has failed to comply with reasonable requests of the
Secretary for any information or materials, or work on materials,
he deems necessary to determine the laboratory's continued eligi-
bility for its license hereunder or continued compliance with the
Secretary's standards hereunder;
"(5) has refused a request of the Secretary or any Federal
officer or employee duly designated by him for permission to in-
spect the laboratory and its operations and pertinent records at
any reasonable tine; or
"(6) has violated or aided and abetted in the violation of any
provisions of this section or of any rule or regulation promulgated
thereunder.
Period of
validity.
License fees.
Revocation, etc.
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Legal procedure. "(f) Whenever the Secretary ias reasoin to believ.e that continua -
tion of any activity by a laboratory licensed under this section would
const it ute an immtninent hazard to t le public health, he imay bring suit
in the district court for the district in which such laboratory is sitiu-
ated to enjoin continuation of such activity and, upoii proper showing,
a temporary injunction or restraining order against continuation of
such activity pending issuance of a fiial order under this section shall
be granted without bond by such court.
Judicial review. "(g) (1) Any party aggrieved by any final action taken under sub-
section (e) of this section may at any time within sixty days after tie
date of such action file a petition with the United States court of
appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal
place of business, for judicial review of such action. A copy of the
petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the
.ecretary or other officer designated by him for that purpose. The
Secretary thereupon shall file in the court the record on which the
action of the Secretary is based, as provided in section 2112 of title 28,
72 Stat. 941; United States Code.
80 Stat. 1323. "(2) If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to adduce addi-
tional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the court that such
additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds
for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the
Secretary, the court may order such additional evidence (and evidence
in rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Secretary, and to be adduced
upon the hearing in such maier and upon such terms and conditions
as the court may deem proper. The Secretary may modify his find-
ings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional
evidence so taken, and lie shall file such modified or new findings, and
his recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of
his original action, with the return of such additional evidence.
"(3) Upon the filing of the petition referred to in paragraph (1)
of this subsection, the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the action,
or to set it aside in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently.
The findings of the Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substan-
tial evidence, shall be conclusive.
"(4) The judgment of the court affirming or setting aside, in whole
or in part, any such action of the Secretary shall be final, subject to
review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or
62 Stat. 928. certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United States Code.
Penalty. "(h) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this sec-
tion or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall on conviction thereof be subject to impris-
onment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000,
or both such imprisonment and fine.
Exemptions. "(i) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any clinical
laboratory operated by a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, or
podiatrist, or group thereof, who performs or perform laboratory tests
or procedures, personally or through his or their employees, solely
as an adjunct to the treatment of his or their own patients; nor shall
such provisions apply to any laboratory with respect to tests or other
procedures made by it for any person engaged in the business of insur-
ance if made solely for purposes of determining whether to write an
insurance contract or of determining eligibility or continued eligi-
bility for payments thereunder.
"(j) In carrying out his functions under this section, the Secretary
is authorized, pursuant to agreement, to utilize the services or facilities
of any Federal or State or local public agency or nonprofit private
agency or organization, and may pay therefor in advance or by way
of reimbursement, and in such installments, as lie may determine.
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"(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the
power of any State to enact and enforce laws relating to the matters
covered by this section to the extent that such laws are not inconsistent
with the rovisions of this section or with the rules and regulations
issued under this section.
"(1) Where a State has enacted or hereafter enacts laws relating
to matters covered by this section, which provide for standards equal
to or more stringent than the provisions of this section or than the
rules and regulations issued under this section, the Secretary may
exempt clinical laboratories in that State from compliance with this
sect ion.
(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall become effective
on the first (lay of the thirteenth month after the nionth in which it
is enacted, except that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare may postpone such effective date for such additional period as he
finds necessary, but not beyond the first (lay of the 19th month after
such month in which the amendment is enacted.
(e) This section may be cited as the "Clinical Laboratories Improve-
ient Act of 1967".
VOLUNTEER SERVICES
SEc. 6. Title II of the Public Health Service Act is amended by
adding after section 222 (42 U.S.C. 217a) the following new section:
"VOLUNTEER SERVICES
"SEC. 223. Subject to regulations, volunteer and uncompensated
services may be accepted by the Secretary, or by any other officer or
employee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare des-
ignated by him, for use in the operation of any health care facility or in
the provision of health care."
COOPERATION AS TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES AND RESOURCES
SEC. 7. Part C of title III of the Public Health Service Act is
amended by adding after section 327 (42 U.S.C. 254) the following new
section:
"SHARING OF MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES AND RESOURCES
"SEC. 328. (a) For purposes of this section-
"(1) the term 'specialized health resources' means health care
resources (whether equipment, space, or personnel) which, because
of cost, limited availability, or unusual nature, are either unique
in the health care community or are subject to maximum utiliza-
tion only through mutual use;
"(2) the term 'hospital', unless otherwise specified, includes
(in addition to other hospitals) any Federal hospital.
"(b) For the purpose of maintaining or improving the quality of
care in Public Health Service facilities and to provide a professional
environment therein which will help to attract and retain highly
qualified and talented health personnel, to encourage mutually bene-
ficial relationships betveen Public Health Service facilities and hos-
pitals and other health facilities in the health care community, and
to promote the full utilization of hospitals and other health facilities
and resources, the Secretary may-
"(1) enter into agreements or arrangements with schools of
medicine, and with other health schools, agencies, or institutions,
for such interchange or cooperative use of facilities and services on
a reciprocal or reimbursable basis, as will be of benefit to the
Effective date.
Short title.
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547
Pub. Law 90-174
81 STAT, 540
- 8 - December 5, 1967
Ante p .
5 34
.
Ante pp. 534,
535.
Ante, P. 534.
79 Stat. 448.
58 Stat. 697.
80 Stat. 600.
trainigiv or research programs of the participating agencies; and
"2) enter into agreements or arrangemients with hospitals and
other health care facilities for the nutual use or the exchange of
use of specialized health resources, and providing for reciprocal
reimbursement.
Any reimbursement pursuant to any such agreement or arrangement
shall be based on charges covering the reas)oilable cost of such utiliza-
tion, including normal depreciation and amortization costs of equip-
ment. Any proceeds to the Government under this sulbsection shall be
credited to the applicable appropriation of the Public Health Service
for the year in which such proceeds are received."
PROGRAM EVALUA'ION
SEc. 8. (a) Paragraph (1) of section 314(d) of the Public Health
Service Act is amended by inserting before the period at the end
thereof the following: ", except that, for any fiscal year ending after
June 30, 1968, such portion of such sums as the Secretary may deter-
mine, but not exceeding 1 per centum thereof, shall be available to the
Secretary for evaluation (directly or by grants or contracts) of the
program authorized by this subsection and the amount available for
allotments hereunder shall be reduced accordingly".
(b) Section 314(e) of such Act is amended by inserting at the end
thereof the following new sentence: "For any fiscal year ending after
June 30, 1968, such portion of the appropriations for grants under this
subsection as the Secretary may determine, but not exceeding 1 per
centum thereof, shall be available to the Secretary for eva luatio
(directly or by grants or contracts) of the program authorized by this
subsection."
(c) Section 309(c) of such Act is amended by inserting "(1)" after
"except that" and by inserting before the period at the end thereof
the following: ", and (2) for any fiscal year ending after June 30,
1968, such portions of the funds made available under this subsection
as the Secretary may determine, but not exceeding 1 per centun
thereof, shall be available to the Secretarv for evaluation (directly or
by grants or contracts) of the program aithorized by this subsection".
RESEARCH CONTRACT AUTTHORITY
SEC. 9. Paragraph (h) of section 301 of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 241) is amended by striking out "two succeeding fiscal
years" and by inserting in lieu thereof "five succeeding fiscal years".
MEDICAL CARE FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AT REMOTE STATIONS OF THE
SERVICE
SEC. 10. (a) 'Section 324 of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 251) is amended by inserting "(a)" immediately after "SEC.
324." and by redesignating clauses (a) through (d) of such section,
and references thereto, as clauses (1) through (4).
(b) Section 324 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) The Secretary is authorized to provide medical, surgical, and
dental treatment and hospitalization and optometric care for Federal
employees (as defined in section 8901(1) of title 5 of the United States
Code) and their dependents at remote medical facilities of the Public
Health Service where such care and treatment are not otherwise avail-
able. Such employees and their dependents who are not entitled to this
care and treatment under any other provision of law shall be charged
for it at rates established by the Secretary to reflect the reasonable cost
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of providing the care and treatment. Any payments pursuant to the
preceding sentence shall be credited to the applicable appropriation to
the Public Health Service for the year in which such payments are
received."
(c) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of section 322 of such Act is
amended to read as follows:
"(7) Seamen-trainees, while participating in maritime training
programs to develop or enhance their employability in the maritime
industry; and".
PROJ.ECTS FOR HOSPIT.\L EXPERIMENTATION, LO.ANS FOR INCREASED COSTS
SEC. 11. Title VI of the Public Health Service Act is amended by
inserting innnediately after section 623 the following new section:
.ANS FOR CERTAIN HOSPITA.L EXPERIMENTATION IROJECTS
"SEC. 623A. (a) In order to alleviate hardship on any recipient of a
grant under section 636 of this title (as in effect immediately before
the enactment of the Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of
1964) for a project for the construction of an experimental or demon-
stration facility having as its specific purpose the application of novel
imeans for the reduction of hospital costs with respect to which there
has been a substantial increase in the cost. of such construction (over
the estimated cost of such project on the basis of which such grant was
made) through no fault of such recipient, the Secretary is authorized
to make a loan to such recipient not exceeding 66% per centum of such
increased costs, as determined by the Secretary, if the Secretary deter-
mines that such recipient is unable to obtain such an amount for such
purpose from other public or private sources.
"(b) Any such loan shall be made only on the basis of an application
submitted to the Secretary in such form and containing such informa-
t ion and assurances as he may prescribe.
"(c) Each such loan shall bear interest at the rate of 21/2 per
centum per annum on the unpaid balance thereof and shall be re-
payable over a period determined by the Secretary to be appropriate,
ut not exceeding fifty years.
"(d) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated $3,500,000 to
carry out the provisions of this section."
MINOR OR TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
SEc. 12. (a) Section 806(c) (1) of the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. 296e(c) (1)) is amended by inserting after "from a loan
fund established.pursuant to section 822" the following: "or from sums
paid by the Secretary from the revolving fund created by section
827(d), or a nursing educational opportunity grant payment made
pursuant to section 862".
(b) The second sentence of section 312 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
244) is amended by inserting "and officials of other State or local
public or private agencies, institutions, or organizations" after "such
health authorities".
(c) Section 725(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 293e(a)) is amended by
striking out "twelve" and inserting in lieu thereof "thirteen".
(d) Section 314(f) of such Act is amended by-
(1) inserting "for"before "the expenses of travel" in para-
graph (5) -
(2) striking out "Service' and inserting in lieu thereof "De-
piartment" in paragraphs (6) and (8).
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"Training oenter (e) Section 795(1) (A) (ii) of such Act is amended to read as fol-
for allied health lows: "(ii) of education in optometric technolog , dental hygiene,
professions." or curriculums as are specified by regulation, an'
80 Stat, 1228. (f) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be effective as of
42 USC 295h-4. November 3, 1966.
Effeotive date. COMPREIENSIVE SURVEY
Report to SEC. 14. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in con-
Congress. sultation and cooperation with other officials of the Federal Govern-
ment and of the States, shall make a comprehensive survey of the
incidence and location of serious hunger and malnutrition and health
problems incident thereto in the United States and shall report his
findings and recommendations for dealing with these conditions to
the Congress within six months from the date of enactment of this
section.
MEANING OF SECRETARY
SEC. 15. As used in the amendments made by this Act, the term
"Secretary" means the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Approved December 5, 1967.
LEGISLATIVE ISTORY:
M)USE REPORTS$ No. 538 (Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commeroe) and
No. 974 (Conu. of Conferenoe).
SENATE REPORT No. 724 (Com. on Labor & Publio Welfare).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 113 (1967):
Sept. 19, 20: Considered and passed House.
Nov. 6: Considered and passed Senate, amended.
Nov. 21: House and Senate agreed to conferenoe report.
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Public Law 91-515
91st Congress, H. R. 17570
October 30, 1970
To amend titles III and IX of the Public Health Service Act so as to revise,
extend, and improve the programs of research, investigation, education,
training, and demonstrations authorized thereunder, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the $enate and House of Repre8entatives of the
U nited State8 of America in Congress assem bled, Public Health
Service Act,
TITLE I-AMENDMENTS TO TITLE IX OF THE PUBLIC amendments.
HEALTH SERVICE ACT
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Heart Disease, Cancer, Citation of
Stroke, and Kidney Disease Amendments of 1970". title.
SEC. 102. Section 900 of the Public Health Service Act is amended 79 Stat. 926.
to read as follows: 42 USC 299.
4PURPOSES
"SEC. 900. The purposes of this title are-
"(a) through grants and contracts, to encourage and assist in
the establishment of regional cooperative arrangements among
medical schools, research institutions, and hospitals for research
and training (including continuing education), for medical data
exchan e, and for demonstrations of patient care in the fields of
heart disease. cancer, stroke, and kidney disease, and other
related diseases; 84 STAT. 1297
"(b) to afford to the medical profession and the medical insti- 84 STAT. 1298
tutions of -the Nation, through such cooperative arrangements,
the opportunity of making available to their patients the latest
advances in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment and reha-
bilitation of persons suffering from these diseases;
"(c) to promote and foster regional linkages among health
care institutions and providers so as to strengthen and improve
primary care and the relationship between specialized and pri-
mary care; and
"(d) by these means, to improve generally the quality and
enhance the capacity of the health manpower and facilities
available to the Nation and to improve health services for
persons residing in areas with limited health services, and to
accomplish these ends without interfering with the patterns,
or the methods of financing, of patient care or, professional
practice, or with the administration of hospitals, an in cooper-
ation with practicing physicians, medical center officials, hospi-
tal administrators, and representatives from appropriate
voluntary health agencies."
SEC. 103. a) (1) The first sentence of section 901(a) of such Appropriations.Act is amended by striking out "and" immediately after "June 30, 82 Stat. 1005.1969,", and by inserting immediately before ", for grants" 42 USC 299a.
the following: ", $125,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971,$150,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and $250,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973".
(2) Such first sentence is further amended by striking out the period
after "title" and inserting in lieu thereof "and for contracts to carry
out the purposes of this title."
(3) Such section 901 (a) is amended by striking out the second Funds, limi-
sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Of the sums tation.
appropriated under this section for the fiscal year ending June 30,1971,
not more than $15,000,000 shall be available for activities in the field
52-067 0
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of kidne <itc% . ( )f tIe suins appropriate(l unierI tis 'sect ion for aIyI
fiscal vyelfr ei Inmg after .1 ine 30, 1970, not ilore t0hani $5,Ii0(x0 ma11'y
be timide a vailable in aIny su1chl fiscal year for grants for Iewv
const ruct ion.
79 Stat. 926; (1)) Sect ion 901 of such Act is further amiffended by adding at tlie
82 Stat. 1006. end thereof the following new subsection:
42 'SC 299a. "(e) At the request of any recipient of a grant under this title, the
paynents to such recipient may be reduced by tlie fair market value of
any equipment, supplies, or services furnished by the Secretary to such
recipient and by the amount of the pay, allowance, traveling expenses,
and any other costs in connection with the detail of an officer or em-
ploy ee of the Government to the recipient when such furnishing or
84 STAT. 1298 such detail, as the case may be, is for the convenience of and at the
84 STAT. 1299 request of such recipient and for the purpose of carrying out the
regional medical program to which the grant under this title is made."
42 USC 299b. SEC. 104. Section 902(a) of such Act is amended by striking out
"training, diagnosis, and treatment relating to heart disease, cancer,
or stroke, and, at the option of the applicant, related disease or
diseases" and inserting in lieu thereof "training, prevention, diagnosis,
treatment, and rehabilitation relating to heart disease, cancer, stroke,
or kidney disease and, at the option of the applicant, other related
diseases".
(b) Section 902(f) is amended by striking out "includes" and
inserting in lieu thereof "means new construction of facilities for
demonstrations, research, and training when necessary to carry out
regional medical programs".
42 USC 299o. SEc. 105. Section 903(b) (4) of such Act is amended-(1) by striking out "voluntary health agencies, and" and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "voluntary or official health agencies, health
planning agencies, and";
(2) by inserting immediately after "under the program", where
it first appears therein, the following: "(including as an ex officio
member, if there is located in such region one or more hospitals or
other health facilities of the Veterans' Administration, the indi-
vidual whom the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall have
designated to serve on such advisory group as the representative
of the hospitals or other health care facilities of such Adniin-
istration which are located in such region)": and
(3) by striking out "need for the services provided under the
program" and inserting in lieu thereof "need for and financing of
the services provided under the program, and which advisory
group shall be sufficient in number to insure adequate community
orientation (as determined by the Secretary)".
SEC. 106. That part of the second sentence of section 904(b) of such
42 USC 299d. Act. preceding paragraph (1) is amended by striking out "section
903(b) (4) and" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "section
903(b) (4), if opportunity has been provided, prior to such recom-
inendation, for consideration of the application by each public or non-
profit private agency or organization which has developed a compre-
hensive regional, metropolitan area, or other local area plan referred
to in section 314(b) covering any area in which the regional medical
program for which the application is made will be located, and if the
application".
National Ad- SEC. 107. (a) Section 905(a) of such Act is amended to read as
visory Council follows:
on Regional "SEC. 905. (a) The Secretary may appoint, without regard to the
Medical Pro- civil service laws, a National Advisory Council on Regional Medical
grams. Programs. The Council shall consist of the Assistant Secretary of
42 USC 299e. Health, Education, and Welfare for Health and Scientific Affairs, 'who
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shal be he the tle lief Medical I )iIect or of tle Veterans'
Adliilistration who shall be anl ex oflicio Imeiber, and twenitv imieimi-
hers, iot otlerwise in the regular full-time employ of the Inited
States, who arec leaders inl tle fields of tle fiuid:ailleital scielnces, tile
Imledical scielces, health care aliilistr-atiol, or pliliic affairs. At least
two of lhe alppoinited mIieibers shiall be practicinhg physicials. oile shall
be outstaldilg inl tlie study orIi healti care of perisons su1thrin g fr oll
heart disease, oie shall be outstanding ill the study or lealtI care of
persons siflering froimi canner, one shall ie olitstalding inl tle stildy
or iealthI care of persois suffering from stroke, one shall be outstaid-
ing in the study or health care of persons suffering from kidney
disease, two shiall le outstanding in the field of prevention of heart
disease, cancer, stroke, or kidiney disease, and four shall be meubers
of the publi.'
(b) Of the >ersons first appoiited under section 905(a) of the Term of
Public Iealtl Service Act to serve as the four additional lielilers of office.
the Natioial Advisory Council on Regional Medical Programs author-
ized bY the aimellnient made by subsection (a) of this section-
(I ) oie shall serve for a term of one year,(2) oie shall serve for a term of two years,(3) one sliall serve for a term of three years, and
(4) one shall serve for a term of four years,
as desigiated by the Secretary of Health, Educatioi, aid Welfare at
the tiie of appointimielnt.
( ) Meibers of the National Advisory Couicil Oil Regioial Medical
Prograilis (thiler tliiim the urgeon Gelleral) in office oil the date of
ellactilelnt of this Act slall continie ill office ill accordance witli the
ter i of office for wich tihey were last appoiited to tile Council.
SEc. 108. Section1 907 of such Act is aneinded iy striking out "or 79 Stat. 930.
" aind iiserting in lieu thereof "stroke, or ki(iey disease,".
-t roke, ae . 42 USC 299g.
SEC. 149. SeCtion 909(a) of suchl Act is amended by in-:ertinlg "or 42 USC 2991.
coitract" after "graint each place it appears thereil.
SEc. 11). (a) Section 910 of such Act is ameided to read as follows: 82 Stat. 1006.
42 USC 299j.
"MUilr1PRo(G*RAM SERVICES
"Sic. 910. (a) To facilitate interregiolal cooperation, and develop
improved national capability for delivery of health services, the Secre-
tarv is authorized to utilize funds appropriated under this title to make
gri'aits to public or nonprofit private agencies or institutions or com-
binations thereof and to contract for-
"(1) programs, services, and activities of substantial use to
two or more regional imedical programs;
"(2) development, trial, or demonstration of methods for con-
tirol of hea rt disease, cancer, stroke, kidney disease, or other related
diseases:
-(3) tile collection and study of epidemiologic data related to
any of the diseases referred to in paragraph (2);
-(4) development of training specifically related to the pre-
vention, diagnosis, or treatment of any of the diseases referred
to in paragraph (2), or to the rehabilitation of persons suffering
froim any of such diseases: and for continuing programs of such
training where shortage of trained personnel would otherwise
limit application of knowledge and skills important to the control
of any of such diseases: and
"(5) the conduct of cooperative clinical field trials.
"(b) The Secretary is authorized to assist in meeting the costs of
special projects for improving or developing new means for the deliv-
ery of health services concerned with the diseases with which this title
is concerned.
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"(c) The Secretary is authorized to support research, studies,
investigations, training, and demonstrations designed to maximize
the utilization of manpower in the delivery of health services."
SEC. 111. (a) The headin r to title IX of such Act is amended by
striking out -STROKE, A. 1) RELATED DISEASES" and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "STROKE, KIDNEY DISEASE, AND OTHER
RELATED DISEASES".
42 USc 2Q9b- (b) Sections 902(a), 903(a), 903(b), 904(a), 904(b), 905(b),
299g, 2991. 905(d), 906, 907, and 909 (a) of such Act (as amended by the preceding
provisions of this Act) are each further amended by striking out
"Surgeon General", each place it appears therein and inserting in lieu
thereof "Secretary".
TITLE II-AMENDIMENTS TO TITLE III OF
HEALTH SERVICE ACT
81 Stat. 534.
42 usc 242b.
Report to
congress,
THE PUBLIC
PART A-RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS RELATING TO HEALTH
FACILITIES AND SERVICES
SEC. 201. (a) (1) Section 304(a) of the Public Health Service Act
is amended-
(A) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "SEC. 304. (a)";
(B) by redesignating clauses (1) and (2) as clauses (A) and
(B), respectively; and
(C) by redesignating clauses (A), (B), and (C) as clauses
(i), (ii), and (iii), respectively.
(2) Section 304(b) of such Act is amended-
(A) by striking out "(b)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(2)";
and
(B) by striking out "this section" each place it appears therein
and inserting in lieu thereof "this subsection".
(3) Section 304(c) of such Act is amended-
(A) by striking out "(c)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3)";
and
(B) by striking out "this section" each place it appears therein
and inserting in lieu thereof "this subsection".
(b) Section 304 of such Act is further amended by adding after the
provision thereof redesignated as paragraph (3) by subsection
(a) (3) (A) of this section the following new subsection:
"Systems Analysis of National Health Care Plans
(b) (1) (A) The Secretary shall develop, through utilization of
the systems analysis method, plans for health care systems designed
adequately to meet the health needs of the American people. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, the systems analysis method
means the analytical method by which various means of obtaining a
desired result or goal is associated with the costs and benefits involved.
"(B) The Secretary shall complete the development of the plans
referred to in subparagraph (A), within such period as may be neces-
sary to enable him to submit to the Congress not later than Septem-
ber 30, 1971, a report thereon which shall describe each plan so
developed in ternis of-
"(i) the number of people who would be covered under the
plan:
"(ii) the kind and type of health care which would be covered
under the plan ;
"(iii) the cost involved in carrying out the plan and how such
costs would be financed;
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"iv) the muinber of additional phyicians and othier health
care personnel aid the nuntiber and type of health care facilities
neede(d to enable the plan to lecomiie fully effective:
-. v) the new and improved methods, if any, of delivery of
health care services wliichi would be developed in order to effec-
tuate tle plan:
(vi) tle acevssibiility of the benefits of such plan to various
SOC ioeConomici classes of persons;
-(vii) the relative effectiveness and efficiency of such plan as
c(omflpared to existing imeans of financing and delivering health
care: and'
( iii) the legislative, administrative, and other actions which
w ouil1d be necessary to implement the plan.
"(C) In order to as'sure that the advice and service of experts in
ihe various fields concerned will he obtained in the plans authorized
by this paragraph and that the purposes of this paragraph will fully
be carried out-
"(i) the Secretary shall utilize, whenever appropriate, per-
sonunel from the various agencies, bureaus, and other depart-
iental sul)(hvisions of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare:
-(ii) the Secretary is authorized, with the consent of the head
of the departiment or agency involved, to utilize (on a reim-
hursable basis) the personnel and other resources of other de-
partmuents and agencies of the Federal Government: and
"(iii) the Secretary is authorized to consult with appropri-
ate State or local public agencies, private organizations, and
individuals.
-Cost and Coverage Report on Existing Legislative Proposals
(2) (A) The Secretary shall, in accordance with this paragraph, National Y
mnduct a study of each legislative proposal which is introduced in insur-ance
the Senate or the iiHouse of Representatives during the Ninety-first legislati
Congress, and which undertakes to establish a national health in- stuIdy-
surance plan or similar plan designed to meet the needs of health
insurance or for health services of all or the overwhelming majority
of the people of the United States.
"(B) In conducting such study with respect to each such legislative
proposal, the Secretary shall evaluate and analyze such proposal with
a view to determining-
"(i) the costs of carrying out the proposal; and
"(ii) the adequacy of the proposal in terms of (I) the portion
of the population covered by the proposal, (II) the type health
care provided, paid for, or insured against under the proposal,
(III) whether, and if so, to what extent, the proposal provides
for the development of new and improved methods for the de-
livery of health care and services.
"(C) Not later than March 31, 1971, the Secretary shall submit to Report to
the Congress a report on each legislative proposal which he has been Congress.
directed to study under this paragraph, together with an analysis and
evaluation of such proposal.
(c) Subsection (d) of section 304 of such Act is hereby redesignated Appropria
as subsection (c) and is amended to read as follows: 81 Stat.
"(c) (1) There are authorized to be appropriated for payment of 42 UsC 24
grants or under contracts under subsection (a), and for purposes of
carrving out the provisions of subsection (b), $71,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1971 (of which not less than $2,000,000 shall be
available only for purposes of carrying out the provisions of subsection
health
plan
on,
tion.
534.
2b.
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b)), $82,00,) for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and
$94,000,0H) for t lie fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.
(2) In addition to tle funds authorized to be appropriatd uinder
paragraph (1) to carry out t ie provisiois of subsec t ion (b) there are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to carry out Such provisionls for
each fiscal year sichi sums as may be necessary.
Effeotive date. (d) The amendments made by subsection () of this sectioi shall be
effective only with respect to fiscal years eni(ling after .June 30, 1970.
SEc. 202. That. provision of section 304 of the Public Health Service
Ante, p. oi. Act redesignated by section 201 (a) of this Act as paragraph (3) of
subsetion (a) is further amended-
(1) by inserting "(A)" immediately after "(3)": and
(2) by adding after and below such provision the following
new subparagraph:
"(B) The amounts otherwise payable to any person under a grant
or contract made under this subsection shall be reduced by-
"(i) amounts equal to the fair market value of any equipment
or supplies furnished to such person by the Secretary for the pur-
pose of carrying out the project with respect to which such grant
or contract is made, and
"(ii) amounts equal to the pay, allowances, traveling expenses,
and related personnel expenses attributable to the performance of
services by an officer or employee of the Government in connection
with such project, if such officer or employee was assigned or
detailed by the Secretary to perform such services,
but only if such person requested the Secretary to furnish such equip-
ment or supplies, or such services, as the case may be."
SFA. 203. That provision of section 304 of the Public Health Service
Act redesignated by section 201(a) of this Act as paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) is further amended by-
(1) striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in
lieu thereof ", and"*; and
(2) adding after and below the clause thereof redesignated by
such section 201 (a) as clause (iii) the following new clauses:
"(iv) projects for research, experiments, and demonstrations
dealing with the effective combination or coordination of public,
private, or combined public-private methods or systems for the
delivery of health services at regional, State, or local levels, and
"(v) projects for research and demonstrations in the provision
of home health services."
PARr B--NATIONAL HEALTH SURvEYS AND STUDIES
70 Stat. 490.
42 USC 242o.
SEC. 210. (a) (1) Clause (1) of subsection (a) of section 305 of the
Public Health Service Act is amended by striking out "and" before
"(E) *, and by inserting after the semicolon at the end of such clause
the following: "(F) health care resources: (G) environmental and
social health hazards: and (H1) family formation, growth, and
dissolution:".
(2) Such suibsect ion is further amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new sentence: "No information obtained in accordance
with this paragraph may be used for any purpose other than the
statistical purposes for which it was supplied except pursuant to regu-
lations of the Secretary; nor may any such information be published
if the particular establishment or person supplying it is identifiable
except with the consent of such establishment or person.
(b) Section 305 is further amended by redesignating subsections
(b), (c), and (d) as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively, and
by adding after subsection (a) the followig new subsection:
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(b) Ihle Secretary is autlorize(l, directly or by coltract, to under-
take research, developiment, demonstration, aid evaluation, relating to
tlie design and iimpleientation of a cooperativ-e system for producing
omiparable and uniformi health informiation a'nd statistics at the
Federal. State, and local levels."
(c) Tle subsection of such section 305 redesignated (by subsection Appropriation.
I b) of this section) as subsection (d) is amended to read as follows:
(d) There are aut horized to be appropriated to carry out this see-
ion $15,000,000 for t he fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, $20,000,000
foI' the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and $25,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending .June 30, 1973."
PART C-GRANms TO STATES FOR COMPREIENSIVE STATE HEALTH
PLANNING
SEc. 220. (a) (1) The first sentence of yection 314(a) (1) of the
Public Health Service Act is amended by striking out "June 30, 1970"
and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1973".
(2) The second sentence of such section 314(a) (1) is amended by
striking out "and $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970"
and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "$15,000,000 for the fiscal
year. ending June 30, 1970, $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
-I tine 30, 1971, $17,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and
-20,000,,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973".
(b) Section 314(a) (2) (B) of such Act is amended by striking out
'State and local agencies" and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal, State,
and local agencies (including as an ex oflicio member, if there is located
in such State one or more hospitals or other health care facilities of the
Veterans' Administ ration, the individial whom the Administrator of
Veterans' Atairs shall have designated to serve on such council as the
relresentative of the hospitals or other health care facilities of-such
A(lninistration which are located in such State)".
(c) Section 314(a) (2) (B) of such Act (as amended by subsection
(b) of this section) is further amended by inserting "(including
Tepresentation of the regional medical program or programs included
in whole or in part within the State)" immediately after "concerned
with health'.
(d) Section 314(a) (2) (C) of such Act is amended (1) by inserting
"and including home health care" immediately after "private", and
(2) by inserting immediately before the semicolon at the end thereof
the following: "and including environmental considerations as they
relate to public health".
PART 1)-PROJECT GRANTS FOR AREAWIDE HEALTH PLANNING
SEC. 230. Section 314(b) of the Public Health Service Act is
amended-
(1) by striking out, in the first sentence thereof, "June 30,
1970" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1973";
(2) by inserting after the word "services" the second place it
appears therein, the phrase "and including the provision of such
services through home health care";
(3) by striking out, in the second sentence thereof, "and
$15,000 000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970" and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "$15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970, $20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971
$30,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and
$40,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973";
(4) by inserting "(1) (A)" immediately after "(b)"; and
80 Stat. 1181;
81'Stat. 533.
42 Usc 246.
80 Stat. 1183;
Ante, p. 340.
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(5) by adding after and below the existing language contained
therein the following:
"(B) Project grants may be made by the Secretary under subpara-
graph (A ) to tTie State agency administerimg or supervising the
administration of the State plan approved under subsection (a) with
respect to a particular region or area, but only if (i) no application
for such a grant with respect to such region or area has been filed by
any other agency or organization qualified to receive such a grant, and
(ii~) such State agency certifies, and the Secretary finds, that ample
opportunity has been afforded to qualified agencies and organizations
to file application for such a grant with respect to such region or area
and that it is improbable that, in the foreseeable future, any agency
or organization which is qualified for such a grant will file application
therefor.
"(2) (A) In order to be approved under this subsection, an applica-
tion for a grant under this subsection must contain or be supported by
reasonable assurances that there has been or will be established, in or
for the area with respect to which such grant is sought., an areawide
health planning council. The membership of such council shall include
representatives of public, voluntary, and nonprofit private agencies,
institutions, and organizations concerned with health (including rep-
resentatives of the interests of local governmentof the regional med-
ical program for such area, and of consumersrbf health services). A
majority of the members of such council shall consist of representatives
of consumers of health services.
"(B) In addition, an application for a grant under this subsection
must contain or be supported by reasonable assurances that the area-
wide health planning agency has made provision for assisting health
care facilities in its area to develop a program for capital expenditures
for replacement, modernization, and expansion which is consistent
with an overall State plan which will meet the needs of the State and
the area for health care facilities, equipment, and services without
duplication and otherwise in the most efficient and economical manner."
PART E-PROJEcT GRANTS FOR TRAINING, STUDIES AND
DEMONSTRATIONS
80 Stat. 1183; SEc. 240. Section 314 (c) of the Public Health Service Act is
81 Stat. 533. amended-
42 USC 246, (1) by striking out, in the first sentence thereof, "June 30, 1970"
and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1973"; and
(2) by striking out, in the second sentence thereof, "and
$7,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970" and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "$7,500,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970, $8,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971,
$10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,1972, and $12,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973".
PART F-GRANTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
SEC. 250. (a) Section 314(d) (1) of the Public Health Service Act is
amended by striking out "and $100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970" and inserting in lieu thereof "$100,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1970, $130,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1971, $145,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972,
and $165,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973".
(b) Section 314(d) (2) (C) of such Act is amended (1) by striking
out "and (iii)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(iii)" and (2) by insert-
ing before the semicolon at the end thereof the following: "; and (iv)
the plan is compatible with the total health program of the State".
558
October 30, 1970 - 9 - Pub. Law 91-515
84 STAT. 1306
P%RT ( -Puojecr ( iORs r(n IIiai~ri S:lvies I)E11orrENT
SF(c. 260. (a) Section 314(e) of the Public Health Service Act is
:inended by striking out "and" immediatelv after ",June 30, 1969," andl
insertig after ".ne 30, 1970," te following: "$109,500,000 for
thle fiscat ar ending .une 30, 1971, $13.5,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending 'June 30, 1972, and $157,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
.hie 30. I 973.".
(b) 'Flite first sentence of 314(e) is further amended by inserting
inmmediately after "cost" tie following: "(including equity require-
m1ieits and amortization of loans on facilities acquired from the Office
of Economic Opportunity or construction in connection with any
progran or project transferred from the Office of Economic
Opportunity)".
(c) (1) T'he second sentence of such section is amended to read as
follows: "Any grant made under this subsection may be made only
if tile application for such grant has been referred for review and
coimment, to the appropriate areawide health planning agency or agen-
cies (or, if there is no such agency in the area, then to such other public
or nonprofit private agehicy or organization (if any) which performs
similar functions) an only if the services assisted under such grant
will be provided in accordance with such plans as have been developed
pursuant to subsection (a)."
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall be effective with
respect to grants under section 314(e) of the Public Health Service
Act which are made after the date of enactment of this Act.
PART Hl--AD311NSTRATION OF GRANTS IN CERTAIN MULTRiANT
PRoJECTS
80
81
42
Effective date,
Siec. 270. Part A of title III of the Public Health Service Act is 58 Stat. 691;
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section: 76 Stat. 592.
42 USC 241.
"Administ ration of Grants in Certain Multigrant Projects 242h.
"SEC. 310A. For the purpose of facilitating the administration of,
and expediting the carrying out of the purposes of, the programs
established by title IX, and sections 304, 314(a), 314(b), 314(c),314(d), and 314(e) of this Act in situations in which grants are sought Ante. pp. 1297,
or made under two or more of such programs with respect to a single 1304.
project, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations-
"(1) under which the administrative functions under such
programs with respect to such project will be performed by a
single administrative unit which is the administrative unit
charged with the administration of any of such programs or is
the administrative unit charged with the supervision of two or
more of such programs;
"(2) designed to reduce the number of applications, reports,
and other materials required under such programs to be sub-
mitted with respect to such project, and otherwise to simplify,
consolidate, and make uniform (to the extent feasible), the data
and information required to be contained in such applications,
reports, and other materials; and
"(3) under which inconsistent or duplicative requirements im-
posed by such programs will be revised and made uniform with
respect to such project;
except that.nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize theSeeretary to waive or suspend, with respect to any such project, any
requirement with respect to any of such programs if such requirement
is imposed by law or by any regulation required by law."
Stat. 1186;
Stat. 534.
USC 246,
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PART I-ANN VAL IIIEPORT, NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCH., E'C.
SEc. 280. Part A of title III of the Public Health Service Act. is
further amended by adding after section 310A thereof (as added by
section 270 of this Act) the following new section:
"Annual Report
Ante pp. 1297,
1304.
58 Stat. 691.
42 USC 241.
Appointment.
Members.
Tenn.
35 F. R. 6247.
5 USC 5332 note.
"310B. On or before January 1 of each year, the Secretary shall
transmit to the Congress a report of the activities carried on under
the provisions of title IX of this Act and sections 304, 305, 314(a),
314(b), 314(c) 314(d), and 314(e) of this title together with (1) an
evaluation of the effectiveness of such activities in improving the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the research, planning, and delivery of
health services in carrying out the purposes for which such provisions
were enacted, (2) a statement of the relationship between Federal
financing and financing from other sources of the activities under-
taken pursuant to such provisions (including the possibilities for more
efficient support of such activities through use of alternate sources
of financing after an initial period of support under such provi-
sions), and (3) such recommendations with respect to such provisions
as he deems appropriate."
SEC. 281. Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended
by adding after section 315 thereof the following new section:
"NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PLANNING
PROGRAMS
"SEC. 316. (a) The Secretary shall appoint, without regard to the
civil service laws, a National Advisory Council on Comprehensive
Health Planning Programs. The Council shall consist of the Secretary
or his designee, who shall be the chairman, and sixteen members, not
otherwise in the regular full-time employ of the United States, who
are (1) leaders in the fields of the fundamental sciences, the medical
sciences, or the organization, delivery, and financing of health care,
(2) officials in State and areawide health planning agencies, (3)
leaders in health care administration, or State or community or other
public affairs, who are State or local officials, or (4) representatives
of consumers of health care. At least six of the appointed members
shall be individuals representing the consumers of health care, one
shall be an official of a State health planning agency, one shall be an
official of an areawide health planning agency, and one shall be a
member of the National Advisory Council on Regional Medical
Programs.
"(b) Each appointed member of the Council shall hold office for a
term of four years, except that any member appointed to fill a vacancy
prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was
appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term, and
except that the terms of office of the members first taking office shall
expire, as designated by the Secretary at the time of appointment,
four at the end of the first year, four at the end of the second year,
four at the end of the third year, and four at the end of the fourth
year after the date of appointment. An appointed member shall not
be eligible to serve continuously for more than two terms.
"(c) Appointed members of the Council, while attending meetin
or conferences thereof or otherwise serving on the business of te
Council, shall be entitled to receive compensation at rates fixed by the
Secretary, but at rates not exceeding the daily equivalent of the rate
specified at the time of service for GS-18 of the general schedule,
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including traveltimie, and while so serving away fromn their holes
or regular places of business they may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section
5703(b) of title 5 of the United States Code for persons inl the 80 Stat. 4991
Government service employed intermittently. 83 Stat. 190.
"(d) The Council shall advise and assist the Secretary in the prep-
aration of general regulations for, and as to policy matters arising
with res )ect to, the administration of section :314 of this title, with Ante- P. 1304.
increased emphasis on cooperation in the coordination of programs
thereunder with the National Advisory Council on Regional Medical
Programs, with particular attention to the relationship between the
improved organization and delivery of health services and the financ-
ing of such services; and shall, in carrying out such functions, review,
not less often than annually, the grants made under section 314 to
determine their effectiveness in carrying out its purposes."
SEc. 282. Part B of title III of the Public Health Service Act is 58 Stat. 693;
amended by striking out "Surgeon General" each place it appears and 76 Stat. 1155.
inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary". 42 USC 243-
247b.
PART J-REGULATION OF VACCINES, BLOOD, BLOOD COMPONENTS, AND
ALLERGENIC PRODUCTS
SEc. 291. Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act is amended
by inserting, after "antitoxin", each time such word appears, the
followinr: "vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic
product,
PART K-ExTENsION OF RESEARCH CONTRAcr AUTHORITY
SEc. 292. Paragraph (h) of section 301 of the Public Health Service
Act is amended by striking out "five succeeding fiscal years" and
inserting in lieu thereof "eight succeeding fiscal years".
TITLE III-COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS
SEC. 301. Section 201 of the Community Mental Health Centers
Amendments of 1970 is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new subsection:
"(c) In the case of any community mental health center-
"(1) for which a staffing grant was made under Part B of the
Community Mental Health Centers Act for any period which
began on or before June 30, 1970; and
"(2) (A) with respect to which the portion of the costs (as
described in section 220(a) of such Act) which may be met from
funds under a grant under such part B is increased (by reason'
of the enactment of the preceding subsections of this section) for
any period after June 30, 1970; or
"(B) with respect to which the period during which a grant
under such part B may be made is extended by reason of the
enactment of subsection (a) of this section;
the provisions of section 221 (a) (4) of such Act shall be deemed to
have been complied with for any period after June 30, 1970, if the
Secretary determines that there is satisfactory assurance that the
amount of total costs, Federal and non-Federal (as described in
section 220(a) of such Act), which will be incurred by such center
for staffing purposes for any period after June 30, 1970, will not be
less than the amount of such total costs for the period which last
commenced on or before June 30, 1970, except that the grantee shall
not be required to increase the amount contributed as the non-Federal
share in the event the amount of the Federal participation is reduced."
58 Stat. 703.
42 USC 262.
79 Stat. 448;
81 Stat. 540.
42 USC 241.
Ante, p. 56.
79 Stat. 428.
42 USC 2688-
2688d.
Ante p. 57.
84 STAT. 13(9 Pub. Law 91-515
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Definitions.
ontracts,
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lation by
States.
TITLE IV-At-TIlORITY FOR GR(It T P)1A(TICE
SEc. 401. (a) The Secretary of Iealth, Education, and Welfare may,
in accordance with the provisions of this section, authorize any carrier,
which is a party to a contract entered into under chapter 89 of title 5,
U nited States Code (relating to health benefits for Federal employees),
or under the Retired Federal Emiiployees Health Benefits Act, or which
participates in the carrying out of any such contract, to issue in any
State contracts entitling any persoii as a beneficiary to receive coipre-
hensive medical services (as defined in subsection (b) ) from a group
practice unit or organization (as defined in subsection (c) ) with whi ich
such carrier has contracted or otherwise arranged for the provision
of such services.
(b) As used in this section, the term "comprehensive medical serv-
ices" means comprehensive preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic
medical services (as defined in regulations of the Secretary), furnished
on a prepaid basis: and may include, at the option of a carrier, such
other health services including mental health services, and equipment
and supplies, furnished on such terms and conditions with respect to
copayment and other matters, as may be authorized in regulations of
the Secretary.
(c) As used in this section:
(1) The term "group practice unit or organization" means a non-
profit agency, co-operative. or other organization undertaking to pro-
vide, through direct employment of, or other arrangements with the
members of a medical group, comprehensive medical services (or such
services and other health services) to members, subscribers, or other
persons protected under contracts of carriers.(2) The term "medical group" means a partnership or other associ-
ation or group of persons who are licensed to practice medicine in a
State (or of such persons and persons licensed to practice dentistry or
optometry) who (A) as their principal professional activity and as a
group.responsibility. eigage in tIe coordinated practice of their pro-
fession primarily in one or more group practice facilities, (B) pool
their income from practice as members of the group and distribute it
among themselves according to a prearranged plan, or enter into an
employment, arrangement with a group practice unit or organization
for the provision of their services, (C) share common overhead
expenses (if and to the extent such expenses are paid by members of
the group), medical and other records, and substantial portions of the
equipment and professional, technical, and administrative staff, and
(D) include within the group at least such professional personnel,
and make available at, least such health services, as may be specified
in regulations of the Secretary.
(d) Nothing in this section shall preclude any State or State agency
from regulating the amounts charged for contracts issued pursuant
to subsection (a) or the manner of soliciting and issuing such contracts,
or from regulating any carrier issuing such contracts in any manner
not inconsistent with the provisions of this section.
TITLE V-STUDY RELATING TO ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION
SEC. 501. (a) The Congress finds that there is general agreement
that air, water, and other common environmental pollution may be
hazardous to the health of individuals resident in the United States,
but that despite the existence of various research papers and other
technical reports on the health hazards of such pollution, there is no
authoritative source of information about (1) the nature and gravity
562
October 30, 1970 - 13 - Pub. Law 91-515 84 sTAT. 1310
of these hazards, (2) the availability of medical and other assistance
to persons affected by such pollution, especiallv when such pollution
reaches emergency levels, and (3) the. measures, other than those relat-
ing solelv to abatem'ient of the pollution, that may be taken to avoid or
reduce the effects of such pollution on the health of individuals.
(b) The President shall immediately commence (1) a study of the Presidential
nattire and gravity of the lazards to human health and safety created study.
bv air, water, and'other commoni environmental pollution, (2) a survey
of the medical and other assistance available to persons affected by
such pollution, especially when such pollution reaches emergency
levels, and (3) a survey of the measures, other than those relating
solely to abatement of the pollution, that may be taken to avoid or
reduce the effects of such pollution on the health of individuals.
(c) The President shall, within nine months of the enactment of Report to
this Act, transmit to the Congress a report of the study and surveys Congress.
required by subsection (b) of this section, including (1) his conclusions
regarding the nature and gravity of the hazards to human health and
safety created by environmental pollution, (2) his evaluation of the
medical and other assistance available to persons affected by such
pollution, especially when such pollution reaches emergency levels,
1) his assessment of the measures, other than those relating solely to
aibateient of the pollution, that may be taken to avoid or reduce the
effects of such pollution on the health of individuals, and (4) such
legislative or other recommendations as lie may deem appropriate.
(d) The President shall, within one year of his transmittal to the Report supple-
Congress of the report required by subsection (c) of this section, and ments.
annually thereafter, supplement that report with such new data,
evaluations, or recommendations as he may deem appropriate.
(e) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be Appropriation,
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
TITLE VI-MISCELLANEOUS
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
SEc. 601. (a) (1) Sections 217(b), 432(a), 443(b), and 703(c) of
the Public Health Service Act are amended by inserting "or com- 42 USC 218,
mittees" after "councils" wherever it appears therein. 289b, 289r,
(2) Sect ions 431, 432(b), 433, 443, and 452 of such Act are amended 292b.it appears 42 USC 289a.by inserting "or committee" after "council" wherever it appear .
therein.
(3) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 222 of such Act are amended 76 Stat. 1073.
by inserting "council or" before "committee" wherever it appears 42 USC 217a.
thle re in.
(4) Such section is further amended by inserting in the heading
thereof "couNciLs OR" before "COMMIrTEES".
(b) (1) Subsection (c) of section 208 of the Public Health Service Compensation.
Aet is amended to read: 64 Stat. 447.
"(c) Members of the National Advisory Health Council and mem- 42 USC 210.
hers of other national advisory or review councils or committees estab-
lishied under this Act, including members of the Technical Electronic
'roduct Radiation Safety Standards Committee and the Board of
Regents of the National Library of Medicine, but excluding ex officio
members, while attending conferences or meetings of their respective
councils or committees or while otherwise serving at the request of
the Secretary, shall be entitled to receive compensation at rates to be
fixed by the Secretary, but at rates not exceeding the daily equivalent
of the rate specified at the time of such service for grade GS-18 of the
General Schedule, including traveltime; and while away from their 35 F. R. 6247.
homes or regular places of business they may be allowed travel ex- 5 USC 5332
note*
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penses, incitiding per diem in lieu of subsistence, as autlhorized by sec-
80 Stat. 499; tion 5703(b) of title 5 of the United States Code for persons in the
83 Stat. 190. (overniueit service employel intermittently."
4? U C 242d. (2) 'I'Iie second sentence of subsection (d) of section 306, the second
42 USC 242e. sentence of Subsection (d) of section 307, the first sentence of para-
42 USC 263f, graph (2) of subsection (f) of section 358, subsection (d) of section
Ante, pp.66, 344. :173, subsection (e) of section (41, subsection (d) of section 703, sub-
42 USC 292b. section (d) of section 725, subsection (d) of section 774. subsection (c)
42 U'C 293e, of section 841, and subsection (c) of section 905 of such Act are
295f-4, 298, deleted.
299e' (3) Paragraph (2) of subsection (f) of section 358 is further
82 Stat, 1179. namended by striking out "under this subsection" in the second sentence
thereof anl by inserting in lieu thereof "to members of the Committee
who are not officers or employees of the United States pursuant to
subsection (c) of section 208 of this Act".'
79 Stat. 929. (4) Subsection (d) of section 905 of such Act is redesignated as
subsection (c).
76 Stat. 1073. (c) (1). Subsection (a) of section 222 of such Act is amended to
42 USC 217a. read:
"(a) The Secretary may, without regard to the provisions of title 5,
United Sttites Code, governing appointments in the competitive serv-
ice, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter
III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General
80 Stat. 443, Schedule pay rates, from time to time, appoint such advisory councils
467, or committees (in addition to those authorized to be established under
5 USC 5101, other provisions of law), for such periods of time, as he deems desirable
5331. with such period commencing on a date specified by the Secretary for
35 F. R. 6247- the purpose of advising him i connection with any of his functions."
(2) Subsection (c) of such section is amended by inserting "or
programs" after "projects".
(d) (1) Subsection (g) of section 408 of the Food, Drug, and Cos-
68 Stat. 511. metic Act is amended by striking out "as compensation for their
21 USC 346a. services-a reasonable per diem, for time actually spent in the work of
the committee, and shall in addition be reimbursed for their necessary
traveling and subsistence expenses while so serving away from their
places of residence." after "shall receive" and by inserting in lieu
thereof "compensation and travel expenses in accordance with sub-
section (b) (5) (D) of section 706."
(2) Subparagraph (D) of paragraph (5) of subsection (b) of sec-
74 Stat. 399. tion 706 of such Act is amended by striking out the third sentence
21 USC 376. thereof and by inserting in lieu thereof the following new sentence:
"Members of any advisory committee established under this Act, while
attending conferences or meetings of their committees or otherwise
serving at the request of the Secretary, shall be entitled to receive
compensation at rates to be fixed by the Secretary but at rates not
exceeding the daily equivalent of the rate specified at the time of such
service for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule, including traveltime;
and while away from their homes or regular places of business they
may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of sub-
sistence, as authorized by section 5703(b) of title 5 of the United
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States Code for persons in the Government service employed 80 Stat. 4991
intermittently." 83 Stat. 190.
TRAINING AUTiioRITY OF INSTITUTE OF GENERAL MEDICAL SCIENCES
SEr. (02. Section 442 of the Public Health Service Act is amended
by striking out "research" before "training".
Approved October 30, 1970.
76 Stat. 1072.
42 USC 289e.
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Public Law 90-351
90th Congress, H. R. 5037
June 19, 1968
To assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of crime, to in-
crease the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and
criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative, of the
United State. of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may Qnnlbus crime
be cited as the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968". Control and
Safe Streets
TITLE I-LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE Aot of 1968.
DECLARATIONS AND PURPOSE
Congress finds that the high incidence of crime in the United States
threatens the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and
its citizens. To prevent crime and to insure the greater safety of the
people, law enforcement efforts must be better coordinated, intensified,
and made more effective at all levels of government.
Congress finds further that crime is essentially a local problem that
must be dealt with by State and local governments if it is to be con-
trolled effectively. 82 STAT. 197
It is therefore the declared policy of the Congress to assist State and 82 STAT. 198
local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at
every level by national assistance. It is the purpose of this title to (1)
encourage States and units of general local government to prepare and
adopt comprehensive plans based upon their evaluation of State and
local problems of law enforcement; (2) authorize grants to States and
units of local government in order to improve and strengthen law
enforcement; and (3) encourage research and development directed
toward the improvement of law enforcement and the development of
new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detec-
tion and apprehension of criminals.
PART A-LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINIsTRATION
Sac. 101. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of
Justice, under the general authority of the Attorney General, a Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (hereafter referred to in this
title as "Administration").
(b) The Administration shall be composed of an Administrator of
Law Enforcement Assistance and two Associate Administrators of
Law Enforcement Assistance, who shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than
two members of the Administration shall be the same political party,
and members shall be appointed with due regard to their fitness, knowl-
edge, and experience to perform the functions, powers, and duties
vested in the Administration by this title.
(c) It shall be the duty of the Administration to exercise all of
the functions, powers, and duties created and established by this title,
except as otherwise provided.
-. PART B-PLANNING GRANTS
Szc. 201. It is the purpose of this part to encourage States and
units of general local government to prepare and adopt compre-
hensive law enforcement plans based on their evaluation of State
and local problems of law enforcement.
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State planning SEC. 202. Ile Administration shall make grants to the States for the
agpncies. establishment and operation of State law enforceiient planning agen-
cies (hereiiafter referred to in this title as "State plannilg agencies")
for tle preparation, development, and revision of the State plans
required Iunider sect ion 303 of this title. Any State may make applica-
tion to the Adninutistration for such grants within six months of the
82 STAT. 198 (late of enactment of t his Act.
82 STAT. 199 SE"c. 2(13. (a) A grant made under this part to a State shall be
lut ilized by tle State to establish aid maintain a State planning agency.
Such agency shall be created or designated by the chief executive of
the State and shall be subject to his jurisdiction. The State planning
agency shall be represent ative of law enforcement agencies of the State
aid of tle units of general local government within the State.
Functions. (b) The State planning agency shall-(1) develop, ill accordance with )art C, a comprehensive state-
wide plan for the improvement of law enforcement throughout
the State;
(2) define, develop, and correlate programs and projects for
the State and the units of general local government in the State or
combinations of States or units for improvement in law enforce-
mient ; and
(3) establish >riorit ies for the improvement in law enforcement
throughout the State.
(c) The State planning agency shall make such arrangements as
such agency deems necessary to provide that at least 40 per centum of
all Federal funds granted to such agency under this part for any fiscal
year will be availaie to units of general local government or combina-
tions of such units to enable such units and combinations of such units
to participate in the formulation of the comprehensive State plan
required under this part. Any portion of such 40 per centum in any
State for any fiscal year not required for the purpose set forth in the
preceding sentence shall be available for expenditure by such State
agency from time to time on dates during such year as the Adminis-
tration may fix, for the development by it of the State plan required
under this part.
SEc..204. A Federal grant authorized under this part shall not
exceed 90 per centum of the expenses of the establishment and opera-
t ion of the State planning agenlcv, including the preparation, develop-
mient, and revision of the plans required by part C. Where Federal
grants under this part are made directly to units of geieral local gov-
ernment. as authorized by section 305. the grant shall not exceed 90 per
celtuma of the expenses of local planning, including the preparation,
development, and revision of plans required by part C.
Allocation of SEc. 205. Funds appropriated to make grants under this part for a
funds. fiscal year shall be allocated by the Administration among the States
for use therein by the State planning agency or units of general local
government, as the case may be. The Administration shall allocate$1)0,000 to each of the States; and it shall then allocate the remainder
of such funds available among the States according to their relative
populations.
PART C-GRANTS FOR L.w ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
SEc. 301. (a) It is the purpose of this part to encourage States and
units of general local government to carry out programs and projects
to improve and strengthen law enforcement.
(b) The Administration is authorized to make grants to States
having comprehensive State plans approved by it under this part,for-
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(1) P1lublic protection, including the development, demonstra-
tion, evaluation, implementation, and purchIase of methods,
devices, facilities, and equipment designed to improve and
strengthen law enforcement and reduce crime in public and
private places.
(2) The recruiting of law enforcement personnel and the
training of personnel in law enforcement.
(3) Public education relating to crime prevention and encour-
aging respect for law and order, including education programs
in schools and programs to improve public understanding of
and cooperation with law enforcement agencies.
(4) Construction of buildings or other physical facilities
which would fulfill or implement the purposes of this section.
(5) The organization, education, and training of special law
enforcement units to combat organized crime, including the
establishment and development of State organized crime preven-
tion councils, the recruiting and training of special investigative
and prosecuting personnel, and the development of systems for
collecting, storing, and disseminating information relating to
the control of organized crime.
(6) The organization, education, and training of regular law
enforcement officers, special law enforcement units, and law en-
forcement reserve units for the preventien, detection, and control
of riots and other violent civil disorders, including the acquisition
of riot control equipment.
(7) The recruiting, organization, training and education of
community service officers to serve with and assist local and State
law enforcement agencies in the discharge of their duties through
such activities as recruiting; improvement of police-community
relations and grievance resolution mechanisms; community patrol
activities; encouragement of neighborhood participation in crime
prevention and public safety efforts; and other activities designed
to improve police capabilities, public safety and the objectives of
this section: Provided, That in no case shall a grant be made under
this subcategory without the approval of the local government or
local law enforcement agency.
(c) The amount of any Federal grant made under paragraph (5) Federal grants,
or (6) of subsection (b) of this section may be up to 75 per centum of amounts.
the cost of the program or project specifie in the application for such
grant. The amount of any grant made under paragraph (4) of sub-
section (b) of this section may be up to 50 per centum of the cost of
the program or project specified in the application for such grant. The
amount of any other grant made under this part may be up to 60 per
centum of the cost of the program or project specified in the applica-
tion for such grant: Provided, That no part of any rant for the Prohibition,
purpose of construction of buildings or other'physical facilities shallbe used for land acquisition.
(d) Not more than one-third of any grant made under this part
may be expended for the compensation of personnel. The amount of
any such grant expended for the compensation of personnel shall not
exceed the amount of State or local funds made available tg increase
such compensation. The limitations contained in this subsection shall
not apply to the compensation of personnel for time engaged in con-ducting or undergoing training programs.
SEc. 302. Any State desiring to participate in the grant program
under this part shall establish a State planning agency as describedin art B of this title and shall within six months after approval of
a planning grant under part B submit to the Administration through
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such State planning agency a comprehensive State plan formulated
pursuant to part B of this title.
SEC. 303. The Administration shall make grants under this title
to a State planning agency if such agency has on file with the Ad-
ministration an approved comprehensive State plan (not more than
one year in ae) which conforms with the purposes and requirements
of this title. Each such plan shall-
(1). provide for the administration of such grants by the State
planning agency;
(2) provide that at least 75 per centum of all Federal funds
granted to the State planning agency under this part for any
fiscal year will be available to units of general local government or
combinations of such units for the development and implemen-
tation of programs and projects for the improvement of law
enforcement;
(3) adequately take into account the needs and requests of the
units of general local government in the State and encourage local
initiative in the development of programs and projects for
improvements in law enforcement and provide for an appropri-
ately balanced allocation of funds bietween the State and the units
of general local government in the State and among such units;
(4) incorporate innovations and advanced techniques and con-
tain a comprehensive outline of priorities for the improvement and
coordination of all aspects of law enforcement dealt with in the
plan, including descriptions of: (A) general needs and problems;
(B) existing systems; (C) available resources; (D) organiza-
tional systems and administrative machinery for implementing
the plan; (E) the direction, scope, and general types of improve-
ments to be made in the future; and (F) to the extent appropriate,
the relationship of the plan to other relevant State or local law
enforcement lans and systems
(5) provide for effective utilization of existing facilities and
permit and encourage units of general local government to com-
bine or provide for cooperative arrangements with respect to
services, facilities, and equipment;
(6) provide for research and development;(7) provide for appropriate review of procedures of actions
taken by the State planning agency disapproving an application
for which funds are available or terminating or refusing to
continue financial assistance to units of general local government
or combinations of such units;
(8) demonstrate the willingness of the State and units of gen-
eral local government to assume the costs of improvements funded
under this part after a reasonable period of Federal assistance;(9) demonstrate the willingness of the State to contribute
technical assistance or services for programs and projects con-
templated by the statewide comprehensive plan and the pro-
grams and projects contemplated by units of general local
government;
(10) set forth policies and procedures designed to assure that
Federal funds made available under this title will be so used as
not to supplant State or local funds, but to increase the amounts
of such funds that would in the absence of such Federal funds be
made available for law enforcement;
(11) provide for such fiscal control and fund accounting pro-
cedures as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement of and
accounting of funds received under this part; and
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(12) provide for the submission of such reports in such form
and containing such information as the Administration may
reasonably require.
Any portion of the 75 per centum to be made available pursuliant to
paragraph (2) of this section in any State in any fiscal year not
required for the purposes set forth in such paragraph (2) shall be
available for expenditure by such State agency from time to time on
dates during such year as the Administration may fix, for the develop-
ment and implementation of progranis and projects for the improve-
ment of law enforcement and in conformity with the State plan.
SEC. 304. State planning agencies shall receive applications for
financial assistance from units of general local government and com-
binations of such units. When a State planning agency determines that
such an application is in accordance with the purposes stated in section
301 and is in conformance with any existing statewide comprehensive
law enforcement plan, the State planning agency is authorized to
disburse funds to the applicant.
SEc. 305. Where a State fails to make application for a grant to
establish a State planning agency pursuant to part 13 of this title
within six months after the date of enactment of this Act, or where a
State fails to file a compt-ehensive plan pursuant to part B within six
months after approval of a planning grant to establish a State plan-
ning agency, the Administration may make grants under part B and
part C of this title to units of general local government or combina-
tions of such units: Provided, however, That any such unit or com-
bination of such units must certify that it has submitted a copy of its
application to the chief executive of the State in which such unit or
combination of such units is located. The chief executive shall be given
not more than sixty days from date of receipt of the application to
submit to the Administration in writing an evaluation of the project
set forth in the application. Such evaluation shall include comments
on the relationship of the application to other applications then pend-
ing, and to existing or proposed plans in the State for the development
of new approaches to and improvements in law enforcement. If an
application is submitted by a combination of units of general local
government which is located in more than one State, such app lication
must be submitted to the chief executive of each State in which the
combination of such units is located. No grant under this section to a
local unit of general government shall be for an amount in excess of
60 per centum of the cost of the project or program with respect to
which it was made.
SEC. 306. Funds appropriated to make grants under this part for a
fiscal year shall be allocated by the Administration among the States
for use therein by the State planning agency or units of general local
government, as the case may be. Of such funds, 85 per centum shall be
allocated among the States according to their respective populations
and 15 per centum thereof shall be allocated as the Administration
may determine, plus such additional amounts as may be made avail-
able by virtue of the application of the provisions of section 509 to the
grant to any State.
SEC. 307. (a) In making grants under this part, the Administration
and each State planning agency, as the case may be, shall give special
emphasis, where appropriate or feasible, to programs and projects
dealng with the prevention, detection, and control of organized crime
and of riots and other violent civil disorders.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303 of this part, until
August 31, 1968, the Administration is authorized to make grants for
programs and projects dealing with the prevention, detection, and
82 STAT. 202
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control of riots and other violent civil disorders on the basis of appli-
cations describing in detail the programs, projeets, and costs of the
items for which the grants will be used, and the relationship of the
programs and projects to the applicant's general program for the
improvement of law en forcement.
P.RT D-TRAINING, EDUCATION, RESEARCH, I)EMONSTRATION, AND
SPECIAL GRANTS
SEC. 401. It is the purpose of this part to provide for and encourage
training, education, research, and development for the purpose of
improving law enforcement and developing new methods for the pre-
vention and reduction of crime, and the detection and apprehension
of criminals.
Ntional Insti- SEC. 402. (a) There is established within the Department of Justice
tute of law En. a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (here-
foroement and after referred to in this part as "Institute'). The Institute shall be
criminal Jus- under the general authority of the Administration. It shall be the pur-
tioe. pose of the Institute to encourage research and development to improve
Establishnent* and strengthen law enforcement.
Funotions. (b) The Institute is authorized-(1) to make grants to, or enter into contracts with, public
agencies, institutions of higher education, or private organizations
to conduct research, demonstrations, or special projects pertaining
to the purp~oses described in this title, including the development
of new or improved approaches, techniques, systems, equipment,
and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement;
(2) to make continuing studies and undertake programs of
research to develop new or improved approaches, techniques, sys-
tems, equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law
enforcement, inc!uding, but not limited to, the effectiveness of
projects or programs carried out under this title:
(3) to carry out programs of behavioral research designed to
provide more accurate information on the causes of crime and
the effectiveness of various means of preventing crime, and to
evaluate the success of correctional procedures;
(4) to make recommendations for action which can be taken by
Federal, State, and local governments and by private persons
and organizations to improve and strengthen law enforcement;
(5) to carry out programs of instructional assistance consisting
of research fellowships for the programs provided under this
section, and special workshops for the presentation and dissemina-
tion of information resulting from research, demonstrations, and
special projects authorized by this title.
(6) to carry out a program of collection and dissemination of
information obtained by the Institute or other Federal agencies,
public agencies, institutions of higher education, or private
organizations engaged in projects under this title, including infor-
mation relating to new or improved approaches, techniques, sys-
tems, equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law
enforcement; and
(7) to establish a research center to carry out the programs
described in this section.
Grants, amount. SEC. 403. A grant authorized under this part may be up to 100
per centum of the total cost of each project for which such grant is
Conditions. made. The Administration shall require, wheneven feasible, as a
condition of approval of a grant under this part, that the recipient
contribute money, facilities, or services to carry out the purpose for
which the grant is sought.
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SEC. 404. (a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
is authorized to-
(1) establish and conduct training programs at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation National Academy at Quantico, Virginia,
to provide, at the request of a State or unit of local government,
training for State and local law enforcement personnel;
(2) evelop new or improved approaches, techniques, systems,
equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law enforce-
ment; and
(3) assist in conducting, at the request of a State or unit of
local government, local and regional training programs for the
training of State and local law enforcement personnel. Such
training shall be provided only for persons actually employed as
State police or highway patrol, police of a unit of loca govern-
ment, sheriffs and their deputies, and such other persons as the
State or unit may nominate for police training while such per-
sons are actually employed as officers of such State or unit.
(b) In the exercise of the functions, powers, and duties established
under this section the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion shall be under the general authority of the Attorney General.
SEC. 405. (a) Subject to the provisions of, this section, the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 828) is repealed:
Pro-vided, That-
(1) The Administ ration, or the Attorney General until such
time as the members of the Administration are appointed, is
authorized to obligate funds for the continuation of projects
approved under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965
prior to the date of enactment of this Act to the extent that such
approval provided for continuation.
(2) Any funds obligated under subsection (1) of this section and
all activities necessary or appropriate for the review under sub-
secti (3) of this section may b~e carried out with funds previ-
ously a )ropriated and funds appropriated pursuant to this title.
(3) immediately upon establishment of the Administration,
it shall be its duty to study, review, and evaluate projects and
programs funded under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1965. Continuation of projects and programs under subsections
(1) and (2) of this section shall be in the discretion of the
Administration.
SEC. 406. (a) Pursuant to the provisions of subsections (h) and (c)
of this section, the Administration is authorized, after appropriate
consultation with the Commissioner of Education, to carry out pro-
grams of academic educational assistance to improve and strengthen
law enforcement.
(b) The Administration is authorized to enter into contracts to
make, and make, payments to institutions of higher education for
loans, not exceeding $1,800 per academic year to any person, to persons
enrolled on a full-time basis in undergraduate or graduate programs
approved by the Administration and leading to degrees or certificates
in areas directly related to law enforcement or preparing for employ-
ment in law enforcement, with special consideration to police or cor-
rectional personnel of States or units of general local government on
academic leave to earn such degrees or certificates. Loans to persons
assisted under this subsection shall be made on such terms and condi-
tions as the Administration and the institution offering such programs
may determine, except that the total amount of any such loan, plus
interest, shall be canceled for service as a full-time officer or employee
of a law enforcement agency at the rate of 25 per centum of the total
F.B.I. law en-
forc ement train-
ing progrwsg
Repeal.
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amount of such loans plus interest for-each coinplete year of such
service or its equivalent of such service, as determined under regula-
tions of the Administration.
Tuition and (c) The Administration is authorized to enter into contracts to
fees. make, and make, payments to institutions of higher education for tui-
tion and fees, not exceeding $200 per academic quarter or $300 per
semester for any person, for officers of any publicly funded law en-
forcement agency enrolled on a full-time or part-time basis in courses
included in an undergraduate or graduate program which is approved
by the Administration and which leads to a degree or certificate in an
area related to law enforcement or an area suitable for persons em-
Servios agree- ployed in law enforcement. Assistance under this subsection may be
ments. granted only on behalf of an applicant who enters into an agreement
to remain in the service of the law enforcement agency employing such
applicant for a period of two years following completion of any course
for which payments are provided under this subsection, and in the
event such service is not completed, to repay the full amount of such
payments on such terms and in such manner as the Administration
may prescribe.
PART E-ADMINIRATIvE PROvIsIONs
Subpena power,
eto,
80 Stat. 461.
Offioers and
mplgrees.
SEC. 501. The Administration is authorized, after appropriate con-
sultation with representatives of States and units of general local
government, to establish such rules, regulations, and procedures as
are necessary to the exercise of its functions, and are consistent with
the stated purpose of this title.
SEC. 502. The Administration may delegate to any officer or official
of the Administration, or, with the approval of the Attorney General,
to any oficer of the Department of Justice such functions as it deems
appropriate.
SEC. 503. The functions, powers, and duties specified in this title to
be carried out by the Administration shall not be transferred else-
where in- the Department of Justice unless specifically hereafter
authorized by the Congress.
SEC. 504. In carrying out its functions, theAdministration, or upon
authorization of the Administration, any member thereof or any
hearing examiner assigned to or employed by the Administration, shall
have the power to hold hearings, sign and issue subpenas administer
oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence at any place in the
United States it may designate.
SEC. 505. Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof-
'(90) Administrator of Law Enforcement Assistance."
SEC. 506. Section 5316 of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof-
"(126) Associate Administrator of Law Enforcement
Assistance."
SEC. 507. Subject to the civil service and classification laws, the
Administration is authorized to select, appoint, employ, and fix.com-
pensation of such officers and employees, including hearing examiners,
as shall be necessary to carry out its powers and duties under this title.
SEC. 508. The Administration is authorized, on a reimbursable
basis when appropriate, to use the available services, equipment, per-
sonnel, and facilities of the Department of Justice and of other
civilian or military agencies an instrumentalities of the Federal
Government, and to cooperate with the Department of Justice and
such other agencies and instrumentalities in the establishment and
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use of services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of the Admipis-
tration. The Administration is further authorized to confer with and
avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of
State, municipal, or other local agencies.
SEC. 509. Whenever the Administration, after reasonable notice Nonocmplianoe.
and opportunity for hearing to an applicant or a grantee under this Withholding of
title, fds that, with respect to any payments made or to be made under peyments.
this title, there is a substantial failure to comply with-(a) the provisions of this title;
(b) regulations promulgated by the Administration under this
title; or
(c) a plan or application submitted in accordance with the pro-
visions of this title;
the Administration shall notify such applicant or grantee that further
payments shall not be made (or in its discretion that further payments
shall not be made for activities in which there is such failure), until
there is no longer such failure.
SEC. 510. (a) In carrying out the functions vested by this title in
the Administration, the determination, findings, and conclusions of
the Administration shall be final and conclusive upon all applicants,
except as hereafter provided.(b) If the application has been rejected or an applicant has been Notioe and
denied a grant or has had a grant, or any portion of a grant, discon- hearing.
tinued, or has been given a grant in a lesser amount than such applicant
believes appropriate under the provisions of this title, the Administra-
tion shall notify the applicant or grantee of its action and set forth
the reason for the action taken. Whenever an applicant or grantee
requests a hearing on action taken by the Administration on an ap-
plication or a grant the Administration, or any authorized officer
thereof, is authorized and directed to hold such hearings or investiga-
tions at such times and places as the Administration deems necessary,
following appropriate and adequate notice to such applicant; and the
findings of fact and determinations made by the Administration with
respect thereto shall be final and conclusive, except as otherwise pro-
vided herein.
(c) If such applicant is still dissatisfied with the findings and Request for
determinations of the Administration, following the notice and hear- rehearing.
ing provided for in subsection (b) of this section, a request may be
made for rehearing, under such regulations and procedures as the
Administration may establish, and such applicant shall be afforded
an op rtunity to present such additional information as may, be
deem sppropriate and pertinent to the matter involved. The fin ings
and determinations of the Administration, following such rehearing,
shall be final and conclusive upon all parties concerned, except as
hereafter provided.
Sic. 511. (a) If any applicant or grantee is dissatisfied with the Review aotion.
Administration's final action with respect to the appro al of its appli-
cation or plan submitted under this title, or any applicant or grantee
is dissatisfied with the Administration's final action under section 509
or section 510, such applicant or grantee may, within sixty days after
notice of such action, file with the United States court of appeals for
the circuit in which such applicant or grantee is located a petition for
review of that action. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith trans-
mitted by the clerk of the court to the Administration. The Adminis-
tration shall thereupon file in the court the record of the proceedings
on which the action of the Administration was based, as provided m 72 Stat. 9411
section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. 80 Stat. 1323,
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(b) The determinations and the findings of fact by the Adminis-
tration, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive; but
the court, for good cause shown, may remand the case to the Adminis-
tration to take further evidence. The Administration may thereupon
make new or modified findings of fact and may modify its previous
action, and shall file in the court the record of the further proceedings.
Such new or modified findings of fact or determinations shall likewise
be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
(c) Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall have jurisdiction
to affirm the action of the Administration or to set it aside, in whole or
in part. The judgment of the court shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as
provided in section 1254 of title 28, ITnited States Code.
SEc. 512. Unless otherwise specified in this title, the Administration
shall carry out the programs provided for in this title during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1968, and the five succeeding fiscal years.
SEc. 513. To insure that all Federal assistance to State and local
programs under this title is carried out in a coordinated manner, the
Administration is authorized to request any Federal department or
agency to supply such statistics, data, program reports, and other
material as the Administration deems necessary to carry out its func-
tions under this title. Each such department or agency is authorized
to cooperate with the Administration and, to the extent ermitted by
law, to furnish. such materials to the Administration. A ny Federal
department or agency engaged in administering programs related to
this title shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult with and
seek advice from the Administration to insure fully coordinated efforts,
and the Administration shall undertake to coordinate such efforts.
SEc. 514. The Administration may arrange with and reimburse the
heads of other Federal departments and agencies for the performance
of any of its functions under this title.
SEC. 515. The Administration is authorized-
(a) to conduct evaluation studies of the programs and activi-
ties assisted under this title;
(b) to collect, evaluate, publish, and disseminate statistics and
other information on the condition and progress of law enforce-
ment in the several States; and
(c) to cooperate with and render technical assistance to States,
units of general local government, combinations of such States or
units, or other public or private agencies, organizations, or in-
stitutions in matters relating to law enforcement.
SEC. 516. (a) Payments under this title may be made in installments,
and in advance or by way of reimbursement, as may be determined
by the Administration.
(b) Not more than 12 per centum of the sums appropriated for any
fiscal year to carry out the provisions of this title may be used within
any one State except that this limitation shall not apply to grants
made pursuant to part D.
SEc. 517. The Administration is authorized to appoint such technical
or other advisory committees to advise the Administration with respect
to the administration of this title as it deems necessary. Members of
such committees not otherwise in the employ of the Vnited States,
while attending meetings of the committees, shall be entitled to receive
compensation at a rate to be fixed by the Administration but not
exceeding $75 per diem, and while away from home or regular place
of business they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem
in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5,United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed
intermittently.
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Si~c. 518. (a) Nothing contained in this title or any other Act shall
be coist rued to authorize any department, agency, officer, or enployee
o)f the nlited States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control
over ainy police force or any other law enforcement agency of any
State or any 0political subdivision thereof.
(b) Not withstanding any other provision of law nothing contained
in this title shall be construed to authorize the Administration (1) to
require, or condition the availability or amount of a grant upon, the
ad(option by an applicant. or grantee under this title of a percentage
rat io, quota system, or other program to achieve racial balance or to
elimiiate racial imbalance in any law enforcement agency, or (2) to
deiy or discontinue a grant because of the refusal of an applicant or
grraitee under this title to adopt such a ratio, system, or other program.
SEC. 519. On or before August 31, 1968, and each year thereafter, Report to
the Adninistration shall report to the President and to the Congress President and
on activities pursuant to the provisions of this title (luring the pre- Congress.
Ceding fiscal year.
Sic. 520. For the purpose of carrying out this title, there is author- Appropriations.
ized to be appropriated the sums of $100,111,000 for the fiscal years
ending June 30, 1968, and June 30, 1969, $300,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending .June 30, 1970, and for succeeding fiscal years such sums
as the Congress might authorize: Proeided, howerer, That of the
amount appropriated for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1968, and
June 30, 1969-
(a) the sum of $25,00:,000 shall be for the purposes of part B;
(b) the sum of $50,000,000 shall be for the purposes of part C,
of which amount-
(1) not more than $2,500,000 shall be for the purposes of
section 302(b) (3) ;
(2) not more than $15,000,000 shall be for the purposes
of section 302(b) (5), of which not more than $1,000,000
may be used within any one State:
(3) not more than $15,000,000 shall be for the purposes
of section 30,2(b) (6); and
(4) not, more than $10,000,000 shall be for the purposes
of correction, probation, and parole; and
(c) the sum of $25,111,000 shall be for the purposes of part D,
of which $5,111,000 shall be for the purposes of section 404,
and not more than $10,000,000 shall be for the purposes of
sect ion 406.
Swc. 521. (a) Each recipient of assistance under this Act shall keep Recordkeeping
such records as the Administration shall prescribe, including records requirements.
which fully disclose the amount and disposition by such recipient of
the proceeds of such assistance, the total cost of the project or under-
taking in connection with which such assistance is given or used, and
the amount of that portion of the cost of the project or undertaking
supplied by other sources, and such other records as will facilitate
an effective audit.
(b) The' Administration and the Comptroller General of the
United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall
have access for purpose of audit and examinations to any books,
documents, papers, and records of the recipients that are pertinent
to the grants received under this title.
SEc. 522. Section 204(a) of the Demonstration Cities and Metro-
politan Development Act of 1966 is amended by inserting "law 80 Stat. 1262.
enforcement facilities," immediately after "transportation facilities,". 42 USC 3334.
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PAr F-DEFINITIONS
SEC. 601. As used in this title-
(a) "Law enforcement" means all activities pertaining to crime
prevention or reduction and enforcement of the criminal law.
(b) "Organized crime" means the unlawful activities of the mem-
bers of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supply-
ing illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling,
prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other
unlawful activities of members of such organizations.
(c) "State- means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States.(d) "Unit. of general local government" means any city, county,
township, town, borough, parish, village, or other general purposeplitical subdivision of a State, or an Indian tribe which performs
Law enforcement functions as determined by the Secretary of the
Interior.
(e) "Combination" as applied to States or units of general local
government means any grouping or joining together of such States
or units for the purpose of preparing, developing, or implementing a
law enforcement plan.
(f) "Construction" means the erection, acquisition, expansion, or
repair (but not including minor remodeling or minor repairs) of new
or existing buildings or other physical facilities, and the acquisition or
installation of initial equipment therefor.
(g) "State organized crime prevention council" means a council
composed of not more than seven persons established pursuant to State
law or established by the chief executive of the State for the purpose
of this title, or an existing agncy so designated, which council shall
be broadly representative of law enforcement officials within such
State and whose members b virtue of their training or experience
shall be knowledgeable in th1e prevention and control of organized
crime.
(h) "Metropolitan area" means a standard metropolitan statistical
area as established by the Bureau of the Budget, subject, however, to
such modifications and extensions as the Administration may determine
to be apropriate.
(i) "Public agency" means any State, unit of local government,
combination of such States or units, or any department, agency, or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing.
(j) "Institution of higher education' means any such institution as
defined by section 801(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (79
Stat. 1269; 20 U.S.C. 1141(a)), subject, however, to such modifications
and extensions as the Administration may determine to be appropriate.(k) "Community service officer" means any citizen with the capac-
ity, motivation, integrity, and stability to assist in or perform police
work but who may not meet ordinary standards for employment as a
regular police officer selected from the immediate locality of the police
department of which he is to be a part, and meeting such other quali-
fications promulgated in regulations pursuant to section 501 as the
administration may determine to be appropriate to further the pur-
poses of section 301(b) (7) and this Act.
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TITLE XI-GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEc. 1601. If the provisions of any part of this Act or any amend-
ments made thereby or the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstances be held invalid, the provisions of the other parts and their
application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.
Approved June 19, 1968, 7:14 p.m.
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91st Congress, H. R. 17825
January 2, 1971
2n act
To amend tike Onnibus crime ('ontrol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and for
other purposes.
Ile it enacted b>y the Sewnrte ail Iouse of Representaiies of the
nitid Ntates of .A merca in ('ongress ,rxemi le<d. T hat this Act may be
cited as the "Oimnibus Crime Control Act of 1970".
Ormibus Crime
Control Aot
of 19701.
TITlE I-OMNIIWS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STRiEETS AT ANENINIENTS 84 STAT. 1880
84 STAT. 1881
LAW ENFORCEMENT AsSISTANCE ADMIFNISTRATION
S.:c. 2. Section 101 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act-of 1968 is amen(led to read as follows:
"Sec. 101.(a) There is hereby established within the Department of
Justice under the general authority of the Attorney General, a Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (hereinafter referred to in
this title as 'Administration') composed of an Administrator of Law
Enforcement Assistance and two Associate Administrators of Law
Enlforeeineiit Assistance, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Scnate. Beginning after the
eid of the term of either of the present incumbents, one of the Asso-
ciate Administrators shall be a member of a political party other than
that of the P'resident.
"(b) The Administrator shall be the executive head of the agency
and shall exercise all administrative powers, including the ap)point-
iiment an(d supervision of Administration personnel. All of the other
functions, powers, and duties created and established by this title shall
be exercised )y the Administrator with the concurrence of either one
or both of the two Associate Administrators."
82 Stat. 198.
42 Usc 3711.
PLANNING GRANTS
SEc. 3. (a) The third sentence of section 203(a) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended to read as
follows: "The State planning agency and any regional planning units
within the State shall, within their respective jurisdictions, be rep-
resentative of the law enforcement agencies, units of general local
government, and public agencies maintaining programs to reduce
and control crime."
(b) Subsection (c) of section 203 of such Act is amended by inserting
the following after the period at the end of the first sentence: "The
Administration may waive this requirement. in whole or in, part, upon
a finding that the requirement is inappropriate in view of the respec-
tive law enforcement planning responsibilities exercised by the State
and its units of general local government and that adherence to the
requirement would not contribute to the efficient development of the
State plan required under this part. In allocating funds under this
subsection, the State planning agency shall assure that major cities
and counties within the State receive planning funds to develop com-
preliensive plans and coordinate functions at the local level."(c) Subsection (c) of section 203 is amended further by striking
out the word "the preceding sentence" and inserting in lieu thereof
"this subsection".
(d) Section 204 of such Act is amended by striking the second
sentence.
42 Usc 3723.
42 Usc 3724.
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GRANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
SFc. 4. Part C of title 1 of the Omnibus Crimie Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 is amended as follows:
(1) Section 301 (b) (4) is amended to read as follows:
-(4) Constructing buildings or other physical facilities which
would fulfill or implement the purpose of this section, including
local correctional facilities, centers for the treatment of narcotic
addicts, and temporary courtroom facilities in areas of high crime
incidence."
(2) Subsection (b) of section 301 is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new paragraphs:
"(8) The establishment of a Criminal Justice Coordinating
Council for any unit of general local government or any combina-
tion of such units within the State, having a population of two
hundred and fifty thousand or more, to assure improved planning
and coordination of all law enforcement activities.
"(9) The development and operation of community based
delinquent prevention and correctional programs, emphasizing
halfway houses and other community based rehabilitation centers
for initial preconviction of postconviction referral of offenders;
exp)anded probationary programs, including paraprofessional and
volunteer participation; and community service centers for the
guidance and supervision of potential repeat youthfuloffenders."
(3) Subsection (c) of section 301 is amended to read as follows:
"(c) The portion of any Federal grant made under this section for
the purposes of paragraph (5) or (6) of subsection (b) of this sec-
tion may be up to 75 per centum of the cost of the program or proj-
ect specified in the application for such grant. The portion of any
Federal grant made under this section for the purposes of paragraph
(4) of subsection (b) of this section may be up to 50 per centum of
the cost of the program or project specified in the application for such
grant. The portion of any Federal grant made under this section to
be used for any other purpose set forth in this section may be up to
75 per centuim of the cost of the program or project specified in the
application for such grant. No part of any grant made under this
section for the purpose of renting, leasing, or constructing buildings
or other physical facilities shall be used for land acquisition. In the
Case of a grant under this section to an Indian tribe or other aborig-
inal group. if the Administration determines that the tribe or group
does not have sufficient funds available to meet the local share of the
cost of any program or project to be funded under the grant, the
Administration may increase the Federal share of the cost thereof
to the extent it deems necessary. Effective July 1, 1972, at least 40
per centum of the non-Federal funding of the cost of any program
or project to be funded by a grant under this section shall be of
money appropriated in the aggregate. by State or individual unit of
government, for the purpose of the shared funding of such programs
or projects."
(4) Subsection (d) of section 301 is amended to read as follows:
"(d) Not more than one-third of any grant made under this section
may be expended for the compensation of police and other regular law
enforcement personnel. The amount of any such grant expanded for
the compensation of such personnel shall not exceed the amount of
State or local funds made available to increase such compensation.
The limitations contained in this subsection shall not apply to the
581
January 2, 1971 - 3 - Pub. Law 91-644
84 STAT. 1883
compensation of personnel for t ime engaged in co0nIducting or under-
going training programs or to the compensation of personnel engaged
in research, d(evelopmenit, deinonstration oir other short-terni
prograills."
(5) Section :303 is anended by inserting immediately after the first
sentence the following new sentence: "No State plan shall be
1I >proved as comprehensive unless the Administration finds that the
pIan provides for the allocation of adequate assistance to deal with
law enforcement problems in areas characterized by both high crime
incidence and high law enforcement activity."
(6) Paragraph (2) of Section 303 is amended by striking out the
semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof the following: ", except that
each such plan shall provide that beginning July 1, 1972, at least
the per centum of Federal assistance granted to the State planning
agency under this part for any fiscal year which corresponds to the
per centum of the State and local law enforcement expenditures
funded and expended in the immediately preceding fiscal year by
units of general local government will be made available to such units
or combinations of such units in the immediately following fiscal year
for the development and implementation of programs and projects
for the improvement of law enforcement, and that with respect to
such programs or projects the State will provide in the aggregate not
less than one-fourth of the non-Federal funding. Per centum deter-
minations under this paragraph for law enforcement funding and
ex)enditures for such immediately preceding fiscal year shall be based
upon the most accurate and complete data available for such fiscal
year or for the last fiscal year for which such data are available. The
Administration shall have the authority to approve such determina-
tions and to review the accuracy and completeness of such data;"
(7) Section 305 is amended to read as follows:
"SEc. 305. Where a State has failed to have a comprehensive State
p)lan approved under this title within the period specified by the
Administration for such purpose, the funds allocated for such State
under paragraph (1) of section 306(a) of this title shall be available
for reallocation by the Administration under paragraph (2) of section
306(a)."
(8) Section 306 is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 306. (a) The funds appropriated each fiscal year to make
grants under this part shall be allocated by the Administration as
follows:
"(1) Eighty-five per centum of such funds shall be allocated
among the States according to their respective populations for
grants to State planning agencies.
"(2) Fifteen per centum of such funds, plus any additional
amounts made available by virtue of the application of the provi-
sions of sections 305 and 509 of this title to the grant of any State,
may, in the discretion of the Administration, be allocated among
the States for grants to State planning agencies, units of general
local gov-ernment, or combinations of such units, according to the
criteria and on the terms and conditions the Administration deter-
mines consistent with this title.
Any grant made from funds available under paragraph (2) of this
subsection may be up to 75 per centum of the cost of the program or
project for which such grant is made. No part of any grant under
such paragraph for the purpose of renting, leasing, or constructing
buildings or other physical facilities shall be used for land acquisition.
In the case of a grant under such paragraph to an Indian tribe or
82 Stat. 201.
42 USC 3733.
42 USC 3735.
42 usc 3736.
_SCpra.
42 USC 3757.
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!nte, !. 1F82.
otier abowigin1l gr'olp1. if tihe A(IiiIist it ionl determines that the tril)e
ori grolup does nlot havie sIticiient fuinids aaiilable to meet the local
SIr of the costs of an program or project to Ib fun1ded un1der the
grlIlt. the A.\dmilistr-atioln ialy 1inease the Federal share of the cost
t hereof to t he extelIt it deem I necessa Ir. Tle limitat ions oil the expeldi-
tire of portiolns of grants for tlie coipelnsation of lersonne l Sill-
sectioll (d) of section 3u1 of this title shall apply to a grant under
h paragraphl. Effective 1uly 1. 1972. at least 40 per centum of the
nion-Federal fuiding of the cost of any program or project to be
funded by a grant under such paragraph shall be of money appro-
priated in the aggregate. by State or individual unit of governimenit,
for the purpose of the shared funding of such programs or projects.
-b) If the Administration determines. on the basis of information
availale to it dui rilg any fiscal year. that a portion of the funds allo-
cated to a State for that fiscal ye ar for grIants to the State )lanlling
a geicy of the State will Iot be required by the State. or that the State
will be unable to qualifv to receive any portion of the funds under
tle requiremelints of this part. that portion shall be available for
reallocation to other States inder paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
of this section."
iR.\NING. EI)tTi.\TN. RESE.RCHI. DEM4NSTH.ATION, AND sPECIAL G.RANTs
SEC. 5. Part 1) of title I of the (O)nlibus Crime Control and Safe
St reets Act of 196S is ailended as follows.
(1) Section 4 is amended-
(A) by striking "in areas directly related to law eiforcellent.
or preparilig for epinloylIelt inl law eliforceilelt" in the first
sentelIce of subsection (1)) an1d ilsertilng inl lieu thereof "in areas
related to law eiforcement or suitable for persons eiployed in
law eiforceieit":
B) by striking ilout "tuition and fees" in the first sentence of
subsection (e) ald iiserting ill lieu thereof "tuition, books, and
fees": and
(C) by inserting at the end thereof the following new
subsect iolts
(d) Full-time teachers or persons preparing for careers as full-
time teachers of courses related to law enforcement or suitable for
)ersons employed in law enforcement, in institutions of higher educa-
tioll which are eligible to receive funds under this section, shall be
eligible to receive assistance under subsections (b) and (c) of this
section as determined under regulations of the Administration.
(e) The Administrati on is authorized to make grants to or enter
inlto contracts with institutions of higher education, or combinations
of such ilstitutionls, to assist them in planning, developing, strengthen-
ing, improving, or carrying out programs or projects for the develop-
ment or demonstration of improved methods of law enforcement
educatiol, including-
(1) planning for the development or expansion of undergrad-
nate or graduate programs in law enforcement:
"(2) education and training of faculty members;
-(3) strengthening the la w enforcement aspects of courses lead-
ing to an undergraduate, graduate, or professional degree: and
"(4) research into, and development of, methods of educating
students or faculty, including the preparation of teaching mate-
rials and the planning of curriculums.
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The min111iiti1 of a grant or cont ract may 1be ill) to 75 per centuin of the
total cost of progranms and projects for which a grant or contract is
made.
( f) The Administration is auitlorized to enter into contracts to
make, and make, pamvnets to instititions of hIigher education for
griallts not exceeding S50 per week to persons enrolled on a full-time
b ,asis in uilldergradultate or graduate degree prograis whto are accepted
for :a11(i serve in fill-time iterniships in law enforcement agencies for
not less than eight weeks thiring any summer recess or for any entire
qua rter or semester on leave from tile degree program."
(2) Part 1) is further amended by inserting after section 406 the
following new sections:
"Sir. 407. The Administ ration is autthorized to develop and sipport
iegional and national training programs, workshops, and seminars to
instruct State and local law enforcement personnel in improved meth-
Is of (rime prevention and re(uction and enforcement of the criminal
Iaw. Such training activities shall be designed to supplement and
Iimiprove, rat her than supplant, the training activities of the State and
til its of general local government, and shall not (ipl icate the act ivi-
ties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation inder section 404 of this
I it le.'
"SEC. 408. (a) The Administration is authorized to establish and
, a t railing program for prosecuting attorneys from State and
local oflices engaged in the prosecution of organized crime. The pro-
ram sliall be designed to develop new or improved approaches, tech-
nliques, systemts. manuals, and devices to strengthen prosecutive
ca pabilities against organized crime.
(b) While participating in the training program or traveling in
connection with participation in the training program. State and
local personnel shall be allowed travel expenses and a per diem
allowance inl the same manner as prescribed under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code, for persons enploved intermittently in
the G'oierniient service.
(c) The cost of training State and local personnel under this sec-
tion shall be provided out of funds appropriated to the Administra-
t ion for the pirpose of such training."
GRANIs FOR CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FACILITIEs
SEC. 6. (a) Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 is amended by inserting i inediately after part D the
follow inr:
"'ART l. E N -iANTs r1R C( IR otE'IoNAL INSTITVTIoNs ANt) FACILITIEs
"SEE. 451. It is the purpose of this part to encourage States and
units of general local government to develop and implement pro-
gramus aid projects for the construction. acquisition. and renovation
of correctional institutions and facilities, and for the improvement of
correctional prograis and practices.
-SEE. 452. A State desiring to receive a grant under this part for
any fiscal near shall, consistent with the basic criteria which the
Administration establishes under section 454 of this title, incorporate
its appliation for sich grant in the comprehensive State plan sub-
uitted to the Administration for that fiscal :ear in accordance with
section 302 of this title.
Enforoement
personnel,
training
programs.
82 Stat. 204.
42 USC 3744.
Proseouting
attorneys,
trainng
programs.
Travel
expenses.
80 Stat. 499;
83 Stat. 190.
82 Stat. 197.
42 USC 3701.
42 USC 3732.
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"SEC. 453. The Administration is aiutiorized to imake a grant under
this part to a State planning agency if the application incorporated
in the comprehensive State plan-
"(1) sets forth a comprehensive statewide program for the
construction, acquisition, or renovation of correctional institu-
tions and facilities in the State and the improvement of correc-
tional programs and practices throughout the State;
"(2) provides satisfactory assurances that the control of the
funds and title to property derived therefrom shall be in a public
agency for t and purposes provided in this part and that
a pl ic agency will administer those funds and that property:
"(3) provides satisfactory assurances that the availability of
funds under this part shall not reduce the amount of funds under
part C of this title which a State would, in the absence of funds
under this part, allocate for purposes of this part;
"(4) provides satisfactory emphasis on the development and
operation of community-based correctional facilities and pro-
grams, including diagnostic services, halfway houses, probation,
and other supervisory release programs for preadjudication and
postad judication referral of dehinquents, youthful offenders, and
first offenders, and community-oriented programs for the siper-
vision of parolees;
"(5) provides for advanced techniques in the design of institu-
tions and facilities;
"(6) provides, where feasible and desirable, for the sharing
of correctional institutions and facilities on a regional basis;
"(7) provides satisfactory assurances that the personnel stand-
ards and programs of the institutions and facilities will reflect
advanced practices;
"(8) provides satisfactory assurances that the State is engaging
in projects and programs to improve the recruiting, organization,
training, and education of personnel employed in correctional
activities, including those of probation, parole, and rehabilita-
tion; and
"(9) complies with the same requirements established for com-
prehensive State plans under paragraphs (1), (3), (4), (5), (7),(8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) of section 303 of this title.
"SEc. 454. The Administration shall, after consultation with the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, by regulation prescribe basic criteria for
applicants and grantees under this part.
"SEC. 455. (a) The funds appropriated each fiscal year to make
grants under this part shall be allocated by the Administration as
follows:
"(1) Fifty per centum of the funds shall be available for
grants to State planning agencies.
"(2) The remaining fifty per centum of the funds may be
made available, as the Administration may determine, to State
planning agencies, units of general local government, or combina-
tions of such units, according to the criteria and on the terms and
conditions the Administration determines consistent with this
part.
Any grant made from funds available under this part may be up to
75 per centumn of the cost of the program or project for which such
grant is made. No funds awarded under this part may be used for
land acquisition.
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-(b) If thle Whinistiration determines, on the basis of informia-
ito it during any fiscal year, that a portion of the funds
granitei to al applicant for that fiscal year will not be re(uired by the
a ppl icalt or will become available by virtie of the appIlication of the
plovisionls of section 50()9 of this title, that portion shall be available
for reallocation imder paragraph (2) of subsection (a) f this
Sect ion)."
(b) Section 601 of such Act is amended by inserting at the end
t hereof t lie following new subsection:
"(]) The term -correctional institution or facility' means any place
for the confinenent or rehabilitation of juvenile offenders or individ-
uals clarged with 0r convicted of criminal offenses.-'
(c) Part E aid part F of title I of such Act are redesignate(d as part
F a nd pa rt (, respect ively.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
SEc. 7. Part F of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (as redesignated by section 6(c) of this Act) is
amended as follows:
(1) Section ,505 is amended by striking "section 5315" and insert-
ing "section 5314" and by striking "(90)' and inserting "(55)".(2) Section 506 is amended by striking "section 5316' and inserting
"section; 5315" and by striking "(126)" and inserting "(90)".
(3) Section 508 is amended by inserting the following before ther.
period at the end of the section:", and to receive and utilize, for the
puirposes of this title. property donated or transferred for the pur-
poses of testing by any other Federal agencies, States, units of gen-
eral local government. public or private agencies or organizations,
institutions of higher education. or imdividi as."
(4) Section 515 is amended by inserting at the end thereof the fol-
lowing new sentence: "Funds a)ppropriated for the purposes of this
section may be expended by grant or contract, as the Administration
may deterimiine to be appropriate."
(5) Section 516(a) is amended by striking out the period and
inserting in lieu thereof the following: ", and may be used to pay the
transportation aid subsistence expenses of persons attending confer-
ences or other assemblages notwithstanding the provisions of the Joint
Resolution entitled 'Joint Resolution to prohibit expenditure of any
moneys for housing, feeding, or transporting conventions or meet-
ings', approved February 2, 1935 (31 U.S.C. sec. 551)."
(6) Section 517 is amended to read as follows:
"SFc. 517. (a) The Administration may procure the services of
experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5.,
United States, Code, at rates of compensation for individuals not to
exceed the daily equivalent of the rate authorized for GS-18 by section
5332 of title 5, United States Code.
"(b) The Administration is authorized to appoint, without regard
to the civil service laws, technical or other advisory committees to
advise the Administration with respect to the administration of this
title as it deems necessary. Members of those committees not otherwise
in the employ of the United States, while engaged in advising the
Administration or attending meetings of the committees, shall be com-
pensated at rates to be fixed by the Administration but not to exceed
the daily equivalent of the rate authorized for GS-18 by section 5332
of title 5 of the United States Code and while away from home or
regular place of business they may be allowed travel expenses, includ-
82 Stat. 206.
42 Usc 3757.
42 Usc 3781.
"Correotional
institution or
raoi lity."
82 Stat. 205.
42 USc 3751,
3781.
su.s
5 Usc 5315.
5 Usc 5316.
42 usc 3756.
42 usc 3763.
42 USC 3764.
49
82
42
Stat. 19.
Stat. 207.
usc 3765.
80 Sta+.
Ante, p.
416.
198-1.
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ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703
80 Stat. 499; of such title 5 for persons in the Government service employed
83 Stat. 190. interinittently."
5 VSC 5703. (7) Section 519 is amended to read as follows:
Reports to "SEc. 519. (a) On or before December 31 of each year, the Admin-
President and istration shall report to the President and to the Congress on activities
Congress- pursuant to the provisions of this title during the preceding fiscal year.
82 Stat. 208. "(b) Not later than May 1, 1971, the Administration shall submit
42 I'SC 3767. to the P'resident and to the Congress recommendations for legislation
to assist in the purposes of this title with respect to promoting the
integrity and accuracy of criminal justice data collection, processing,
and lissemination systems funded in whole or in part by the Federal
Government, and protecting the constitutional rights of all persons
covered or a trected by such systems."
Appropriation. (8) Section 520 is amended to read as follows:
42 15e 208. "SEc. 520. There is authorized to be appropriated $650,000,000 for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, of which $120,000,000 shall be for
Ante, p. 1885, the purposes of part E; $1,150,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1972, and $1,750,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1973. Funds appropriated for any fiscal year may remain available for
obligation until expended. Beginning in the fiscal year ending June 30,
1972. and in each fiscal year thereafter there shall be allocated for the
purposes of part E an amount equal to not less than 20 per centum of
Ante, p. 1882. the amount allocated for the purposes of Part C."
Reeordkeeping. (9), Section 521 is amended by inserting at the end thereof the fol-
42 USC 3769. lowing new subsection:
"(.) The provisions of this section shall apply to all recipients of
assistance under this Act, whether by direct grant or contract from
the Administration or by subgrant or subcontract from primary
grantees or contractors of the Administration."
80 Stat. 460. SEc. 8. (a) Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by striking -(1) Deputy Attorney General," and renumbering "(2)"
through "(54)" respectively "(1)" through "(53)".
80 Stat. 460; (b) Section 5313 of title 5. United States Code, is amended by add-
83 Stat. 864. ing at the end thereof "(20) Deputy Attorney General."
5 USC 5313
and note. DEFINITIONS
82 Stat. 209. SEc. 9. Section 601 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
42 USC 3781. Act of 1968 is amended to read as follows:
"Law (1) Subsection (a) is amended to read as follows: " 'Law enforce-
enloroement." inent' means any activity pertaining to crime prevention. control or
reduction or the enforcement of the criminal law, including, but not
limited to police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to
apprehend criminals. activities of courts having criminal jurisdiction
and related agencies, activities of corrections, probation, or parole
authorities, and programs relating to the prevention, control, or
reduction of juvenile delinquency or narcotic addiction."
(2) Subsection (d) is amended by striking out "or" the second
place it appears and by striking out the period and inserting in lieu
thereof the following: ", or, for the purpose of assistance eligibility,
any agency of the District of Columbia government or the United
States Government performing law enforcement functions in and for
the District of Columbia and funds appropriated by the Congress
for the activities of such agencies may be used to provide the non-
Federal share of the cost of programs or projects funded under this
title; provided. however, that such assistance eligibility of any agency
of the United States Government shall be for the sole purpose of
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faicil itatilg the transfer of cimi jiinal jirisdict ion fromi the United
States District Court for the I)istrict of Coluibia to the Superior
('ourt of the District of Columbia pursuant to the District of ('oliium-
bina Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970."
Smc. 10. Title I of tle Omntibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 is amended by nmediately after part G (as
redesignated by section 6(c) of this Act) the following.
"I'Arr H-CimixmXAL PExAriEs
"Stxc. 651. Whoever embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or
obtains by fraud any funds, assets, or property which are the subject
of a grant or contract or other form of assistance pursuant to this
t itle. whether received directly or indirectly from the Administration,
sliall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
tive years, or both.
"SEC. 652. Whoever knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or
covers up1) by trick, scheme, or device, any material fact in ainy applica-
tion for assistance submitted pursuant to this title or in any records
required to be maintained pursuant to this title shall be subject to
prosecuition under the provisions of section 1001 of title 18, United
States (ode.
-Si(c. 653. Any law enforcement program or project un(lerwritten,
in whole or in part, by aIy grant, 01 contract or other fori of assist-
ance pursuant to this title, whether received directly or indirectly
from the Administration, shall be subject to the provisions of section
371 of title 18, U'nited States Code."
Sc. 11. Section 5108(c) of title 5 of the United States Code is
ammended by insert ing at the end thereof tihe following new paragraph
(10) the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration may
place a total of t wenty positions in GS-16, 17, and 18.
Sc. 12. Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
oif 1968 is amended by insertiing after part H (as designated by sec-
tion 14) of this Act) tihe followimg new part
.urr I---ArronsYi- GEt1:Nm:R.us ANNUAL REiomrr ON FEENRAL LAw
ENFoRcEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTIVITIES
Sc. 670. The Attorney General, in consultation with the appro-
priate officials in the agencies involved, within 90 days of the end of
ea"Ii fiscal year shall submit to the President and to tihe Congress an
Animal Report on Federal Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Assistance Activities setting forth the programs conducted, expendi-
tI res Imade, results achieved, plans developed, and problems discovered
in the operations and coor(lination of the various Federal assistance
programs relating to crime prevention an(l control, including, but not
imilted to, the Juvenile De liquency Prevention and Control Act of
1968, the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act 1968, the Gunl Control
Act, 1968, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, title XI of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 (relating to the regulation of explosives),
anid title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (relating to wiretapping and electronic surveillance).
TITLE II-STRICTER SENTENCES
SEc. 13. Section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
"(c) Whoever-
Ante, p. 473.
82 Stat. 197;
Ante, pp. 1885,
1887.
42 USC 3701.
62 Stat. 749.
62 Stat. 701.
80 Stat. 453.
Supre..
82 Stat. 462.
42 Usc 3801
note.
82 Stat. 1213.
18 USC 921
note.
78 Stat. 552.
18 USC 3006A
note.
Antes p. 952.
82 Stat. 211.
18 USC 2510.
82 Stat. 1224.
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--(1) uses a firearmii to coiniiit any felony for wlicI le Imiav be
p&osecuted iiI a court of I it i itled t ates. or
-(2) caruries a fi rearlm uawfully dur thle commiiii ission of any
feiony for wich he may be prosecIute(d inl a court of the United
States.
Ihall. inl additioll to the pulisliaiint plrovided for the comissiol of
snich feloi, ve seiteiced to a terI of impIiurisonmIllent for not less than
One ear 1o more thanii ten vearus. lii tihe case of Iiis second or subse-
juient conviction uinder this suubsection. such person shall be selntenced
t' a term of imIrisominenit for not less than t w(o nor Imiore thiani twent y-
live ye'ars and. notwithstanding any other provision of law. the court
shAin1 niot suslpenIvd the seuitence in t case of a second or subsequent
conviction of such person or give him a probationiary sentence. nor
shiall tle terI of iiprisonIimienlt imlposed under this suIsect ion run
co 0ncu rrently witi an v term of imlWisonmenlt imnposed for the comn-
miiissionu of such felony."
62 Stat. 844;
82 Stat. 237.
62 Stat. 684.
is USC 1.
TITLE 111-CRIMINAL APPEALS
SEc. 14. (a) Section 3731 of title 18, United States Code, is
alnenV~ded-
(1) by striking out the first eight paragraphs and inserting in
lien thereof the following:
"In a criminal case an appeal by the Uinited States shall lie to a
court of appeals from a decision, jiu(gient, oi or(er of a district court
disimissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts,
except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the
1 nite:1 States Constitution prohibits further prosecuit ion.
"An appeal by the I nited States shall lie to a court of appeals from
a decision or order of a district courts suppressing or excluding evi-
dence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal pro-
eeeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and
before the verdict or filnding on an indictment or information, if the
1United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal
is not taken for p)urIse of delay and that the evidence is a substantial
proof of a fact material in the proceeding.":(2) by striking out the word "or" in the ninth paragraph and
inserting in lieu thereof a comma, and inserting "or order" fol-
lowing the word "judgment" in the same paragraph;
(3) by striking out the last two paragraphs and inserting in
lieu thereof a new paragraph as follows:
"The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectu-
ate its purposes."
(b) The amendments made by this section shall not apply with
respect to any criminal case )egun in any district court before the
eftective date of this section.
TITLE IV-PROTECTION OF MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS
SEc. 15. Part I of title 18 of the United States Code is amended
hy inserting, immediately after chapter 17, a new chapter as follows:
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"Chapter 18--CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION,
KIDNAPING, AND ASSAULT
"351. Cangressionial assassination. kidnaping. and assault ; penalties.
"§ 351. Congressional assassination, kidnaping, and assault;
penalties
(a) Whoever kills any individual who is a Member of Congress
or a Member-of-Congress-elect shall be punished as provided )y sec-
t ions 1111 and 1112 of this title.
(b) Whoever kidnaps any individual designated in subsection (a)
of this section shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any tern
of years or for life, or (2) by deatli or imprisonment for any teri of
years or for life, if death results to such individual.
"(c) Whoever attenipts to kill or kidnap any individual designated
in subsection (a) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life.
"(d) If two or more persons conspire to kill or kidnap any individ-
ual designated in sul)section (a) of this section and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life, or (2) by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for
life, if death results to such individual.
"(e) Whoever assaults any person designated in subsection (a) of
this sect ion shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both: and if personal injury results, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or
both.
"(f) If Federal investigative or prosecutive jurisdiction is asserted
for a violation of this section, such assertion shall suspend the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by a State or local autlhority, under any applicable
State or local law, until Federal action is terminated.
"(g) Violations of this section shall be investigated by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Assistance may be requested from any Fed-
eral. State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air'Force,
any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding."
SEc. 16. Paragraph (c). sul)section (1), section 2516, title 18, United
States Code, is amended by striking the word "or" in the last phrase
of the subsection and inserting at the end thereof between the paren-
thesis and the semicolon "or section 351 (violations with respect to
congressional assassinat ion. kidnaping, and assault)".
SEc. 17. The table of contents to part I of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after the following chapter reference:
"17. coins andi curren(y------------------------------------- 
_----- 331"
a new chapter reference as follows:
"19. Congressional assassination, kidnapping, and assault----------- 351"
TITLE V-PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
SEc. 18. Title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the
following new section after section 1751:
"§1752. Temporary residence of the President
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons-
"(1) willfully and knowingly to enter or remain in
62 Stat. 756.
18 USC 1111,
1112.
82 Stat. 217.
62 Stat. 683;
79 Stat. 580.
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"(i) any building or grounds desigiated by the Secretary
of the Treasury as temporary residences of the President or
as temporary offices of the President and his staff, or
"(ii) any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area
of a building or grounds where the President is or will be
temporarily visiting,
in violation of the regulations governing ingress or egress thereto:
"(2) with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of
Government business or official functions, to engage in disorderly
or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any build-
ing or grounds designated in paragraph (1) when, or so that,
such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of
Government business or official functions;
"(3) willfully and knowingly to obstruct or impede ingress or
egress to or from any building, grounds, or area designated or
enumerated in paragraph (1); or
"(4) willfully and knowingly to engage in any act, of physical
violence against any personi or property in any building, grounds,
or area designated or enumerated in paragraph (1).
"(b) Violation of this section, and attempts or conspiracies to com-
mit. such violations, shall be punishable by.a fine not exceeding $500
or iiprisoniment not exceeding six montihs, or both.
"(c) Violation of this section, and attempts or conspiracies to
coniunit, such violations, shall be prosecuted by the United States
attorney in the Federal district court having jurisdiction of the place
where the offense occurred.
"(d) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized-
"(1) to designate by regulations the buildings and grounds
which constitute the temporary residences of the President and
the temIporary offices of the P3resident and his staff, and
"(2) to prescribe regulations goveriing ingress or egress to
such buildings and grounds and to posted, cordoned off, or other-
wise restricted areas where the President is or will be temporarily
visitmlg.
"(e) None of the laws of the United States oi of the several States
an1d the District of Columbia shall be superseded by this section."
Former SEC. 19. Sectioin 3056, title 16, lnited States Code, is amended by
Presidents and (lesigilat ing the present paragraph as "(a)" and adding a new
fani lies, pa rarapli at the end thereof as follows:
proteotion. "(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or inter-
65 Stat. 122; feres with an agent of the United States *ecret Service engaged in the82 Stat. 1198. performance of the protective functions authorized by this section, by18 USC 3056 tihe Act of June 6, 1960 (82 Stat. 170)), or by section 1752 of title 18,
I Inited States Code, shall be fined not more thian $3(0 or imprisoned
not iore th.an olle year, or both."
TIi V I-WilmETA I' COMM ISSION
SEc. 2o. (a) Title Ill of the ()nmibus Crime Control and SafeSvreets Act of 196S (S2 Stat. 211) is amended by striking subsection
82 Stat. 224. (g) of section 804 and inserting tihe following:
18 USC 2510 "(g)(1) The commissioi o1 any duly authorized subcommittee or
note. member thereof may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this title, hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places,
adiniiiister such oaths, and require by subpeia or otherwise tile attend-
.ace and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondeince, memoraidums, ipers and documents as the.
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Conimission or such subcommtittee or member may deem advisable.
Any member of the Commission may administer oaths or affirmations
to witnesses appearing before the Commission or before such sub-
committee or member. Subpenas may be issued uider the signature
of the Chairman or any dlily desigiated member of the Commission,
ald may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such
member.
-(2) In the case of contumacV or refusal to obey a subpeiina issued
under subsection (1) by any person who resides, is found. or transacts
business within the jurisdiction of any district court of the United
States, the district court, at the request of the Chairman of the Com-
mission, shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requir-
ing such person to appear before the Commission or a subcommittee or
member thereof, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to
give testimoniy touching the matter under inquiry. Any failure of any
such person to obey any such order of the court may be punished by
the court as a contempt thereof.
-(3) The Commission shall be -an agency of the ITnited States'under
snbsection (I), section 0,001, title I, Uinited States Code for the pur-
pose of granting immunity to witnesses.
-(4) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government. incluiding independent agencies, is author-
ized and directed to furnish to the Commission, upon request made by
the Chairman, on a reimbursable basis or otherwise, such statistical
data, reports, and other information as the Commission deems neces-
sary to carry out its functions under this title. The Chairman is further
authorized to call upon the departments, agencies, and other offices of
the several States, to furnish, on a reimbursable basis or otherwise, such
,tatistical data, reports, and other information as the Commission
deems necessary to carry out its functions under this title."
(b) Such title is further amended as follows:
(1) in subsection (I) of section 804, strike "one-year" and insert
"6two-year", and
(2) in subsection (k) of section 804, strike "six-year" and insert
-tifth year".
(c) Section 1212 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 is
hereby repealed.
Approved January 2, 1971.
Ante, p. 926.
82 Stat. 224.
18 USC 2510
note.
Repeal.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C
LEAA PROJECT AWARDS TO STATE AGENCIES IN MASSACHUSETTS
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Department of 1969 69-7A Crime scene search training 8, 000
Public Safety 69-66 Data handling and communications 20, 000
69-14 Riot control communication equipment 12, 525 40, 525
1970 70-006 Crime laboratory 10, 000
70-010 Crime scene search training 15, 000
70-111 State police communications 60, 000
70-011 Crime-scene search training 35, 000
70-102 Internships 12,646
70-097 Management training..state police 15, 000
70-077 Police planning and -esearch 40, 000 187, 646
1971 71-33 Police planning and research 85, 000
71-50 Training and reference materials 20, 000
71-02 Study of laboratoriets 10, 000
71-03 Crime scene search training 75, 000
71-38 State police reorganization 265, 000
71 -49, Management training-state police 25, 000
71-55 State police-selecticn and performance analysis 25, 000 505, 000 W
THREE YEAR TOTAL 733, 171
Department of 1969 69-26 Correction pre-release center 12, 330
Corrections 69-26A Research in vocational rehabilitation 17, 000
69-29 Halfway house study 12,000 41, 330
1970 70-051 Work release 50, 000
70-053 Community based followup of Norfolk fellowship 20, 000
70-101 Specialized skills 15,000
70-064 Evaluation method for rehabilitation program 20, 000
70-062 Family counseling within institutions 15, 000
70-059 Vocational rehabilitation programs 25, 000
70-061 Education programs for institutions 28, 000
70-061 Education programs (Elma Lewis) 52, 934
70-117 Analysis of correctional needs 59,250 292, 184
APPENDIX C (continued)
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Department of
Corrections
cont' d.
Metropolitan
District
Commission
Massachusetts
Superior Court
Parole Board
1971
1969
1970
1971
1969
1970
1971
1969
1970
1971
71-25
71 -20
71-22
71-26
71-23
71-73
69-14
70-096
70-030
71-36
69-44
70-056
71-36
71-41
69-25
70-068
71-29
(Not specified)
Seminars
Vocational rehabilitation
Followup-Norfolk fellowships
Education for institutions
Re -integration
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Riot control communications equipment
In-service training
Disorder control coordination
Management study
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Judicial sentencing conference
Interdisciplinary seminars
Management study
Model bail program
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Specialized parole caseloads
Drug halfway house
Parole halfway house
THREE YEAR TOTAL
115, 755
7, 500
100, 000
45, 000
19, 066
100, 000
16, 800
8, 400
6, 600
50, 000
4, 950
10, 000
75, 000
50, 000
8, 000
60, 000
100, 000
%_n
387, 321
720,835
16, 800
15, 000
50, 000
81,800
4, 950
10,.000
125, 000
139, 950
8, 000
60, 000
100, 000
168, 000
APPENDIX C (continued)
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Attorney General 1969
1970
1971
69-19
69-19
70-072
70-015
70-014
71-50
71-30
71 -05
Organizing crime investigation training
Preliminary design of organizing crime technical
assistance center
Drug training, manual, and technical assistance
Organizing crime investigation capability and
training
Organizing crime technical assistance
Training and reference materials
Drug intelligence information system
Organizing crime unit
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Municipal Police
Science Institute
Mass. Police
Training Council
1969 69-66,
THREE YEAR TOTAL
1969
1971
69-38
71-46
Supervisory training for police
Police recruit and in-service training
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Office of
Commissioner
of Probation
1969
1970
1971
69-97B Probation management institute
70-048
70-117
71-21
Assessment and accreditation.
Correctional treatment
Assessment and accreditation
Parole officers
THREE YEAR TOTAL
14, 850
9, 900
4, 950
50, 000
55, 000
50, 000
48, 500
75, 000
58, 792
15, 000 %_
15, 430
200, 000
155, 000
182, 292
332, 142
15, 000
15, 000
15, 430
200, 000
215, 430
5, 000
78, 000
25, 000
108, 000
5, 000
35, 000
-43, 000
25, 000
APPENDIX C (continued)
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Massachusetts
Defenders
Chief Justice-
Supreme Court
Department of
Mental Health
1969
1970
1971
1971
1970
69-45/67
70-058
70 -004
71-42
71-43
70-066
70 -070
Roxbury/Dorchester office
Roxbury/Dorchester office
Roxbury/Dorchester office
Roxbury/Dorchester office
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Office of administration
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Technical assistance for drug treatment
Data collection and analysis
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Division of
Youth Services
1970
1971
70-036
70-034
70-032
70-060
71-16
71-17
71-18
71-32
71-39
71-66
Parole volunteer programs
Technical assistance
Planning capability
STEP innovative educational program at
juvenile institution
Planning and development: community services
Parole volunteer program
Innovative education at DYS institutions
DYS planning capability
DYS administration and management services
Reorganization
THREE YEAR TOTAL
9, 000
50, 000
20, 000
183, 950
65, 000
12, 000
30, 000
9, 000
70, 000
183, 950
262, 950
65, 000
65, 000
42, 000
42, 000
'.0
0~
25, 000
25, 000
62, 550
60, 000
250, 000
25, 000
60, 000
50, 000
50, 000
200,000
172, 550
635,000
807,550
, %I . I -- -,- "W1 -AMW%, - M-I--q .141M Wo 
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APPENDIX C (continued)
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
United 1970
Community
Services
(Joint Correctional
Planning) 1971
Chief Justice
District Courts
Regional Board
of Community
Colleges
Massachusetts
Association of
Chiefs of Police
Lynnfield
Woburn
Division of
Civil Service
70-055
70-092
70-078
71 -34
70-101
71-44
71-20
1970
1971
1970
Probation incentive design
Joint probation parole training
Joint correctional planning and action capability
Joint correctional planning
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Specialized skills
Office of administration
Judicial Seminars
THREE YEAR TOTAL
70-105 , Model tommunity colleges curriculum
THREE YEAR TOTAL
1970
1970
1971
70-075
70-109
71 -54
Police chiefs conferences
Municipal police radio
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Civil service improvements
THREE YEAR TOTAL
10,
10,
55,
000
000
000
200, 000
13, 600
40, 000
7, 500
20, 000
75, 000
200, 000
275, 000
13, 600
47, 500
61, 100
20, 000
20, 000
%-n
10, 000
40, 500
46, 000
50, 500
50, 500
46, 000
46, 000
APPENDIX C (continued)
AGENCY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Govenor's Committee:
New England 1971
Institute of Law
Enforcement
Management
Maine
Harvard
Lowell Tech.
Administered
Projects
1970
1970
1971
1970
1970
1971
71-48
70-089
70-047
71-35
70 -009
70 -120,
70-119
70-118
70-081
71-45
71-35
71-04
71-56
71-62
71-63
71-36
Police command training institute
Police command training institute
Community residential treatment centers for
juveniles
Community residential treatment centers for
juveniles
Forensic Science Improvement: Neutron
activation analysis
Criminal law revision
Juvenile law revision
Information and communication- technical
assistance capability
Program evaluation component
Mass media public education
Program evaluation component
New England organized crime
Emergency communications
Frequency management
Juvenile law revision
Lower court study
42, 000
20, 000
11,500
89, 235
75, 000
37, 000
10, 000
45, 000
25, 000
50,
150,
8,
25,
100,
10,
25,
42, 000
20, 000
100, 735
75, 000
O,
117, 000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
000
000
520
000
000
000
000 368, 520
723, 255
APPENDIX C (continued)
LEAA PROJECT AWARDS TO COUNTIES IN MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Riot control equipment
Data handling and communications
Police data handling,
Regional and local disorder control units
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Specialized probation caseloads
Specialized probation caseload
Management study for D. A.
THREE YEAR TOTAL
------ ------ ------ ------
Data handling, communications equipment, etc.
Specialized training
District court prosecutors
THREE YEAR TOTAL
2, 765
10, 000
18, 000
11,677
8,000
15, 000
11,000
15, 000
23, 160
11, 000
12, 765
18, 000
11,677
42, 442
8,000
15, 000
11,000
34, 000
%U,
15, 000
34, 160
49, 160
_j
Barnstable 1969
1970
1971
.69-15
69-15
70-115
71-09
Berkshire
Bristol 1969
1970
1971
Dukes
Essex
Franklin
69-24
70-067
71-36
69-66
71-47
71-53
1 969
1971
APPENDIX C (continued)
COUNTY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Intensive juvenile probation
Model juvenile probation
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Resource and referral agent - county
District court prosecutors
18, 000
81, 569
35, 000
11,000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Youth resources bureau (YRB)
District court prosecutors
Student prosecutor programs
YRB continuation
Probation volunteer
District court prosecutors
Student prosecutors
Mental health to delinquents
Model juvenile probation
District court improvement
Specialized skills
Specialized training
Specialized skills
District court prosecutors
18, 000
81, 569
99, 569
46, 000
46, 000
714
500
000 39,214
134, 856
231, 351
405, 421
22,
11,
5,
52, 256
20,000
57, 600
5, 000
68, 747
54,419
15, 110
40, 000
26, 675
11,400
15,000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Hampden
Hampshire
1969
1971
1971
69-33
71-19
71-24
71-53
Middlesex 1969
1970
1971
69-5
69-21
69-22
70 -038
70-050
70-103
70-103
71-15
71-19
71-20
71-44
71 -47
71-52
71-53
COUNTY
Nantucket
Norfolk
YEAR PROJECT #
1969 69-22
1970 70-063
70-103
1971 71-25
71-36
APPENDIX C (continued)
DESCRIPTION
------ ------ ------ ------
Student prosecutor program
County referral agents and work release
Student prosecutors
Work release
Management study
THREE YEAR TOTAL -
D. A. office management
Specialized training
Court management information systems
Management study criminal justice agency
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Student prosecutor program
D. A. office management study
Witness security
County resource and referral agents
District court prosecutors
Student prosecutors
Specialized training
Training and reference manuals (D.A.)
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Plymouth
DOLLARS
5, 000
29, 980
5, 000
34, 245
10, 000
TOTAL
5, 000
34, 980
44, 245
84, 225
1969
1970
1971
Suffolk
69-63
70-101
70-114
71-36
69-22
69-63
70-018
.70-063
70-103
70-103
71-47
71-50
1969
1970
1971.
8, 000
31, 037
37, 500
30, 612
5, 000
16, 000
25, 000
30, 000
34, 575
5, 000
10, 945
28, 794
8, 000
01%
0
68, 537 I
30, 612
107, 149
21, 000
94, 575
39, 739
155, 314
COUNTY
Worcester
YEAR
1970
1971
PROJECT
70-037
70-063
70-103
71-19
APPENDIX C (continued)
DESCRIPTION
Intensive juvenile probation
Referral agents and work release
District court prosecutors
Model juvenile probation
THREE YEAR TOTAL
DOLLARS
21, 984
30, 000
14, 500
90, 501
TOTAL
66, 484
90, 501
156, 985
m~
C0
i'
APPENDIX C (continued)
LEAA PROJECT AWARDS TO CITIES OVER 100, 000 POPULATION IN MASSACHUSETTS
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Cambridge
(100, 361)
1969
1970
1971
New Bedford
(101, 777)
1969
1970
1971
69-4
69-5
69-5A
70-028
70-065
70-115
70-020
70-038
71-102
71-10
71-40
71-14
71-13
69-1
69-5
69-13
70-076
70-102
70 -020
70-038
71-11
71-10
71-06
71-28
71-13
71 -36
71-33
Police community relations
YRB
YRB Evaluation
Model conflict management training
Community based drug treatment
Police dispatch analysis
Major city high crime
YRB
Technical assistance.
YRB
Innovative opcrations models
Innovative recreation education
Vocational projects -juveniles
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Civil disorder prevention and training
Youth Resources Bureau (YRB)
Police dispatching analysis
Police planning and research
Internships
Major city high crime
YRB
Community residential centers-juveniles
YRB
Major city high crime security
Community drug treatment
Vocational projects for deliquents, juveniles
Management study
Police planning
12, 715
23, 970
4, 714
24, 250
67, 100
37, 650
20, 125
130, 987
15,
150,
26,
36,
28,
686
000
250
638
125
15, 000
12, 465
12, 000
10, 000
11,826
34, 460
30,945
100, 000
100, 106
48, 865
74, 717
78, 000
35, 000
29, 430
THREE YEAR TOTAL
41, 399
280,112
256, 699 "'582 )
578, 210
39, 46-5
87,231
466, 118
592,814
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Springfield 1969 69-15 Riot Control 8, 500
(163, 905) 69-66 Data handling and communications 15, 000 23, 500
1970 70-030 Disorder control training 27, 852
70-039 YRB 20,000-
70-047 Community residential treatment center for juveniles 45, 441
70-044 Innovative recreational educational enrichment 41, 820 135, 113
program
1971 71-33 Police planning and research unit 20, 000
71-11 Community residential treatment - juveniles 93, 238
71 -14 Innovative recreational educational enrichment 66, 000 179, 238
program
THREE YEAR TOTAL 337,851 m
0
Worcester 1969 69-15 Riot control equipment 10,080 10,080
(176, 572)
1970 70-030 Disorder control training and coordination 29, 205
70-039 YRB 20, 000
70-043 Employment for delinquent youth 59, 986
70-050 Probation volunteer programs 23, 402
70-065 Community based drug treatment 55, 000
70-074 Community based alcohol treatment 59, 000
70-076 Police planning and research 18, 367
70-086 Management studies - criminal justice 15, 000
70-020 Major city high crime 34,830 314,790
1971 71-47 Specialized training 15,000
71-06 Major city high crime security 53, 000
71-31 Community alcohol detoxification -135, 822
71-10 YRB 78,000 281,822
THREE YEAR TOTAL 606,692
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Boston 1969 69-8 Crime laboratory improvement 5, 000
(641,071) 69-15 Riot control equipment 5,000
69-16 Riot control training 21,830
69-23 Administration of cirminal justice under emergency 5, 000
circumstances
69-33 Intensive juvenile probation 45, 000
69-34 Local law enforcement recruitment 18, 000
69-53 Police precinct crime analysis 24, 820
69-66 Data handling and communications 30, 300 154, 950
1970 70-019 BHA tenant security 200, 000
70-023 Violent crime 25, 000
70-024 Burglary and auto theft 32,230
70-037 Juvenile probation 44,294
70-042 Prevention 50,000
70-045 Psychiatric services 50, 000
70-046 Therapy 25,000
70-047 Residential juvenile centers 45,842
70-049 Model probation 49, 320
70-050 Probation volunteer 30, 000
70-052 Released offenders 100,000
70-054 Community based treatment 100, 000
70-057 Referral handbooks 9,927
70-061 Education for institutions 10, 135
70-073 Alcohol detoxification 150, 000
70-096 In-service training 91, 400
70-099 Community service officers 24, 817
70-101 Specialized skills 48, 000
70-107 Information and communications 350, 000 1,435, 965
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Boston cont'd.
(641, 071)
1971 71-13
71-15
71-28
71-06
71-08
71-60
71-27
71-11
71-12
71--31
Vocational projects - youthful offenders
Mental health services - delinquents
Community drug treatment
Major city high crime security
Violent crime program
Police information and communications system
Community based treatment and rehabilitation
Residential centers for juveniles
Crime high area delinquency prevention
Alcohol detoxification
THREE YEAR TOTAL
32,
71,
113,
430,
140,
500,
200,
50,
65,
340,
500
250
183
000
000
000
000
000
000
921 1, 942, 854
3,533,769
CY'
C)
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LEAA PROJECT AWARDS TO CITIES BETWEEN 50, 000 AND 100, 000 IN MASSACHUSETTS
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
District court prosecutor
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Alcohol detoxification
Probation volunteer program
Police planning and research units
Family crisis unit
Police recruit and in-service traiiing
12, 000
12, 000
50, 000
20, 000
13, 800
25, 000
100, 000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Riot control equipment
Security project
Police planning and research
Police dispatching and patrol
Police data handling
Development investigative strategies
Police planning and research
Assessment and accreditation probation officers
Optimum investigative strategies
Regional and local disorder control
1, 359
23,900
10, 000
22, 000
22, 899
50, 000
20, 000
23, 900
135, 000
20,000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
208, 800
208,800
1, 359
os
0
128, 799
199, 300
328, 099
Disorder control coordination
Police planning and research
In-service training
Police data handling
Police dispatching and patrol
Management study
and training
Fall River
(96, 898)
Lowell
(94, 239)
Newton
(91, 263)
1971
1970
1969
1970
1971
71-53
70 -074
70-050
70-076
70-084
70-091
69-15
70-021
70-076
70-116
70-115
70-001
71-33
71-21
71-01
71-09
Lynn
(90, 294)
1970 70-030
70-076
70-096
70-115
70-116
70-086
25, 200
16, 200
22, 300
78,851
18, 000
15, 000 175, 551
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Lynn cont'd.
(90, 294)
Brockton
(89, 040)
1971
1969
1970
1971
71-50
71-53
71-11
69-5
70 -038
-70-030
70-076
70-096
70-115
71-10
Training and reference manual
District court prosecutor
Community residential centers - juveniles
THREE YEAR TOTAL
YRB
YRB
Disorder control and coordination.
Police planning and research
In-service training
Police data handling
YRB
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Somerville
(88, 779)
Quincy
(87, 966)
1970
1971
1969
70-040
70 -044
71-14
71-33
71-09
71-12
69-35
69-15
69-62
69-66
YRB
Innovative recreational education program
Innovative recreational enrichment
Police planning and research
Regional and local disorder control
High crime area delinquency prevention
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Police cadets
Riot control equipment
Management survey
Data handling and communications
6, 300
13, 891
50, 000
25,850
70, 191
245, 742
25,850
42,
24,
9,
10,
18,
025
500
000
000
000
64, 059
103, 525
64, 059
193, 434
63, 520
23, 000
40, 520
M
ao
50,
15,
16,
35,
000
000
250
000 115, 250
178, 770'
8,
1,
14,
15,
000
800
615
000 39, 415
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Quincy cont'd
(87, 966)
1970
1971
Chicopee
(66, 676)
Lawrence
(66, 915)
Medford
(64, 397)
1969
1970
1969
1970
1969
1970
70-030
70-076
70-096
70-115
70-116
71-33
69-15
70-030
69-48
70-024
70-043
70-050
70-065
70-096
70-102
70-102
69-54
70-030
70-093
701-115
Disorder control and training
Police research and planning
In-service training
Police data handling
Police dispatching and patrol
Police planning
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Riot control equipment
Disorder control and training
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Police juvenile training officer
Auto theft and burglary
Employment of delinquent youth
Probation volunteer
Community based drug treatment
In-service training
Internships
Internships
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Police planning and research
Disorder control coordination and training
Training material preparation
Police data handling
- 33,513
16, 200
22, 300
78, 851
18, 000
25, 000
1,358
28, 532
6, 000
168, 864
25, 000
233,279
1, 358
28, 532
29,890
M
6, 000
28,
49,
20,
75,
12,
12,
9,
520
762
000
000
240
000
000 206, 522
212, 522
9, 000
64, 500
9, 000
19, 500
25, 000
20, 000
APPENDIX C (continued)
CITY YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Medford cont'd.
(64, 397)
Framingham
(64, 048)
1971
1969
1970
1971
71-33
69-15
70-086
71-33
71-09
29, 268Police planning
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Riot control equipment
Management study
1, 358
10, 542
15, 000
22, 480
Police planning and research
Disorder control unit
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Brookline
(58, 689)
1971 71-33
71-36
71-07
71-47
71-40
71-58
Police planning and research
Management study
Auto theft and burglary
Specialized training
Innovative operations models
Police information system
15,
20,
54,
30,
15,
20,
29, 268
101, 768
1, 358
10, 542
37, 480
49, 381
370
000
900
000
000
040
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Malden
(56,127)
Holyoke
(50, 112)
1971
1969
1970
71-33
69-15
70-083
70-086
20, 000Police planning and research unit
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Riot control equipment
Team policing
Management studies
1, 359
40, 000
10, 000
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Cities with populations between 50, 000 and 100, 000 which have received no money are:
Waltham (61, 108) Weymouth (55, 328)
Pittsfield (56, 673) Arlington (52, 710)
155, 310
155, 310
20, 000
20, 000
1, 359
50, 000
51, 359
C)
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LEAA PROJECT AWARD TO TOWNS BETWEEN 20, 000 AND 50, 000 IN MASSACHUSETTS
TOWN YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Peabody 1970 70-086 Management study 7,260
(48, 080) 70-115 Police data handling 7,020 14,280
THREE YEAR TOTAL 14,280
Fitchburg 1970 70-103 District court prosecutors 12, 000 12, 000
(43, 243)
1971 71-33 Police planning and research 27, 700
71-28 Community drug treatment 65, 000 92, 700
THREE YEAR TOTAL 104, 000
Revere 1970 70-086 Management study 15,000 15,000
(43, 159)
1971 71-07 Auto theft and burglary 29,900 29,900 C7
THREE YEAR TOTAL 44, 900
Everett 1970 70-115 Police data handling 15,600 15,600
(43,243)
THREE YEAR TOTAL 15, 600
Haverhill 1971 71-47 Specialized training 27, 360 27, 360
(42, 120)
THREE YEAR TOTAL 27, 360
Salem 1970 70-086 Management study -10, 000 10,000
(40, 556)
THREE YEAR TOIAL 10, 000
APPENDIX C (continued)
TOWN YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Watertown
(39, 307)
Beverley
(38, 348)
Woburn
(37,406)
Attleborro
(32, 907)
Chelsea
(30, 625)
Marlborough
(27, 936)
Milton
(27, 190)
1970
1970
1970
1969
1970
1969
1970
1970
70 -086
70-086
0
70-030
6 9-66
70-030
70-115
69-62
70-086
70 -086
Management study
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Management study
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Disorder control and training
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Data handling and communications
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Disorder control and training
Police data handling
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Police department management surveys
Management studies
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Management study
THREE YEAR TOTAL
12, 000
12, 500
14, 397
6, 200
19, 000
12, 000
5, 745
7, 097
15, 000
12, 000
12, 000
12, 500
12, 500
14, 397
14, 397
6, 200
6, 200
31, 000
31, 000
5, 745
7, 097
12,842
15, 000
15, 000
K)i
APPENDIX C (continued)
TOWN YEAR PROJECT # DESCRIPTION DOLLARS TOTAL
Winchester
(22, 269)
1970 70 -024 Auto theft and burglary
THREE YEAR TOTAL
Cities with populations between 25, 000 and 50, 000 which have received no money are:
Belmont (27, 750) -
Braintree (35, 373)
Danvers (26,133)
Dedham (27, 233)
Gloucester (27, 690)
Leominster (32, 709)
Lexington (31, 628)
Melrose (32, 881)
Methuen (34, 986)
Natick (31, 055)
Needham (29, 737)
Northampton (29, 726)
Norwood (30, 828)
Taunton (43, 766)
Wakefield (25, 268)
Wellesley (27, 951)
Westfield (31, 102)
W. Springfield (28, 276)
28,250 28, 250
28, 250
ON
P
WA
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APPENDIX D
LEAA Discretionary Grant Awards in Massachusetts (page
Title
/70
Amount
$150,390
Location
Boston
21,295 Cambridge
124,300
75,000
Boston
Boston
DF #
073
105
135
145
172
265
421
438
487
494
507
510
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control Program
Police Policy Manual
Development of Inter Agency Cooperation
in Corrections
Massachusetts Superior Court Management
and Operations Study
Community Youth Residence
Day/Night Care and Drug Crisis Center
Vertical Policing Services: Multi
Story Housing
Regional Staff Training Center and
Treatment Unit for Youth (DYS)
Conflict/Disorder Assessment Group
Middlesex County Sheriff's Office Program
for Rehabilitation and Work Release
Emergency Communications System Project
Mutual Aid Compact and Training Program
Development
22,250 Cambridge
45,182 New Bedford
185,000 Springfield
183,120 Boston
59,981 Boston
180.661 Billerica
99,599 Boston
25,000 Lowell
/71
CaN
i-
one of four pages)
LEAA Discretionary Grant Awards in Massachusetts (page two of four
Title
Vertical Policing Services: Multi Story
Housing
Forensic Science Improvement Program
Comprehensive Inter Correctional Drug
Addict Treatment Program
Police Legal Advisor
Breaking/Entering and Auto Theft (BEAT)
Program
Mutual Aid Compact and Program Develop-
ment: Western Massachusetts
Police in Service Training Curriculum
Design
Court Management Study (3rd District Court,
Middlesex)
Mass State Police Legal Advisor
553
560
565
566
578
586
592
594
654
684
Amount
$173,540
Location
Boston
120,000 Boston
154,318 Boston
15,000 Quincy
90,477 Lowell
22,874 Holyoke
29,500 Boston
25,000 Cambridge
15,000
25,000
Boston
Boston
149,000 Billerica
150,000 Salem
DF #
517
529
Legal Advisor and Psychiatric Assistance
Middlesex County Sheriff's Office Program
for Counseling and Legal Services
VISIT (Volunteers in Service Intern
Training Project)
tH_
pages)
LEAA Discretionary Grant Awards in Massachusetts (page three of four pages)
Amount Location
Development of Inter Agency Cooperation
in Corrections
Norfolk County Comprehensive Drug
Program
Police Legal Advisor
Educational Negotiations Project
Team Police Development
Probation Residential Center
$ 75,615 Boston
153,986 Dedham
15,000 Andover
62,910 Boston
200,000 Holyoke
164,23 Framingham
707
719
903
907
962
963
997
998
999
1065
1099
1103
Police Legal Advisor
Police Legal Advisor
Police Legal Advisor
Brookline
15,000 Lynn
15,000
Conflict Management and Crisis Intervention
Organization for Police
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and
Control Programs
Police and Community Service Cadets
New Bedford
98.968 Boston
100,000 Fall River
100,000 Springfield
DF # Title
15,000
a-'
I-i
LEAA Discretionary Grant Awards in Massachusetts (page four of four
Amount Location
72-DF-01-0008
72-ED-01-0002
72-ED-01-0003
72-ED-01-0004
72-DF-01-0011
Community Assistance Group (Conflict/
Disorder)
Program Alternatives to Institutionali-
zation - Stephen L. French Youth
Forestry Camp, AKA Homeward Bound
Community Based Group Home Project
Norfolk Reintegration Center
Quincy Police Legal Advisor
$ 60,000
91,760
235,000
249,750
11,250 Quincy
H
co
The Governor's Committee also received two discretionary grants for its own use:
Pilot Organized Crime Info. System
New England Organized Crime Intelli-
gence System
$174,176
598,430
DF # Title
Boston
Boston
Boston
Norfolk
021
044
pages)
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